These conditions for any crime, namely a causative incriminating action or omission, cannot be discerned at once in the sub-sections c) through f). Therefore, the following alternatives therefore result: Either the Control Council Law has established forms of participation which neither exact that the perpetrator provided a "conditio sine qua non" for the successful committing of the crime, nor that the respective deed or omission should be imputed to the amount of guilt; or the forms of participation as in subsection c) through f) must be measured by the same standards as those mentioned in subsections a) and b).
The judgments of the Nuernberg Military Tribunals which were passed hitherto, are an unmistakable proof that the second alternative has been adopted. Some more quotations from the judgments of Military Tribunal I in the case versus Karl BRAND et al, and of Military Tribunal II versus Erhard MILCH disclose that, in contrast to the opinion of the Prosecution, the Nuernberg Military Tribunals have taken the viewpoint that a causative and responsible deed or omission is indispensable also as regards sub-sections c) through f), and that the fact of merely consenting to, or being connected with the crime is not sufficient proof that a defendant actually participated in the same.
In the "Specific Opinion of the Judgment", as pronounced by Judge MUSMANNO in the Erhard MILCH case (page 92 through 94 of the German transcript), some principles were stated which disclose that, exactly as in the criminal codes of he continent, nobody shall be punished unless he provided a cause for the crime intentionally and deliberately, which means guiltily criminally. Particularly high standards are exacted by this judgment as to the "knowledge" and the "responsible power" of preventing the committing of the crime by others. I want to quote verbatim the following sentence because it is particularly characteristic:
"One can easily reach the hypothesis of guilt from the documents and testimony but that hypothesis in many of its phases is also consistent with innocence."
And also below on page 93:
"Remarks such as "the defendant must have known" or "to the best of my knowledge he knew", and other similar inconclusive conjectures frequently used in this part of the case are not the kind of links which are imperatively needed to make up a chain strong enough to sustain the weight of a conviction."
In the case versus Karl BRAND et al, the Military Tribunal (l) acquitted some defendants although an express statement was made to wit that these defendants were fully informed about the criminal experiments and were connected with them by way of discussions and certain correspondence; they were acquitted because it had been impossible to establish beyond any doubt any personal and causative actions which contributed directly to the realization of the criminal facts, nor any omission of taking steps to prevent the criminal experiments, steps which would have been possible thanks to the official position of the defendant. I refer to the opinion on the judgment as regards the Defendants ROSTOCK, POPPENDICK and BLOME.
Within the framework of this plea, it is impossible for me to quote the numerous proofs which result from the other judgment of the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, proofs which make it a condition that nobody must be convicted unless his causality and personal guilt have been proven beyond any doubt, even if he seems to meet objectively all external conditions which are required by the subsections c) through f) of paragraph 2 of Section II of Control Council Law No. 10. In addition, I briefly refer to the Judgment of Military Tribunal IV in the case versus Friedrich FLICK et al which also proves that very high standards are applied to the establishment of causality and guilt, standards which are basically the same which we are accustomed to find in German Criminal Law. This completes the circle. In its beginning stood the finding of the Judgment of the IMT, as follows:
"It is one of the most important of such principles that criminal guilt must be a personal guilt also, and that mass punishment must be avoided."
What conclusions then must be drawn from this in the case of General FOERTSCH?
In Part I of my Plea I have proved that FOERTSCH, already on account of his official position as Chief of the General Staff could not, and actually did not, provide any causes for the committing of the alleged crimes against the laws of war and humanity. I have elucidated this fact in part II of my plea on the basis of the counts of the indictment and of the documents of the Prosecution. The analysis of Section 2, paragraph 2 of Control Council Law No. 10, combined with the judgment of the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, as effected hitherto, also discloses that this law, if interpreted correctly, likewise exacts in all cases of its application that both prerequisites, causality and guilt, must be fulfilled if the defendant is to be convicted. The fact that as Chief of Staff General FOERTSCH had to orientate and advise his Commanders-in-Chief and had to direct the work of the Staff.
the fact that he initiated drafts and in connection with current matters personally wrote letters to subordinated offices and the fact that as Chief of the General Staff he held a high military position are not sufficient for the sentencing of General FOERTSCH and objectively constitute cases d) to f) of Article II, Paragraph 2 Control Council Law No. 10.
Nor is Case c) present in the case of FOERTSCH, because, apart from the fact that the Prosecution has not proved his consenting part but, on the contrary, that his negative attitude has been proved by me, a causal criminal action or commission would also be necessary, apart from the more consenting part, in accordance with judgments regularly passed up to now by the Nuernberg Military Tribunals in order to prove participation in a crime.
The verdict of Military Tribunal IV in the case against Friedrich FLICK contains a passage which can be exactly adapted to the defendant FOERTSCH and which in some measure instantly clarifies the main problem in the case FOERTSCH in the light of the judgment of a Nuernberg Military Tribunal and which clarifies the sense of the types of participation c) to f) in conformity with the verdicts of cases I and II.
The quoted passage deals with the activity of the acquitted defendants BURKART and KALETSCH, as well as the defendant WEISS who was not sentenced in connection with the case in question.
"...They furnished him (FLICK) with information and advice.
But the decisions were his. He alone could gain or lose by the transaction. They did not conspire with him or state officials in any plan of "systematic plunder". We cannot see in their conduct any culpability for which they should now be punished."
Before I continue on Page 158, Your Honors, I take the liberty of interpolating Pages 144a to 144c. This is "The Answer to the Speech of the Prosecution," Page 144a:
The statements made by the Prosecution have caused me to supplement my final plea on a few points, and to correct certain assertions made by the Prosecution.
1.) The Prosecution has endeavored to dispose of the objection made by the defense with reference to the absence of the defendant from the South-East by quoting the example of the time-bomb. This comparison however, cannot apply to General Foertsch. It would apply, and Foertsch would be responsible for results of a criminal nature which would have occurred during his temporary absence or after his transfer, if he himself had been the initiator of the affair during his presence. But the Prosecution failed to prove just this point in particular. And so for instance the Keitel order of 16 September 1941 is irrefutably the first initiative for the crime alleged by the Prosecution. Just at this time Foertsch was on leave. I have already expressed my opinion to the conscquences of the Kommando order after his transfer.
2.) The Kommissar order cannot incriminate him, because Foertsch was not assigned to the Eastern theatre of war until 1944. At that time the commissars had already been removed by the Red Army and the Kommissar order rescinded.
III. When characterizing the responsibility of all defendants the Prosecution stated that all of them had held the rank of at least a Major General and were in command of from 50 - 100,000 men. But Foertsch was only a Colonel when he became Chief of the General Staff of the 12th Army and later in the South East he never exented any authority other than over his own staff, that is to say only over a very limited number of officers and men.
IV. The Prosecution quoted wrongly from General Foertsch's testimony when it stated that Foertsch only considered military expediency as being decisive for the German Wehrmacht in the South East and not the Hague Convention for Land Warfare.
It obviously meant the direct examination of Foertsch concerning the question of recognizing the partisans as belligerents. Foertsch said something entirely different:
The partisans were not recognised as belligerents, but for reasons of expediency they were to be regarded as prisoners of war (Prosecution Exhibit 302).
V. The Prosecution placed special responsibility upon General Foertsch for measures against Jews and for concentration camps in the South-East. Not one iota of proof was furnished for this allegation. With regard to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg and the reception camps I have expressed my opinion while discussing the documents to be submitted. I only rejected as essentially untrue and unproven, the incorrect assertion of the Prosecution that Foertsch had been particularly well informed about Jewish measures and concentration camps because the officers to whom the execution of these measures was entrusted were subordinated to him.
VI. Above all, the Prosecution attempted to shake the defense on the basis of Foertsch's position as Chief of General Staff. With regard to this I must correct the following:
1.) Foertsch never contended that he was only a letter carrier or something similar. The importance of a General Staff officer and above all the importance of the Chief of General Staff with respect to military matters is clearly revealed by the hand book for the General Staff. However the decision always rested with the Supreme Commander and the Chief of Staff did not have the authority to issue orders; thus be neither had the authority to impose punishment.
2.) The assertion quoted by the Prosecution contained in a letter of the XV Mountain Corps to the "Prinz Eugen" division: Guilt is also shared in general by older General Staff Officers", voiced a private opinion in a special case and may hardly be evaluated as the statement of an expert.
3.) Neither does it incriminate the Defendant Foertsch, if the Chief of Staff to the Defendant Dehner should have exceeded his authority as Chief at one time.
4.) The Prosecution states, that the Chief of the General Staff had disciplinary power over a Divisional Commander. In reality the Chief of Staff had disciplinary power only over his own Staff, and this disciplinary authority with regard to its nature and extent was the same as was exercised by a Divisional Commander over his troops.
5.) The Prosecution has attempted to discredit General Foertsch, by referring to a passage in his book, where he stresses the "Joy of holding responsibility". Foertsch expressly admitted this point in his examination. He never refused responsibility in his province, namely for his Staff. The same applies also to his activities later on as Divisional Commander, Commanding General and Commander in Chief of an army. However for this period the Prosecution has not raised any charges against Foertsch.
6.) Finally the Prosecution reasoned that the legal position of the Chief of the General Staff was unimportant because through his long years of activities Foertsch has in any case somehow participated in the crimes mentioned. The Prosecution thus attempts to evade the precise question as to elements of guilt, which are necessary for the purpose of passing sentence."
And the last sentence will be changed:
"I have just discussed this problem."
I shall continue on page 158.
"International Criminal Law" is, at least as far as its application is concerned, a new field a law. The trial of Goering and Others before the International Military Tribunal, Nuernberg, comprise the initial phase of its development. This trial in turn is based on the "London Agreement" and the "Statute of the International Military Tribunal". The objections voiced by the Defense and in the literature on International Law against these proceedings, which were based on the principle "nullum crimen sine lege", were overruled by the IMT and, subsequently by the Nuernberg Military Tribunals on the grounds that the contents of the "London Agreement" and the "Statute" as well as of Control Council Law No. 10, represent merely the codification of International Law which had already been in existence at the time the acts in question were committed.
Even if one takes the point of view that the above-mentioned laws do not violate the principle of "nullum crimen sine lege" and the injunction against an "ex post facto - verdict", there still remain numerous problematic questions because in this new field of administration of justice experience has to be made and precedents in the judiciary have to be established before clearly outlined specifications as to criminal acts can be given, as is the case with internal criminal law. Moreover, to be at all effective, "International Criminal law" must be observed by all civilized peoples and must be enforced without regard to the nationality or rank of the person in question. At present, international criminal law is only applied by victor-states in proceedings against subjects of vanquished states, and well known events all over the world prove that the theoretical development of the law which started with the statute and the verdict of the International Military Tribunal has not yet asserted itself in practice.
It is not within the scope of this final plea to pursue the profound problems arising from international criminal law and its enforcement. However, the following must be kept in mind if a correct attitude is to be taken in judging the case Foertsch.
The standards of justice as applied by international criminal law are still in a state of development and therefore as yet so undefined - above all, they were hardly perceivable at the time relevant to this case - that in finding a verdict here the greatest caution should be applied. That requires first of all that all the provisions which exist that far in the field of law:
"International Criminal Law," be interpreted in a restrictive way. Besides, it must be taken into consideration that, as far as the indictment for war crimes is concerned, the relevant provisions - Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, Hague Convention 1899 and 1907 - were compiled at a time when the conception of "Total War" was unknown and the modern development of weapons could not be foreseen.
Thus it is doubtlessly unfair to expect here of the defendants to have acted strictly in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Hague Convention on the customs of land warfare. It was also admitted in the Prosecution's opening statement that the laws and customs of war have changed. As an example for the fact that many principles of the Hague Convention on the customs of land warfare were not respected by the Allies during the Second World War, without anybody having been called to account for it, I merely quote Articles 22 - 27 of the Hague Convention on the land warfare which prove the illegality of the indiscriminate bombing of the civilian population.
How can, in such a war, individual soldiers and officers be expected to recognize at any time the boundaries of the still valid law of war? Must he not proceed from the thesis that the means and methods employed by all sides in fighting a total war, when, in contrast to all former wars, the existence of entire nations is at stake, have been intensified to such a degree that even extraordinary measures - such as severe reprisal measures in order to maintain the security and safety of the own troops in an occupied country - have become necessary and are therefore permissible? Where is he to recognize the dividing line? How high must he set the quota for reprisal measures, provided that the killing of hostages as a reprisal measure is itself permissible? Many more such questions could be posed in order to show in how precarious a legal position the defendants found themselves at that time when already a considerable part of the provisions of the laws on war had been rendered ineffective by the intensification of modern war, by all parties. That is not meant to imply that now everybody was authorized to rage unrestrainedly and unchecked.
All and everyone have been set general limits prescribed by a normal sense for humaneness. But it should prove difficult to judge afterwards if reprisal measures which were permissible in themselves were rendered inadmissible again, and thus liable to Prosecution, because of the extent to which they were inflicted. It should prove all the more difficult if one draws a comparison between them and the air raids on Germany which caused such heavy losses among the doubtlessly innocent civilian population.
4.) The application of the maxim "in dubio pro ree".
There are three circumstances then, which, apart from other complicated judicial questions of this trial (which have been discussed in detail by my learned colleague, Dr. Laternser), will render a decision of the Tribunal extremely difficult:
1) The insufficient guarantees offered by the law with regard to procedure of this trial,
2) The vagueness of the facts, as specified in Countrol Council Law No. 10, in particular the regulations concerning parties in crime.
3) the vagueness of International Criminal Law which at present is a result of the vicissitudes of Martial Law.
Hence what conclusion can be drawn, with regard to General Foertsch?
In the whole world the maxim "in dubio pro reo", i.e. in a case of doubt, judgment must always be passed in favor of the accused, is applicable. I believe that I discussed practically all actual and legal doubts, which one would have to overcome first, before sentencing the defendant Foertsch. I do not wish to repeat anything, but I want to merely point out that the vagueness of International Criminal Law and the vicissitudes of Martial Law, of which I have just spoken, would save General Foertsch from being sentenced, even if all other arguments would prove inadequate. Modern war, like an avalanche, engulfs the people, and if it is to be regarded not just as a phenomemon of nature, but one wishes to make certain leading personalities personally responsible for all the grief it has caused then such blame, as one is wont to impose, must not be extended to the soldiers themselves.
General Foertsch was only a Colonel, when he became Chief of the General Staff, Southeast. Neither before, nor afterwards did he have a position which would have enabled him to recognize the final political background of the entire events, and thus to form an opinion as to whether this war was, from the point of view of the German Wehrmacht, a right, or a wrong one. All parties conducted the war with increasing intensity and this fact made it impossible for him to recognize what parts of Martial Law, originating from the time before the first world-war, were still applicable. In addition, he himself had no cause to decide anything concerning this matter, as due to his position, he had no opportunity to interfere decisively in operations as a whole, and in the events of the Southeast theater of operations in particular.
If one considers all these facts, then one realizes that one is on unsteady ground, if one wants to establish a clear, criminal responsibility of the defendant Foertsch. In such a situation, the phrase as formulated in many verdicts of the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, is without doubt applicable, namely that a conviction is impossible, be it not for the reason that the defendant's guilt has been proved without reasonable doubt.
Final Conclusions "I just mentioned that in the case of Foertsch, so many legal doubts exist, that the Court, alone for these reasons, cannot find the accused guilty.
However, this applies only to part III of my plea, in which I discussed a number of problems which invariably occur in every one of these Nuernberg Trials, in connection with every defendant. I believe, however, that I have, in the preceding two parts of my plea, proved irrefutably, that the guilt of General Foertsch is not only doubtful but impossible.
"Of the whole of the indictment, but a few unproven assertions remain, together with the attempt to put the blame on Foertsch, quasi as a substitute for those of his superior officers, who are not in the dock.
"In summing up, may I request your Honors, to consider the whole of the evidence submitted by the defense on behalf of the defendant Foertsch, in particular the document relating to his testimony in the witness stand, as it was impossible to discuss all events in details within the framework of this plea. I would, therefore, ask you and to direct your attention in particular, to the 500 or so documents submitted by the prosecution against Foertsch, and to note that there was not one fundamental order which would prove that Foertsch exceeded his authority as Chief of the General Staff, that they did not contain one single order to subordinate troop units, and no execution order.
"I, therefore, ask you to find General Foertsch NOT GUILTY and to release him from detention."
DR. GAWLIK (Counsel for the defendant Dehner):
Your Honor, I am just informed that the German Court reporters do not have any German copies of my final plea. I would be grateful to your Honors if you would give instructions that after the recess the German court reporters should receive the German copies.
I do not know what the cause for this is.
THE PRESIDENT: Secretary-General, will you check on that please?
DR. GAWLIK: Your Honors:
"During the presentation of the evidence of the Prosecution in the trial against the South-East generals 10 Prosecution witnesses were heard.
"None of these witnesses has made any statement whatsoever by which General Dehner is incriminated.
"In particular, the witnesses von dem Bach-Zelevsky and Korn, who were cross-examined by the Prosecution in the rebuttal proceedings, have reported no acts whatsoever which could be regarded as a violation of the laws and customs of war, or violations of the laws of humanity, on the part of General Dehner.
"The Prosecution has submitted the following in evidence against General Dehner:
a) 38 exhibits during its presentation of evidence,
b) no document during the cross-examination,
c) 9 exhibits during the rebuttal proceedings.
"The Prosecution has thereby submitted 47 exhibits in all in evidence against General Dehner.
"In contrast to this the Defense has submitted 52 documents in refutation of the evidence presented by the Prosecution.
"Of the exhibits submitted by the Prosecution, Exhibits 315, 297, 310, 316, 351, contain no facts at all which could even remotely be considered as incriminating General Dehner.
"The remaining exhibits are mainly daily reports and other teletype messages from army offices.
"These documents have no evidential value at all, for they violate generally recognized rules of procedural law in all civilized States, recognized rules which must be taken into consideration even in this trial, rules which must be given very special consideration if the truth is to be discovered and a wrong verdict is to be avoided.
"On the basis of this evidence, therefore, General Dehner's guilt, as alleged by the Prosecution, cannot be regarded as proven.
"To be sure, it is true that according to American law the American Military Tribunals and the American Military Commissions are not bound by all the rules of procedure which apply to American Military Courts and Civil Criminal Courts in the United States. Furthermore, it is true that according to Article 7 of Ordinance No. 7 issued by the American Military Government the Military Tribunals are not bound by the rules of evidence and that any evidence is admissible which appears to have probative value.
"This provision, however, cannot be interpreted as meaning that the Military Tribunals may disregard the recognized principles governing the hearing of evidence, recognized principles which were developed on the basis of the laws of logic in the course of centuries of legal history, principles of procedure which alone make it possible to discover the truth. Such an interpretation would deprive the proceedings. The toil and trouble which have been expended by all those participating in this trial would be in vain. On the contrary, the provision of Article 7 of Ordinance 7 may only be interpreted as meaning that the Military Tribunals are not bound by rules, the nonobservance of which does not prejudice the discovery of the truth.
"It is, therefore, general principle in the theory and practice of American Military Law that the American Military Tribunals and Military Commissions are also bound by the fundamental rules of procedure which apply to the American Military Courts.
"Furthermore, it has been expressly stated by recognized authorities that the military courts have to observe all the rules of evidence which are to be applied by the civil courts in criminal trials: To that extent I make reference to my statement in the reply to the Memorandum of the Prosecution and refer in particular to the statements on pages 2 and 3 of my memorandum."
I shall add something here:
The statements in my memorandum are given on page 4 to 11 of my final plea and they are summarized there. On these pages I have given the principles against which the evidence submitted violates. I refer to these statements here.
I also have confronted the procedure of the Prosecution with that of the defense; in this listing concerning every single document of the Prosecution. I have listed the violations against the usual procedures. This list contains a list of violations against well known procedures.
In this list numbers 1 to 5 are noted down and the numbers in this list refer to 1 to 5 on pages 1 to 9 of my final plea.
I shall continue my presentation on page 11.
As a result of my memorandum and statements regarding pages 4 to 11, the following can be established:
"The evidence presented against General Dehner is in no way suitable to be locked upon as proof of the statements contained in these documents and especially not as proof that the facts contained in the reports actually occurred."
I shall skip the next paragraph.
"The evidence presented is, therefore, insufficient to warrant a conviction of General Dehner. One is especially incapable of ascertaining, on the basis of this evidence beyond any reasonable doubt, that General Dehner committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Therefore General Dehner has to be acquitted already for this reason alone, that the document material presented violates several principal rules of evidence, so that by reason of this evidence it cannot be looked upon as conclusively proved that General Dehner incriminated himself in the sense of the indictment.
"With these statements I could conclude my plea, for every defendant is favoured by the legal assumption of innocence until proved guilty by the prosecuting authorities"-- and this means by suitable, genuine evidence.
And this has not been proved, as I have explained in detail.
The defendant is under no obligation to prove his innocence, it is rather the task of the prosecuting authorities to prove the defendant's guilt.
But I consider it my duty as defense counsel to assume in the continuation of my plea that the evidence presented is of full value as evidence, and on the basis of this supposition I will examine the facts in their actual and legal aspects.
In my further statements I shall, whenever possible, observe the order of the indictment and state my point of view in regard to each of the four counts of the indictment. I shall, therefore under Part I, state my point of view in regard to all charges which refer exclusively to Croatia. Under Part II, I shall discuss all other charges.
Part I The Prosecution has based its indictment on violations of the laws of warfare, especially on violations of the Hague Law on Land Warfare.
General Dehner is first of all called to account for the activity of German troops within the area of the 69th Reserve Corps in Croatia, during the time from August 1943 to March 1944. But the position of the German troops in Croatia was different from that of the German troops in other parts of the South-Eastern territory.
"This becomes also especially evident by the War Diary entry of the 2nd Panzer Army dated 9 September 1943 -- offered by the Prosecution in the rebuttal evidence proceedings.
"The real facts in the proceedings against General Dehner are therefore to be judged in a different manner as these of the other defendants, with the exception of the defendants Leyser and Rendulic, insofar as in his case the Croatian area is subject of the charges made against him.
"Evaluation of the real facts depends first of all on the decision about the question which has to be asked previous to this, namely, what the position of the German troops was in Croatia, and whether the laws of warfare are to be applied to the relationship of the German troops to the bandits active in this territory, and especially whether the norms of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, or whether merely Croatian internal law is to be applied.
"The decision in regard to this question touches at the same time the competence of this Tribunal, for according to the decision rendered by Tribunal IV this Court is an International Court obliged to apply International Law.
"Based on the literature of International Law, I have in detail stated in my legal brief which prerequisites would have to be met in order to have Croatia considered as an independent State in the sense of International Law. In this respect I refer to the statements made on page 10 to 12 of my brief. I so not intend to repeat these statements here, but will only state the five prerequisites which will have to be met in this case:
1) There must be a national population.
2) There must be a national territory inhavited by the national population.
3) There must be an organized government capable of exercising sovereignty inside of this territory.
4) This government must be able to take up international relations with the other States and
5) the population must have reached such a degree of civilization that it is capable of observing International Law.
"There is no doubt about the fact that the conditions as to 1, 2 and 5 had been fulfilled. The Croatian people and the Croatian State territory was in existence. The population had also the degree of civilization required.
"All further conditions demanded by the science of International Law were also met. Croatia had an organized government which exercised its sovereignty in Croatia and one which watched with an eagle eye that its sovereignty was not impaired. In this respect I refer to the Dehner documents presented, namely:
"Affidavit by Von Strachwitz, Engelschall, Selehow, Von Beer, Kaudewitz, as well as the entry in the War Diary of the 69th Reserve Corps dated 3 March 1944.
"Croatia was also able to take up international relations with other States. This is especially shown by the fact that the Croatian State kept up relations of this kind. Treaties were concluded with other States, as, for instance, with Switzerland. So, for instance, a commercial treaty was concluded on 10 September 1941 between Switzerland and Croatia."
I shall continue on page 15.
"The Prosecution has repeatedly made the assertion in this trial that the Croatian State was a Puppet State. This assertion of the Prosecution is irrelevant, in the first place, for the sovereignty of a State does not demand complete independence. Even a state which is dependent on another, that is, to use the words of the Prosecution, a puppet state, is a state in the sense of international law. Insofar, I refer to my statements on page 13 of my Memorandum where, in particular, I specified examples for sovereign states in the sense of international law, which are more or less dependent on other states, and are or were under the influence of these states.
"Does the Prosecution wish to deny the rights of a sovereign state to the present day states of the so-called Eastern Bloc, that is, Poland, Jugoslavia, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania, which, to a very large extent, are dependent on Soviet Russia -- states which are even represented in UNO as independent states?
"This view represented by the Prosecution overlooks, in particular, the fact that the world is at present in a state of transition which cannot be disregarded by international law either.
"A new world picture and historical picture is conceived in the making. The System of history which up to now was based on the free rivalry of numerous big and small continuous states seems to be coming to an end. National sovereignties are experiencing ever greater limitations in favour of structures and forms transcending nationalism. This is a phenomenon which did not first appear after the second World War but this development began already even many years ago.
"This development already recognized by international law cannot be disregarded either by this court.
"Moreover, the assertion of the Prosecution that Croatia was a puppet state is incorrect. The inaccuracy of this statement is seen in the already mentioned affidavits of Strachwitz, Selchow, Engelschall, Kaudewit, Beer, and the entry dated 3 March 1944 in the War Diary of the LXIX.
