General Speidel was on sick leave from 23 January till 17 March 1944 in Germany. This fact probably removes the last doubt for a responsibility of General Speidel.
Count 1, digit 5 w: The so-called Krech's case:
All the documents, pertaining to this occurrence are compiled in Spledel Exhibit 27.
One single report of the Staff of the Military Commander Greece on the reprisals caused by the murder of General Krech was submitted by the prosecution. This I c morning report of the Military Commander Greece on 30 April 1944 contains 2 incidents from Athens and one more from the Peloponnese, all of which had nothing to do with Krech Case. This report belongs to the regular reports to the superior bureau which kept it informed on the events in the Greek area. It was pointed out at another place that nothing at all can be concluded on the responsibility of the reporting bureau from such a report. Thus it is more than poor to submit one single report for such a grave accusation as the present one. It must justify from the outset the heaviest doubts in the compelling consistency of the prosecution' argumentation. These doubts increase and change to the certainty of the correctness of the prosecution's assertion, if the following facts are considered:
All other reports, submitted by the prosecution, do not come from the Military Commander Greece. All the intended reprisals are reported already in a report of 28 April 1944, which, therefore, is dated 2 days before the report of the Military Commander Greece, while the single report of the Military Commander Greece of 30 April 1944 mentions only part of the measures. Neither final report on the Krech Case comes from the Military Commander Greece. This would have been the case with certainty, if the reprisals would have been ordered by him.
b) General Krech was commander of the 41. Fortress Division, consequently Commander of Troops. According to the order Loehr reprisals belonged to the duty of the troops.
c) If the witness SONTIS reports of the shooting to death of 200 hostages in Athens on 1 May 1944. who allegedly -- though not at all conclusively, taken from the concentration camp Chaidari, the participation of the Senior SS and Police Leader is excluded in any form, though not fully proven either. Chaidari, however, was a police institution of the Senior SS and Police Leader, on which the Military Commander Greece had no influence.
Thus the assertion of the prosecution, that General Speidel had perhaps ordered and carried out the execution through the only security battalion which by the way was entrusted exclusively with guard duties, this assumption becomes an entirely unproven assertion.
e) If the carrying out of the reprisal had been ordered by the Military Commander Greece, the Ia of the Staff of the Military Commander who was then also Deputy Chief would have learned of it at any rate. However, the person in charge of the section I, the former Major MUEHLTMANN, as also his assistant officer, Lieutenant Heilingbrunner declared under oath that the Military Commander Greece had nothing to do with the carrying out of reprisals caused by the murder of General Krech.
The then field commander of Athens, Brigadier General Eisenbach declared under oath as well that nothing became known to him that the Military Commander Greece ordered the shooting to death of the 200 communists.
He would undoubtedly have learned somehow of it in consideration of the close relationship in and off duty between the Military Commander Greece and the Field Commander Athens.
f) I finally refer to the testimony of General Speidel as witness in his own case.
Summarizing, I arrive at the conclusion that the prosecution has submitted no evidence proving General Speidel's responsibility for the carrying out of reprisal measures in case Krech. In view of the evidence submitted by the defense, there is no room for an assumption beyond any reasonable doubt, for less a conclusive proof, that General Speidel had any responsibility in this connection.
In document Speidel No. 60 all reports contained in the documents submitted by the prosecution and having any connection with the Greek area have been compiled in 6 sections and were arranged according to time and locality.
