A. The Cetniks who were loyal to the Government were lead in spirit by Kosta Pecanac, who has often been mentioned.
Q. And what role did Kosta Pecanac play in this war?
A. In the First World War Pecanac was a leader of the insurgents around about the year 1916 or 1917, and in this war he was the oldish man who warned the population against any kind of insurgent movement or any kind of illegal activity, because by reason of his experience he was convinced that this only occurred at the cost of the Serbian population.
Q. And did he have any success with his warnings?
A. At the beginning, yes, in that district in which he was, heard it was usually peaceful. Later on---
Q. I don't think that came through on the translation. I asked you whether Pecanac had success with his warnings? Please repeat the answer.
A. In the first period he had quite definite success, above all in that area in which he was heard. It was extraordinarily peaceful at that time in this area. Later on his voice was drowned by Mihajlovic, as well as by the Communists.
Q. And did any other sections fight against the communists?
A. Yes, exactly the Mihajlovic Cetniks.
Q. Witness, on the last page of this document, Exhibit 112, there is a note under the 21st of November, that after an entry of the Cetniks after paying homage to Peter IInd and Kosra Pecanac, 20 communists were arrested, slaughtered and thrown into the Danube.
Q. Who arrested, slaughtered and throw these communists into the Danube?
A. According to the report here, the Cetniks.
Q. And was that unusual brutality?
A. In Serbia everything was possible. The conditions there could not be compared with any other area of Europe.
Q And did you frequently receive such kind of reports?
A These kind of reports partly confirmed and photographed appeared often enough.
Q What were the aims of the Communist movement in Serbia?
A Primarily they wanted to make Serbia into a Communist state.
Q And was there to be some kind of an internal revolutionary fight or a fight against the occupation powers?
A Both.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The witness has been asked to state the aims of the Communists in Serbia. I think he ought to be qualified to speak on that point.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q Have you had any definite experience, any definite basis or did you have any at that time, which justifies you to speak on the aims of the Communist movement in Serbia?
A Yes, we had numberous testimony from captured band members and in addition we intercepted the radio messages of the bands, although there weren't very many and we had therefore definite reports from as the term wont, "reliable sources."
Q And this fighting inside Serbia, did it come to any definite head while you were in the Southeastern area?
A No.
Q Which aims of the Communist movement in Serbia were recognizable to you from tho external fighting that is against the occupation powers?
A The external political aims, if I can call them that.
Q Noo perhaps more definite, the aims which tho Communist movement had in relation to the occupation power?
A The fighting against the occupation power.
Q And what was the attitude to their neighbors in the Balkans.
A Their external political aim, if one may call it that, this movement was undoubtedly a Communist Greater Serbia or the restoration of a Communist Panslavia. In any case an aim which was also directed against the neighboring states of Serbia, Hungary, Bulgaria and the newly created Croatia.
Q And did this situation have any influence on the attitude of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast toward the question of the recognition of the Tito movement?
A Insofar as this was also a reason for the fact that the question of the recognition of the non-recognition was a highly political question, and not a decision which the Wehrmacht Commander or the Commander in Chief Southeast could make.
Q. Witness, exhibit 100-B-27, this is a loose document submitted by the prosecution to document book 3, it is the interrogation of the Oberregierungerat Kiessel; did you know Kiessel?
A I don't remember that I have ever seen him or spoken to him. I know that he was the first collaborator of Thumer's.
Q During this interrogation Kiessel was in Belgrade prison on the 21st of March of this year, and among other things he was asked about the employment of a police battalion. Among other things it says that the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast knew about the subordination of this police battalion to the Chief of the General Staff of the Commander Serbia; is that correct?
A Yes, that is, it doesn't mean subordination to LieutenantColonel Grafenherst, but a subordination for the disposition of the troops, in contrast to the subordination for disposition by Thurner as administrative man. This question of subordination was known to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and he was in agreement with this regulation.
Q In this interrogation Kiessel speaks about the fact that Lieutenant-Colonel Grafenhorst had referred to your order when Kiessel protested against the Skela operation. First, a preliminary question concerning this Skela action, what was this Skela action?
