A. In any case the importance of such a measure is such that not every single soldier can perform it. That is quite clear.
Q. What is the rank of a Battalion Commander, generally speaking?
A. That varies considerably. In peacetime, normally, in our Army it was a Major or Lt. Colonel. At the beginning of the War it was a captain, and when I was in charge of a division it was mostly a First Lieutenant, as the result of the serious losses which we had suffered. That varies considerably.
Q. General, wasn't there danger in permitting a mere captain who was very likely to be a very young man, to take reprisal measures, to order collective reprisal measures?
A. After all the age is not always proof of the fact that a man can take a high amount of responsibility, even though the experience, of course, is quite important. However, I do believe that a reprisal measure in itself to the person confronted by the necessity, that this person will realize this affair is serious, and even a person comparatively young will normally realize the responsibility he had when confronted with the question.
Q. You didn't think there was any danger in permitting a mere captain to order collective reprisal measures?
A. No.
Q. Now, General Foertsch, will you look at Paragraph 100 of these regulations for anti-guerrilla warfare in the East.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Page 29 of the English, Your Honor.
Q. It states here "the population is to be included as far as possible in anti-guerilla combat" What does that mean, General Foertsch?
A. The sentence which you have just read?
Q. Yes, what does it mean to include the population in antiguerilla combat?
A. The population is to collaborate with us for the purpose that the partisan bands can be combatted properly. That is to say, for example, towards the German units which combat partisans they should help than and find ways and means in order to help them, and they will furnish guides into the woods and into the mountains and they can help carry supplies, whenever necessary, and things of that sort.
Q. You mean that you were asking the population of the occupied countries to help you, enemy troops, in combat against their own units and own people, who were trying to free the country from your troops?
A. I believe you have to look at that matter differently. After all you can't call a partisan band a troop unit and then you must not forget that at least in the Southeast the native population suffered as much under the partisan bands as the German units, if they did not suffer more. Therefore, the combatting of the partisans was not only in the interest of the German Armed Forces, but also was absolutely in the interest of the population.
Q. Who decided that, you or the population, as to whether the partisans were in the population's interest or against the populations interest?
A. In the last act the partisans decided that by their activity, when they set fire to 100 centners of grain, this was an act against the population. If they were reasonable and did not do than this was good for the population.
Q. General Foertsch, lets be realistic, you don't mean most of the people in the occupied country preferred German troops and preferred to help German troops, to helping the Partisan units, do you?
A. No, I don't mean to say that at all. No people like to be occupied by another nation.
Q. Then when you fording people to help you against the partisans you were asking them to do something against their will, weren't you?
A. No, this cannot be said so generally. In the Prosecution documents, and I believe in the new documents from Washington, we have quite a number of recorded cases where the population liked very much to help the German forces, and where on their own initiative they did much to get rid of individual bands and franc-tireurs and saboteurs, etc., and to turn them over to the German units.
They only did that to get rid of these people.
Q. Did you ask the population first whether they wanted to help you against the partisans, or did you force them to help you whether they wanted to or not?
A. I don't know that because I was never in charge of a unit personally engaged in combatting the partisans.
Q. What do you think, do you think the people were asked first whether they wanted to fight on your side or not?
A. I believe that wasn't the question at all. In a part of the country where the people were reasonable, even if they did not like us there they would help us, and wherever these people on their own initiative took the sides of the partisan bands, they would not even help us, if we asked them to.
Q. You are familiar with the provision of the Hague Rules of Warfare which says that an occupying army must not force the population to engage in activities against their own units?
A. Yes, that is quite correct. Quite correct, it is written there. However, we are dealing with a different case. Here this refers to the regular army of the enemy.
Q. General Foertsch, will you look now at paragraph 105 of these regulations.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: On page 90 of your Document Book, Your donors.
Q. Dr. Rauschenbach, asked you about this paragraph this morning. The second sentence, "It may be expedient to provisionally arrest all male inhabitants for this purpose and to watch them for sometime in special camps, in order to find out by this method through confidental agents, those who are siding with the bands." I beg your pardon, I mean the sentence before that, - "By the process of clever questioning of all the villages and by comparing the contradictions, the bandits and bandits helpers must be pinned down and rendered harmless." Dr. Rauchenbach clarified the problem of "must be pinned down." I would like to clarify by the language "rendered harmless."
