It starts on page 5 of the original and that is in the document book, the third page of this document; and the sentence reads: "This kind of warfare is without any danger whatsoever for the opponent, for since he leads his sabotage units in uniform but on the other hand gives them civilian clothing as well, they can appear as needed either as soldiers or as civilians." It is the first sentence on page 29 of the English document book.
"While they themselves have the mission to liquidate ruthlessly German soldiers or even inhabitants who hinder them, they are not indanger of suffering really serious losses in their activities, because if the worst comes to the worst and they are caught, they can give themselves up immediately and thus they believe they will fall under the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is the worst kind of abuse of the Geneva Convention, all the more so since some of these elements are criminals who have been released from jail and can rehabilitate themselves by such actions."
Are you thinking of this passage in Hitler's reasons when you said previously that in your opinion you had to fight, concerning the pro's and con's of this order?
A. Yes, I was thinking of this passage which has just been read.
Q. The Commander-in-Chief Southeast--did he make any additions to this order of Hitler's?
A. I seem to remember that additions were made. Regarding the band warfare, this order was not to apply, but only for the landing or parachuting of such men where we essentially thought of a coastal battle; but after such a long time I cannot recollect the exact text of these additions.
Besides, General Loehr ordered, in order to prevent certain things, orally to the subordinate commands, that before this order was applied, the Armed Forces Commander Southeast had to be informed and his consent had to be gained. He believed in this manner he could best prevent the practical carrying out of this order.
Q. Was this oral additional remark of your Commanderin-Chief--passed on?
A. As far as I remember, yes, because it was ordered.
Q. And who passed on this oral directive?
A. I cannot say that with certainty. I assume it was the responsible Ia.
Q. Was the Commando Order carried out at all in the Southeast?
A. I know of no example, of no case where it was applied.
Q. The members of the regular belligerent forces of the allies who worked together with the bands--were they treated in accordance with the Commando Order?
A. No, they were not treated in accordance with the Commando Order.
Q. Can you give examples for this statement?
A. I know of two examples, I can name them from the documents of the prosecution. They were contained in Volume XII in Exhibit 309 but I do not know the actual page at the moment. One example concerns an occurrence near Alexinac in Serbia and the other concerns an occurrence near Lauplia in Greece.
Q. Exhibit 309 is contained in Document Book XII on page 101 of the German and 121 of the English text. Have you got it in front of you?
A. Yes.
Q. And which is the actual passage that you mean?
A. I mean the daily report of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast of the 9th of August, 1943. It says there under No. 4, "Near Alexinac, 20 kilometers north of Nish, one English officer and a non-commissioned officer were captured."
Q. That is contained on page 37 of the original and it is on page 18 of the document here. It reads: "Near Alexinac, one English officer and non-commissioned officer were captured."
What would have had to happen to this officer and NCO according to the Commando Order?
A. If the Commando Order had been applied for this area, for the band warfare, then they would have had to be killed in combat.
Q. And you mentioned another passage?
A. Yes, another passage is the daily report of the 23rd of August, 1943. It is on page 25 of the German text of this document and towards the end of figure two under Greece it reads:
"In the areas Lauplia-Argos, two parachutists probably of British nationality were apprehended."
Q. That is an extract of page 51 of the original?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And can you give us another example?
A. I know of another case. This case, however, did not occur during my time. It concerns the capture of a Commando unit which was led or where participated a relative of Prime Minister Churchill. I heard of this incident by way of a talk.
Q. I will show you, witness, a passage from Document Book XXI of the prosecution. This will be Exhibit 488 contained on page 65 of the German and 75 of the English Document Book.
A. I am sorry, I am afraid I haven't got that document book.
Q. I have got a photostat of the original here which I will show you and there is some talk about so-called members of military missions which according to the contents of that document should have really been treated in accordance with the Commando Order. However, in actual fact, they were not treated in that manner.
(Handed document to witness).
A. We have here a memorandum of the operational department of the OKW concerning an alteration, or rather expansion, of the Commando Order which was wanted by Hitler. And it says here clearly "In accordance with issued orders, the British apprehended near Roesslsprung which is a cover name for an operation have to be treated as prisoners-of war." The Commando Order has so far not been applied to such missions and an extension to such missions had so far not been ordered. This document therefore, shows that the Commando Order in the Southeast was not applied in band warfare.
Q. Witness, we will now turn to Exhibit 227 in Document Book IX. That is on page 47 of the German and 32 of the English Document Book. These again are teletypes--that is daily reports, to the OKH and the OKW. Did you know those reports, the way they are contained here in the document book?
