In actual fact, however, it was different, because subsidiary governments existed that had partly been informed from above and on the other hand were also formations of which I didn't know anything. And we must consider that I was stationed in Athens and these things took place in Belgrade, that the communications were bad and other means of communications were bad too, that I had a number of other tasks too so that it was quite possible that the knowledge of such occurrences did not reach me.
Q Field Marshal, I believe that we all agree that you were a very busy man and that you had many tasks in the Southeast, that you were the fourth or fifth ranking Field Marshal in the whole German army. Do you mean that a mere Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS was able to dominate you?
A I may say that on paper certainly, tut if one knows the situation and the prevailing conditions, one must realize that in times of tension that we lived in, that endeavors existed on the part of the SS to play their own part and I have already mentioned the example of the forming of a government and the example of the armed police. Therefore, if on the occasion of normal events where I should have been asked previously whether it was correct to nominate a new government in Serbia, if I have not been informed about such occurrences which are the most important thing that one can possibly imagine, if for days I don't know anything about such occurrences, it can be just as easily explained that I was not informed of a number of other occurrences and that in spite of all power which I had on paper, this SS Obergruppenfuehrer and Prussian State Councillor had done what he deemed advisable behind my back.
Q Field Marshal you protested to OKW against the formation of a government in Serbia without your previous approval. Isn't that correct?
A No. I did not protest to the OKW. Instead, I opposed the fact that State Councillor Turner or rather his superior, General Danckelmann, did not inform me. I did not make representation of the OKW. The OKW for its own part had asked me what had happened, and all I could say as a reply was that I myself had not been informed.
Q You were quite annoyed at having a government formed without your previous knowledge or approval, were you not?
A That is correct, of course.
Q Did you take any steps to correct that situation so that in the future you would be informed?
A Yes. At one time I issued a communication in which I emphasized that I expected in future at least to be informed about the most important events in Serbia in good time, and I called State Councillor Turner to Athens to see me and I told him my opinion to this effect.
Q When was that?
A That was on the 16th of September.
Q And in spite of the fact that you admonished him to keep you informed, on the 21st of September, 1941, just five days later, he is doing something else without having cleared it with you earlier. This report is dated the 21st of September, 1941, just five days after you and Turner had your altercation.
A That is correct.
Q Was it customary in the German army in 1941 for a Field Marshal to permit himself to be defied by an Obergruppenfuehrer in the SS?
A It is not the German army that is concerned here, but this Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS as an administration chief who was appointed by Goering in Serbia. One must not apply normal conditions of the German army in this case.
Q You say Turner was not subordinate to you?
A Turner was subordinate to me via Danckelmann. He was directly subordinate to his superior.
Q Will you turn to Exhibit 59 in Document Book 2? It begins on page 79 of the English, page 63 of the German, This exhibit is a series of reports and I am particularly interested in the daily report from the Commander of Serbia to you as Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, dated 17 September 1941. It is on page 98 of the English, and I believe on about page 82 or 83 of the German Daily report of the 17th of September, 1941. Do you have it?
A Yes.
Q This report is from the Commander of Serbia; in paragraph 6 it states: "Parts of the Belgrade male Jewish population transported to transit camp near Belgrade. Action continuing."
Do you recall anything of that event?
A It doesn't say here "action continuing."
Q Well, let's get -
A I can only repeat again that I don't know for certain whether I received that report or not. If I received it, I maintain the point of view that it is necessary in view of the security of the troops
Q Now will you turn to Exhibit 39 in that same document book 2, the very first document in that book? I am particularly interested in the report which appears on page 17 of the English and perhaps on page 17 of the German as well.
It is a morning report dated 29 July 1941 of the OKH operations department. There is a portion of the OKH report which deals with activities in the Southeast. Do you have it?
A Morning report of the 29th of August?
Q The 29th of July is the one I am referring to.
A Yes, I have got it now.
Q You will note paragraph I reads: "25 July, in Belgrade, Jewish attempts to burn German vehicles. One hundred Jews were shot to death." Have you any recollection, generally, about actions against Jews, reprisal actions of this nature?
A I am certain didn't receive that report because I wasn't in Athens at that time.
Q There was no information given to you on your return to Athens by your chief regarding activities taken by the Jews in reprisal actions taken against the Jews?