Can you help us?
A. Well, that depends on the individual case. If these bandits were found with a weapon in their hand in combat then of course they were shot. When they could be considered to be assistants to the bandits then it depended in this case whether they were active supporters of partisans, who cooperated with the partisans on their own initiative, or whether they were passive band helpers, that is to say, whether they were forced by the band to give some help of some sort. In any case here it is meant that as bandits or bandit helpers they should not be given the possibility of taking further action, so that they are not in a position to help the partisan bands any more. If they are confined in a camp then they cannot take any further action.
Q. General Foertsch, this language does not talk of bandits with arms in their hands; it talks about finding out who the bandits and the bandit helpers are by questioning the population, and after finding out by clever questioning to render the bandits or bandit helpers harmless; is there anything about a summary court martial there?
A. Yes. But to give an example, this does not mean that the bandit has to be in the same village. After all, for example, in the course of the examination of the population it can be determined that a young man who has resided in that village up to this time has been staying with the band for about 8 days, and that he hides in the forest somewhere, it does not state here that as a result of such an examination immediately some action has to be taken.
Q. General Foertsch, isn't this language an invitation to threatening and coercing the village population to reveal on their fellow neighbors?
A. The technique of interrogation frequently is connected with other intentions. For example, I was not in charge of any interrogations as they are mentioned, but the purpose is to finally set an end to the activities of the bands.
Q. General Foertsch, I don't want to get into another Merry-geround discussion with you, but perhaps you can answer this one question; where you pleased, when those regulations arrived in the Southeast, did you feel that they were necessary for you to accomplish your mission down there?
A. These directives about combatting the partisans when they were issued, without any doubt clarified many things or clarified several things which were unclear up to that time, however, in one point they did not satisfy our desires at all, that was in the treatment of bandits who had been captured.
Q. You would not have resorted to any of these techniques if you had not received an order of this kind?
A. No. I want to remind you of the fact that already at the turn of the year 1941 to 1942 the Commander of the Armed Forces Southeast was favorably inclined towards the thought that the captured bandits should be kept alive even under conditions which were not very pleasant. That becomes evidence from the agreement for the deportation of prisoners in order to do some sort of work in Norway. I also want to remind you of the fact that in July of 1943, that is one half year after this order was first issued, this paragraph was actually rescinded in practice by the decree that captured bandits were to be treated just like Prisoners of War and both of these things corresponded to our ideas on the subject.
Q. General Foertsch, I think you have said that these regulations were absolutely binding upon you; is that correct?
A. It was a regulation.
Q. A regulation differs from an order insofar a sits binding effect is concerned; docs it not?
A. Yes, directivesleave us a certain amount of liberty.
Q. They did leave you a good deal of liberty, did they not, General Foertsch?
A. That depends on the individual matter, one cannot put that in a general way.
Q. You preferred to receive directives and regulations from the O.K.W. to Revolving orders from them; did you not?
A. One cannot put that generally either. Sometimes a situation arises in certain villages where we must very strictly adhere and where we prefer a binding order so having lasitude.
Q. We are talking here about the sphere of reprisal measures and I take it in that realm of activities you desired to have as much independence from the O.K.W. as possible?
A. In principle, yes.
Q. Directives and regulations were an easier way for you to circumvent O.K.W. desires?
A. That is correct in principle.
Q. These regulations for the combatting of guerrillas were veryeasy to avoid and circumvent; were they not?
A. Well are you now referring to the directives about the combatting of partisans?
Q. Yes, the one that you have in front of you.
A. Yes. that was a regulation.
Q. It was easy to get around and circumvent; you did not have to obey it to the letter?
A. Yes, a regulation isobligatory; in any case with regard to the principles which it refers to, of course it always depends on the formulation.
Q. In the case of regulations you had a great deal of latitude regarding tho precise execution of the principles which were laid down?
A. One cannot put that so generally either, much lasitude.
Q. Look at the language here, General Foertsch, look at paragraph 84, page 88 of the English, Your Honors. Look at the second sentence: "As a rule, prisoners are to be shot on the spot following a short questioning." That term as a rule leaves you a perfect out, does it not?
