It did not remain effective very long.
Q. Please turn to Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive on page 26 of the German text and page 37 of the English Document Book. What do these paragraphs show?
A. From Paragraph 4 it can be seen that the administration of the occupied territories was established by the OKH and Paragraph 5 shows that the Military Commander Serbia, who at that time held this title, was independent. From this independence he only with great dislike subordinated himself to the command of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. In the course of time this resulted in considerable friction.
Q. Are you thinking about any particular incidents when you talk about friction?
A. Two major incidents, I can remember clearly. One was the establishment of the Nedic government which took place without any previous notification of Armed Forces Commander Southeast, and the second was the question of armament of the Serbian police and gendarmerie. However, there were quite a number of individual cases which I can not remember. I, only have the total impression--quite clearly even to-day-that at that time we had to protest against this condition.
Q. Now, we turn to Exhibit No. 10, German page 27, English page 38, commitment of the offices of Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the Army area.
A. This document I did not know. About the commitment of such an office of the Rosenberg department I only heard when the order was submitted to me here which is to be found in the documents of the prosecution about the allocation of this office of Rosenberg to another staff.
Q. By this do you mean Exhibit No. 68, that's in Document Book II of the Prosecution, page 105 of the German, page 137 of the English Document Book?
I think it is there.
A. I am talking about Exhibit 68.
Q. What can be seen from this?
A. From this can be seen that this detachment Rosenberg was economically and as far as discipline was concerned put under the command of the Commander Southern Greece as of the 1st of October. This became necessary for the following reasons: The Commander of the Serbian Army rear area No. 560 was after the conclusion of the operations in Greece no longer needed. The staff was re-formed into the Staff of the Commander Salonika-Aegean. Thus the Staff was transferred from Athens to Salonika. This detachment Rosenberg was supposed to remain in Athens and now had to receive food, supplies, pay, leave orders, etc, from some other office, in so far as the people who belonged to this detachment were soldiers who had been drafted by the Army. For this reason this detachment was subordinated to the Commander Southern Greece and remained in Athens.
Q. And did this new allocation of the Rosenberg detachment have any kind of effect with reference to the objective tasks with which this staff of Rosenberg was commissioned?
A. No, in no manner.
Q. But the Document 68 says that the Rosenberg detachment is also assigned for discipline. How far could disciplinary measures be taken against this staff?
A. This disciplinary allocation concerned merely questions of military discipline. For example, if NCO Meyer of the detachment did not salute a lieutenant, he had to be punished, or at least be remonstrated with, or if a private of such and such a name came back late from a leave, he had to be punished for that, or if corporal so and so got on some street which was out of bounds there had to be some authority that could punish him or otherwise there would be soldiers who, as far as their physical needs as well as far as their discipline was concerned, lung in the air, so to speak.
Q. From whom then did the Rosenberg detachment receive their commissions? That is, for its activity.
A. I can't say that, but I assume from an office of the Reichsleiter Rosenberg. Certainly not from a military office and not from the Military Armed Forces Commander South East.
Q. Then, in the time which followed, were you at all interested in what this Rosenberg detachment did at all?
A. This detachment Rosenberg, after this bread allocation had been signed by me, so to speak, was altogether forgotten by me. Probably, I must have asked at the time what kind of a crowd is that as one was wont to say - and if I think about it now I remember that I have been told that they make ideological studies or something like that. The detachment Rosenberg I first started to think about at the beginning of 1944. At that time there was a question of saving personnel and the Commander South East in Belgrade got the order to make suggestions how personnel could be saved. Also, as far as non-military 10 0ct.
-A-LU-21-2-Leonard (Int. Evand-Scharf) offices were concerned.
The then case worker, Major Theilig, the 1-D of my staff, came to me and suggested to me to propose that this detachment Rosenberg should be completely dissolved. I was particularly glad to sign this after having obtained the permission of my commanderin-chief, Field Marshal von Weichs.
