Q. Were you a true and faithful advocate of National Socialism at that time?
A. No, I was a National Socialist with my reason, if such a thing is possible, and I think it was possible at that time, but I was never a National Socialist with my heart.
Q. And you told us about some of the books you wrote during that period? Would you say that those books were filled with National Socialist ideology or not?
A. I have already said that on direct examination that the books and articles which I wrote at the time and which I had to write, National Socialist ideology was contained. After all a Chief of the press in the Reich Defense War Ministry in a National Socialist state could not be expected to make Communist propaganda or he could not be expected to talk about militant pacifism. That was in the nature of my work, and it was also within the scope of the tendency which, at the time, I considered correct.
Q. You weren't enthusiastic about writing those books?
A. I don't know whether it's material, but if I'm asked it I shall have to answer. I think you are thinking of the book, "The Officers of the Armed Forces." This book has a special history which I would have to report a little more in detail if it is considered material. But briefly I can summarize the following facts. The book bears my name, and there are many sentences contained in the book which not I but Reichenau wrote. Even Keitel included a few of his own sentences because for three weeks I worked under Keitel after I had worked under Reichenau. Blomberg too included a few sentences, and I gave my name for reasons which I would have to enlarge upon if that is considered material. But there is something I would like to say. Whoever reads this book from the beginning to its end, and not in excerpts, will only come to the conclusion in my opinion that many National Socialist ideas are contained in this book, but whoever acts in accordance with this book will never by a National Socialist, as he is described today in common language.
He is simply a soldier.
Q. You mean that you were in effect a wold in sheep's clothing, General Foertsch? You were simply undermining the Nazis while you writing National Socialist tracts?
A. I was a sheep when I consented to write the book at the time. That's certain. I am sure that I was not a sheep in wolf's clothing because I, as a major, was too small to do anything like that.
Q. Were you in favor of the political indoctrination of soldiers in the German Army?
A. No, I did not do that deliberately, although I must say I always regarded it in the light of the time--1933 to 1935. I must say that there were many questions concerned in National Socialist ideology which could certainly be affirmed to by a soldier. The only difficult thing was that the National Socialist did not act according to their own principles. They did not live by them.
Q. General Foertsch, you know, of course, that Hitler wanted each German to be a militant bearer of a given political ideology, namely, National Socialism. Were you in disagreement with Hitler?
A. Hitler wanted that, that is correct. I did not agree with him 100%. That was quite impossible. One has to differentiate between those things that were considered good in the light of the times then, and between those things which were considered exaggerated and fantastic, and above all, one must make a distinction between what was actually done in accordance. If I, for instance, say that the common good is more important than private good, that is an ideal which I would subscribe to even today. But if I see that a person does not act by this ideal but acts contrary to it, then it is not important to me whether he is a National Socialist or anything else. I just consider that he acts badly. And you cannot bring all of that into a common denominator.
Q. Would you look not, General Foertsch, at that copy of your book, "Our German Wehrmacht," particularly at Page 9? I believe you wrote this book in 1934, is that correct?
A. For at least ten years I haven't handled it. I must have a look at it first. Yes, I must have written it about 1933 or 1934. I don't know for sure.
Q. Would you look at the passage beginning on Page 9 which reads "It will not be politically indifferent or unreliable men who will be permitted to have to leave the barracks upon completion of their period of service, but on the contrary only men who along with military ability take with them the conviction the Wehrmacht and National Socialist reasons on the same basis."
A. Yes, I subscribe to that even today because I know exactly what I meant when I said it. What I meant is that according to my feeling, National Socialism had originated in its final version from the war expentures 1914-18, and its ethic basis exceeded by far the boundaries of nations. The decisive factor is that Wehrmacht and National Socialism rest on the same basis but in the meantime National Socialism by far deviated from that basis and therefore from my most honest conviction I would no longer write this sentence today. After all, it was written in 1934.
Q. Now will you look at the passage on page 8 which reads: "It is self-understood that there can no longer be a non-party Wehrmacht as there was in the Reich defensive of Weimar interregnum. Furthermore, the fact that a unpolitical attitude can no longer be committed is a commandment of the future. The Wehrmacht of the Third Reich along with the party is the pillar supporting it."