A. Yes, however, I believe you are reading that wrong. It states before "captured bandits are to be shot or hanged." In the first place this is stated quite clearly without any limitation and now comes the individual regulation, that is to say "as a rule after a short interrogation the captured bandits arc to be shot right on the spot." That is to say normally they are to be shot right on the spot and normally after a short interrogation, however, the order for the shooting, is already contained in the first sentence of the paragraph without any limitations.
Q. Well that is all the device that you and your Commander in Chief would need, you could circumvent it very easily. It is general rather than specific and as a matter of fact you told us yesterday that General Loehr seized upon precisely the same opportunity with regard to the commando order to circumvent orders of the O.K.W.?
A. I beg your pardon, but this is not a parallel thing. I would like to point this out once more because I think you did not quite understand me. In paragraph 84 it is stated that "captured bandits, as far as these are not exceptional cases, are to be hanged or shot", then it is stated "as a rule captured bandits after a short interrogation are to be shot right at the spot and only in exceptional cases are bandits to be turned over for individual interrogations if they are suitable." Therefore, the two sentences which begin with "as a rule" and the sentence which begins, "Only in exceptional cases" they belong together as far as the context is concerned, for after all the contrary of a rule is the exception and no limitation is placed on the order that captured bandits are to be shot or hanged.
Q. You don't believe, General Foertsch, that a Commander who wanted to do so, could toll Hitler's spies if there were any around that people that he is holding in that particular camp, that he is holding for anti guerilla activities and that he is holding them for a short questioning or as exceptional cases or desertors, you don't believe that this would be an excellent opportunity to circumvent an order of which you disapproved?
A. I am convinced that is practice the method which you have just hinted was frequently used, however, it is not possible that a Commander-in-Chief now can simply rescind an essential part of a regulation which after all has been passed on to the individual companies.
Q. He may not be able to rescind it, but he could get the divisions and corps commanders together and ask them to circumvent it in exactly the same way General Loehr, as you said earlier, asked his Commanders to circumvent the Commando order.
A. In theory that is not impossible, however, the better way was without any doubt that which Loehr actually used. He tried again and again to effect an order which practically would rescind this entire affair, that would be along the same line as the attempt of General Kuntze in his oral report to the O.K.W., also tried to have those provisions rescinded.
Q. Look at paragraph 86, General Foertsch. "Corrective measures will normally be required against villages;" couldn't the Commander say that the situation was abnormal and therefore he chose not to burn the village? The language in these regulations and directives was broad enough for any commander to do whatever he wanted; wasn't it?
A. No, with regard to this sentence without any doubt everybody was able to say "this does not come under the rule, but in this case it is an exception and therefore if I do not do anything about this village, I am not violating any regulations, for here it says clearly against villages, etc., as a rule collective measures will be required," that is to say exceptions are quite possible and according to the indivi dual case a responsible commander could use this possibility.
Q. Now look General Foertsch at the language in 105, "It may be expedient to provionally arrest all male inhabitants, etc." The commander who wanted to circumvent O.K.W. orders would seize upon language of that kind, wouldn't he?
A. Yes, I am just reading it now, yes. Well, what was your question on the subject, I don't understand it.
Q. My question was to the effect that language of that kind "it may be expedient" to do this or to do that, it was exactly the same kind of language you or a Commander would seize upon to do exactly as he wished and to circumvent orders and to choose the reprisal measures which be wished to choose, not with standing O.K.W. orders?
A. "It may be expedient", this expression allows here a certain amount of liberty.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Don't these orders allow latitude rather than permit circumvention, aren't we getting a little off the subject calling it circumvention of an order?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Well, perhaps I can clarify that through the witness, Your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Before you do, I think we will take our afternoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess in 15 minutes.
( A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please take their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General Foertsch, I believe you told us already that there were several orders of the OKW which you received in the Southeast which you tried and did circumvent. Is that true?
A. There were some individual orders where certain possibilities were given.
Q. What kind of orders were they? How were they worded. What was the language used?
A. I believe in this case we should not concern ourselves with the language and the actual text which did play a certain part but was not so very important. In stead we should concern ourselves with the individual case in question. Basic orders could not be circumvented.