A It was a month later when I returned, and in the meantime the situation had become so tense that I was not prepared for this, and, generally speaking, I can only repeat that the Jewish problem in Serbia and Greece was no problem to me.
Q You mean the Jewish problem was not considered important enough for your chief to call to your attention the fact that Jews had attempted to burn German vehicles and in reprisal you were forced to execute one hundred of them?
A I don't think that he informed me in detail about this. Four weeks later, so much had accumulated and the whole situation had become so much tenser in view of the insurgent movement and in view of the endangering of the troops that I am sure he had other worries.
Q Field Marshal, when did you go to Crete? I think you said it was sometime in October, 1941.
A On the 8th of October.
Q 8th of October? Was Crete under your command and jurisdiction at that time?
A Yes.
Q How do you know that it was the 8th, rather than the 9th or the 10th of October when you went to Crete?
A Because I could ascertain that from a few notes which I made at that time.
Q Did you make a practice of keeping notes, or making a note of when you went on leave?
A I had a notebook, a diary, where I entered these notes of where I happened to be.
Q Did you ever make notes about what was happening in the area of your command? Things like the execution of hostages and the taking of reprisal measures?
A No, never. Those were merely notes of where I was located at that time. It was not a diary in that sense of the word. It was just a pocket diary where, under the date, I entered where I happened to be at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess until 1:30.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until 13:30.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Field Marshal, just before the luncheon recess, I asked you when in October you went to Crete?
A. On the 8th of October.
Q. Did you leave for Crete in the morning of the 8th or in the afternoon or just what tine of d p did you leave?
A. I can't recollect that for certain. But generally speaking I made the best possible use of the days, so I assume that it was during the early morning hours.
Q. When did you return from Crete?
A. During the course of the 11th in the afternoon.
Q. Do you recall whether you signed any orders after you returned on the 11th?
A. I can't recollect that today. After such an absence of four days, a lot of material mush have been submitted to me. First of all by the chief of staff, then by the Ia, and by other departments. It is impossible for me to recollect details now.
Q. Reports which you received from your subordinate units and then consolidated into reports of your own for OKW---about how much time would you say elapsed between the arrival of the report from a subordinate unit and the time when you took that report and made a consolidated report of your own for OKW?
A. That depends on the circumstance. I can't say that in detail.
Q. would there usually be a lapse of a day or two between the time you received reports from the field and the time when you sent out your own reports?
A. I can't say that, theoretically and generally speaking. That depends on the individual circumstance, on the type of report which I had received and on the type of report which I passed on.
Q. Now I believe you said earlier that the communications between Athens and Serbia were quite disrupted and that it often took several days for you to hear of events which had taken place in Serbia?
A. I said that the telephone communication were frequently disrupted between Belgrade and Athens.
Q. Would you turn to Exhibit No. 80 in Document Book 3. This is on page 4 of the English and page 3 of the German Document Book. Will you turn to about the third page of that exhibit. It begins on page 7 of the English and I believe on about page 5 or 6 of the German. It is a report from a company commander concerning the shooting of Jews on the 9th and 11th of October, 1941. On the second page of that report, there is paragraph nine, the details of the execution are listed and it states there that the first shooting took place on the 9th of October, 1941.
If the shooting did not take place until the 9th, I presume that the murder of the German soldiers for which the execution of the 2200 Jews was made in retaliation occurred some days earlier than the 9th of October, 1941. Would that presumption be correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't leave for Crete until the 8th of October?
A. Yes.
Q. If the murder of 22 German soldiers had taken place a few days prior to the 9th, would you have been informed of that fact----of the loss of 22 of your men?
A. That can be assumed.
Q. The death of 22 of your soldiers was the largest loss which your troops had suffered in an event of this kind up until that time, was it not?
A. I can't say that way more. In any event, that occurrence was rather particular because these people were murdered in a terrible manner.
Q. From the first page of this report it appears that on the 8th of October, 1941, the shooting of 2200 Jews who were in the camp at Bel grade was ordered.
Did you have any information that Jews to the large number of 2200 were held an a particular camp in Belgrade?
A. No.
Q. When you returned from Crete on the 11th of October, did your chief inform you that 2200 Jews had been ordered executed in retaliation for the death of 22 of your men?
