Q Field Marshal, we cannot expect you to have detailed knowledge of these things after 6 years. Do you recall whether the insurgents ever demanded recognition as a regular belligerent?
A No.
Q Will you look at Exhibit 123, in Document Book 4, on page 129 of the English, and beginning on page 73 of the German. These are excerpts from the War Diary of the 18th Army Corps, and I am particularly interested in the entry for the 8th of October, which should be on about page 80 of the German, I believe, the entry:
"Kraljevo, 6 October, --" it is page 78 of the German. This entry reads:
"65th Corps Command: The Peoples' Liberation Group of Jeva Kursula on 7 October demands the following of the local Kraljevo Garrison Commander."
and will you look at the 5th demand:
"Recognition of all rights as a unit engaged in warefare Nonfulfillment will bring about the shooting to death of 8 captured German soldiers:
Were any of these demands for recognition ever brought to your attention?
A Of course, I do not this activity report of the Army Corps Commander 18: I have already stated that I do not recollect such a demand, and I do not believe that the 18th Corps regarded this demand because this was only one group which was limited as to area and the group called itself Jeva Kursulov that was one individual band leader, who demanded the status of a belligerent, and I can well imagine that the Army Command, - 18th Corps Command, - said, "That is quite impossible; we cannot ascribe such a concession to such a small individual band in view of the fact that the whole rest of the insurgent movement has been and is being regarded as an insurgent movement?
Q Now, Field Marshal, how did you treat these insurgents when you captured them?
A The insurgents were to be treated as franctireurs, that means there existed the possibility that they would be killed in battle i.e. shot in battle,and on the other hand, the possibility that after the fight if they were found with a weapon in their hands, they were shot, after a summary court martial.
Q. How long did the average Summary Court Martial take?
A. I can't say that. That was relatively quick. A Summary Court Martial is a relatively fast court.
Q. Was the accused permitted to bring witnesses on his own behalf?
A. No, that would not have been permitted to him. The Summary Court Martial passed sentence when the facts were obvious and when the two associates could confirm the facts. But I personally never participated in such a Summary Court Martial, but the possibility, in any case, existed.
Q. Was the accused permitted to testify on his own behalf?
A. Yes, certainly. I'm sure he was permitted to do that. I must assume that as absolutely certain.
Q. What was the lowest rank......
A. But I emphasize again that I myself never participated in a Summary Court Martial or in any proceedings of a Summary Court Martial.
Q. Yes, but surely you as Armed Forces Commander Southeast and as an officer with forty odd years knows how these Summary Court Martials are handled. What was the lowest rank of an officer who was permitted to convene a Summary Court Martial?
A. That was a regimental commander or the independent batallion commander.
Q. And what would his rank usually be?
A. In war-time that was different; it varied. A regimental commander could be a lieutenant colonel or a full colonel, and a battalion commander would be a major or a captain. The independent battalion commander would have been a major or a lieutenant colonel.
Q. Was there any appeal regarding the verdict of the Summary Court Martial?
A. Appeal? No, that possibility did not exist.
Q. Field Marshal, is there a difference between a franc-tireur and a spy, in your opinion?
A. Yes, I would think so. There is a difference between a franctireur and a spy.
Q. What is the difference?
A. A franc-tireur is a person who is a member of a certain band and fights with a band, and a spy is a person merely concerned with intelligence and information matters. But I'm not in a position to define that from a legal point of view.
Q. A spy generally does not wear a uniform or insignia, does he?
A. Generally speaking, I don't think he would wear a uniform or insignia.
Q. Field Marshal, I would like again to go back to the Rules of Land Warfare of the Hague Convention of 1907. Article 30 reads: "A spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous trial." Did you ever consider any of these people spies rather than franc tireurs?
A. No.
Q. Field Marshal, I have noticed in the reports, from the subordinates to you as Armed Forces Commander Southeast, references to certain numbers of insurgents fallen in combat and to other numbers of insurgents shot dead. I wonder if you can clarify for us what the two references meant?
A. Generally speaking, it would have been like this: the person fallen in action would have been designated as "fallen in action," and the person who was caught, sentenced by a Summary Court Martial and then shot would have been designated as "shot to death."