Q. Isn't it true, General Foertsch, that a Commander who wanted to go his own way would look carefully at the language in the orders which he received to determine whether the language used gave him enough lattitude, so far as his individual activities were concerned, and if the language was broad and gave him a lot of lattitude for independent action then he was able in effect to do what he wished to do, rather to do what OKW intended him to do?
A. The language and the lattitude which were given in the language of the orders were decisive. It was also very important that this order demanded and concerning what particular sphere it was given.
Q. Take some of the basic orders of the OKW. Take the one we have been considering for some time now, the Keitel order of the 16th of September 1941. Was it possible to circumvent that order?
A. It was not possible to circumvent it in my opinion.
Q. You mean---
A. However, if I may add something, I believe it is important to clarify what we understand by "circumvent."
In my opinion, there are various degrees of considering and treating an order.
Q. What is you definition of circumvention?
A. I would like to say the following; the lattitude given in an order can be made use of. I believe that would essentially depend on the wording. If the order says: "generally speaking," or "as a rule," or "for instance," or "it may be done" -- if the language is such then a certain lattitude is given which can be made use of. Then the possibility exists to circumvent an order by interpreting it according to its meaning. That, however, would not yet amount to circumvention. An order can be treated according to its meaning. That will be done whenever the grounds on which the order was given have changed considerably. One can act in contradiction with an order by not executing it at all or by circumventing it. I think the last possible degree would be to refuse to execute an order. In these conceptions which I am sure are not exhaustive, the transition from one conception to the other in rather unstable.
Q. Would you say, General Foertsch, that lattitude in the language of an order is the first prerequisite for its eventual circumvention?
A. I don't think it can be put that way. I believe the whole question cannot be clarified just in theory. I believe it can only be clarified with regard to every individual order. One can try to establish the facts concerning to the situation and the time period when the order comes in.
Q. You can't circumvent an order, General Foertsch, unless the language of the order gives you a certain amount of lattitude, can you?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Well, if the -
A. In theory, purely in theory, I can circumvent many orders.
Q. Suppose an order -
A. That depends on what has been ordered.
Q. Suppose you receive an order saying that in case a German soldier is killed you must execute 50 Serbs in retaliation; can an order of that kind be circumvented?
A. I can only say that if I have the order in front of me and if I am faced with a definite situation -- I cannot explain all that theoretically -- theoretically I can only say that an order has to be executed.
Q. And the way you tell whether a piece of paper is an order or a directive or a regulation is by examining the language and determining whether the language is strong or whether the language used gives the commander lattitude in executing it.
A. To a certain extent, yes, but I don't believe that's an exhaustive definition of the concept.
Q. Now, these regulations that we have been looking at for antiguerilla warfare, you are familiar with that language; could those regulations be circumvented in your opinion?
A. Not in principle.
Q. And then you mean that in fact you did not circumvent those regulations when you received them in the Southeast in November 1942?
A. How this regulation was executed in practice and in the individual case cannot possibly be known to me. There might well have been cases and I suppose there have been cases where a captured bandit was not shot to death on the spot as was ordered here. I am sure there were such cases but I cannot say what the prerequisites were at the time and, therefore, I can't say what prerequisites have to exist in order that certain acts be taken.
Q. General Foertsch, you saw the reports. As a matter of fact, you are the best informed man there is on the events in the Southeast between 1941 and 1944. You can say generally speaking whether these regulations were circumvented in the Southeast or not, can't you?
A. I am sure I was not the best informed man in the Southeast. I was that only with regard to certain spheres. From the reports which came to me I am not in a position to reconstruct or judge individual cases. Basically, the regulation was binding and in general it was adhered to because that is what was its nature.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: That's about the best I can do, your Honors, on the problem of the lattitude in orders and their circumvention. Does that satisfy your Honors?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I hope you were not doing all this on my account because I think I knew what it meant before it ever started.
Q. General Foertsch, I would now like to show you the regulations for the conduct of band fighting which were issued by the Communist Party of Serbia in 1941 to contrast those with the ones which you received in 1942. You will recall that they were shown to you by Dr. Rauschenbach.