A. I can't remember that an longer but I would assume that he informed me. The other day I have already testified that I do not recall the details of this case either today any longer.
Q. Would you consider the execution of 2200 Jews in retaliation for the death of 22 of your men a conspicuously high retaliation ratio?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you had heard about this incident, would you have taken steps to see that it didn't happen again?
A. I assume that I would have done something about it.
Q. Do you recall whether you did do anything about it.
A. That too I do not remember, whether I did or didn't do anything.
Q. Field Marshal, I assume you would remember outstanding incidents which occurred during the time you were Armed Forces Commander Southeast particularly outstanding incidents. Is that correct.
A. I don't quite understand the question.
Q. I mean that one can't expect you to remember a lot of extraneous details about what occurred while you were armed forces commander southeast, but is your memory good enough to recall the large or particularly outstanding events which occurred during the time you were down in the Southeast?
A. I cannot say. One event I happen to remember, and another one I don't happen to remember. Generally speaking, I had an overall picture of all events, but details are a different matter. It is not within my own province, to decide that. That is the function of the troops as a body, and sometimes one remembers and sometimes one does not.
Q. Did an event like this, the execution of 2200 in retaliation for the death of 23 German soldiers occur frequently, or would you say that it is an exceptional circumstance?
A. It was certainly an exceptional case.
Q. But you still have no recollection of it?
A. I expressly stated that this is the only event which I recollected vaguely when I was refreshed in my memory here, about all of these matters.
Q. Will you turn to Exhibit 128, which is in Document Book V, and begins on page 102 of the English, and page 70 of the German; particularly will you turn to the daily report of the 9th of October, 1941 which is on page 117 of the English and I believe on about 85 or 86 of the German. It is the daily report from the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast for the 9 October 1941. This is the report of your 1-C officer, and the portion of the report dealing with activities in Serbia, and it states:
"In reprisal for 22 murdered men of the 521st Signal Regiment, 2000 communists and Jews are being shot to death."
That report sent out on the 9th of October, 1941.
DR. LATERNSER: Just a minute, Your Honors, I would like to have this report submitted to the interpreter for a retranslation.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Do you have the original document? It is NOKW 251; does the Secretary General have Exhibit 128 here? If not, could you bring Exhibit 128 into Court?
Field Marshal, the report which was sent out from your office on the 9th of October, is probably based on a report which you received a day or two earlier; isn't that true?
A. It can be assumed that these reports came in a day or two earlier, if not on the same day, since this is a teletype me have here.
Q. Now if the report which came in from Serbia, on which your report of the 9th of October is based, arrived in your office on the 7th or 8th before you went to Crete, you would have heard about the proposed execution of 2000 Communists and Jews in retaliation for the murder of 22 of your German soldiers, would you not?
A. But I did not hear it, because this report came in on the same day, which can, in this case, be clearly seen from the document.
Q. How can it be seen from the document, Field Marshal?
A. It reads, that the shootings of 2,200 Jews is about to be carried out. That is the first report of the 9th of October, which came to as from lower echelons to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast
Q. But this report to which I have called your attention just now does not indicate when it was received at your office as the Military Commander in Serbia does it?
A. This report here only shows when it left the office, but another report docs show when it was received.
Q. Perhaps we can have the court interpreter translate the portion which Dr. Laternser has requested.
MRS. SCHAEFFER: The sentence reads:
"As reprisal for 22 murdered men of the 521 Signal Regiment, 2000 Communists and Jews are being shot to death."
I would translate it the same way as the translation which we have in front of us. I do not know whether Dr. Laternser intends it to read, "will be shot to death" because then in German it should read, "werden erschossen werden" which means, "are being shot to death."
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Field Marshal, I believe you stated that the reference on certain of the documents to concentration camps in Serbia, referred merely to collecting camps, and they were not concentration camps in the sense of the word as we learned to think of them when we talk of concentration camps within Germany; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. We will turn to Exhibit 17, Document Book 1, on page 63 of the English, and page 36 of the German. This is a communication from the Military Commander Serbia, Administrative Staff, Belgrade 22 June, 1941, to the Minister-Commissioner of the Interior, Mr. Acimovic.