A. I beg your pardon, I haven't been able to find the passage. Is it on page 8?
Q. "The Wehrmacht of the Third Reich, along with the party, is the pillar supporting the National Socialist State. Therefore, the National Socialist ideas will be fostered in it, that is, the Wehrmacht, to be sure by means of other forms which conform to the particular nature of the organizations but with the same aim. The soldier's oath to the Fuehrer as the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht is simultaneously an obligation to the Fuehrer of the National-Socialist movement. The soldier's ideas correspond to national socialist thinking and national socialist philosophy is not to be divorced from the thinking of the soldier....Hence in the Wehrmacht of national socialist Germany a political education in the national-socialist sense is indispensable."
A. It is correct that I wrote this at the time and it does not contradict that idea which I expressed as the fundamental basis of my activity at the time. The decisive factor is here too that one realizes when it was written and how things went on afterwards, because the same aim existed undoubtedly at the time and concerning it, it is my opinion that the oath is binding for both sides and I expect that if I make an oath which he expects me to adhere to that he expects me to adhere to that he does the same thing and the other side did not do that.
When I realized that the nazi party and movement went crooked ways, that is the basis of my judgment changed decisively, then my judgment changed too and I believe that is what must be understood and I think it can always be understood. In future too, I shall always change my judgment when its basic reasons have changed decisively. May I conclude by saying that I am not foolish enough to stubbornly cling to a point of view which I have once written down in 1934.
Q. Just one more passage, General Foertsch, on page 2 of that book. "the shackles of Versailles have been removed."
A. Yes, I found the passage, thank you.
Q. "The period of one--sided disarmament has reached its end. The military sovereignty of the German Reich has been reinstated. This Germany owes to its Fuehrer and the National-socialist movement which has been created by him. Now all young Germans will bear arms again and in every house, in every family, there will be the closest personal relationship with the Wehrmacht -- with the resurrected German peoples' army."
A. That is a fact which exists and cannot be denied, and it cannot be blamed on any soldier that he was pleased when the military sovereignty was reinstated; that it was to be misused and abused ten years later could not be suspected by anybody not inside Germany and not abroad, not as early as 1934.
Q. Now will you look at just one short passage more from another book of yours? "The Officer of the New Wehrmacht" which I believe you wrote in 1936.
A. 1935.
Q. Will you look at the passage on pages 32 and 33 which reads -
this is the passage which concerns itself with the joy of responsibility and self-awareness?
A. You mean it is on page 32? All right, I have got it.
Q. "Soldierly leadership rests on the joy of responsibility. It is one of the finest but also one of the most difficult virtues of a leader. The greatest enemy of true leadership is anonymity. This appears in various forms: at times in the nameless authority of an office, i.e., in bureaucracy, at times in the conscious crawling behind a higher order, law or regulation, at times in the attempt to deny 'responsibility' in the event of failure in a given act."
Did you write that?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Do you endorse that attitude today?
A. Yes, I believe that is corrects
Q. General Foertsch, what was the political philosopy and tenets that you wished each German soldier to be indoctrinated with?
A. I am afraid I didn't understand it. Could you please repeat it?
Q. As I read these passages, I get the impression that you wished each German soldier to be taught to think as a National Socialist and I am wondering which particular tenets of National Socialism you wished to be emphasized in the education and in the actions of each German soldier?
A. May I again repeat in my own words the question so I can see whether I understood it correctly? What you want to know is what features of National-Socialist thinking I wanted to plant into the thinking of the soldier? Is that what you wanted to know? Did I understand it correctly?
Q. You understood correctly.
A. May I think about it for a moment? The answer is more difficult than the question. I believe I can answer it briefly -- all those thoughts of National Socialism which coincided with the thinking of any decent German soldier.
Q. Do you know what Hitler's and the National Socialists' attitude towards the Jews was, General Foertsch? Did you wish each German soldier to think likewise?
A. No, I have already said that I - regarding the Jewish question, such as it was tackled by National Socialism, I regarded it as foolish, I think that is the expression I used, and I think another expression I used was incorrect -- unjust. I don't know, it was a week ago.