Q. And was the dissolution of the staff carried out at that time?
A. Not at that time.
Q. Why not?
A. I can't tell exactly but I assume that the OKW could not prevail with its point of view or, perhaps, did not want to settle the matter. I do not know.
Q. Now, after the description of your career and after the descriptions which are contained in the affidavits which I submitted today, one must first of all assume that questions of art and research interest you so much that you had to be interested in the Rosenberg detachment.
A. For such questions I would never have considered the detachment Rosenberg if I had remembered it to be competent. On my own staff, I had an expert for the protection of art, a Dr. von Schoenebeck, and if, officially or unofficially, such questions interested me, I asked this real expert. For example, he made very good summaries, which were disseminated in the entire area, regarding the largest and most important places of art and culture, especially in Greece. He was consulted in questions of fortifications if any points of culture were touched, and he was consulted in all matters which concerned the preservation of art treasures.
Q. Witness, now please look at Exhibit #12 on page 31 of the German and 43 of the English document book. On the second page of it there is an entry for the 11th of April, 1944, and on the 11th of April, 1944, you were described, by Field Marshal von Weichs, as a man who knew the Balkans well.
A. I consider this an affable exaggeration, but I admit that possibly more than many other people I concerned myself with problems of the Balkans because I had to and wanted to concern myself with these problems.
Q. Did you think that the period of three years which you spent in the Balkans would be sufficient to have obtained exact information of the Balkans?
A. That depends on what preliminary knowledge and education one had. For the first time, I concerned myself with Balkan problems when I came down there, and it depends very much on how far one wants to stretch the concept of knowledge.
Q. On page 3 of this document is an entry pertaining to your career, the 1st of October, 1924 - High School for Politics, Did you over visit this school?
A. No, this entry here is a camouflage entry. During this year I was in the officers' school and this is simply a formal entry for budget purposes which has nothing to do with my actual employment.
Q. And now to Exhibits 13 and 14 on German page 33-A, English 48-A and German 34, English 49, with regard to the Commissar Order, During your activity in the South East did you see this Commissar Order?
A. This Commissar Order I saw for the first time in my life in the cell of the Nurnberg jail.
Q. Please look at the distribution list on the document on page 33-A of the German, page 48-A of the English; and page 37 of the German and 54 of the English. Is there any kind of office there which was in the South East?
A. As far as I know, in my opinion, not.
Q. Well, then, was this Commissar Order at all valid for the South East?
A. It never had any application in the South East.
Q. Now, please take Exhibit #15. That is page 38 in the German and page 55 in the English document book. It's the so-called Fuehrer Directive #31.
What importance has this document with reference to the South East?
A. This concerns a Fuehrer directive which gives orders to the Armed Forces Commander South East. Concerning the extension of tasks which Field Marshal List has mentioned and explained here in the witness stand and I can't say anything else myself.
Q. And did it extend your own sphere of work?
A. My own sphere of work, of course, was extended greatly by that but the staff was not enlarged, it only received a naval liaison officer and an air force liaison officer with the necessary clerical workers.
Q. Do you know whether the Military Commander South East, before the Wehrmacht Commander was created, ever received directives from the OKH?
A. The Commander South Greece and the Commander Saloniki-Agean were also created only by this directive. That is, in consequence of this directive. The Military Commander Serbia already existed as an office and I assume had been given the necessary fundamental directives by the OKH.
Q. After the creation of the Wehrmacht Commander South East, did other offices have any influence on the executive authority in the South East?
A. As far as I remember, one can certainly say that about Himmler as far as police matters were concerned. As far as Goering goes, with regard to the Four Year Plan and all kinds of different economic questions, and, as regards the Foreign Office, they had influence with reference to all kinds of matters which I cannot define any better today than I could at that time.
Q. Exhibit No. 17, German Document Book page 46, English page 63, speaks about the setting-up of concentration camps which the Commisarial Minister of the Interior in Serbia received was instructed to erect. Did this order rest on an order from the Wehrmacht Commander South-East as possessor of executive power?