A This Skela action was an attack on one or two cars which were occupied by German police officials and in which three or four were killed and thrown in the Save.
Q We will talk about that later on. What was done as a result of this attack and by whom?
A In the documents there are reports from which can be seen the following; that on 14 August at 1650 hours this attack took place in the village of Skela and on 15 August, that is immediately afterwards, as a reprisal a number of Communists were shot to death, the village was burned down or the houses in the village were burned down and also there is a supplementary report, according to which small numbers of villages residents were shot to death because they knew about this attack.
Q Kiessel maintains here in his interrogation that he protested against this reprisal action Skela, and when he protested LieutenantColonel Grafenhorst emphatically referred to your order; who was Grafenhorst?
A Grafenhorst was the Chief of the General Staff of the Commander Serbia.
Q Do you know whether or not Grafenhorst referred to your order to Kiessel?
A I don't know what Grafenhorst said to Kiessel. In any case he did not get the order, or as he described further on in his interrogation, the approval, from me.
Q Why not?
A First, because there was nothing for me to approve, I also did not approve anything. Then the report about the attack of 14 August in the afternoon at 1650 hours, and the report of the reprisal action, which had already been carried out, were both contained in the same daily report of 15 August. With the communication at that time it seems to me very doubtful if not impossible, that between the attack which took place at 1650 hours and then comes the report etc. and the decision to carry out the reprisal, it seems to me impossible that some kind of an approval or discussion had taken place; and thirdly it is very improbable that General Dankelman, who was completely justified to order reprisals himself, had made inquires through his chief because Dankelman knew exactly that Field Marshal List was on leave at that time, and that General Felmy was his deputy.
And, Dnakelman was not a man, who would have asked for approval from an equal, at that moment deputy superior for a measure which he could have carried out on his own authority and which he also had carried out.
Q Witness, you said that the report about the Skela incident arrived at the same time as the report about the intended reprisal measures, which can be seen from the daily report; do you know which day this could have been?
A The 15th of August, I know that exactly.
Q. And that must be the report contained in exhibit 127, document book 5, beginning on page 34 of the German, page 27 of the English document book. Which report do you mean there?
A. It is the report with the heading "Teletype No. 7688, 15 August, 1445." The daily report of the 15th of August.
Q. Yes, this is on page 4 of this document, it is on page 9 of the original. This will help you to find the English page quicker, page 9 of the original, Teletype 7688 from 15 August on page 33 of the English. What do you gather from this report?
A. As I already said the attack took place on 14 August - 1650 hours on a passenger car of the police company which was shot at by bandits with machine guns: the car was burned-out and the police killed. The search party found the bodies of one sergeant and one lieutenant thrown in the Save, and two sergeants were missing. In the same report it says on 15 August, that is the day of the report and the day immediately after the attack: the village of Skela burned to the ground and fifty Communists from Belgrade hanged there.
Q. And in this period, that must have been on the same day, was any connection made because of this with me Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. I already said I don't remember about that, and in this case because of the reasons of time mentioned, I think it highly impossible if not technically out of the question.
Q. How does it happen that you remember this case about Skela?
A. The affair of Skela in the middle of August was nevertheless the most malicious and cowardly attack which had taken place in that period.
Q. Kiessel states in his interrogation that the connection between you and Grafenhorst was very close; was that correct?
A. Unfortunately, it is not correct because of the very difficult communications.
Q. Could you telephone him at any time?
A. No, from the daily reports, from the complete daily reports, it can be seen how many acts of sabotage were undertaken on telephone lines, and how often attacks on Post Offices took place. In addition, one must also know that on the Belgrade-Salonika-Athens line, at this time this was a distance of about 1,500 or almost 2,000 kilometers, and on this line there were only overhead cables, that is a telephone line, which is only usual here on land. There were no underground cables, but only telephone poles and then plain wire and these went through most isolated districts. If the communication was interrupted in a place like this, then it took hours before the spot could be found, and then it took also a long time until it was repaired. If for instance, let us say ten telephone poles were sawn down, and of course this took place in a district where there were no trees at all, sometimes it took a whole day until the ten telegraph poles were set up again, therefore for two or three days we could not telephone at all.