Q. Will you look at Exhibit 67 in Document Book II? This is an Page 124 of the English and Page 96 of the German. This is a report of the 704th Infantry Division, dated 22 September 1941. Will you look at the last line of the report? "Communists are being caught daily and shot to death immediately. For instance, twelve in one day."
Is it your understanding that even though it is stated that they were shot to death immediately, they had previously been given a Summary Count Martial trial?
A. I have to assume that, although I do not know this report of the 704th Division.
Q. Suppose, Field Marshal, that you captured someone who were no insitnia and who did not have a weapon in his hand? How was it possible for you to determine whether or not he was an insurgent?
A. That depended entirely on the circumstances under which the person concerned would be captured. I, as Commander in Chief, did not find it possible to judge these individual cases. I would have to assume that the troop would do, in each individual case, what was proper to do. If I am located in Athens I cannot, for instance, judge events that occur in Serbia.
Q. Wasn't it your job to know what was going on in Serbia, even though you were stationed in Athens?
A. It was my task to know it on a large scale, but, on the other hand, I simply had to rely on my commanders as intermediaries--the commanding general, the divisional commander, the regimental commander, and, the battalion commander. And when these reports had gone through all these channels and reached me, I then had to assume that they had been investigated and that everything was in order.
Q. Field Marshal, will you look at Exhibit 115, which is in Document Book IV, the first document in that book. And will you turn to Page 5 in the German and Page 5 in the English. This is a report from the 342nd Infantry Division to the Headquarters of the XVIIIth Corps, and it is the Daily Report of the 29th to the 30th of September 1941. Will you look under the section of the report which concerns itself with prisoners and booty, the second paragraph: "Of the prisoners 190 men could be selected by interrogation as forming a Communist group in the village of Usveco. These men will be shot today." Does that mean that the people were condemned only after the interrogation and not after a Summary Court Martial trial?
A. No, after Summary Court Martial proceedings.
Q. Field Marshal, suppose some of these insurgents laid down their arms and offered to surrender to your troops. Would that make any difference as to the manner in which they were treated?
A, That , again, would have to depend on the individual case.
Q. I don't quite understand. Could you give us an example of what you mean?
A. It's difficult to say. When these people had fought previously and the Summary Court Martial judged that it was too late when they delivered up their arms--then the possibility existed that the Summary Court Martial gained the conviction that they were fighters and that they were caught while carrying arms, and then they would be shot in accordance with the very strict regulations which existed.
Q. In the case of the regular belligerent, when is it too late to surrender your arms? Are you allowed to fight up until the last minute and then surrender or must it be at a given interval before? I'm speaking now in the case of a regular belligerent.
A. The situation there is completely different. That is why specific regulations exist and why there is a specific difference between a regular belligerent and an insurgent.
Q. That is to say, in the case of a regular belligerent you must always accept his surrender?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. You have in mind, I take it, in saying that Article 23 of the Hague Regulations--Article 23 reads: "In addition to the prohibition provided by special conventions, it is especially forbidden"-- and then sub-paragraph "c" reads: "The killed or wounded enemy who, having laid down his arms and having no longer means of defense has surrendered at discretion." And it is your understanding that that provision relates only to regular belligerent forces?
Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Field Marshal, as I understand the Laws of war, they're based, in part, upon the principle of chivalry. Is that correct?
A. Yes
Q. You didn't feel that that principle applied in the case of franctireurs who offered to surrender to you?
A. In the manner in which we were fought, and considering the situation in which we found ourselves,we had to act rigorously. We could not act any differently. I believe that we proved to be chival rous in the campaign against Yugoslavia and against Greece and that we could not be more so than we proved to be--but on the other had this insurrection touched vital spots of the occupational forces, of the German Army and of the German population. For this reason we had to act rigorously, hoping that by acting this way we would avoid further Heavy losses on both sides. May I emphasize here that I had not the slightest idea of hate against the Serbian population any more than I had against the Greek population. Why would a Serbian peasant not be just as acceptable to me as a Greek one? This was merely and solely a case of emergency defense; and, if I may say this here, it happens to be the way that war demands severe measures, and soldiers, therefore, are not in favor of war. It is an erroneous concept to think that the German officer is fond of war. When one has already anticipated personally in the First World war and suffered the consequences, one Knows quite well what war means. And our endeavor has always been to, as much as possible, diminuish the severeness of war and the losses of war. But this here was to burn out a festering wound applying even severe measures, and that was the basic idea behind all of this.