A. No, as can be seen from this document, the Military Commander Serbia, previous to this communication, ordered the establishment of a so-called concentration camp. Even this communication was written before the Armed Forces Commander South-East took over command of Serbia, so that Serbia was taken over by us when this institution already existed.
Q. Exhibit No. 18, page 48 of the German, page 66 of the English Document Book contains entries in the War Diary about shootings of Communists and Jews; under the 5th and 17th of July 1941, were special orders issued by the Wehrmacht Commander, South-East before these shootings took place?
A. No, I cannot remember any such order.
Q. Now, to Document Exhibit No. 19. These are teletypes about an attack on the car of General Lomschar. This has a hand-written note on it as to why no counter-measures --- no hostages were taken in Valjevo. This is at the end. Was this addition written by you?
A. This is not an addition; this is a question which I wrote down myself by hand to the referent, the Ic -
Q. In your staff?
A. Yes, in my staff.
Q. And what was the aim of this note?
A. When such reports came in I had to clarify them for my commander-in-chief, and for further report to the OKW everything that could be clarified at all by way of reports; in order not to have them writing back asking what they were all about, I asked the I-C here as to these two things.
Q. And then what took place in consequence of your note?
A. I don't know whether the I-C actually inquired about that again.
Q. But do you know about counter-measures because of this attack?
A. Probably; I cannot say that for sure, but probably countermeasures must have been reported, even if the I-C did not inquire again. In fact, these counter-measures did occur , as I have seen from the documents of the Prosecution, on the 20th of July.
Q. Now, please, in connection with this, look at Exhibit 23, on page 57 of the German and 78 of the English document book: Activity reports of the 704th Infantry Division, on the second page the entry of the 20th of July. There it states shooting to death of 52 Communists, 17 of them in Valjevo, in reprisal for the attack on the car of Brig. Gen. Lomschar, Commanding Officer of the 724th Infantry Regiment on the 18th of July 1941, pursuant to the order of the 816th Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters, Uzice.
Now, the teletype , Exhibit No. 19, was initialed by you on the 19th?
A. Yes.
Q. Counter-measures were taken on the 20th, and you asked about the counter-measures. Is there any connection there? Is that possible?
A. Such a connection I consider to be impossible for the following reasons: First of all, this hand-written note was not an order, neither from the Commander-in-chief nor from me, who was not authorized to give any such order. Secondly, from the times given in this tele-type, that is also chronologically,a putting into effect of the reprisal measures would have been impossible through these notes. This teletype took 13 hours from Serbia to my I-C (G-2).
Q. Witness, I will now show you the original of the photostat submitted by the Prosecution. (Document handed to witness.) Please check your description of the time taken with the help of this original.
A. As I have said, it was sent off on the 18th at nineteenthirty; at eight -forty five, on the 19th , it arrived at the Department I-C. Such reports were usually submitted in the course of the day, and on the 19th it was actually submitted to me, as I can see from my initial. Or it is possible that it was submitted only in the evening, when the usual daily reports were submitted. The communications from Athens to Belgrade were very bad. Now, if one considers that from Belgrade to the Sub-Area Headquarters Uzice, and from Uzice to the Serbian Gendarmerie -- it would have been necessary to telephone again, it would, according to my knowledge -- with communications as they were then -- already for this reason , have been completely impossible that this request to the 1-C should have resulted in the reprisal measures.
Q. And was this shooting reported to the Wehrmacht Commander South-East?
A. I consider it probable. However, I cannot prove that from the documents.
Q. What about the reprisal measures reported on the 20th of July -these shootings? What is your opinion? Or what was your opinion at that time?
A. That is the basic question: whether retaliation measures are justified -- if I understand you correctly.
Q. I also mean that, too, but primarily I mean now a question of whether that was introduced by the Wehrmacht Commander SouthEast or whether the shootings rested on an order which was already valid before the Wehrmacht Commander South-East had executive power.
A. The Armed Forces Commander South-East did not introduce any such measures. In Serbia there must have already existed orders by the OKW or by the OKH in that sense because, after all, we took over Serbia on the 23rd of July with -- if I may say so -- such conditions prevailing.