A. I probably knew those reports but not in the abbreviated form in which they have it here.
Q. There are a number of shootings mentioned in these reports. Can you give the reason for these shootings?
A. No, I am afraid I cannot give the reasons because statements which might have probably caused the shootings were not taken over into the document books from the original reports.
Q. Was it, generally speaking, this way? In the daily reports, there were besides these shootings, such as they were reproduced in the document books, there were also the reasons for it. That is, the number and kind of the surprise attacks?
A. Yes, certainly. That can be seen from the reports which were presented here during my examination either in full text or in excerpts.
Q. Witness, can one say, generally speaking, that in the daily reports, such as they are submitted by the prosecution in the document books in the places where there are usually dots in the document books, there were usually the reasons for the reprisal measures -- that is, the reports of the attacks, etc?
A. That might not have been that way in every case but generally speaking it can be assumed that it was that way.
Q. Then, it was in the same manner as we have seen it from a few examples of original documents which you have read here during the last few days and we see that in the documents of the prosecution the causes for the ordered reprisal measures are omitted?
A. That is the case.
Q. With the passing on and compilation of these daily reports, did you take over any responsibility for the measures, especially reprisal measures reported in these messages?
A. No, I can only repeat here that my task consisted in summarizing the essential parts of the reports which we received and to check the correctness of the formulation-- that is, the formal correctness of the report.
Q. In these daily reports, we have at various times occurrences which happened in the Italian occupation area. Were the Italian military authorities subordinate to the Armed Forces Commander?
A. No, but we had liaison with the Italian armies. And through liaison we learned, if sometimes belatedly, what had occurred in these Italian occupation areas, and inasmuch as the incidents were important or interesting they were reported by us too in order to give a complete as possible picture concerning the Southeastern area to the OKW.
Q. Witness, we will now turn to Exhibit 228. It is on page 65 of the German text and on page 51 of the English Document Book.
This is a file note in a war diary of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia of October 1942. It concerns a conference of Chiefs-of-Staff in Salonika. Did you know that document?
A. No, I didn't know that document but its contents is of course known to me because that conference took place with my staff.
Q. This document again is just an excerpt as one can see in the dots between the paragraphs. I will show you the original.
(Handed witness the original.)
On the first page of Exhibit 228 in the Document Book, there is a sentence saying that our division seemed to be frequently of an attitude too much in favor of the Serbians. The SS would act differently. How do you explain that sentence?
A. That is the reproduction of an opinion of the OKW addressed to the Chief of Staff.
Q. Do you see other typical passages in the original which are not contained in the Document Book?
A. Yes, I just notice here a further communication where it reads: "There will be no support assured from above against the Serb murders." That means that we, regarding the already mentioned Ustsha tendencies, had made representations but that a support from Hitler's side was not to be expected and I remember in this context that General Bader with the consent of General Kuntze, had demanded a court martial procedure which against Ustasha men which was also started on the part of the Croats. Eventually, however, this procedure was prevented and forbidden by Hitler himself.
Q. Witness, in Exhibit 228, there is apart from the note regarding the chief conference an order by the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia dated the 10th of October. That is on the second page of the document, on page five and six of the original. Did you know that order?
A. I cannot say that with certainty. It went for information to the Armed Forces Commander and I would assume as probable that I knew it.
A I cannot say that with certainty. It went for information to the Armed Forces Commander, and I would assume it probable that I knew it.
Q And again there is some talk about political commissars were they, in accordance with this order, treated differently from other band members?
A No, they were never treated differently from other band members.
Q Then regarding Exhibit 229, which is a report by the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia about the Communist Resurrection movement in the area of former Yugoslavia, dated 30 Oct. 1943, which is page 73 of the German, and page 61 of the English text. Did you know that document?
A No, I didn't know the document.
Q Did you know the rank insignia of the Communist bands which are mentioned on the second page?
A In detail I did not then. I knew that occasionally such insignia were worn.
Q You said occasionally, were these insignia not worn uniformly and everywhere?
AAccording to the reports which we received and according to the limited observations which I made on captured band leaders, they were not worn at all times.
Q Exhibit 230 on page 75 of the German, page 65 of the English Document book, we have information about the enemy, an enclosure to the 718th Infantry Division; did you know this information about the enemy?
A No, I did not know it.
Q And now quite a different question, witness, you as Chief of General Staff and as Commander in Chief Southeast, did you have a great number of telephone conversations?
A Yes, a great number of telephone conversations.