Q. But you didn't say in this book that you wished each German soldier to know about National Socialism except for the attitude of the National Socialist towards the Jews?
A. No, and I might say generally that this is where I meant I was a fool to give my name to this book. It says here the following. I read it a short time ago, that is why I know it. There are many things contained here, which I did not actually want to include, because it actually originated from other people's pen but there are many things contained in there which were attacked by the party examination office which existed at the time, the censorship of the party. I could enumerate these points if you want me to, and this book has the same feature as a lot of other documents. One can only understand it if one reads it completely. Every excerpt gives a one-sided picture. If this book is to be used as evidence for me or against me, then I would ask you to read the whole book so that one can gain a picture of what would have happened if the principles laid down here would have really been -- what would have been the result if the principles laid down in here had been adhered to. Not a National Socialist would have emerged but a soldier.
Q. You believe that if one reads between your lines, you would find out that you were subtly trying to undermine National Socialism rather than advocating it?
A. No. That is not what one would establish and that would not have been the right way either. I did not want to take a part of undermining but I wanted to say it in a way as the following -- not to be brake of the car but to be the guiding factor.
I wanted to be inside National Socialism and I wanted to guide it. What I said was to swim in this broad stream of the movement of that time with the aim to get to the head of that not to stand by the banks of the river and to spit in it. But I would never put that down publicly. I would never tell that to other people against whom I am supposed to apply this method. That would be the first prerequisite for a failure. What I honestly wanted was that we should go along with the movement, that we should take over leadership and then such excesses, such as we experienced them, probably would not have happened. Then, European history would have run completely differently.
Q. General Foertsch, you knew what Hitler's and Rosenberg's ideas were regarding the Slavic race and the so-called mentality of the Balkan people?
A. No, I didn't know that.
Q. You didn't know that in "Mein Kampf" and in Rosenberg's book "Myth of the German People", I believe it is called, there is talk about the superiority of the German people -
A. I only know the title, I don't know the book. I didn't read more than the first ten pages. It is called "The Myth of the 20th Century" -- that Rosenberg book. I did read "Mein Kampf."
Q.- You didn't know at that time that Hitler and Rosenberg and the other Nazi were preaching the superiority of the German people and the inferiority and beastiallity of the Balkan and Slavic people?
A.- Hitler never put it that way. He was much too clever to do it. He might have thought that way, I don't know that, I don't know him or what he actually thought.
Q.- Wasn't it a part of National Socialistic ideology to think of the Balkan and Slavic people as somewhat different from the western peoples, inferior more animalistic, less cultured; wasn't that all part of the National Socialistic teachings and wasn't that exactly what you were asking that every German soldier be taught?
A.- No, I don't know. I would have to have proof for it. I have never known the opinion that the Slavic nations are an inferior race. I have always maintained the opinion that in contrast to the completely senseless race theory of National Socialism that a healthy mixture between German and Slavic blood would have the best results that one could possibly imagine, because in my opinion people like Hindenburg and Seeckt if one just looks at their faces are a mixture between German and Slaw. Everything that is valuable to the eastern German man and I myself originate from that country, therefore I am a little shy in that respect. All that is valuable in those people can be traced back to the fact that there is no oneside separation between them and the Slavic blood. Now in the southeastern area I never heard anything of that. I only know that before the war, for years before the war, we tried to gain their favor even if we were not very clever in this endeavor. I just now remember that officers were invited to participate in special trips through the southeastern area, through Yugo Slavia. These trips had certain politi cal aims, they were intended to recruit and make the connections more binding. The southeast was for Germany a market in every respect, a better market could not have been found. It would have been senseless to destroy it.
Q.- The language which Keitel used in his order of 16 September 1941 regarding the mentality of the Eastern peoples and the Slavic peoples came as quite a surprise to you then?
A.- I would have to study the text from that point of view because I have not heard it from that point of view before. I remember one sentence contained therein and maybe that is what you mean. It says that, "In those countries frequently human life counts for naught." That however is an actual fact.
Q.- General Foertsch, you don't believe that the political indoctrination of the German soldier, which you advocated and encouraged was responsible for the acts of the German soldiers in the southeast from 1941 to 1944?
A.- No, one cannot put it that way.