Q. What about the connections with Grafenhorst's successor, Kewisch.
A. With Kewisch it was a much better because my staff was then in Salonika, and the distance was only about one half, there wore also more repair units, more signal forces available: however, I also experienced even in 1943 that sometimes one could not telephone for a whole day.
Q. Witness, we now come to prosecution book No. 4, at the beginning I read the documents which you know only from the trial. These are exhibits 115, 116, 119, 120, 121 and 123.
A. Those are the ones which I did not know.
Q. Yes the ones that you did not know. Among these is also contained exhibit 118, this is German page 30, English page 40; now what is your knowledge with respect to the incidents which are described in this document?
A. I know the incidents as far as they are reported, but I cannot say anything certain about them because the report is not complete.
Q. From the figures contained in this document, that is in these daily reports, it can be seen that the losses of the bands in comparison with the German losses was very high; can you give any explanation for this?
A. Yes, the losses by the bands were, according to our experience, very high in comparison to the German losses, because the bands were poorly trained and also in comparison with our troops were poorly equipped, but as far as pure figures go, in general they were stronger than they German troops, that is according to the German soldier they offered more targets-they were easier to shoot at because there were more of them. The bands were numerically stronger than the German troops, as a result they offered more targets and as a result, since there were more targets they also had more losses. I found this confirmed in figures about the present fighting in Northern Greece where the losses on the side of the rebels were in the same way sometimes even twenty times greater than the losses on the side of the regular Greek troops. Therefore, this must certainly be a typical aspect of the band fighting.
Q. From this daily report it can also be seen that German soldiers, who were captured by the bands, were released; did that happen regularly or frequently?
A. If that had happened regularly then it would have not been reported. The mere fact of the report of such an event shows the exception.
Q. What was done in the other cases by the bands with the German soldiers?
A. We often received reports to the effect that the prisoners were shot or that they had been found shot, or mutiliated, etc. This was discovered when the German troops came into these places, or else they were found by the population.
Q. Now please take Exhibit 120. This also belongs in itself to those which you learned for the first time in the trial here, but it is necessary to ask a question on it. The document is on page 40 of the German, page 53 of the English document book, exhibit 120.
A. Exhibit 120?
Q. Exhibit 120, these are daily reports which the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Belgrade.
It says here on page 42 of the German document book--and it will probably be on page 56 of the English, in the report from the 12th of the 10th, page 55 of the English:
"In Banat near Kevin and Dubevac appearance of small groops of insurgents in black uniform."
This note brings me to the question about the uniform of the bands in general and what information there was about this,
A Well, there can be no talk at all of a general uniform. It is exactly the present individual reports about the fact that bandits had been found in uniform shows that these were exceptions. The uniform of a regular army is typical and is, in spite of camouflage, to be recognized through the cut, through the shape of the helmet, through the equipment and, therefore, our own soldiers needs only once, at the beginning of such a campaing, to have a lecture about this with a board where the enemy soldiers are portrayed, and then he has the picture, let's say, of the American soldier or the Russian soldier, in his head.
Q And what were the characteristics of the bands?
A In the bands occasional uniforms appeared and this was the Serbian, German, Croatian, Italian and, later on, English, and they also wore occasionally certain badges, insignia.
Q And could one see them from a distance? Could one recognize them from a distance?
A No, in modern one must demand that such insignia, such uniform, must be recognizable at firing distance. That is normally 800 to 1,000 meters; and, in the same way, a soldier must be recognizable from a fast flying aircraft; but mostly a dirty stripe or star or piece of metal on a cap which one can turn round at a decisivemoment or which one can tear off, can never be insignia which can be recognizable from a distance.
Q You said already that for a soldier in the regular army it was necessary for his whole uniform and equipment to be typical. What was done in order always to learn how the members of these bands looked?