Q. Did you frequently talk to the Chief of Staff of subordinate units and command authorities?
A Yes, of course.
Q Were these conversations long or short?
A If I talked to the Chief of the Subordinate staff then I usually talked for a longer period about those matters which were of immediate interest.
Q The opinions which you uttered during these conversations, or let us say the directives contained in these conversations, were they your personal opinions?
A No. If I wanted to express personal opinions then I said so expressly. For instance, if my personal opinion deviated from an official one I would, for instance, use a phrase like "I personally am of another opinion, but it has been ordered in this way." Or I would say, "I don't understand it, but it has been ordered in this way."
Q If you made no personal remarks of a special nature, what then did that mean what you said on the telephone, was it your personal opinion or what was it?
A It was in the course of my official activity as Chief of Staff, and when the conversation concerned directives then they were given on behalf of the Commander in Chief.
Q Were these conversations put down in the files by you?
A No, I have never noted down my telephone conversations.
Q Did other members of your staff note down your telephone calls?
A No, only my personal ordnance officer could listen, and he did not have to do it during the day, but I had ordered that during the night when I had been awakened up and the call therefore came on his instrument, in any case then he had to listen in.
Q And how were especially important telephone calls which you had laid down in the files?
A In the usual procedure, not at all, but I later asked that decisions or directives issued over the telephone was to be supplemented by teletype, or by written order and thus confirmed.
Q Please have a look at Exhibit 231, which is on page 76 of the German text, and page 67 of the English Document Book. It is the War Diary of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, 1-A, of November 1942. On the 1st page of the text of the 26 November 1942 we find a note: "Army chief requests by telephone shooting to death of all mayors remaining passive." Can you remember that telephone conversation?
A I had of course completely forgotten that conversation among all the thousands of conversations I had, but from the whole context of these documents I did refresh my memory and now recollect this particular document.
Q What kind of a passive attitude of mayors did you mean?
A I have mentioned previously in another context the action Mihajlovic, which lead to disobedience on the part of the authorities towards the occupation forces, and in that connection he succeeded in persuading a few mayors to passive resistance, and those were the mayors I meant.
Q And why did you demand the shooting of these mayors?
A In this memo in the files by way of a file notice it is rather briefly expressed. I don't remember anymore. Either there was an evening or rather daily report which gave the cause for the decision or a remark by General Lehr in accordance with which I phoned Geitner, or there was some other cause because of which I received this order.
Q And when did that telephone call take place?
A On the 26 of November 1942.
Q Will you please look at Exhibit 237, which is in the German Document Book page 124, and in the English 117. It is an Activity Report of the 704th Infantry Division, and it contains the following passage under the 21 November 1942. It is on the second page of the text. "Division 21 November 1942." You will always find the date in the left column, the division, -- "Post Proclamation of Commanding General and Commander in Serbia." It states that "Serbian officials of the civil service are under German protection and in the event that such persons would be wounded" 5 hostages will be shot to death and if such persons will be killed 10 persons will be shot to death." Then we have the following: "Officials of the Public Services who have resigned their office without compulsion will have proceedings taken against them." After you have seen this now can you give us further explanations why you demanded that the passive mayors should be shot?
A Well, from this submission the proof can be seen for the already mentioned disobedience action and also the proof for the fact that such officials whose attitude was passive were to come before a summary court marshal, and that would be the consequence of their activity, so that in contrast with this announcement of the 21 November the telephone conversation of 26 November does not bring anything decisively new. Besides during those days we received the band combatting regulations of 1942, and in these regulations there is a special remark "within the scope of supervision of the population," where it says that mayors who do not execute their duties are to be prosecuted, and in this connection there is also a reference to the death penalty.
It is possible, that the knowledge about this new regulation also influenced the order, which is at the bottom of this telephone conversation.
Q During the subsequent period were mayors actually shot?
A Nothing to that effect is known to me, and in the documents available here I have not seen any example concerning it.
Q You have just mentioned the so-called regulation for band warfare; was this regulation valid for the Southeast territory?
A It was valid for the whole of the armed forces.
Q And how had this regulation been distributed?
AAs all regulations of that time it was distributed by the competent office of the OKH to the Division, and was issued in the necessary copies so that it could be automatically distributed right down to the companies.
Q Did the Armed Forces Commander make any additional remarks to this regulation?
AActual additions or amendments to regulations were not permitted to him on principle, but I do recollect that a very short decree was issued which pointed out that this new regulation was to be valid also for the Southeast and that the special conditions prevailing in the Southeastern area had to be considered.