Q. In other words, Field Marshal, the measures "which you took to pacify Yugoslavia and Greece were taken by you only to save lives rather than to destroy them? Is that what you mean?
A. If you want to put it that way, yes-solely and merely in order to achieve peaceful conditions as far as possible.
Q. You say, Field Marshal, that you had no hate for the Yugoslavian people and the Greek people. Were you surprised that they had some hate for you, as shown by the attacks on your troops? Could you understand that feeling of theirs?
A. As long as I stayed in Greece there were no considerable attacks. I could understand the feelings of the Greeks, in as much as Hitler let the Italians into Greece, and that through this fact the Creeks were upset about us. I can also understand that a nation like the Youglslavians was not kindly disposed towards us. This insurrection which we noticed here did not originate so much from the Yugoslavian peasants, but it was incited by Moscow and by the Russian legation in Sofia. Only when the Russian campaign started did this insurrection become what it appeared to be later on.
Q. Field Marshal, with that in mind, will you turn to Exhibit 42, which is in Document Book II. I beg your pardon--Exhibit 48 in Document Book II, which is on Page 31 of the English, Page 42 of the German. This is a communication from you to OKW, and you will note from the first paragraph you say, and this is at the beginning of the fourth sentence: "Association between the insurgents, in my opinion, not aptly described as Communists by the Commander in Serbia, with the Cetniks has been confirmed." Was this movement inspired by Moscow or was it not? Were these people Communists or not?
A. They actually were Communists.
Q. But on the ....
A. But it happens to be the case that the judgment of this situation was different at different times. That is, we didn't always know for sure where the insurrection originated to begin with, Later on it was quite clear that it was of Communist origin. In this particular case, maybe, or the basis of reports which I had just received, I wasn't sure whether this actually was the case, but I never doubted the Communist insurrection as such.
Q. When did you first believe that it was a Communistic insurrection? Can you give the approximate date?
A. No, I can't say that--not even an approximate date.
Q. But on the .....
A. If I may say this, it reads here: "Association between the insurgents with Cetniks has been confirmed," and in brackets it reads: "In my opinion not aptly described as Communists by the Commander in Serbia." That is to say, that it was not only purely Communism, but that insurgents were concerned as insurgents. That is, emphasis was laid on the word "insurgents," but that these insurgents were also Communistically influenced and influenced by Moscow is not refuted here.
Q. Field Marshal, do you recall that you said earlier that the Cetniks often fought against the Communists and here you indicate that the insurgents are collaborating with the Cetniks.
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Did the situation change?
A. The situation did not change. That was continuously the case. Obviously here I mean by Cetniks the people around Mihajlovic and these people did partly fight with the Communists against us.
Q. Now, in any event the situation became very serious in August, September, and October of 1941. What measures did you take to put down the insurrection?
A. With this communication of the 15th September I made an application for uniform leadership in Serbia and for further forces.
Q. Did you tell your troops to take hostages?
A. Yes, that is contained in an order of the 5th of September.
Q. Did you tell your troops to put hostages on the railroad lines and if any attacks were made on the railroad lines which the hostages were to watch that the troops would then execute the hostages?
A. No.
Q. Field Marshal, will you look at Exhibit 67, which is in Document Book II, at Page 124 of the English, Page 96 of the German? I'm particularly concerned with the third page from the end of that exhibit, which is on Page 134 of the English and should be on about Page 106 of the German. This is the third page of the report from the LXVth Corps to the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, dated 10 October 1941. Will you look at the paragraph which begins on Page 17 of the original document? It begins: "However, I told him that I could not understand his considerations regarding the taking along of hostages. If obstructions would have to be removed during the march hostages would have been the obvious labor forces. These forces would have been a means of sparing the strength of his own men. Furthermore, according to general opinion, the taking along of a greater number of male hostages who were distributed through the march columns would have represented the best protection against attacks, and so I could not see any valid reason for his failure to carry out the order." Did information of that nature ever reach you?