A Because there was no general uniform and equipment, our intelligence had to find out, as far as possible, every time what kind of bands we would probably be faced with in this area or during the next operation, in order to give the German soldier at least something to go on in the imminent fighting and it can be explained in this way that in this document it is repeatedly they especially stressed that the bands probably looked like this or like this or that they probably wore black uniforms or bore these and these insignia. If I am facing a regular army then I don't need every eight days or when fighting is just beginning to say to my own troops, "Your opponent will probably look like this," and then as I describe because he knows that, but every 14days I have to deal with another kind of band, which is under different leadership which has ether conuictions, and I have to fight three enemies in the same area, then as responsible commander I must take care that our own troops before the fighting know as much as possible about the enemy they are going to face.
Q And what about wealing the insignia of a Soviet star?
A That certainly happened in many cases, but if one has not seen the figures and the uniforms of such band members one's self, then one has to look for the Soviet Star through,--I would like to say through dirt and patches and holes; and quite often they took the Soviet Star away in time before we go there, in order not to be recognized as Communists partisans but to appear as the peaceful churchgoer or the herdsam or the farmer who was coming back from the cornfields or the tradesman who was going from one village to another.
Q And di you yourself see much band members?
A Oh, yes, I saw them for the first time in May 1942, I saw dead band members in Bosnia and observed a fight with bandits at a distance from about 400 to 500 maters.
Q Now, please take Exhibit 122. This is on page 45 in the German document book, page 60 in the English document book. This is a teletype in which there are several reports. Do you know about these reports?
A Yes, I know about these reports until I left, but also not in the mutilated form which is again presented here.
Q When were you absent?
A Until the 27th of September.
Q And to whom did these reports go?
Q These are reports of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast.
Q You just said that the reports were incomplete as they are portrayed here in the document beck. What is missing as far as you remember?
A Here, too, as in the documents dealt with this morning, all those statements are missing which were the reason for the fighting and for the counter measures of the German troops.
Q Witness, I will now give you the original, or rather, the photostat copy which was submitted by the Prosecution. I would now ask you just to find perhaps a few of the most characteristic passages which are not contained in the document book but which, however, give the reasons for the measures taken by the German troops.
AAt the moment it is very difficult to do this because, first of all, I have to find out the difference. I am locking at this document for the first time.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We will take our afternoon recess and in the meantime he can check up on the document.
THE MARSHAL: The court is in recess until three-fifteen.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACK:
Q. Witness, before the recess I gave you the original Exhibit 122, and I asked you whether the teletype messages contained in the document book were complete or what was lacking in them. Now, meanwhile you have had the opportunity of looking at them, at least superficially. Can you tell me of some particularly characteristic passages which are not contained in the German and English document books, but which serve to prove why the actions against the partisans were taken? What are such passages?
A. I looked over this book just now. What I did find is correct. That is to say I found some which are not contained in the document book of the Prosecution. For instance, on 23rd September in the Daily Reports in actions at 10 Km NW of Lapovo and in Slot where the local inhabitants took part, 146 insurgents were captured. In the Daily Report of 27th September recruiting by force of insurgents near Cacak.
Q. What does that mean? What does it mean, "recruiting by force?"
A. That means that the bands were taken from the population, and they were taken by force, and in most cases they were threatened with being shot, and that is how they got their recruits. It goes on to say typically in the neighborhood of Cacak chain gangs shanghied into armed service rebelled against the insurgents. Then here we have a report of the 29th of September where it says insurgents terrorized the parishes of Mockovo North of Alecinac and Popovac NW of Paracin. Cetniks near Krusevac proved their worth against the Communists. In the report of the 1st of October, the following figure is given coal mines. Jelasnica, East of Nigh, has been destroyed by the insurgents. At the hemp factory at Basaid two hundred wagons were burned. In a report of the 3rd of October, led mine Kapaonik, attacked; power station blown up, three employees killed. Then in a report of of 7th of October I find attacks on railways at a locality named Gleisnic has been destroyed; another at a place called Globoda, the railway conductor wounded broken dead.