Q What were these special conditions?
A I only remember two points. One was the geographical conditions, the territory was of a rather special kind, it was a difficult mountainous area compared with the large forest areas in the east. The second point in question, if I remember correctly, was the following: On other fighting fronts there was a uniform and complete front where the band fights took place in the rear, whereas in the eastern area there was no such closed fighting front. Instead the band activities stretched over the whole area and were constantly fluctuating.
Q Was this regulation binding for the troops?
A Yes, just as much as all regulations.
Q Now, let us have a look at exhibit 232, it is on page 69 of the German text and on page 78 of the English text. I beg your pardon, I really refer to a different document, I mean the order by the Armed Forces Commander for the intensified combatting of bands in the winter 1942-1943. I will have to refer later to this order because I cannot find out what it is, or can you find out what it is?
A Exhibit 232, I am afraid I don't know the page number.
Q Exhibit 232, did you know that order?
A Yes, I did know it.
Q Was it initialed by you?
A I cannot say that from the document, I would have to have the original document.
Q I will show you the original. It is on page 69 of the English document book.
(The document is handed to the witness.)
A Yes, that order bears my initials.
Q It is on page 78 of the German document book, page 69 of the English text. What does the initial mean?
A It means, as I have already said, that the formulation of the order complies with the decisions of the Armed Forces Commander and/or with the orders given by superior officers and that he is formally in order.
Q And what was the cause on the 7th of December 1942 to issue an order concerning the intensified combatting of bands?
A That can be seen from the first few sentences, where there is some talk about the expansion of the over-all position in the Mediterranean and in that connection there is some talk about the increased inciting and supporting of insurgent movements in the Balkans through enemy forces.
Q Did this order primarily mean the military combatting of the bands or could anything be taken from it regarding a policy of terror?
A No, here it reads: intensified combatting of bands and therefore is an order intended for the military combatting of the band activities.
Q What does the expression mean at the bottom of the paragraph: "Every band formation which proclaims itself must be nipped in the bud, every enemy group which appears must be destroyed and exterminated immediately......"?"
A That means that the band, as such, had to be destroyed, that after the fighting it should no longer be in a position to proclaim itself as a band.
Q Did that mean that every individual member of the band was to be killed?
A No, it meant that the individual member of the band was no longer to be in a position to join up with a new band or to reorganize the old band.
Q What is understood by the expression "Combat Units" and "emergency units"? (Kamepfstaffel and Alarmeinheiten).
A These are organizational expressions, which are intended to increase the fighting strength of the own troops employed. They are merely organizational measures with a division or a regiment and which expresses the structure of a certain combat unit. May I say something else?
A I can just see from the original document that the omission in the document book is of quite a material nature. In the document here, that is the document which is reproduced in the document book, it looks as though Figure 2 followed immediately the demand for the destruction and extermination of the band groups, because it goes on to say: "This knowledge, forces us to an intensified conduct of warfare." In the original we see in the order, before the words. "This knowledge.." the following sentence:
"If we do not succeed up to spring in doing this we will not have fulfilled the task put to us. This is not only to apply to Serbia, but to Croatia as well, etc...."
Then it goes on to say, "this knowledge," that means the knowledge refers to the general task of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
Q Witness, we now turn to exhibit 233, it is on page 73 of the English document book and 81 of the German. This is a report on Experiences in connection with the dynamiting of the Gorgopotamos Bridge and it is dated 15 December 1942. The report bears your signature; why did you sign this report?
A Because it is not an order, which contains an evaluation or a reprimand, it is a report on experiences which can be seen by the subject. And a report on experiences constitutes no basic decision so it is therefore not binding for the recipient.
Q Now from the formulation, such as it is reproduced in the document book, one might easily assume that it was an order because it says for instance:
"Take Hostages! Arrest non-residents! Employment of the civilian population extensively and ruthlessly for the construction of fortification!"?
A If I may see the original I may possibly give an explanation.
(The document is handed to the witness.)
Here too the omissions distort the meaning. Looking at the original I see that this report on experiences has two parts, one is the chronological sequence of events such as it reads here in the document book, the second comprises the conclusions drawn from these events. The heading of that paragraph has been omitted. One can further realize that the conclusions contained under the letters A to E are a number of tactical conclusions, for instance the fact that all obstacles have to be guarded by machine gun fire, that the individual objectives are to be built up to the points of resistance. Then at the very end these are the paragraphs F and G, which in this document book appear of course, as very outstanding.