A. No.
THE PRESIDENT: We'll take our morning recess at this time. We will recess until 11:20.
(The Court recessed at 1100).
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q Field Marshal, before recess I asked you what measures you took to put down the insurgents' uprising in Jugoslavia and to pacify the country.
A I had given an order of the 5th of September and on the 13th of September demanded from the OKW that a uniform leadership may be installed in Serbia and for this purpose I demanded reinforcements.
Q Did you also tell your troops to take measures against the relatives of those people who were fighting against your troops?
A Yes.
Q Why was that done?
A To the extent that these relatives were at the same time helpers of the partisans -- this was done for the security of the troops. These people were supposed to be interned; in the same manner as it has been ordered by the Control Council Law that all people who are endangering the occupation forces be interned, in the same manner this order is to be understood.
Q Did you also expect to get some information from the relatives as to where their people were fighting, with what units and where those units were located?
A No, these members of the families which were to be interned here I did not expect to give information about the troop units. Besides we cannot talk about troop units but only about insurgent bands.
Q Did you never try to coerce the population into giving information about the whereabouts of the insurgent units?
A The troops might have tried that.
Q Will you turn to Exhibit 125 in Document Book V? It is the first document in the document book. This is a report of Councillor of State, Dr. Turner, and I am particularly interested in the last page of that report. It is on page 6 of the English, and, perhaps 5 or 6 of the German. The last paragraph of the report above the signature of State Councillor Turner. Do you have it?
That paragraph reads: "Last but not least, a proclamation would be released in the Belgrade area allowing a deadline of a very few hours in which it is requested that all arms and ammunition and explosives, etc be surrendered. Belgrade should be cut off during this period and a warning be published that if arms and such were found, not only the one in possession of arms but also the proprietor of the house will be shot without legal proceedings. Thus the proprietors themselves would be impelled to give information against others in order not to become liable for this punishment."
Did information of that nature ever reach you.
A. No, that is the report of State Councillor Thurner. It is shown from the text that it is addressed to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, who then submitted this memorandum to me.
Q. You don't really having any knowledge about the execution of proprietors of certain houses without legal proceedings in order to coerce the proprietors to give information against others?
A. No.
Q. Field Marshall, do you know whether your troops ever punished civilians in Yugoslavia for not warning the German troops beforehand that the insurgents were about to attack?
A. From a report which I have read here amongst these documents I can take this as a fact.
Q. Did you agree with such procedure?
A. To what extent the circumstances justified a summary court martial procedure, I cannot now judge. That can only be judge taking into consideration all the events that occurred at that time.
Q. Will you turn to Exhibit 32, Document Book I; this is on page 113 of the English and page 87 of the German; do you have it?
A. Yes.
Q. This is a report from a Battalion Commander to the 704th Infantry Division. The first two paragraphs read: "On August 16 1941 the Commander in Serbia made known by radio that a village in which a car of the Wehrmacht had been shot at, had been levelled to the ground, and that the inhabitants had been shot to death and hanged.
"The inhabitants had seen the preparations for the attack and had omitted to notify the police post situated nearby or to warn the occupants of the car. Therefore, they became accessories to the crime."
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, I don't know whether at the time I already pointed out the error in translation. I have made a note here and I am asking to have the last part of the first paragraph translated again by the interpreters.
JUDGE CARTER: I think it is true that some changes in the translation have already been made.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, do I recollect correctly that it was changed to "inhabitants had been shot to death and hanged," and not "the inhabitants had been shot to death and hanged."
JUDGE CARTER: That is right.
Q. (continue Did you ever receive information regarding this particular incident, Field Marshal?
A. I have already stated I cannot recollect individual occurrences. The report was made by the 704th Infantry Division and I don't remember now whether I received it or not.
Q. Do you remember generally whether the inhabitants had been considered accessories to crimes simply because they did not reveal that an attack was about to take place on your troops?
A. I have already testified that on the basis of these documents I gained this knowledge.
Q. The first time you had any information in that respect was when you came to Nurnberg?
A. No, I did not express it that way. I said I do not recollect whether or not I received such reports, details at least have r t remained in my memory.