Attempts on a long-distance train-Vienna-Semlin without success. Another example on 10th October the mine at Dobraseca raided; explosives captured. 14th October, as a result of railroad tracks blown up near Aracicevo, the long-distance train #867 was derailed. Attack by the train escort was repelled. These were armed soldiers on leave. You could change the train, and the line was repaired in twenty-four hours. 15 October, peasants in Krusevac have been forced to commit acts of sabotage. Twelve telephone lines in Belgrade were destroyed. That is what I found so far.
Q. Witness, in the report of the 26th of September 1941, which is on Page 5 of the document and comes from Page 7 of the original, there is a remark under Figure arabic 4, "Colonel Foertsch 27/9/41--12:00 hours CACOI." What does that mean?
A. That is the announcement that I have returned at the Tatoi Airfield near Athens on 27th of September after my leave.
Q. And when did you take up service again?
A. On 28th of September. After that my initials become recognizable again.
Q. And you always initialed everything you saw of these papers and documents.
A. Yes, I always did that. May assistants, if they wanted to be in the right, could only contradict me by saying, "Here are your initials; you signed this."
Q. In some of the Daily Reports which are contained in this exhibit differences are made in the cases, when the enemy had losses, between "people killed" and "people shot." Why was this difference made?
Q. Quite generally, one may say that the designation "killed" meant people killed in battle, whereas the designation "people shot" meant that in connection with the battle they were shot.
Q. Were these shootings done after sentence had been passed?
A. I assume so.
Q. How did you explain that?
A. I can explain that by two orders. The one is the order mentioned today, by Field Marshal List, concerning the treatment of the male population in the mopped-up areas, of 4 October. And the other is the order by Boehme which has also been mentioned today, dated 9th October, concerning the participation--I believe it's called, of the courts martial when fighting insurgents. This is the last document in Volume II.
Q. Did you hear anything from a member of Department III or an Army judge about these things, namely, whether those shootings were done after proper sentence had been passed by court martial?
A. General Kuntze--I don't remember the exact date, but I think it must have been about the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942-appointed the Army judge, Colonel Gruen, and sent him to Serbia to join the divisions there, telling him that within his supervisory powers about the divisional judges etc., he should examine and to find out whether with the divisions there existed clear knowledge of all the regulations. And I know that Colonel Gruen, at the time when he returned, reported to General Kuntze that all was well.
Q. Were these shootings concerned with reprisals?
A. No, shootings as reprisals or retaliations had nothing to do with sentence by court martial. They are reprisals carried out without sentence by a judge.
Q. And, according to what procedure were those people dealth with who were not shot as a retaliation but connected with the battle, as it was called?
A. According to the procedure under court martial.
Q. Did you yourself hold summary courts martial?
A. No, I never was a commander of troops in the Southeast. I did not have the authority as a judge or could I issue orders, but later on when I commanded troops I never was faced with that situation.
Q. Were you ever present at a summary court martial of this type?
A. No, never.
Q. Did you know the general decrees covering summary courts material?
A. By and large, yes.
Q. Do you think that your assumptions, namely, the shooting on the basis of a summary court martial, that is to say that shootings were proceeded by a summary court martial, was always possible for the troops in combat?
A. I can only express an assumption on this. The assumption is this: I can imagine a situation where the troops--let me say used a simplified procedure, although every precaution had been taken to have summary courts martial ordered by the commanding officers concerned. But I can imagine and I would like to state again, namely, assuming now that in the event of its being entirely clear that--lets say three bandits were coming out from the forest with guns--it was found before witnesses that these three men had just been fighting and that thereupon a summary court martial passed its sentence. As I say, this is what I find myself in a position to assume, if I'm trying to feel with the troops at that moment as it were.
Q. Now, if the troops found themselves in a position where they were also being attacked at the same time, did they have time in that case even to have an extremely brief summary court martial, or would it be possible under those circumstances, which are so obvious, that the shootings were carried out immediately without further ado?
A. Well, I can't give you an answer on oath about that, because this hypothesis is not entirely exhaustive. Of course, I can imagine that a situation like this might arise, but I couldn't say that it has actually occurred. I cannot tell you is how I would have acted.