In the first parts of my statements I have shown the fundamental elements on which the judgment as to whether General Speidel is responsible for these incidents or not and the reprisals carried out must be based. None of these incidents can be traced back to troops commanded by or subordinated to him. If any individual incident is mentioned in the indictment, the formula under his command or subordinated to him has always been added. The prosecution are right in emphasizing the fact that this criterion in itself is decisive. But just because this criterion is decisive it must be established beyond any doubt. Certain questions which came up in the course of the presentation of evidence induce me to give once more a brief but precise description of the scope return of the commands and authorities in Greece:
a) The sphere of activities of the Military Commander of Greece exclusively comprised matters of administration -- in contrast to other Military Commanders in the South Eastern territories.
b) The military administration did not materialize, as the Greek government received basic instructions from the "Special Commissioner of the German Reich";
c) The operational and tactical command in the Greek territory was exclusively in the hands of Army Group E;
d) The following were committed in the Greek area: the 68th corps, the 22nd mountain corps and the commander Salonika -- Aegaeis. These staffs and their troops were subordinated to Army Group E.
e) The subordination of these troops to the Military Commander in his capacity of territorial commander was limited to matters of supply and welfare;
f) This difference becomes apparent when the question of deputies is taken into consideration:
The C in C of Army Group E was represented by the Senior Commanding General, the Military Commander on the other hand by the Oberfeldkommandant; if the corps had been subordinated to the Military Commander the Senior Commanding General would have been his deputy, which was, however, not the case.
g) Conditions in Greece were completely different from those in Serbia, where the Military Commander South East was at the same time the tactical commander. That was why the latter was also competent for tho so-called reprisal measures carried out by the troops and police units, while in the Greek area the C in C of Army Group E was competent for these matters;
h) The Higher SS and Police Leader was competent for police matters, he in his turn was subordinated to the Reichsfuehrer SS;
i) The Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group E, not the military commander, was in charge of the tactical deployment of the police troops.
k) The witness Felber stated clearly in his interrogation of 11 August the consequences of this fact, as to the responsibility for retaliatory measures: "Apart from this, Speidel had, as much as I know, really nothing to do with retaliatory measures, as, unlike me, he had almost no troops.
The competence and responsibility of the military commander Greece may, therefore, not be judged by analogy with conditions in Serbia, as the troop command tasks are lacking. Facts which may apply to Serbia, cannot be applied to the Military Commander Greece.
General Felber rightly called the Military Commander Greece a "torso" and added: "A big title and tasks which sound very good". Something, which was actually quite unimportant, had to be made to lock like something big." The reasons for this opinion are obvious. These reasons have to be taken in consideration at the examination of the question whether or not the incidents compiled in the tables of the Speidel -- exhibit 30 took place under the command and authority of General Speidel. It is not always easy to understand the chain of command in the German army. The question may also be raised, why conditions in Serbia are to be judged differently from conditions in Greece. I believe, however, that I have explained these matters sufficiently and that the reasons which I have given do not permit any doubt of the fact that General Speidel rightly rejects the responsibility for incidents, in regard to which he had no authority and on which he, therefore, did not have the slightest influence.
The defense is not able to refer to the English and American case law, as the corresponding literature and decisions are not available. I refer, therefore, only to a passage of the judgment of the American Military Tribunal II in the case of the United States of America against Field Marshal Erhard Milch.
I would like to recommend to the judicial notice of the Court the statements on this page and I am now turning to Count II of the Indictment on the next page:
In No. 7 of the indictment ail defendants are changed with the wanton destruction of cities and villages. The individual cases mentioned under no. 9 a -- p mention not a single incident which has any connection with General Speidel. During the adducing of evidence by the prosecution, there was also no incriminating document submitted, in this connection. I therefore do not have to discuss this count of the indictment.
Count 3 of the indictment General Speidel is charged with the carrying-out and transmitting of the so-called commissar order and the so-called commando order.
It has already been stated here repeatedly, that the commissar order was intended exclusively for the Eastern front and not for the South Eastern zone. In June 1941, when the commissar order was given, General Speidel was chief of the German Luftwaffe mission in Roumania.
My client did not participate in the German offensive against the Soviet Union; neither was he ever active in the East. He has never received the commissar order. This excludes, also, a transmitting of the order.
General Speidel received the so-called commando order. He did, however, not carry it out, nor did he transmit it. Speidel-exhibit 10 mentions a British commando which had been captured. All members of the commando were treated as POW's and were transferred to a POW camp in Germany.