GERMAN TRANSLATOR: I beg your pardon, what page?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Page 46 of the German.
You will note in the third sentence of the communication it states:
"Later on these, as well as other criminal elements arrested in the country and Communists, are to be transferred to the concentration camp which you have been directed to erect."
Do you know which concentration camp was erected in Belgrade?
A. No.
Q. Do you know to whom these concentration camps were subordinated?
who was in charge of their administration?
A. They were so far as I can read from the document now, the administration chief of the military Commander Serbia.
Q. You have no knowledge of these camps, when you were the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. No.
Q. Turning to Exhibit 46----
THE PRESIDENT: Our reception is particularly bad up here for some reason.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Ours is too, Your Honor. Perhaps we can have it checked.
Q. Turning now to Exhibit 46,--in Document Book 2, which begins on page 37 of the English, page 37 of the German---
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that again?
Q. Exhibit 46, Document Book 2, page 47 of the English, and page 37 of the German, and particularly to the second page of that exhibit, which is on page 48 of the English, and I believe page 38 of the German, this is a communication from the Commander in Serbia, dated Belgrade, 11 September, 1941, and it reads:
"Letter from Commander Serbia; Command Staff, Section IA, No. 397/41, Secret; dated 21 August 1941, orders that the prisoners with the troops are to be transferred to Concentration camp Belgrade in order that the troops may be relieved or their responsibility.
This cancels out the local importance of the concentration camp Belgrade subordinate to the Administrative Sub-area Headquarters.
Therefore, effective immediately, the concentration camp will be made subordinate to the Commander Serbia-Administrative Staff and will be designated as, 'Concentration Camp Serbia, Belgrade.'
The Administrative Staff Trill regulate directly the process of taking over of the concentration camp and the inclusion of the Einsatzgruppe of the Security Police and SD. Guarding of the concentration camp as heretofore."
Did you ever receive information to this effect, Field Marshal?
A. No, not that I can recollect. This order was issued by the Commanding General Serbia to his various departments.
Q. Was the Commanding General, Serbia, subordinate to you?
A. He was subordinate to me.
Q. Now will you turn to Exhibit 61 in the same document book, and page 103 of the English, page 82 of the German? This is an order from the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, to the 342nd Division, dated 23 September 1941. You will note from paragraph 2:
"342nd Division is to evacuate Sabac by surprise attack on the entire male population between the ages of 14 and 70 and take it to a concentration camp set up by the Division north of the Save. For this purpose, the German troops and officers in Sabac are subordinated to the 342nd Division."
Did you ever hear of the Sabac Concentration Camp?
A. This order reached me as an informational copy, therefore I must have received it. However, I cannot remember it, and, "by a concentration camp to be established by the troops", one should never understand a "concentration camp" like those which existed an Germany, but only a collection camp, and collection is stressed by the word "concentration." In other orders again it reads, "collection camps".
Q. It would be much clearer if they had said, "collecting" camps in this order, rather than "concentration" camps, would it not?
A. Yes, that would have in fact been more correct.
Q. Were the "concentration camps" in Germany referred to as "concentration camps"?
A. No, I don't know.
Q. Now, will you turn to Exhibit 71 in the same document book, which is on page 143 of the English, page 110 of the German--one question first, Field Marshal, What did these collecting camps look like?
A. I have never been in one.
Q. Did you ever hear how they were constructed? Were they made of wood or brick; how many people could they accommodate? Did you ever receive information about these kind of details?
A. No, nothing that I recollect. But the erection of this one collecting camp shows that evacuated houses were to be equipped as their collection camps, but in detail I am not informed about this, and I have never seen one.
Also, I assume that locally there was a difference; sometimes it would have been a large, other times a small camp.
Q. Field Marshall, this report, Exhibit 71, is from the Commanding General in Serbia, to Commander Serbia, Chief of Military Administration, 65th Corps 342nd Infantry Division, and its subject is, "Zasaviza Concentration Camp". You will note in paragraph 2 it says:
"In the proximity of the locality Grn-Zasaviza a camp sufficient for holding some 30,000 prisoners is to be erected first of all in the open air, so that the transfer of the inmates in Sabac can take place by 20 October. In the course of further construction the locality is to be included into the same camp for winter quarters."