Q.- I would like now, General Foertsch, to pass to your responsibility as a chief of staff and in that regard, I would like to remind you of the passage which I have just read from your book concerning "The joy of Responsibility".
A.- Yes.
Q.- For how many years were you a chief of staff between the years 1939 and the end of the war in 1945?
A.- From the beginning of the war until I parted from the southeast that was including the Hungarian events of April 1944, a long time.
Q.- And then you become successively division commander, corps commander and finally an army commander?
A.- Yes, that is correct.
Q.- Was the transition from a chief of staff position to a commander of troops an easy one for you to make?
A.- It was an enormous relief for me, I longed for it with all my heart and from a military point of view I was the happiest person as a division commander always seeing it from a military point of view, because at last I had something else than the position in the staff, now I had real soldiers.
I could punish them, I could reward them, I could give decorations, I could admonish them and praise them, I could do all the things which a soldier wanted to do. I could order men, this I could do as division commander.
Q.- What I meant was did you to have to learn anything new about how to handle troops? After all you had been just a chief of staff and your experiences were somewhat different and you were limited from a commanding responsibility standpoint. I would like to know if you found the transition from that type of jog to the job of handling troops an easy or a difficult transition to make?
A.- It is always very easy to adapt oneself from worse circumstances to better, that is easier than to adapt yourself to the reverse. I have already said from the scope of a very limited responsible on the staff to be transferred to the scope of a broader responsibility, even if only a division, that was something which made me happy. Before I was only in a position to say I suggest, or to the superior authorities I warn you or something like that, now I could say that is how it is to be done in my own division. Of course there is a big difference, admittedly.
Q.- The kind of things which you dealt with as chief of staff, the problems, the situations, they were not so very different from those which you encountered as a troop commander; were they?
A.- Oh, yes, the different was enormous because as divisional commander, disregarding the fact that there were different theaters of war and completely different combat, but as divisional commander I had to make decisions which became necessary within my scope and my 1-A had to do the work and subordinate himself to me previously I had to do the work and had to subordinate myself and somebody else made the decisions. That is quite an essential difference.
Q.- Except for the fact as chief of staff you proposed and suggested to the commander and as the troop commander someone else proposed to you and you in fact gave the orders there was no difference between chief of staff and troop commander?
A.- Oh, yes, of course, there were any number of differences.
Q.- General Foertsch, isn't it true that the chief of staff and commander of troops are almost interchangeable, you as chief of staff became an army commander and troop commander, and, on the other hand, it was quite possible for a troop commander to assume the duties of chief of staff?
A.- Yes, if he had proper training in the general staff, but not every regimental commander without general staff training could become chief of staff.
Q.- Wasn't your duty as chief of staff to suggest and to propose and to recommend to your Commander in Chief; was it not?
A.- I was the advisor and helper of the commander in chief. I had to be in charge of the work of the staff.
Q.- Next to your commander in chief you were the most important single individual at headquarters; were you not?
A.- In my staff, yes. I would have been a bad chief if in my staff I had not been the man next to the commander in chief.
Q.- In April of 1941, General Foertsch, the headquarters of the 12th army was in Athena. Next to Field Marshal List you were the most important person at headquarters in Athens; were you not?
A.- No, not in Athens. At that time I was certainly not the most important man as I had just taken the position in my staff as chief of staff. I was the person who had to establish what had to be done and if you consider that power then in the staff I was the most powerful man.
Q.- How many persons were there on your staff and subordinate to you?
A.- Well, about with an assigned guard company and with propaganda people there might have been about 800 men perhaps. This is just a round figure.
Q.- Then it was the nerve center, the nucleus, the brain cell of the 12th Army; was it not?
A.- It was the center of work of the 12th Army.
Q.- That is where the tactical plans and the operational plans of the troops were outlined and decided upon?
A.- No, it is the center where the decisions which had been made either by a superior office or by the commander in chief were worked out and executed.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess until Monday morning, October 20th at 9:30 a.m.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 9:30 o'clock Monday morning.
(A recess was taken until 0930 hours, Monday, 20 October, 1947.)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List , et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 20 October 1947,0930 hours, Justice Wennerstrum presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the Defendants are present in the Courtroom except von Weichs, who is still in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed with the cross-examination, Mr. Fenstermacher.
CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued) Defendant Foertsch
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General Foertsch, on Friday we talked about your functions and duties as Chief of Staff. Before we continue on that, I would like to ask you a few questions about the OKW. When Hitler took over from von Brauchitsch in December, 1941, as Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, OKW was already in existence?
A. Yes, it is correct.
Q. Would you say that the duties and functions of Fieldmarhsal Keitel as Chief of the OKW were, in effect, those of Chief of Staff to Hitler?
A. I do not know the relation between Hitler and Keitel. At least, not well enough to be able to give any judgment. I believe, however, that Keitel was a little more than just a Chief of Staff.
Q. Keitel, however, did nothing except with Hitler's permission. Isn't that true?
A. I am not in a position to judge because I was never part of the OKW.
Q. General Jodl was in charge of the operational and strategic plans of OKW, was he not?
A. Yes, I believe that was the most important part of his work.
Q. General Jodl was, in effect, the Ia or ope rations officer of Hitler, was he not?
A. I do not know how the work was divided up between Hitler and Jodl because I was only able to see things from a subordinate level.
Q. When you received orders from Keitel, you never doubted that they had Hitler's approval, did you?
A. That could be assumed, yes.
Q. So that in effect Keitel had no more power than a Chief of Staff so far as his relations with Hitler were concerned.
A. I can only repeat that I am not in a position to judge that, because I had no insight into the work and the relation between Hitler and his collaborators.
Q. Jodl -
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, Mr. Fenstermacher. Is it your thought that questions along this line are cross-examination?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I have just one more question on this point, your Honor, and I think my theory will become clear to you.
THE PRESIDENT: Well you may proceed briefly but we don't want to get too far afield from the direct examination. Proceed.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. You never received any orders signed by Jodl, did you, General Foertsch?
A. I cannot say. that. I believe that I did read Jodl's signature on orders. In general, they were then signed "on behalf of" and then signature "Jodl" but I am not sure of this.
Q. In any event, they were always signed"on behalf of" Hitler?
A. I had to assume that.
Q. And Keitel's order as well was signed on behalf of Hitler?
A. Keitel signed even without that form "on behalf of." Sometimes he just signed his name.
Q. As Chief of Staff, General Foertsch, it was your duty to review the reports and make recommendations to your Commander-inChief?
A. When such recommendations became necessary, then it was my duty.
Q. And it was also your job to prepare drafts of orders and to submit them to your Commander-in Chief and talk them over with him?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Did you ever disagree on basic policy with your various Commanders-in-Chief: Fieldmarshal List, General Kuntze, General Loehr, or Fieldmarshal Weichs?
A. There were, on repeated occasions, various problems where we disagreed but of course I had to succumb to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief.
Q. On what basic policy matters did you disagree with either of those four Commanders-in-Chief, in which you had to succumb? I am thinking now of matters connected with reprisal measures.
A. I know, for instance, that with General Loehr, I had a long discussion whether or not reprisal ratios should be fixed for the whole area. General Loehr decided then not to fix such reprisal quotas and to this extent he followed my ideas. But I cannot say whether that was done merely on the basis of my objections or whether he had discussed the matter with other people too. For instance, concerning the questions whether all illegal actions had to be retaliated with reprisal measures on principle, I maintained my own opinion in contrast to the one of the OKW.
My opinion was that it did not have to be done in every case and unconditionally. I had differences of opinion with Fieldmarshal List concerning the matter of the combatting of the insurrection but that was a question of the commitment of the forces. I just remember that on one occasion I disagreed on principle with General Kuntze regarding the question of the creation of the Russian protective Corps. However, these are only examples and I cannot say that these are the exhaustive facts because I do not remember the matters clearly enough.
Q. You did not disagree with respect to policy measures concerning reprisals with either of your Commanders-in-Chief, did you?
A. I am afraid I didn't quite understand the question.
Q. In respect to reprisal measures, you and List, you and Kuntze, you and Loehr, and you and Weichs saw eye to eye. There was no case in which you had one opinion and had to succumb to their ideas regarding reprisal measures.