General Speidel stated in direct examination the reasons which decided him not to transmit the commando order. At the time, when the commando order was issued, he had under his command only regional defense battalions which were charged with guard duties, and supply units. Besides, General Speidel had no battle order; he, therefore, believed that he could assume the responsibility for not transmitting the commando order. He did not even transmit the commando order to the 11th Luftwaffe field division, when he was charged with its command, as the commander of that division, Major General Drum stated under oath.
General Eisenbach also declared under oath and in an affidavit to that effect that he has seen neither the commissar order nor the commando order at the Feldkommandanturen Korinth and Athens. General Speidel also never talked to him about these orders.
I want to point out that also in this connection there is not the slightest fact which would prove the correctness of the charges of the prosecution.
Count 4 of the indictment Under Paragraph 14 of the indictment, all defendants are charged with participation in murders, tortures, systematic terror, confining in concentration camps, arbitrary forced labor, deportation of the civilian population.
The individual cases under Paragraphs 15 a - g contain nothing which could incriminate General Speidel.
I want to state the following, in regard to the evidence submitted by the prosecution during their case in chief.
1.) Deportation of workers.
The IMT judgment states, and I quote:
"Hitler appointed Sauckel on 21 March 1942 as plenipotentiary for labor allocation with full authority to centralize under a unified control the allocation of all available labor forces, including workers and prisoners-of-war recruited for work in foreign countries. Saukel was instructed to act within the scope of the Four Year Plan, and on 27 March 1942 Goering in his capacity as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, issued a decree which transferred his departments for labor allocation to Saukel, On 30 September 1942, Hitler gave Saukel full power to appoint commissioners in the various occupied territories and to arrange for all necessary measures for the carrying-out of the order of 21 March 1943."
Therefore, Saukel had become the head of all labor allocation in the occupied territories. Saukel was, however, placed outside of the military and military administration hierarchy.
The IMT judgment states furthermore: "Based on this order, Saukel's commissioners procured the workers, with the assistance of the police authorities of the occupied territories and sent them to Germany".
It follows from these findings of the IMT judgment that the labor recruiting was the exclusive task of Sauckel and of his commissioners. These findings do not ever speak of a subordination of these commissioners to the military commanders, neither of a participation of the military commander; neither could the prosecution produce a single document which would prove participation of any kind of the defendant Speidel in his capacity as military commander. Nor could it produce any order by Speidel, which refers to the labor recruiting. The prosecution itself submits, however, an order which states clearly that the military commander had nothing to do with such -- or similar authorities and offices. This is Prosecution Exhibit 297.
Sauckel's commissioners are doubtlessly "offices outside of the Wehrmacht". These offices are subordinated to the commander-in-chief South East, but in a restricted manner only, because the authority of the highest Reich offices to issue technical directives is not touched by this subordination." This makes it clear that:
a) (a positive factor) Saukel's commissioners received their technical directives in regard to labor recruiting from Saukel only and were responsible only to him.
b) (a negative factor) -- that the military commander had no authority to issue technical directives.
Thus the prosecution has proven by its own documents that the military commander had no authority of command in regard to the labor recruiting offices.
Beyond this, the defense submitted also a number of exhibits supporting and positively confirming the fact that Saukel's labor recruiting was outside of Speidel's sphere of activity.
Finally, there is another fact of decisive importance; it is the return to Germany of foreign workers on leave, which follows from documents submitted by the prosecution.
If only one of these Greek workers had been dissatisfied with the conditions under which he worked in Germany, he would have had a 100 times the opportunity during his leave to escape an unpleasant duty by fleeing to the partisans. These men on leave did, however, not do that. They preferred to return to their place of work.
The prosecution has referred to the following documents: concerning the recruiting of 2,200 workers for the General of the transport service.
Article 52 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare proclaims the right of the occupying power to request services from the population; this was recognized by the IMT and I quote: "The rules concerning forced labor by the inhabitants of the occupied territories are stated in Article 52 of the Hague Convention." There are only two restructions to this right of the occupying authority:
1.) The requested services must correspond with the resources of the country;
2.) The population may not be forced to war-like acts against its country.
There is no doubt that the 2,200 transport workers were recruited for authorized purposes and requirements of the occupation troops. This make sit obvious that the registration and allocation both were voluntary. Besides, this was an order which was never carried out.
(Statement and testimony by Geitner and direct examination Speidel).
And then Prosecution refers to NOKW-692, Exhibit 422, against General Speidel.
Firsts, there is no evidence that the measure was ordered by the Military Commander Greece. It is also not clearly stated what the forced measure consisted of. There are forced measures in existence which are recognized by the law. It cannot be easily understood for which decisive reasons the passage of the submitted document must be considered as incriminating evidence against General Speidel.
c) Document NOKW-2520 (Exh. 631) which was submitted subsequently by the prosecution - Situation report of 14 April 1944 - does also not prove anything against the voluntariness of the recruiting. The words "procured" (vermittelt) and "engaged" (verpflichtet) are, in the use of the German language, no opposites. No forced measure can be concluded, from their use.
The defense refers, on the other hand, to document NOKW-649. This is a situation report of the military commander Greece of 13 July 1944, which was therefore written long after General SPEIDEL's departure. This document mentions for the first time that "in future and for the first time" also forced, measures were to be applied. This proves that previously no forced measures were applied.
2) Suppression of strikes.
The right of the occupying power to suppress strikes results from the already quoted Article 52 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. As the IMT judgment recognizes the right to use forced labor, based on Article 52 this also includes, of course, the right to use force, within certain limits, and to suppress strikes which would have unfavorable effects on the occupying power.
The prosecution did not prove, for any case, that General SPEIDEL actually suppressed strikes with illegal means. In most cases nothing was done anyway.
The strike referred to in prosecution-exh. 418 mentions merely the arrest of 39 persons. It may be assumed as certain that the arrested had been taking part in the strike. Nothing proves that any further steps beyond the arrest were taken.
The incident mentioned in prosecution exhibit 437 took place on 9 March 1944? that is, at a time when General SPEIDEL was on sick leave in Germany. His responsibility is, therefore, excluded.
The following has to be mentioned, in this connection:
a) The prosecution attempted to hold General SPEIDEL responsible for those retaliatory measures which were carried out by his deputy during SPEIDEL's 54-day long absence when he was ill.
The prosecution has made an attempt to represent these measures of the deputy as following orders and instructions issued previously by General SPEIDEL, partly because of previous incidents, partly for the explicit purpose to give definite fixed directives to his deputy for the time of his own absence.
b) On principle, the following has to be stated in this connection: First: that a "deputy" (Vertreter) is alone responsible for the measures taken by him, Second:
that the basis of his decisions were the orders issued by his superiors which were generally to be obeyed, and Third:
that General SPEIDEL did not give any directives or instructions, to his deputy, before his departure, as there was no reason for it. The deputy in his capacity as officer of the military government area headquarter, was just as well informed about all matters as the military commander himself.
c) The prosecution attempted, in this connection to regard, as basis for the retaliatory measures of the deputy, a so-called "Strike Decree" of the military commander, dated 1943, This "Strike Decree" was not submitted in evidence. Its contents is not know. It is also unknown whether or not it concerned "retaliatory measures"; however, this must be doubted. The following fact makes it appear improbable: Immediately after his return in March 1944, General SPEIDEL released several hundred Greek workers who had been arrested because of participation in that strike, and then tried by a court-martial only a few of the instigators. This measure proves conclusively that the Strike Decree called for punishment by Court proceedings.
d) Finally; even if we assume that it was proven that the so-called Strike Decree called for the measures applied in that case, this decree would not have been any longer in force in March 1944. Because the socalled "LOEHR order" of 22 December 1943 which repealed all former socalled retaliatory orders, had already been in force in the course of January, and that is before the time, in spring 1944 when the deputy of the military commander applied the retaliatory measures.
Only this LOEHR order could have been the basis of the decisions of the deputy of the military commander. Thus any attempt to refer to previously issued orders or directives is without success.
c) As final evidence against the assertions by the prosecution must be regarded the very obvious fact that the only two large-scale retaliatory measures in the zone of the military commander were applied exactly at the time of General SPEIDEL's absence!
This fact proves the opposite of the facts charged by the prosecution. It proves that, after the two acts of sabotage of January and June 1943, General SPEIDEL himself did not make any use of the opportunities presented to him to order retaliatory measures! He has also in this regard shown the greatest reserve, because he personally disapproved of these measures, as he stated himself under direct examination. The decisions and measures of the deputy are not incriminating but rather redeeming in regard to SPEIDEL.
3) Deportation of Jews.
In connection with this point the prosecution in their Opening Statement of 15 July 1947 states that SPEIDEL's police troops had deported Jews from Crete, Corfu, Rhodes, and the other islands.
This statement shows that the deportation of Jews was definitely a police measure which came within the exclusive competency of the Higher SS and police leader, and was carried out in accordance with the instructions of the Reichsfuehrer SS. The judgment of the International Military Tribunal stated: "The evacuation of Jews from the occupied territories was carried out according to the instructions of the SS with the help of SSpolice units."
Although Crete was Greek territory, it was directly under the command of Army Group E. The military commander of Greece was only entitled to give directives regarding basic questions of administration. (For instance, currency questions and such). As to the operations connected with the Jews, the military commander of Greece was not even informed about them.
Rhodes was not even Greek territory, but as is known belonged to the Italian Dodekaneses. The commander of Rhodes was subordinated to the Army Group E in every respect. Besides, according to the documents submitted by the prosecution, the deportation of Jews from Rhodes took place at a time when General SPEIDEL had long ago left Greece.
The measures carried out in Corfu did not take place at the order or with the authorization of the military commander of Greece, neither was the latter informed of these measures by way of orders or reports. All orders went from Army Group E to the offices directly or indirectly concerned. As the distribution shows, the military commander of Greece was not even notified by way of information.
This leaves only those measures for discussion which were carried out in Athens itself. When General SPEIDEL heard about the intended evacuation of Jews from Athens, he attempted to have this project cancelled, though he had no authorization, and was not compelled by any official duty to do so. The attempt failed. When, shortly after this, General SPEIDEL heard that Jewish property was being looted, he immediately contacted the Special Commissioner of the Reich, in order to have measures instituted which would preserve this property for the Jews. - a step which did not come within his competency and was not a part of his official duties. In agreement with the political representative of the Reich, the Jewish property was confiscated and placed in the hands of the Greek Government which was to act as trustee. The purpose of this measure was to preserve the property of the Jews as far as possible. That is to say, its purpose was not to destroy and annihilate but to spare and safeguard as far as possible.
The humane attitude which General SPEIDEL adopted in this matter is not surprising if one peruses the affidavit WALDECK; this affidavit shows clearly that even in previous cases SPEIDEL had taken active and positive steps on behalf of the Jews.
4) Confinement in Concentration Camps.
As is shown by the prosecution documents, there were two hostage camps, one in Saloniki and one at Larissa. General SPEIDEL did not know of them. On the other hand it must be stated that they were situated in a territory where the commander of Saloniki-Aegaeis was in charge of the combatting of partisans, and thus they were probably subordinated to him in his capacity of tactical Commander.
General SPEIDEL did not institute nor maintain hostage camps. On the contrary as is shown by Document NOKW-692 (Exhibit 422) he even tried to prevent the institution of such camps.
The camp at Chaidari was a police camp and was subordinated to the competency of the Higher SS and Police Leader.
This circumstance makes it understandable that General SPEIDEL had no detailed knowledge of this camp. The fact that these matters did not come within the Military Commander's competency, as also the fact that the police offices carefully veiled their measures and institutions, brought it about that General SPEIDEL heard nothing of the conditions which are alleged to have existed in the camp of Chaidari. Even the Field Commander, General EISENBACH, who was competent and responsible for this region, only heard about this camp in the course of a conversation after he had been in Athens for a long time.
II.
A survey of my expositions up to now will provide a clear answer to the question whether the assertion of the prosecution quoted at the start is correct or not, namely, the assertion that the defendants in this trial "instituted and carried out a well-planned program of terror and annihilation." The answer in the negative which is perfectly justified even now will be further supported by some additional remarks.
General SPEIDEL pardoned and released many hundreds of Greeks who had been sentenced by German courts to terms of imprisonment, some of which were of considerable duration.
Furthermore, after the retreat of the Italians, General SPEIDEL immediately released far more than a thousand Greeks who had been confined in the prisons of Athens.
In addition, General SPEIDEL energetically supported the aid for Greece project of the International Red Cross; the purpose of this project was to help the Greek population that had always been dependent upon the import of foodstuffs over the difficult time of war.
In particular, I refer to the statement of the Swedish President of the Senate, Sandstroem, who was at that time President of the International Red Cross in Greece. Sandstroem knew the events in Greece from his own personal experience, and for this reason special importance should be attached to the statement which he makes in his affidavit: "With regard to the connections between the Administrative Committee of the Aid for Greece and Herr SPEIDEL in his capacity of Military Commander, I can say the following: As the time passed, we contacted more and more the military authorities, and if we had business with General SPEIDEL he not only met us in every way, but his intention was always to adhere to international agreements; and he tried to help us by every means in his power."
The British air attack on the Piraeus in January 1944 resulted in a destruction which was certainly not necessary from a military point of view, and on account of which thousands of Greek families lost their homes and were left with nothing in the world. It was General SPEIDEL who, in cooperation with other German offices, immediately instituted aid measures for the victims of the air raid; he saw to it that field kitchens of the Wehrmacht were set up and made considerable amounts of foodstuffs available for the thousands of people.
The former Greek President of the Cabinet Council, Logothetopoulos, who was no more the chief of a puppet government than, for instance, the Bavarian President of the Cabinet Council today, describes General SPEIDEL as a sensible and mild soldier, with whom it was easy to get on and who, having enjoyed a classical education, had understanding for the soul of the Greek people.
The number of these examples could be considerably increased. If any further proof is needed for the irreproachable and humane attitude of General SPEIDEL toward the Greek population, I wish to refer to the reasons which led to General SPEIDEL's recall, his mild and yielding attitude with regard to the Greek population, an attitude which was frequently opposed to the measures of the tactical command and which was the decisive reason for his recall in May 1944.
All these facts are not very suitable for confirming the assertions of the prosecution regarding a program of murder and terror. And nothing is more foolish than the assertion of the prosecution that my client had committed murders and crimes in order to support the racial and economic policy of the Third Reich.
General SPEIDEL's negative attitude towards National Socialism has been unmistakably established in his direct examination.
From the number of affidavits which I have submitted to this point I here mention the affidavit of the American Colonel, Truman-Smith, who by reason of his personal contact with General SPEIDEL had occasion to gain intimate knowledge of his anti-National Socialist attitude. The prosecution has thought that they could refute General SPEIDEL's own statements in connection with this point by submitting the opinion of 22 February 1939. It has previously been shown that the more or less involved phrases describing an officer's attitude toward National Socialism which appeared in the official opinion, were just a farce and only complied with a regulation. In document NOKW-2829, Prosecution Exhibit 666 - submitted as a supplement - the prosecution themselves have provided the proof for this statement.