Q. Can you recall what criteria was used in determining communists in occupied Yugoslavia?
A. Communists have to be understood in this respect here as insurgents. How that was handled in detail by the troops and how it was ascertained in detail I cannot remember and I do not know.
Q. Did you ever take measures against communists who were simply civilians living in Yugoslavia and who were not part of the insurgent units?
A. I must assume, and I had to assume they were always insurgents, that these concepts, insurgents and communists coincide here in this case.
Q. Will you turn to Exhibit 67, Document Book II; this is on page 124 of the English and page 96 of the German. Will you turn to second page of that report, which is on page 125 of the English, and I believe page 97 of the German.
This is report of the 704th Infantry Division, dated 22 Sept 1941, and then turn to the final page of the report, the next page I believe in your document book, -- to the last paragraph, I beg your pardon, to the next to least paragraph, last sentence, "All five were led off the road to the front of the stabel of Krstivoj about 200 meters away. A machine gun was in position, all five were shot to death, the stable was burned down. The five belonged to a wealthy esteemed family, up to now, no one in the entire village has joined the Communists." Do you know whether mistakes of this kind were made on a large scale or not?
A. I did not know anything of that kind. If this description were correct that would constitute an excess by the troops.
Q. Would you in this case have tried the five persons by summary court martial before they were executed?
A. That is not shown by the document. In this case as it is described here, I cannot assume this. The troops in this case transgressed their orders and this constitutes an excess.
Q. Did you say then, Field Marshal, that to your knowledge none of your troops ever forced the inhabitants to furnish information about the insurgent troops except for the one instance which you recall form the documents introduced here?
A. I can't say that in detail.
Q. Would you have been in favor of taking coersive measures against the inhabitants in order that they should tell you where units fighting on their behalf were vacated, and when they intended to attack your troops?
A. That depends on the connection between these things. If the inhabitants participate clearly with the bands, then coersive measures are justified.
Q. Are you familiar with Article 44 of the Hague Regulations, Field Marshall, --- Article 44 reads, "A participant is forbidden to force the inhabitants of a territory occupied by it to furnish information about the Army of the other belligerent or abouts its means of defense." Is that provision known to you?
A. Yes, this provision is known to me. That means statements about the enemy army, but not concerning the inhabitants or insurgents.
Q. Field Marshal, you stated that you were opposed to the Nazi Policy regarding the jews?
A. Yes.
Q. In so far as this policy was known to me at all. Did you ever receive reports that you can now remember generally, to the effect that Jews were being executed throughout Yugoslavia?
A. Yes, these reports repeatedly expressed that Jews and communists were executed. If this is here expressed in this way I understand by this that the Jews and communists mentioned her were insurgents and that they were not executed for racial reasons. I can well understand from the point of view of the jews that they worked against the Germans and that they combined with the Communists. I say I can well understand that on the basis of events which had occurred. All these things that were at that time now known to me, but that docs not justify the fact that they now actively worked against us, and if they did that as insurgents, then they were caught as insurgents and punished as such.
Q. Why should the Jews have been opposed to the Germans in Yugoslavia if no measures had been taken against them in Yugoslavia?
A. As a consequence of their racial connection, generally speaking, with other Jews.
Q. And do you suppose that the Yugoslavia Jews know in 1941 that other Jews in Germany and Poland were being executed?
A. I assume that the *oscow propaganda made use of these facts in order to win the Jews for their purposes, that is the communist revolution.
Q. Field Marshall, now turn to Exhibit 34 in Document Book 1, which is on page 93 of the German and page 113 of the English. I beg your pardon, I mean Exhibit 30, which is on page 99 of the English and page 77 of the German. I am particularly concerned with the report from the Ger man liaison officer to the Wehrmacht Command Southeast, dated Belgrade August 8, 1941,----that begins on page 104 of the English and I think about four or fine pages from the beginning, of Exhibit 30, in the German Document Book.
Q.- Now, will you turn to the fourth paragraph from the beginning of this report?
A.- That is the report of August 8?
Q.- Yes. You will sec on the next page, that is sent for information to Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, 1-C, Athens. Then turn to the first, second, third, fourth paragraph, beginning, "Many insecure elements are said to have penetrated into the police force." Do you have it?