Q What is to be understood under the expression contained in paragraph "F": "to call to account the civilian who was strolling their previously, if necessary to shoot him"?
A That means here that the civilians who were to guard the railroad in the event that sabatage acts took place were to be taken to account. It means that an investigation was to take place whether the person concerned was through negligence or through aiding and abetting responsible and guilty or whether he himself had committed a sabotage act which was also a regular occurrence. "To take to account" means "investigate matters." and "make accessible to a legal investigation." that would be under those circumstances summary court martial so that if it had been proved that the person concerned was guilty and the proper requisites were in existance then it would be carried out. Then death penalty would be carried out.
Q The sentence reads on: "In case of a surprise attack, to punish the villages situated near the locality of the attack." Why under certain circumstances were the villages near these localities of the surprise attack to be punished?
A On the occasion of the very frequent sabatage on railroads it had been repeatedly established that the villages near the railroad line were the starting and supporting points of such sabatage and band enterprises, that the bands were quartered there, got food there, were directed there and found every kind of support; and this sentence can be referred back to the experience that on the occasion of such a surprise attack the villages near the surprise attack should be and could be punished.
Q Why was the civilian population asked to work on constructions of fortifications?
A The construction of fortifications means merely a building up of the security arrangements of the railroad line. That is, near the most important objectives: bridges, tunnels or rather difficult bends, steep slopes, et cetera.
There were special security measures. There were machine gun posts of a varying strength and they, of course, had to be dug in and such a construction of fortifications is meant here; and, in my opinion, it was entirely justified to call in the civilian population to help there because, after all, the railroad did not only serve military purposes but also economic purposes, in other words, the food supply of the population, the transport of passengers, et cetera. Besides, it was obvious that the bands and individual perpetrators of sabotage did not only fight against the occupational forces but also -- and that in Greece, too very much against the part of the population which were of a different opinion.
Q How do you know that?
A I knew it from reports which we received and I have found a rather interesting confirmation of that opinion. A few months ago I found in a periodical which appears in Vienna -- I believe it is entitled "Europaeische Rundsihan" and from that paper I remember as a confirmation the report of an interview with a Greek by the name of Sofianopolos. He was Foreign Minister of the Leftist Government which ruled in Greece for a certain period after the end of the war. He was an old fighter of the EAM and ELAS units which have been frequently mentioned here. This man who after all is in a position to know says as a refugee either in England or in the United States the following -
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I object to the witness quoting what he read in a newspaper.
THE PRESIDENT: For what reason?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Whatever he read in the newspaper is purely hearsay Your Honors. He can refresh his recollection regarding certain facts which he knew at the time -- he can tell about that but he is simply restating here what he read in the newspaper. I submit that is inadmissable.
THE PRESIDENT: The statement is in the nature of hearsay and only to the extent that it may refresh his memory on matters of which he has personal knowledge, the Tribunal is not interested.
Q Well, will you then continue?
A This man says the following.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, he is simply restating again what he read in this newspaper article.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be sustained.
Q We will then turn to Exhibit 234.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honors, I want to apologize for the fact that the witness continued exceptionally. I listened to the German translation and there the word "not" was omitted.
Q I continue with Exhibit 234, page 83 of the German text, and page 76 of the English Document Book. This is an evaluation of the situation sent from the Commander of the German troops in Croatia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. Did you know that document at the time?
A I don't believe I did. I was absent during the time and I don't believe that I read it after my return.
Q And the subsequent exhibit, 235?
A I believe that I knew it -- most likely I did.
Q This exhibit 235, page 79 of the English document book, after the subject, "Estimate of the Situation of the Enemy," it mentions the "Reich of the Supreme Communist Leader Tito." What is meant by this expression?
A May I remind you that today in another connection the problem was touched upon how the Italians occupied their area. On that occasion I talked about zones which they had installed for certain reasons and the Italians had evacuated a part of these zones. The Armed Forces Commander Southeast warned very strongly against such evacuations because it was quite obvious that in that case a new herd of bands would establish itself there and that is what actually happened; the Italians evacuated the area; we could not follow up fast enough and now we found that a new band area established itself here and we designated it rather ironically as the Reich of Tito and that is why it is put in in inverted commas here.
Q And in this evaluation there is some talk about 63,000 armed Tito men. Don't you think that that is rather a high figure?
A Yes, it shows here the numeric superiority which has already been mentioned and which also is one of the reasons for the heavy losses.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. We will adjourn at this time until nine o'clock tomorrow morning -- nine-thirty.
THE MARSHAL: The Court will be in recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 0930 hours 15 October 1947)