A. Concerning the basic question of reprisal measures, the Commanders-in-Chief and I agreed to the effect that reprisal measures were not desired but were unavoidable. In individual cases, there could be no such difference of opinion because the individual cases were not decided by my Commanders-in-Chief.
Q. As a matter of fact, General Loehr, either of those Commanders-in-Chief could not act upon a basic policy matter without first consulting you?
A. Of course, the Commander-in-Chief could do that. He was by no means obliged to listen to my suggestion. If one can talk of an obligation at all, he was only obliged to listen to my opinion concerning tactical and operational matters, with regard to their execution they were not as much in the foreground in the Balkans as they would have been on a purely operational front.
Q. According to the manual for the general staff officer, the Commander-in-Chief had to first consult you and listen to you before he could act upon a basic matter.
True, he did not have to follow your opinion but he had to first consult you, isn't that correct?
A. That was generally the custom. Basic questions were discussed by the Commander -in-Chief and the Chief-of-Staff.
Q. You have told us about your regular conferences with your staff, particularly the ones you held on Mondays. Did you have a set time for conferring with your Commanders-in-Chief?
A. You mean set times of the day for discussions?
Q. Yes.
A. No, that depended on what work was there to be done. When oral reports became necessary and when it became necessary to get the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, then of course I had the right at all times to ring him up or to enter his office and to interrupt ether discussions that he might have. The daily reports were reported with a certain amount of regularity because they were in turn bound to set times.
Q. You wore the man in charge of the issuance and passing on of the orders, were you not? It was your job to see that -
A: Yes.
Q: It was your job to see that the orders were received by the subordinate units and you were also responsible to see that the orders were enforced, were you not?
A: No, I was never responsible for the fact that the orders were enforced. That is a matter of the Commanding Officers and the commanders of the subordinate units. I was responsible for the fact that orders were properly drawn up and were sent out in the proper manner. Of course, I was also responsible for a certain check whether these orders were received.
Q: Were you never sent on inspection trips to sec whether the orders were actually received and being enforced?
A: No, unfortunately I could only leave my desk on very rare occasions and then I undertook trips which were mainly for my own information. It was in the vast area very difficult to get a clear picture of the situation. Whether I received special commissions to check up on the enforcement of the orders I do not recollect.
Q: The Chief-of-Staff was in charge at least so far as current matters were concerned when the Commander-in-Chief was absent from headquarters.
A: He had a certain latitude concerning current matters. He did not deputize that isn't putting it quite correctly. Even when the Commander-in-Chief was present, he had a certain latitude concerning the work on current matters. These were affairs which already had been decided on principle.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me just a minute, Mr. Fenstermacher. May I make inquiry of the defendants in the box as to whether or not it is chilly over there? I notice some of you seem to be feeling a draft. Is there a draft from the windows?
DEFENDANT RENDULIC: Yes, from the top windows. They are broken, there is no glass in them, and the outer windows are broken too and so unfortunately we have a draft here. There is no window up there.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you see that is repaired during the noon hour if possible?
THE MARSHAL: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q: General Foertsch, regarding the three mass executions which took place in October at Valjevo, at Kraljevo and at Kragujevac, two of these took place when the Commander-inChief Fieldmarshal List was absent. Were you not in charge of head-quarters at that time?
A: I was in charge of my own staff as always but I did not deputize for the Commander-in-Chief.
Q: But you were always in charge of your staff even when the Commander-in-Chief was present. When the Commanderin-Chief was absent you were, in effect, in charge of headquarters, were you not?
A: I was in charge of the work of the headquarters but never of the decisions. We have to make a difference between the functions of the Commander-in-Chief and those of the Chief-of-Staff. The Commander-in-Chief makes the decisions and he makes resolutions and he has to keep his head clear for just this purpose. The Chief-of-Staff works on the incoming and outgoing matters and prepares the decisions of the Chief of Staff by giving him the pertinent information. The Commander in-Chief has to keep a clear head for his decisions and the Chief-of-Staff does the hard work.
Q: You had enough power and jurisdiction while Lise was absent to institute on inquiry regarding the mass executions at Kraljevo and Kragujevac, didn't you?