A. But I only had one quick look at them. From what point of view am I to look at them?
Q. I want to know whether there is anything contained in those directives which in your opinion is in violation of International Law regarding the conduct of warfare.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honors, the photostat of that regulation was not submitted by me as a document and I have only shown it to the defendant so that he might say whether he could remember that it was the regulation of the Communist Party in Serbia, which he had referred to during the examination. However, if the witness is now to testify in detail as to what is contained in the regulation then I think he should have enough time to read all of it which up to now he has not done but, apart from all this, I doubt the admissability of the question because it seems to me, although Hr. Fenstermacher has just started questioning, still it seems to me that the defendant is asked to judge on International Law. As a witness under oath on the witness stand I don't think that is possible for him, and I don't think he is competent to do it.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think probably it is improper cross, examination.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I am trying to refresh the witness's recollection regarding these directives which he has already testified he has seen and then I will ask him regarding his memory.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I don't know what bearing the contents of the exhibit can possibly have. It is on an immaterial matter certainly.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, there has been more than one innuendo in this case to the fact that these regulations issued by the Communist Party in Serbia encouraged the partisans to commit all manner of illegal activities.
The innuendo has been in these directives to tell the partisans to execute prisoners and to mutilate captured German soldiers.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Even that wouldn't justify criminal action on the part of the opposition.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: But it goes to the question of mitigation, Your Honor, and to military necessity. Surely if German soldiers were ordered to be executed and mutilated by the partisans there is some fact for some justification for the severe measures which these commanders took.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: All right. We will let him answer the question.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: May I just point out, Your Honor, that there is one misgiving which I had and which I am not sure has been sufficiently considered. I don't know whether in the meantime the witness was in a position to read the document sufficiently and I think only if he has done that should he answer the question after this ruling of the Tribunal was made.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Certainly, the witness won't be expected to answer anything he doesn't know about. If he hasn't read it, he can assert it himself.
Q. Have you familiarized yourself with the contents, General Foertsch?
A. No, I am afraid it wasn't possible in this short time to deal with this document sufficiently to be able to answer the question. Besides, I don't feel at all in a position to answer this question under oath. Quite apart from the fact that I am under the impression, as I said the other day that this is not the whole of the regulation and quite apart from the fact that I am surprised here when I read the second line, "organized bands". Then, in my opinion, the question of what is contained hero is subordinate to the fact that the bands in themselves were illegal.
I would only be in a position -- I might almost, say, after a thorough study; after a long period of leave in order to attend a university --to answer the question so that i can take the responsibility for it under oath.
Q. General Foertsch, you remember having seen the directives of the Communist Party of Serbia for the conduct of band warfare in 1941.
A. In 1941, I did see it. That is correct.
Q. And doesn't your memory tell you that those directives were only concerned with the methods to be used in guerilla tactics -- that is to say, attacks upon railroads and communication lines and attacks from ambush, attacks by night, and says nothing whatever about the treatment to be afforded to captured German soldiers?
A. I don't know that any more and in the direct examination I stated that I do not recall the contents exactly. I said I only know that this regulation gave me the impression at the time that it originated from Moscow. Besides, at the time I looked at these regulations of the Communist Party for band warfare from an entirely different point of view. Not the regulation was important for us, but the behavior of the people. The regulation was interesting for us inasmuch as we tried to establish from it where the spirit came from which instigated these people to commit such cruelties and atrocities. Maybe it was possible to assume from these regulations what methods applied in their actions in order to know how to counter it with a corresponding military action. I never at the time looked at that regulation from the legal point of view.
Q. Suppose, General Foertsch; you keep those directives until Monday and look through them with the idea of determining whether or not there is anything in those directives which orders or countenances illegal activity on the part of the partisans concerning the treatment of captured German soldiers.
A. I can't say for sure that I will be in a position, even then, to make any kind of a judgment. I would be grateful if the question which is to be put to me on Monday could be put down in writing prior to being put to me so that I can answer precisely and then I think I ought to have the opportunity to discuss the matter with an expert after I have formed my own opinion because, after all, I am under oath.