Did you ever hear of the Zasaviza Concentration Camp?
A. Not that one; I cannot recollect that particular concentration camp. I heard of the evacuation of those people from Sabac and on the basis of this evacuation I issued a teletype on 4-10 to the effect that a release of all those was to be effected, -- of all of these people who were not under suspicion and who were not guilty, just in order to put all these things right again, because on the basis of a report by my chief, who was at that time in Belgrade. I had the impression that it was necessary to reestablish order here. I thought that the troops had carried out arrests here which exceeded the extent of those who could be accommodated here.
Q. This report is from the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, and it is dated 6 October 1941. Who was the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia at that time?
A. May I say that this is not a report; it is an order. This report was not addressed to me. Instead, the order was issued by the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to his subordinate officers, but in the form of a report to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
The order in such as we see it hare in the text, I have never gotten it, and I don't think any of our officers have ever gotten it either. The channels would be in this way, that the subordinate officers issue their own orders and take their own measures on the strength of them. If all of these orders would have to be submitted to the superior officers, that would go too far. Details about this matter I do not think wore known to anybody in my staff.
Q. I stand corrected, Field Marshal. It is an order rather than a report, and I ask you again, who was Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia at this time?
A. That was General Boehme.
Q. He was subordinate to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Field Marshal, I believe you said that these camps were not related at all to the German concentration camps. Is that correct?
A. That is how I would picture it. I do not know the concentration camps in Germany either, but here we are merely concerned with the accommodation and the safekeeping of people who might at some time be a danger to the German occupation forces.
Q. We turn to Exhibit 81, Document Book 3, on page 11 of the English and page 9 of the German. This is a report from the Chief of the Security Police of the SD dated Berlin 9 October 1941. Of course, you could not know about the reports which the SD sent, because there is this reference to an event and a situation an Serbia that perhaps you do know something about:
"Collecting camps are installed by the German Wehrmacht in the Save river bend near Mitrevica for the persons arrested in the course of the mopping-up action by the Wehrmacht and also for other arrestees. This camp is being constructed by Organization Todt. It will have an immediate capacity of 50,000 persons, and can be enlarged to hold 500,000 persons. The camp is constructed like the German concentration camps. The direction of the camp is in the hands of the Einsatzgruppe of this Security Police and of the SD."
Did you hear any tiling about the erection of camps in Serbia during the month of October, 1941?
A. I have never heard anything about it. That is a report by the chief of the Security Police where he described a plan for the future, and I do not believe, according to anything which I have heard later, that this camp was ever erected in the form as it is mentioned here, and none of the reports which we see here, show that it was ever established.
I can therefore, only think that the idea existed at one time and that this idea was reported by the Chief of the Security Police, to special officers, and it reads here in actuality. "It should be, and it will be built up". It seems to me just a picture of fantasy that this camp should ever have the capacity of 500,000 people. I can only say that I know nothing about this, and that I must assume with certainty that the camp never existed in this shape or form.
Q. We will turn to the first page of that particular SD report. You will note from the second paragraph of the report, "mopping-up by the German Wehrmacht in the area of Sabac has resulted up to now in the arrest of 22,000 male persons. These are housed in a temporary camp and are at present being screened by a Detachment of the Security Police with the assistance of the Belgrade Police."
Then the next paragraph refers to the reprisal execution of 2100 Jews and Gypsies for the 21 German soldiers shot to death in Topola, and finally, that 800 foreign Jews and Gypsies are taken from the camp in Sabac, the rest from a Jewish transit camp in Belgrade."
I believe that you said that you never knew about a Jewish Transit Camp in Belgrade?
A. It doesn't say anything here about a Jewish Camp in Belgrade. As a reprisal measure, the Security Police are asked to put the necessary number at the disposal but there is no talk about a Jewish Camp. The 22,000 male persons, I could not recollect the number any more, and I would have never thought that it was that high, but as I stated before, the evacuation of Sabac at that time, a great number of male Persons were captured, and on the 4th of October, after I had gained insight into these conditions, I had ordered the release or all of these people who were not guilty in any way.
Q. Will you look at the last line on the first page and the top of the second page: "*05 Jews and Gypsies are taken from the camp in Sebac direct from the Jewish transit came Belgrade." Do you find that?