Q. Well, then, what was the attitude of the Office of the Wehrmacht Commander South-East, and your own opinion with regard to such measures?
A. One has to start from the following premises: As I said before, these sabotage acts, band fights, and other illegal acts of the population are contrary to international law. They were not only directed against the German Armed Forces, against which they were meant to be directed, but also against the indigenous population -- that is, against at least part of the indigenous population, and against the interests of the indigenous population.
On the other hand, these illegal acts could not be carried out without the aid of the indigenous population - and actually did find the aid of the indigenous population. Under these prerequisites that have been described by other witnesses here explicitly, it was only in the fewest cases possible to catch the real perpetrators of these crimes; reprisal measures, in view of the co-responsibility of the population, were indispensable, and could not be avoided.
Q Now, what is your attitude towards the question of how far one could go with these measures and in particular what was your opinion of the attitude of the OKW in this connection? Were any steps taken against the opinion of the OKW?
A The Armed forces Commander Southeast and the later Commander in Chief Southeast time and again opposed such collective measures in principle. As I said previously before the office took the attitude that the best and surest means was always sufficient strength of troops, and we put forward this attitude to the OKW?, and we pointedout our attitude and our opinion on the principal attitude of the OKW time and again; but the unavoidability in many cases, as fan as I am concerned at least in the course of further developments I could not possibly deny.
Q Therefore, did you want to take steps against the OKW and its attitude because the OKW was obstinate and demanded that these collective measures should be carried out and because you in contrast to that thought that the measures should be applied in a reasonable way?
A For such reprisal measures I always considered the following prerequisites to be correct. One, the perpetrators cannot be taken. Two, the reprisal measure must be carried out by a responsible office whose rights are clearly defined; and three, as far as possible they are to affect only such people that stood in an inner--connection with the incidents, that is as far as possible.
Q Now, was anything done against the views of the OKW that the reprisal measure should be carried out without going into these special conditions and that they should be carried out obstinately and as collective measures?
A Yes.
Q In which way?
A I myself, of course, do not know all the steps and all the objections clearly. I can't remember them cleanly, but I know for sure that General Field Marshal List, for example, in Summer 1941 protested in a particularly aggressively put teletype which was addressed personally to Keitel himself against the methods which were asked for by the OKW.
I myself drafted this teletype at the order of the Field Marshal, and I know that I put it in the hands of my personal orderly officer so that he should see to it that it was dispatched; and that after that, as I will point out later, I personally verbally reported to Keitel at the order of the Field Marshal. Then I know, and my recollection has been refreshed by letters which date from that period, that General Kuntze himself protested to the OKW as far as these points were concerned and found absolutely no understanding at all. I know that General Loehr tried to do something about it, that is, against theas you say - stubborn attitude of the OKW, and I myself have utilized many an opportunity when I was at the OKW to do the same.
Q Now, please look at Exhibits 20, 21, and 22, starting on page 50 of the German Document Book, and page 70 of the English Document Book. These are so--called reports of events, reports of the chief of the Security Police and of the SD. You have already stated that you didn't see these documents at that time, but nevertheless, you give me cause to ask the following question. By whom and to what extent had the SD been attached to the Military Administration in the Southeast?
AAttached, incorporated, as far as I remember it, not at all. By whom the SD offices had been sent to Serbia, I don't know. When we took over Serbia the staff of the Military Commander Serbia had already been formed.
Q But later on after the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast took over the executive power, was there collaboration with the SD?
A I should like to make a difference there between the following points. There was no SO office for the entire Southeast. I personally and my staff collaborated with the SD offices as far as the exchange of communications was concerned.
Q And could you say how the SD worked?
A May I still add something about the Commander Serbia. As far as I remember to the Commander Greece and Saloniki--Agean no SD office was attached at all, at least not in the beginning. As far as Serbia was concerned, I already said what the situation was like; in how far collaboration of the staffs of the Commanders with the SD went. Well, I, of course, can't say that in detail.