Q. Suppose, General Foertsch, you just familiarize yourself with the contents, study the firectives, think back to the year 1941 when you first saw the directives, and formulate some opinions with regard to the directives and I think you will be able to answer all the questions I put to you.
General Foertsch, I believe you said on direct examination that you were with the German Press Bureau during the year 1925 to 1930.
A. No, I was as a captain an export on press matters in the Reich Defense Ministry. I was not a member of the press. I was an officer and I had to report in the Reich Defense Ministry on matters of the German press.
Q. Your duties were to evaluate military and political matters?
A. Yes, military matters contained in the press and political matters which had any connection to the Armed Forces.
Q. For five years you worked on that complex of the relationship between military and political matters?
A. The circle of questions was somewhat more narrow than you described it now because there were many matters of political and military nature which did not appear in the press. I can only answer a specific question.
Q. You said, I believe, that during that period of the late " "twenties" the two burning issues in the German army were (1) the above politics' conception of the Wehrmacht and the freedom from the shackles of Versailles?
A. Yes, that is about the way I expressed it. I believe I said it was a question of disarmament.
that as far as internal politics were concerned it was the "above party" attitude of the armed forces. Concerning foreign policy, I believe I said it was the problem of disarmament.
Q. Was it during that period that you became sympathetic towards the Nazi Party?
A. No, -- I only became aware of the Nazi Party as a factor which had to be taken into account about 1930, 1931.
Q. When did you work with Schleicker?
A. From 1925 to 1930 and from August 1932 until January 1933,to 30 of January 1933, the assumption of power.
Q. Who was Schleicher?
A. Schleicher in 1925 was a lieutenant - colonel or a colonel, and he was Chief of the so-called Armed Forces Department. Then he became--and I don't know the year--Chief of the so-called Minister Office. Then as successor of General Groener he became Reich Defense Minister. And in November, 1932 he became Reich Chancellor.
Q. And what happened to him subsequently?
A. After the Nazi assumption of power he had no particular assignment, and on the 30th of June 1934, as far as I am informed, he was shot in his home in Babelsberg.
Q. Do you know for what reason?
A. I believe that I know that very well. It is quite an extensive and long story that cannot be answered in one sentence.
Q. Could you be somewhat brief and yet cover the matter?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It seems to me that this is entirely foreign to any issue we have here. I can't see the materiality of this cross-examination.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honor please, you will recall that in the first document book of Foertsch there was a good deal mentioned of Schleicher. But if Your Honors feel that it is irrelevant I shall pass on.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Well, the details of his death and things of that kind are certainly not material here.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: His death does have political overtones, Your Honors; but perhaps we can pass on.
BY MR FENSTERMACHER:
Q. When did you work for Reichenau?
A. I worked under General von Reichenau from February, 1933 until the middle of September, 1935.
Q. How did you get along with Reichenau? Were you sympathetic to each other?
A. That again I can't answer in one sentence, but I can say the following: When Reichenau took over the then Minister Office, which later on became the so-called Armed Forces Office, I could not follow his thoughts and ideas, and for about half a year I disagreed with him, and I fought with him about many questions. Then for matters of reason I succumbed to the fact that nothing could be changed in inner political masters. Reichenau respected my opinion, and he demanded no more of me than absolute obedience and loyalty, and later on, under this highly intelligent man whom I esteemed from a human point of view, I liked to work, but we disagreed concerning National Socialist questions.
Q. Reichenau was a notorious Nazi general, was he not, General Foertsch?
A. Yes, that is what he was.
Q. And are you familiar with the model order which he issued to his troops in 1941, which was subsequently issued to all other commands throughout the Wehrmacht?
A. This is the first time I have heard of it. I've never heard of it before.
Q. What period was it when you---I believe you said--started to bore from within the Nazi Party? That is to say, you decided no longer to stay on the banks of the river, as you described it, but to got in.
A. I said just now that about around the fall of 1933 I realized that this assumption of power was not a normal parliamentary change of government, as one was used to from previous years. Instead it was a complete change in all political principles and, therefore, one could no longer work with it up to the then customary political and tactical means. One could not achieve anything by the old means. Instead one had to realize and recognize the fact and to try to make the best of it I said under direct examination that one should endeavor to give the Armed Forces a leading part in this now state.