Q. Why were these bandits shot?
A. Because they were franc-tireurs. And this was a decree covering franc-tireurs. Under that decree there was only the possibility of acquittal if they were innocent or a death sentence if they were guilty.
Q. From these Daily Reports it becomes clear that in some cases it's been reported that a certain number of men had been shot, and on other occasions it was reported that a certain number of men were shot after a summary court. What is the difference there?
A. Well, in my opinion the difference is simply in the form of reporting. The report had to be made as briefly as possible. Anyone who ever drew up a report, particularly for wireless transmission, knows how very important it is to save ever word possible. And there were special decrees covering the possibility that, for instance, the people in charge of Signal Service, the LDN's, had orders to have every wireless message, before it went out, scrutinized as to whether it could not be cut down further. I know from my own experience on my own staff that as far as the man in charge of the Signal Service was concerned I had given him full powers to cut down these reports as much as possible. And I know then that the experts working on these things came along with complaints to the effect -"Now, he's cut something out which was particularly important to me." But the necessity for cutting down existed, and, therefore, in the case of many reports, the term "by summary court martial" was left out if these messages were passed on by wireless or on a teletype line which have overworked staffs. In the case of written reports it was then made up later on. From my knowledge of the documents there is one example I recollect at present, and I happen to know the Exhibit number. It is Exhibit 208. There it says in the Daily Report of 18th of July, that 250 partisans have been shot. This report was passed on by wireless or teletype, and the Ten-days reports concerning the same period of time, which usually was delivered by courier because it was lengthly, contains exactly the same figure in exactly the same period of time with exactly the same formulations, but it adds the words "summary court martial." This is but one example which I happen to be struck by.
Q. The omission of the words "summary court martial" in these reports does not mean, in other words, that the summary court martial had not been convened?
A. No, I said before, as a general rule it's simply the manner in which these reports had been formulated. For tactical reasons they had to be abbreviated.
Q. Witness, you mentioned just now the so-called LED, the man in charge of Signal. Did he have anything to do with enemy communications?
A. No, he was the officer or NCO of the technical corps who was in charge of the technical side of passing on news of the staff. In other works, he is the man who supervises telephone lines, teletype installations, the wireless installations, etc. And he was responsible for the fact that one of those instruments was always available and in order. It was also his responsibility that a report coming from I/a should be passed on more quickly then one coming from the Catholic Army Corps priest.
Q. That's enough. Thank you very much. I simply wanted to make this quite clear because in connection with LDN, the term "intelligence" was used by the Translator which I think is wrong. In one of the reports contained in Exhibit 122, from which you have quoted, it says that an express train had been raided and travellers plundered. Were we here concerned only with German soldiers?
A. No, it says in this report further 17 killed, including one German NCO; 15 injured (one German soldier). There must have been included civilians too.
Q. You mean native civilians?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, let us turn to Exhibit 124, which is the last document in Document Book IV. It's on Page 80 of the German and page 132 of the English book. These are reports by teletype. Are these reports to your staff?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you receive knowledge of these reports?
A. Apart from the ones which came in during my absence I probably did. I think almost certainly, but I cannot say with actual certainty from my initials whether I did or not.
Q. Do they offer anything new in new in their contents as compared to the previous ones and the things we discussed in connection with the previous document books?
A. No. most of these things are repetitions which had occurred at least three or four times in the other document book. Only the Ten-days reports at the end of the document are new in this case.
Q. Are these reports complete or are they again mutilated?
A. Here again we have only small paragraphs which have been taken down.
Q. Among these reports there is one dated the 30th of October. Did you receive that?
A. I could not say that with certainty because in the days between the 30th of October and the 1st or 2nd of November the staff changed its position. It went from Athens to Saloniki.
Q. How was this done?
A. As usual this was done in stages by staggered movements.
Q. How is that to be understood?
A. What I mean is that one part of the staff went ahead to the new GHQ, whereas the other part remained behind in the old one so as too long interruption of work could be avoided.