Q Could you see how the SD worked?
A No.
Q But you heard, about it at that time. What did you imagine the SD was?
A Well, the SD was, as far as we knew and as fan as we felt, a state and police office which after all we could not just get rid of like that. If I understand your question correctly, you are thinking about what one now-a-days considers to be extricably with the SD.
Q Yes, that is what I am talking about.
A Such a thing did not exist at the time. A thought about an illegal and even criminal action of the SD never occurred to me while I was in the Southeast area.
Q Do you know whether the Einstzgroups of the SD in Belgrade reported directly under the Chief of the Security Police of the SD and finally to Himmler without another intermediate office being in the Southeast?
A I considered it absolutely certain because after all the SD was not subordinate to any military office so that there was no necessity to report through Wehrmacht channels.
Q And now Exhibit 25 on page 62 of the German and page 86 of the English Document Book. This also belongs to those documents which you only got to know here, but nevertheless I would ask you to look at the document and to say for which sphere this supplement to the OKW Directive 31 was valid. In figure one, the expression "Southeast Front" is contained, what was meant by it.
A This order was applicable for the eastern theater of war. Here it says "Southeastern Front", then it goes on, "the enemy still being in the Dnjeper area."
Q Therefore this order didn't even arrive in the Southeast, that is, in the Balkans?
AAs far as I think, not, for it was after all only meant for the East.
Q Witness, how please turn to pare 1 of the German book, page 91 of the English Document Book. This is Exhibit no. 27. It is a teletype from the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast of the 29th of July, and it is directed to the Commander Serbia, "OKW deems it requisite that death sentences for sabotage be carried out by hanging and that in addition all other means of intimidation which are customary with the residents of the country should be employed." Why has this expression been used which is rather unusual in military language "The OKW deems it requisite"?
That was done quite intentionally in order to show to the Commandeer Serbia that the Armed Forces Commander Southeast wanted to keep as far as possible away from the methods which are mentioned here. This order arrived at a time when Field Marshal List was on leave. With the approval of the Deputizing Commander Southeast, General Felmy, it was passed on with this expression to indicate our dis-agreeing attitude.
Q This formulation in the passing on of OKW orders, was this form frequently chosen?
A. I can't say that in detail. In cases in which a passing on could not be avoided and in which one wanted to show that this was not our ideas, I have used such forms of expression.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Rauschenbach, the Tribunal desires to have a conference with representatives of the Prosecution and the Defense in connection with matters which were presented earlier this afternoon, and for that reason we will adjourn at this time. The Tribunal will stand adjourned until Monday morning, October 13th, at ninethirty a.m.
THE MARSHAL: The Court is in recess until nine-thirty Monday morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 13 October 1947, at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 13 October 1947, 0930-1630, Justice Carter presiding,
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom except von Weichs who is still in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
DEFENDANT HERMANN FOERTSCH DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q Witness, we were discussing prosecution documents, Document Book I, Exhibit 28. In this Exhibit 28, German Document Book No. 72, and English Document Book I, page 92, have you ever heard about the report contained in document book about the shooting of communist functionaries?
A I can't say with certainty but I think I have seen the report.
Q Witness, now I hand you the original, a photostat copy. What can you assume from this photostat in excess of what is contained in the document book? The measures mentioned in this report on the basis of orders of the Wehrmacht Commando South East -- were they carried out?
A No. I assume from the original that Communists were described as especially responsible for the unrest, that the situations are judged to be thus: that the unrest as it is called here was caused mostly by the Communists, and because of the directions they received from Moscow.
To date there is no reason to worry about large actions as long as the Serbian people and the Cetniks do not collaborate with the Communists. And one can assume from this that up until this period, the beginning of August, on the whole, mostly police actions were carried out, and that the Commander in Serbia intended in the future, as he writes, principally to undertake police actions and in exceptions to advance against the collecting points of the bands with large numbers of troops.