A. Yes.
Q. You never heard of a Jewish transit camp in Belgrade?
A. No.
Q. Field Marshal, when did you return from the Russian front to your home in Partenkirchen? I believe you said it was in September, 1942.
A. On the 10th of September 1942.
Q. And from that time until the end of the war you remained in Partenkirchen?
A. In the main, yes, in Partenkirchen.
Q. Did you ever hear of the events which were transpiring between. 1942 and 1945 in Dachau?
A. No.
Q. How far is Partenkirchen from Dachau?
A. 120 KM.
Q. How long would it take to travel from Dachau to Partenkirchen on a train?
A. I would think six hours or eight hours.
Q. Field Marshal, in order to put down the uprising in Yugoslavia you ordered...
A. I beg your pardon, Mr. Prosecutor, Mr. Fenstermacher. May I say something else in connection with this last question? In Garmisch Partenkirchen I live in a very isolated manner and only with my family because I knew that all my social activities were under supervision. I had hardly any contact with anybody with the exception of those people whom I have described here already, and in addition with a Geheimrat Dr. Wicker. And none of these people told me anything of events in Dachau. I have a good friend of mine who was in a concentration camp for 7 months near Berlin, and when she returned she would not tell any thing because she said if anything became known she would only be sent again to that camp.
When I asked her how she fared there, she said, "generally speaking, all right," and that's the only thing that I actually ever knew about concentration camps. And in the Winter of 1944, to my extreme horror, I heard for the first time of the enormous figures of extermination of Jews from Geheimrat Wicker, and he told me that as a big secret because he said "if it ever becomes known that I know about it and that you know about it, both of us will be put into a concentration camp by the Gestapo." We lived at that time in Germany, in such a state of terror and dictatorship that a Field Marshal couldn't ever do anything which anybody in any other state and in any democracy would consider a matter of fact and a matter of course. And please take that into consideration when evaluating my statements.
Q. You were threatened with imprisonment in a concentration camp, not a collecting camp?
A. No, Geheimrat Dr. Wicker, who gave me the information about concentration camps said to me, "Look, I can't even say this loudly, I ask you urgently never to say anything about it because if it does become known, then both of us will be put into a concentration camp."
Q. Turning to Yugoslavia. In order to put down the insurrection you ordered your troops to take hostages. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that is the order already existed, and I said an increasing number of hostages.
Q. Did you ever hear that conspicuously high numbers of hostages were executed in retaliation for attacks on your troops and installations while you were Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. I heard about reprisal measures in general.
Q. Did you hear that large numbers of hostages were executed as part of German reprisal measures?
A. I can't say now in detail.
Q. What would you considered conspicuously high hostage ratio -10 to 1, 50 to 1, 100 to 1?
A. That's difficult to establish in theory. That, again, will have to depend on the circumstances of the facts, and under certain circumstances very high figures may be justified. In general, I was against the general establishment of fixed numbers, and I, for my part, never established a ratio for this very reason.
Q. Can you imagine circumstances in which 200 to 1 might not be a conspicuously high ratio?
A. 1 to 200 never occurred, and I can only keep maintaining my point of view that in general, I refused to establish any number. Very high ratios that were ordered from above, which for human reasons seemed much too high to me, I have already stated that.
Q. Can you imagine a military situation in which a Commander would find it necessary to execute 50 to 1?
A. That's very high, but it is extremely difficult to say in theory that that should not happen under any circumstances, that's impossible; because the accompanying circumstances can be of such a difficult nature and I believe purely theoretically concerning such a crisis one cannot determine this.
Q. Well, let us take events in Serbia while you were there. Were military conditions so grave from the German standpoint that a ratio of 50 to 1 would be considered too high by you? In individual instances I meant.
A. Generally speaking, too high. In individual cases there might have been a justification for this. This situation in Serbia was in fact very grave and threatening. The situation in Serbia was thus that parts of units were suddenly captured, disappeared, were deported to the mountains. It happened that the complete supply was gravely endangered, a thus the whole occupation could collapse if those ready communication lines did not function any more. I think the importance of the rear communication lines in the Balkans made it very difficult to estimate and it is also very difficult to establish what consequences such an interruption could have.