A.- Yes.
Q.- "Many insecure elements are said to have penetrated into the police force. It was to be observed that individual Serbian policemen and police patrols showed complete disinterest in the occurrences in their proximity. They prefer to frequent well lighted streets, whilst in the dark sidestreets no policemen are to be seen. Attention must be drawn to the fact that the designation of the Serbian police by black numbers printed on a red arm band is insufficient, as these numbers can hardly be read by day and not at all at night. In case of encroachments committed by members of the police there is no possibility to identify the guilty person. Often it could be determined that jews walked about without the prescribed yellow arm band. Also the jews who were baptised "Christians", and who have besides changed their names, are not yet taken care of. It would be advisable to find out at the ecclesiastic matriculation offices which jews were baptised in recent years."
Did any information come to you that Jews in Serbia were being made to wear yellow arm bands?
A.- No, that was not known to me. I wasn't aware of it.
Q.- Then will you turn to Exhibit 125, Document Book V, -- this is a report which we have looked at previously from Councillor of State Dr. Thurner, dated Belgrade 21 September 1941; will you turn again to to the last page, of that report which is on page 6 of the English, and I believe page 5 or 6 of the German, the next to last paragraph:
"At the same time all active officers and NCO's are to be arrested with the exception of those who put themselves at the disposal of the government Neditch immediately, Consideration towards officers, who in the last months worked professionally, does not seem to be appropriate because these persons by virtue of their feeling of solidarity were no doubt used in the communications service or were put in harness in some way, likewise the arrest of all Jews which has already started, is to be carried out more drastically and the gypsies too, are to be arrested." Do you recall this report?
A.- I have already said before that this is a report of State Councilor Thurner to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General of Serbia, a report which never reached me, but in this connection I must state that State Councilor Thurner was at the same time SS Obergruppenfuehrer and Prussian State Councillor; he was a very dominating person and a very inscrutable person, a man who went his own way. I must remind you that I have testified here that I was not at all informed of the reforming of the Serbian government, and only days later did I receive any report, that I learned from newspapers only about the arming of the Serbian police, which was an important matter; that I told State Councillor Thurner to see me and pointed out to him his duties. Hard words fell on that occasion, because State Councilor Thurner repeatedly told me he was independent. Without doubt in this case this State Councilor Thurner wanted to make use of General Boehme when he started his activities. It seems entirely incomprehensive to me that State Councillor Thurner was immediately subordinate to General Danckelmann, and that he here submits a report directly to the Commanding General of Serbia, that was not within his competence. This whole report showed that he intended to make use and to influence General Boehme and to familiarize him with his ideas.
There can be no doubt that the chief of the administration staff in Serbia, went his own way which he hid at least with respect to my person, just the same as nothing was clear concerning the Government and the armed police. That can also be seen by one of my teletypes, and one of my communications, where I demanded that now at least I would have to be informed about the most important events in Serbia.
Q.- You wrote that I believe on the 16 of February to the OKW, and the OKW wrote back to you, and said you will be in complete charge in the Southeast, and will have full executive powers; wasn't that on the 16 of September 1941 when you demanded that you be given full power in the Southeast, so that events like you being misinformed or uninformed be brought to an end?
A.- I had the executive power already before. That had nothing to do with that. As of the 23rd of June, I was Commander in Chief Southeast. But in this case all that was concerned was that State Councilor Thurner only did what he deemed necessary and advisable, and he did not inform me and his military commander did not do that either. The documents too show that State Councillor Thurner quite often issued orders on his own. initiative, and signed them "Military Commander, or Plenipotentiary Commanding General, with the signature: Chief of Administrative Staff, Thurner." Therefore, it happened that doubtlessly I was actually not informed about quite a number of occurrences, and I can only assure you with emphasis that the Jewish problem in Serbia, as well as in Greece, did not exist as far as I was concerned.
Q.- Were you the most powerful individual in the southeast?
A.- How do you mean that?
A.- Were you the most powerful single individual in all the southeast from the time you became armed forces commander in the Southeast, in June 1941, until the time you left in October 1941?
A.- I had the executive power in the southeast, and on paper I had enormous powers, as the prosecution here has explained.