Q Did you know Exhibit 29 on page 73 of the German and on page 94. of the English Document Book before this trial?
A The document as such, no, but probably the report contained in it addressed to the Commander Southeast.
Q I will come back to these individual reports later. Exhibit 30, German 77, English page 99, contains a report of the Wehrmacht Liaison Office in Belgrade. What was the task of this Wehrmacht Liaison Office?
A I am not quite certain, either it was an office which was concerned with the care for the troops and propaganda or else it was an intelligence office.
Q Was this office subordinate to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
AAs far as I can remember, it was allocated to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and was subordinate directly to the corresponding department of the OKW, but I can't say that with certainty.
Q Have you seen this report of the 31st of July, 1941?
A I knew it because I have initialed it.
Q Did this report have any effect on the orders of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A I don't know of any such effect.
Q And now to Exhibit 31--it is on the German page 86, English page 111. This document bears your initials at the top as of 11th of August. It is a teletype.
A This is the answer of the German General in Zagreb to an inquiry from the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast about the shooting of insurgents in Croatia.
Q And who carried out these shootings?
I don't know with Certainty, probably Croatian officers because at that time in Croatia we only had weak security troops near the railroad lines and a few in the Bosnian-Serbian frontier territory.
Q What influence could the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast take on the happenings at that time in Croatia?
A Such a taking of influence was not given. The German General in Zagreb was not subordinate to us at all.
Q Then take Exhibit 36 on page 124 of the English Document Book. This is also a teletype. What can you tell us about this?
A This is a teletype of the High Command of the 18th Corps which was at that time stationed in Greece and it deals with incidents in Northern Greece and Crete. They show that at that time, the beginning of August, individual sabotage acts did occur also in Greece.
Q And Exhibit 37, German Book 101 and English 128--contains a report to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast through the Commander Serbia and amongst other things it contains the note that in Zagreb persons who committed attempts and 98 Communists and Jewish hostages were shot. Did you or your Commander in Chief have any kind of influence on these events?
A No, for this applies to what I have said just before.
Q This concerns Croatia?
A Yes, this concerns Croatia.
Q I now come to Document Book II. I will read to you, first of all, the numbers of those exhibits which you got to know only during this trial and please confirm to me whether the numbers are right: Exhibits 40, 44, 46, 47, 51, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73, 74, 75 and 77. You only got to know these documents for the first time during the proceedings here.
A Yes, that is correct.
Q And how does it happen that exactly in this document book there are comparatively large numbers of them which you didn't know before?
A Because this document book covers many events which happened during my absence.
Q This document book contains excerpts from daily reports of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast during the period from the 23rd of July to the 1st of September, 1941. Please state how these daily reports of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast originated and on which basis these reports were made.
A: The daily reports of the subordinate commanders came in, in general, during the late afternoon or the evening and then they were worked on by the experts concerned and compiled into an individual report, which was then submitted to me. After this, these matters were either verbally reported to the Commander-in-Chief or else the reports were submitted to him and then they went to the OKW Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Armed Forces Operational Staff) and they had to arrive so that by the next day early in the morning they could be submitted there.
Q: Did you know about all these reports of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A: Of course, as far as I was present.
Q: In the document book of the prosecution, do the excerpts there give a sufficiently complete picture of the occurrences?
A: No, in my opinion these reports are only a selection and moreover this selection is definitely mutilated.
Q: I now draw your attention especially to several reports and perhaps you can tell me where there are special gaps. Turn please, first of all, to page 5 of the German document book. This is a report from the 7th of August.
A: In the report from the 7th of the 8th-
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, where is it in English?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I don't think there is very much difference between the pages. In the English, it also begins on page 1 of the document, the sequence will be approximately the same and it will be page 4 or page 5 in the English. This exhibit is Exhibit No. 39 and it also begins on page 1 of the English document book, and it contains numerous reports and an approximately page 5 of the English document book is a report that reads at the top "Morning report from the 8th of 8th daily report, Commander Southeast from the 7th of the 8th, 1942".BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH: