No one would honestly think of making this Court clerk responsible for the sentence, if later on such a sentence should be considered as a miscarriage of justice. The court clerk is certainly not obliged to examine the formally correct sentence as to its correctness and as to its concurrence with international law; this would not even be possible for him. The same applies to a staff member, the Chief of Staff or any other member of Staff, if he dispatches an order recognizable as a personal decision of the Commander in Chief, and which is based solely on the authority of the Commander in Chief, to the proper authorities.
One could go still further and inquire in this respect:
Is the public prosecutor, in charge of meting out punishment, in any way obliged or is he even authorized to examine the death sentence passed on to him by tho court for execution as to its material correctness or as to its concurrence with international law? This question is not only of a theoretical importance, but might also very well become practical. The IMT has for instance answered the question of conspiracy in the affirmative, and based its sentence of 1 October 1946 thereon. The American Military Tribunals later on rejected this construction. Now if the executing attorney would have had the death sentence carried out, which might possibly have been imposed on the basis of conspiracy only, would he be criminally liable today because he had the death sentence carried out, if same would later on be recognized as wrong?
Could the future, rejecting this sentence, charge the public attorney with murder? To pose this question is to answer same in the negative, despite the fact that one must demand of the public Prosecutor in this position the fullest knowledge of law. But one intends to make the layman Geitner responsible for the fact that he did not know international law better as for instance tho legal department of the OKW.
It would naturally be also absolutely wrong to take the attitude that Geitner should have recognized the illegality of such reprisal orders according to Article 47 of the Military Penal Code, and that he should therefore have been in duty bound to refrain from even the mere signing and dispatching of reprisal orders of this kind which the Commander had issued, but could not sign personally for some reason or other. For Geitner had, as already mentioned, found this practice and usage as an established custom in the Balkans when he took up his post there, and it could not possibly occur to him that the Supreme Commander, the High Command of the Army, the Armed Forces High Command and his own Army Group Commander in Chief had for years on end been committing crimes against international law. von Geitner had besides been able to convince himself time and again by own observation that severe reprisal measures could simply not be dispensed with in the Serbian territory, even though he never identified himself with the kind of reprisal measures which were carried out.(An urgent military necessity existed for them, and in a case like this the Prosecution has also acknowledged such measures as absolutely admissible. These reprisal measures were inevitable, as only by draconic counter measures the obstinacy of the population could be broken. The Balkan people's fighting method has always been very cruel and malicious. Thus it was during the time of the Turks, and that is the way it came down to the time of the Austrian occupation, that is how it remained during the time of the German occupation in the second world war, and that is the way down there today where Greek troops and the Greek national government have to continue to fight with all means possible if tho partisans are to be forced to act in a legal manner. Any court which today has to decide about the admissibility of reprisal measures has to be aware of the fact, that the principles today advocated and applied against tho then active functionaries of the German administration in the Balkans, might possibly be applied tomorrow to the troops of those States now sitting in judgment over German Generals.
And it would be a peculiar development of international law, if treaties concluded by the community of nations for the protection of the legal army would in practice finally bring it about that the regular troops of an occupying force were more or less defenselessly subjected to the cruelty and maliciousness of franc-tireurs. One should ask oneself how the present occupying forces in Germany would react if day after day hundreds of serious acts of terror and dangerous acts of sabotage were reported, and due to the civilian population's attitude it would almost never be possible to ascertain and punish the guilty ones.
In any case, to deter the civilian population from dangerous acts of terror, assassination, incendiary and plundering in the Balkans it was necessary, according to the personal impressions of von Geitner, to employ such reprisal measures as proved themselves the only reliable means by which peace and order could be maintained in this area. That is why reprisal measures of this kind were regularly threatened in advance and their execution publicly announced, and the method of executing the death sentence was for the same reason carried out in a manner, which according to the customs of the population promised probably the best deterrent. But measures obviously intended only to safeguard German troops, measures to guarantee the civilian population's life and work and safeguard the country from complete chaos, from a war of all against all, could by no means appear to the defendant von Geitner as acts which all of his highest superiors, up to the highest judicial authorities and Chief of State, effected only for the one reason to commit "crimes" thereby, as section 47 of the German Military Penal Code demands if the military order issued should not be carried out any longer. Even if Geitner should have done more and had for instance asked some jurists whether reprisal measures of that kind were legal under international law -- which he did in fact -- then he would have surely received the answer under conditions in existence in Germany, that such orders were not to be questioned. One might possible have pointed out to him that reprisal measures of that kind were also recognized as legal in the rules of warfare abroad, and one might have informed him that the hard necessities of warfare under the exceptionally difficult conditions of the Balkan war did not condone any other choice. Just to Balkan warfare applies, as not so easily to any other case, Section 358 cipher b of the Rules of Land Warfare: "Commanders must take the responsibility for reprisal measures if an enemy without scruples does not permit any other possibility to counter his barbaric atrocities. American law goes as far as to waive 'a careful investigation about the actual occurrence', if 'the safety of the troops demands immediate drastic measures'". Geitner could and had to consider the measures ordered by his Commanders under those circumstances as legal.
There existed for him no legal hindrance to sign and dispatch the orders given to him by his Commanders. Anything expressly permitted to an Allied officer by the Rules of Land Warfare cannot become a criminal act because a German officer is concerned, an officer who anted in his mental conflict unconsciously in the way permitted by American law.
I skip the next paragraph which describes in more detail the conditions in the Balkans, and I recommend the omitted parts to the attention of the Tribunal, and I shall continue on page 56.
These were the actual facts for v. Geitner, under which he as a fair soldier suffered in the same manner as did his commanders. How could he then have hit upon the idea, which would have seemed to him to be downright absurd, namely, that his commanders committed by their orders one serious crime after the other. How the conditions in the Balkans actually were, and in what situation the German South-East Generals actually were placed is probably best illustrated by the order issued by tho OKW on 8 February 1942. In this order the OKW most strictly criticizes the indulgent attitude of the German Generals in the SouthEast, states that the number of prisoners was strikingly high -- probably all of them should have been ordered shot -- and that the number of dead was by far too low. It was attributed to the leniency of the Generals "that one had not succeeded hitherto in breaking the backbone of the insurgents." General Kuntze who was of the same opinion as the other Generals, did not pass on the order at all, he "forgot" it, and in the following time he managed to get along with "camouflaged" reports on reprisal measures, in order to "satisfy" the OKW. At that date most rigorous reproaches were made to the German Generals, they were blamed of incapability, negligence, irresponsibility; today they are accused because of the same attitude of inhumanity and cruelty, and they are put to trial as they had deserved in the opinion of the OKW during the war already, of course in the contrary sense.
Certainly v. Geitner repeatedly asked himself whether it would not be better if he or his commander tried to get away from this difficult post. He and his commander could perhaps have attained their recall, be it only with the result to be brought then before a court-martial or to be committed to a concentration camp. But what would this have benefited the Serbian population or the Partisans? The Commander would have disappeared, but the order would have remained, and Berlin would have sent a new commander on whom Hitler could rely, who would have gone to Belgrade with most strict orders and previously established directives, of whom one would have previously made sure that he would comply with Hitler's orders in exactly that sense in which they were issued. Again and again the name of the Higher SS and Police Leader Meyszner appears in the documents; he was that SS officer against whom v. Geitner and his commander were in incessant opposition during the whole year. This SS General Meyszner hated the Serbian people; he was one of those who wanted to govern only through bloodshed, terrorism and oppression. What would have happened if for instance, this Meyszner had taken the place of General Felber, and if he had brought with him a Chief of Staff from among his SS officers who had not been so pro-Serbian and had. not officiated in such a just and conciliatory way as it proved that Geitner did.
One has to take all these things into consideration. Then one will understand why a v. Geitner, a Felber and other conscientious Generals remained at their difficult posts: With this they made a sacrifice not only to their troops and their country but also to the Serbian people, whom they saved from great distress by this.
Of course, it was at that time already clear for the defendant v. Geitner that it would have been much simpler, more comfortable and less burdened with responsibility to leave the service, to go back to his factory and to lead a quiet life at his native Schneeberg.
If he did not do this, but held out at his post, he certainly did not do it for the purpose of committing crimes or participating in crimes of others, but because of his sense of responsibility and humane feeling.
4.) The legal situation in the case of the defendant v. Geitner thus is doubtlessly so that according to German law and German conceptions he bears by no means any responsibility for orders of his commander, even in those cases in which he signed an order issued by his General because of the absence of his commander, as it was incumbent on him and was his duty in his position as Chief of Staff.
Any responsibility, or even participation in the responsibility only, by the Chief of Staff for a reprisal order could of course not be founded on the fact that the Chief of Staff on his part initialed a reprisal order issued and signed by the commander, that means that he signed with his initials a copy or carbon copy of the order, which was made out in the orderly room. The former Chief of the General Staff, General (Generaloberst) Halder, rightly stated that this initialing of the reprisal order of the commander by the Chief of Staff regardless whether it was done before or after the signature by the commander and before or after the dispatching of the order, always had only the legal meaning that he wanted to express with this: "this fair copy of the reprisal order actually corresponds to the order given by the commander, and is thus a correct rendering of the will expressed by the commander." Legally, from the viewpoint of responsibility, this initialing thus cannot be evaluated otherwise than for instance the certification of a verdict by the Secretary General of the Tribunal, as already mentioned in another connection. By this certification the latter indeed does not assume the responsibility for the correctness of the sentence passed by the Tribunal either, but he only confirms that the present copy of the verdict is fully concordant with the decision taken by the Tribunal, sad thus renders the verdict in formal correctness. Nobody would think of calling the Secretary General to account, if by an examination of the sentence a higher court it would be found that the decision taken by the verdict constitutes a violation of International Law or a crime against humanity.
I shall not road Paragraph 5 on page 59. It deals with the question of reports, and it states that the fact that these reports were used do not constitute responsibility for the Chief of Staff. More details about this will be given by Defense Counsel for General Foertsch.
I shall begin with paragraph 6 on page 59.
6.) Of course, it is true, and it was never denied by Geitner, that he regularly received knowledge of reprisal measures which were ordered by his commander. However the mere knowledge of a crime -- supposing that it really was a crime -- generally does not constitute a responsibility within the meaning of criminal law. An exception from this principle could only be assumed with respect to such a person who has the jurisdiction to prevent a crime, and also actually has the possibility to do this in the individual case. These preconditions were however lacking in the case of a Chief of General Staff of a Commander. As already set forth, the ordering of reprisal measures came on principle not within his jurisdiction, and, even if he received knowledge of a reprisal order before its execution, he had no legal or actual possibility of any kind to prevent the carrying through. He was a subordinate of the Commander, he was obliged to obey him and it would have been unthinkable that a Chief of Staff could have annulledan order of his General arbitrarily, on his own initiative and under assumption of the rights of another. No Chief of Staff is in a position to do this, likewise not in other Armies.
The only thing a Chief of Staff could do in such a case was to exert an advisory influence on his Commander, and to try in this way to attain perhaps a mitigation. Whether or not the Commander is amenable to such attempts of his Chief of Staff to exert an influence, and whether he even gives his Chief of Staff the possibility to express himself in a critizising or disapproving sense about orders of his Commander, depends of course exclusively on the personality of the Commander and on the question whether he concedes to his Chief of Staff an influence of any kind.
It can well be supposed, and it is properly a matter of course, that the Commander occasionally conferred with his Chief of Staff about reprisal measures. However, this of course does not constitute a responsibility within the meaning of criminal law for the Chief of Staff, who on the contrary took advantage of such opportunities to recommend to his Commander moderation and indulgence, or to avoid as far as possible hardships and injustices in some other way. Among other things, v. Geitner, for instance, recommended to his Commander in spring 1943 to grant an amnesty to Serbians, and by order of his General he successfully strove for this with the Commander in Chief South-East.
During the proceeding of this trial lasting for months not one single proof was produced, nor was it attempted, showing that v. Geitner had exerted any unfavorable influence on his Commander. However, it is proven that v. Geitner was extremely correct subordinates who never exceeded his rights and authorities; he did not endeavor to exert an influence which was not due him as Chief of Staff; he always respected the rights and authorities of his Commanders and contented himself with the spheres of activity he was charged with, which culminated in giving advice to his Commanders concerning the fighting of the insurgents with military means, i.e. military operations of larger or smaller extent, as for instance, enumerated by General Felber in his memorial in Doc. Book 17 of the Prosecution, NOKW 1735, Exh. 409a, page 35.
Geitner was never ambitious to advance -- this was for him as reserve officer of absolutely secondary importance, but to comply with his duty, to do good wherever he had the opportunity, and to serve thus to his country and to help his follow men. This impression is also confirmed by his former Commander Felber, by his superior Chief of Staff with the Army Group, General Foertsch and by his qualifications entered in his personal file.
Therefore, it is still today absolutely unintelligible for the defendant v. Geitner for what reasons he of all people, he who had nothing to do with reprisal measures, who always particularly advocated the laws of humanity also in this field, was indicted here, while there was a great many of officers and civil servants - I am not going to mention any names -- who were actually competent for reprisal measures and indeed ordered such, or who co-operated the Hitler's and Keitel's draconic measures, and part of whom were even extremists and willing tools in the Army; several of those persons were certainly to blame for the conflict of conscience of the Commanders or other executive authorities, in which no other choice was left to them than either to comply with the orders from above or to rebel, and so to do something that would have been a most serious crime in the opinion prevailing at that time in Germany. All these persons who really could be held more or less responsible, were not indicted. v. Geitner, of all people, who perhaps had deserved it least, was placed in the deck. As can well be understood, he again and again asks himself for what reasons he of all people, and only he who was mere Chief of Staff, is called to account, while this is not the case with several responsible commanders; and furthermore, for what reasons the external executive officials who were under highest pressure are supposed to be responsible, while Hitler's advisors and co-operators in the central offices bear a by far greater moral responsibility, if, in their devotion to Hitler, they indeed lent themselves to the issuing of orders, the nature of which was - allegedly -- contrary to International Law and could much more easily be recognized by them than by a reserve officer standing on an isolated post in the Balkans.
At all events it is a fact and proved by innumerable affidavits, v. Geitner was that Chief of Staff of a Corps Headquarters who perhaps was the most correct of all, the most reserved, the least influential and in spite of this he is apart from Foertsch - the only Chief of Staff who was indicted.
It must be supposed that this is due to the fact that none of his two Commanders was indicted and therefore v. Geitner was placed in the deck, so to speak, as substitute for the missing commanders. But all this can indeed not justify his being placed in the dock.
If one looks at the Generals who are in the dock in this trial, if one endeavors without prejudice create daily as regards their character and their attitude, and listens to the reports on the reputation these Generals enjoyed within the Armed Forces, one comes always again to the conclusion that the wrong people were summoned into the dock. That is the unanimous opinion of all officers and soldiers who became personally acquainted with these Generals, who could observe their official activity for years, and are best able to judge them.
The following statements concerning the case of v. Geitner may perhaps be emitted; there we deal with an opinion concerning the remainder of the counts of the indictment which have already been commented on by General v. Geitner during his examination on the stand. I may perhaps just refer to these statements and recommend them to the judicial notice of the Tribunal.
I shall continue reading on page 66 at the bottom of the page.
The evidence presented for the exculpation of the defendant Geitner comprised a period of over 40 years. It showed the defendant to the Tribunal as a soldier of extraordinary personal valor, who received in the first World War, as a young captain, the highest Bavarian decoration for gallantry, which apart from him, only about 200 officers received, and which gave him the personal status of a nobleman. But we also got to know him, during the long months of this trial, as a man, who distinguished himself everywhere and so in Belgrade, by his honest and faithful performance of his duties, who was to all the officers of his staff an example of a humane way of thinking and chivalrous attitude.
It is worth emphasizing that not a single Serb was prepared to testify here as a witness against v. Geitner; for nobody could talk badly of him. He can bear the responsibility for everything he had done; he always tried to perform his duties not by means of the provisions of a law code which might have been employed towards a conquered and defenseless enemy, but with a heart that recognized the human being in the conquered enemy and wished to help him.
I move that the Defendant, General Ritter v. Geitner be acquitted, since his innocence has been proved, acquitted, it is true, to a hopeless life of poverty, of misery and deprivation, that will be his fate just as it will be that of millions of other political refugees in present Germany, who have lost everything, home and country, and all their property; still, on the other hand, the acquittal for a future into which the defendant will have saved all the sublimest ideal goods which are owned by a good man and brave soldier. His honor as an officer who at all times acted fairly and chivalrously, and his blameless conscience which testifies on behalf of him that he always and everywhere and in each position performed his duties in an exemplary manner; his duties as a Christian and as a soldier, his duties towards God and mankind, towards his own fatherland as well as towards the enemy of yesterday, in whom he saw the friend and ally of to-morrow.
Let the Tribunal decide, what it will -- his conscience acquits him; this man has not done a thing he need be ashamed of to-day.
Behind him is a life of hard performance of duties, a life of a decent way of thinking, a life of a struggle for the right and order and humanity. Before him he sees, even if he leaves this court room as a free man, an old age of distress and deprivation, an existence without a home, a future, without hope.
If Your Honors, please, I should now like to start with the final plea for General Hubert Lanz, which is on page 69 and the following pages.
I, General Lanz was during his service in Greece in the time between September 1943 and October 1944 only troop commander. He never was territorial commander and never had executive power. The troops under his command, the 1st Mountain Division and the 104th Light Infantry Division had been in action before his arrival in the Epirus (Greece) and were already in receipt of the orders by the OKW and the Army Group authorizing reprisal measures. By virtue of these orders which had not been issued by Lanz, the divisions were, in conjunction with the territorial agencies, authorized to an responsible for, the reprisal measures, not the Army Corps.
The "Special Instructions" of the 1st Mountain Division of 13 September and 25 October 1943 dealing with reprisal measures, became known to General Lanz only at Nuremberg through the documents presented here. The division commanders were judicial authorities. The Commanding General Lanz had no Field Court Martial. II. In conformity with his spiritual way of thinking, General Lanz was opposed to the taking of hostages. He never ordered the execution of hostages. Once only on 3 October 1943, he ordered the seizure of hostages on cogent military grounds. Since that measure served its purpose, the hostages were released; this has been proved.
The warning given to the inhabitants of a Greek village because of repeated raids in May 1944, which was mentioned by the Prosecution in the course of the cross-examination resulted a few days later in the arrest of 18 suspected people. Even these people were not shot, but only detained, which is absolutely permissible according to international law.
The execution by shooting of 71 Communists in the area of the 104th Light Infantry Division has neither been ordered by General Lanz, nor carried out by forces under his command, but by a Greek Evzones detachment, which was never under the command of the Corps Commander (Lanz), but always only under that of the Higher SS and Police Leader of Athens, thus removed from any influence on the part of Lanz. For this reason alone Lanz does not bear any responsibility, so that there is no need to examine the other legal problems which might be raised by such an affair.
In as far as in individual cases reprisal measures were taken by the divisions under his command under their own jurisdiction and responsibility, they had been caused by cogent military necessities. In no case they were ordered by General Lanz. In so far as he was subsequently informed of such measures, his examination of the circumstances gave him in only one single case sufficient reasons for interference. In this case (Pinguiades) the guilty ones were handed over the Courts for trial in orderly way and sentenced to prison terms by the Court.
The case Akmotopos (Count 9 f of the indictment) was a tactical measure, which was carried out by independent order of the 1st Mountain Division. Lanz had described this Akmotopos case during his own interrogation on 20 November 1947 in every detail; there result the following facts for the legal evaluation:
The small mountain village was situated in a notorious band area, from which numerous serious and vicious attacks against the German forces had been made. When the German troops approached, the village was defended tenaciously. It had to be taken by storm after violent fighting with the use of artillery and mortars. In this fight part of the bands as well as part of the civilians fighting with them were killed. The village burned down. Part of the bands escaped. The peaceful civilian inhabitants had, according to an eyewitness report. left the village before.
The order for the day for the Corps issued by General Lanz on 1 October 1943, was an obituary for the Regiment Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Salminger, who had been murdered by the bands. The retaliatory action anticipated in the last sentence of the obituary was justified by the following facts. a) Salminger!s assassination had been preceded by several attacks on practically the same spot. On one of these occasions, the chief of a bakery company, that is, of a peaceful rear installation, Captain Stitzinger had been shot from behind.
(b) A great, and quite understandable agitation had taken possession of the troops as a consequence of these incidents, so that the danger arose that they might take the law into their own hands.
(c) In this position General Lanz could not ignore these happenings tacitly, since the troops would have felt left in the lurch by their General. That is why he issued the obituary in the form of an order of the day for the Corps, using a language adequate for the prevailing state of affairs. It was not a tactical order. The following statements which deal further with the Akmotopos incident I shall not read, but recommend them to the judicial notice of the Tribunal. Figure III on page 72 I shall also omit, this deals with the burning--down of villages and localities. I continue reading under figure V on page 73: -
V. The treatment of the Italians after the Italian capitulation and, in particular the fighting with the troops of the Italian General Gandin on the Islands of Corfu and Cephalonia have essential significance in the indictment against General Lanz.
Since, in the legal evaluation of these events, it is a question of problems which from a point of view of international law are specially interesting and unusually difficult, they must be gone into more closely.
Document NOKW 960, Exh. 448, Doc. Vol. 19, Page 32 fol. English page 33 fol was submitted against Lanz first of all; according to it 74 Italian Officers were shot at the beginning of October 1943. This matter can in truth in no wise incriminate General Lanz. For he had expressly ordered in his Corps Order No. 3 dated 24 September 1943 No. 1: "The disarmed Italians are to be dispatched along the main highway of Division with a light escort detachment so that they can join the other Italians by going via Moscovic to Korea." His Order was therefore clearly and unequivocally to the effect that the capture Italians were to be treated as prisoners of war. After the issue of this Corps Order which (according to its distributor) was directed to the I Mountain Div., the Commander of the latter General v. Staettner ascertained that these 74 Italian Officers had joined the Bands and had fought with them for 8 days in the Albanian coastal area against the German forces. Thereupon, General v. Staettner had 74 Italian Officers deemed to be guilty shot, while the mass of Italians captured in these actions (about 3,500) were taken into captivity. General v. Staettner, without previously asking his Corps Commander (Lanz) ordered, on his own initiative and on his own responsibility, the shooting of the 74 Italian Officers mentioned. He did this independently on the basis of Hitler's Order dated 15 September 1943.
This order given by Staettner and his reasons are in Doc. Vol. 19, This is not the place to examine whether General v. Staettner's way of acting was right or wrong, for, at all events, Lanz cannot be responsible for an order issued by a General under him, in violation of the clear instruction of his Commander.
Further, Document NOKW 1118, was evaluated so as to incriminate Lanz. According to it "Italian soldiers who were wearing civilian clothing and had remained among the population were to be ascertained by raids and shot, since such indicated intensification of danger from bands.
PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we will now take our afternoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
DR. SAUTER (Counsel for defendants von Geitner and Lanz): I am continuing with page 75 at the bottom "The order of 16 September 1943 -- that is the order of the Italian soldiers -- was given by the 22nd Mountain Army Corps but was not given by General Lanz.
This can be seen from the fact the order was given by General Lanz independently but it was rescinded.
"The Italian soldiers who had been caught in civilian clothing were rather, in practice, treated exactly like prisoners of war and moved to prisoner of war camps like other Italians in uniform. Consideration of events on Cephalonia and Corf demands, first of all, evaluation of the prelude to them in Athens: Lanz had come to Athens at the end of August 1943 to consolidate his staff there with which he was then to take over command in the Greek province of the Epirus, as soon as the anticipated capitulation of Italy would take place and the necessity would arise to have German troops move in to the areas previously occupied by the Italians. Scarcely arrived in Athens, Lanz got orders on 8 September 1943 from his Commander in Chief (Loehr) to transmit to the Italian Commander in Chief of the Italian troops in Greece, General Vecciarelli, the order for disarming and surrender of the Italian 11th Army. Now that was for Lanz an extremely difficult and unusual task; he had had nothing to with politics up to that time, an order of this kind was something absolutely new for him. Moreover he was only very superficially informed about relations in Athens and Greece; he did not even know what troops would be at his disposal in case of war. Therefore, Lanz begged General Loehr to spare him this mission. In vain; the order hold, that he (Lanz) had to bring over to General Vecciarelli the demand for capitulation. Lanz did this and went to Vecciarelli with the intention of negotiating with him on a basis and in a spirit intended to take into account the previous comradeship in arms and to respect the military honour of the Italian Army.
He was dumb-founded when Vecciarelli declined the demand and referred to the danger that the demand for complete disarmament of the Italian army might lead to bloody disputes. What was to be done? Lanz had come with the fixed idea of avoiding all blooshed. Veciarelli's aims were similar and he proposed to the German General that the Italian 11th Army would fight, from then onwards, at the side of the German Armed Forces until the situation cleared up. Lanz had no authority to agree to such a proposal; his instructions read immediate and complete surrender of arms. If he departed from it he was placing himself in opposition to the express order he had received from his own Commander in Chief. Lanz knew this order. However he saw the Italian General, too, who was fighting for the honour of his army.
The situation was very difficult for Lanz; he was aware of the consequences that direct contravention of his superior's instruction could entrail for him. A few mouths before he had not carried out in Russia an Order given him personally by Hitler so as to spare his men; for that reason he had been relieved and sent home and could still rejoice that this big-handedness had had no more tragic consequences for him. In Lanz, however, sympathy for the situation of the former companion in arms triumphed; he accepted the proposal of the Italian General and thought that, in so doing, he was performing a good deed that might satisfy both parties. He reserved to himself, at all events, the subsequent approval of his own Commander in Chief.
The latter, however, declined; he reprimanded General Lanz sharply because of his high-handedness and gave him the Order anew to demand from Vecciarelli immediate and complete surrender and laying down of arms. With a heavy heart, General Lanz went of view and together with Vecciarelli tried to find a way out which might still prevent a struggle between German and Italians while avoiding offense to Italian Military honour. Vecciarelli saw Lanz's conflict and he did not want a struggle either and, in the end, the two Generals agreed to this effect that indeed the surrender and disarmament was to follow, the latter, however, not immediately on a complete scale, but in 3 stages, so that in answer to Vecciarelli's requests the Italian troops were left their rifles, to start with, and their respect in the eyes of the Greek population was preserved.
Lanz came to this agreement, too, in the interest of good understanding with former companions in ars. By this agreement Lanz once more contravened an express of his military superiors, although he did not know how his Commander in Chief would interpret this. Lanz was happy when the latter finally declared his agreement however.
Then Lanz took over his command in the Epirus, conscious of the fact that he had performed a blessed deed by which he rendered a service to his fatherland. It entailed for himself, it is true, later severe disapprobation which resulted even in his disqualification as an Army Leader. His chivalrous behavior towards Vecciarelli and his services in the avoidance of all bloodshed was later branded as the expression of an "unstable disposition" and the point of view was adopted that such an officer was unsuited for employment as an Army General. Any Court, however, whether constituted of soldiers or civilians will value the behavior of General Lanz all the more highly and not see in it any lack of "severity", not a "refusal to take action in a specially difficult situation as suggested in that qualification, but, on the contrary, proof of a sense of responsibility and chivalrous disposition to an especially high degree even towards the highest superiors.
This "lack of severity" which, however, in reality was high civil courage, determined the behavior of General Lanz toe in the battles of Cephalonia and Corfu.
Throughout the Greek Mainland the surrender and laying down of arms agreed to between Lanz and Vecciarelli took place without friction without the need for shedding of a drop of blood. German troops moved into the areas previously occupied by the Italians, they were indusputably master of the situation, the German occupation of the Greek Mainland was carried out according to plan, the Italian 11th Army found itself on the move through the instrumentality of the German Armed Forces.