As late as 1943 an opinion certified that Major Kuhn in the General Staff was a convinced National Socialist. But at this time Major Kuhn had already made a bomb attempt on Hitler's life. That was what the National-Socialist's conviction of Major Kuhn really looked like. This fact clearly shows the value of Exhibit 648 submitted by the prosecution. It is certainly no refutation of General Speidel's own declaration.
As far as the short time at my disposal permits, Your Honors, I have tried to give you the most important viewpoints of my client's defense. Several things might still be said, but I know that you are acquainted with the entire material of the trial, the presentation of the case-in-chief and all the exhibits submitted in evidence on behalf of my client.
If I tried, in particular, to clear up the official relations between my client and the high-SS and Police Leader of Greece, it was my aim to point a way out of that maze of confused Commands which existed in the Greek territory. It must be definitely admitted that it is very difficult for an outsider to gain a clear insight into the entire State and Party apparatus of the Third Reich. The fact that these ambiguities, the overlapping of competencies, the impossibility of having matters cleared up by a superior agency, were parts of a system of the supreme State authorities, is beyond any doubt for anybody who has busied himself with the conditions under the last German regime. The subordinate was meant to find his own way of this confusion. General Speidel had to cope with the institution of the higher-SS and police leader, i.e., the personal representative of Himmler. General Speidel has explained in detail and I may say in a convincing manner, how he interpreted the directives defining authority of this official, and how he drew a clear borderline between their two competencies. Now the prosecution has asserted in the last part of their presentation of their case-in-chief that the directives defining the authority of the higher SS- and police leader were ambiguous, they did not mean what they said -First, I cannot see why official directives should be ambiguous.
Is it perhaps because General Speidel showed up the legal misconception on which the indictment has been built up by his explanation of the manner in which he interpreted these official directives in 1943, in accordance with the experience of his thirty years of military activities?
If, however, the official directives are ambiguous and do not mean what they say, then the prosecution must admit that at least two interpretations are possible, without one or the other being necessarily and intentionally wrong.
Is it thus possible to base a verdict of "guilty" on the fact that, according to the assertion of the prosecution, General Speidel's interpretation of the directives defining the authority of the higher SS- and Police Leader was wrong? I refer to three passages of the judgment in the case of the United States of America versus Field Marshal Milch: I quote:
"Unless the court which hears the proof is convinced of guilt to the point of moral certainty the presumption of innocence must continue to protect the accused. If the facts as drawn from the evidence are equally consistent with guilt and innocence, they must be resolved on the side of innocence.
Under American law neither life nor liberty is to be lightly taken away, and, unless at the conclusion of the proof there is an abiding conviction of guilt in the mind of the court which sits in judgment the accused may not be damnified." End of quote.
And at another point: I quote further:
"......before we can find the defendant guilty we must conclude that every hypothesis resulting from the circumstances is consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence. One can easily reach the hypothesis of guilt from the documents and testimony by that hypothesis in many of its phases is also consistent with innocence."
End of quote.
And finally I quote: "Remarks such as "the defendant must have known", or "to the best of knowledge he knew", and other similar inconclusive conjectures frequently used in this part of the case are not the kind of links which are imperatively needed to make up a chain strong enough to sustain the weight of a conviction".
If I would add anything to the impressive precision of these sentences I would only detract from their clarity. Your Honors, you will now evaluate the presentation of evidence by both the prosecution and the defense in the case of General Speidel according to the principles of an administration of justice based on a high sense of moral responsibility.
Hitherto, in the history of civilized states and powers, war as such came to an end at the moment when the defeated party offered to surrender, i.e., when they signed an "armistice" and laid down their arms.
This military conclusion of the war was followed by its political liquidation. Never before, however, in the history of civilized powers has it been the consequence of a war that the victor should sit in judgment over the vanquished.
Where is this consequence going to lead, if years after the actual conclusion of a war the victor considers himself entitled to sit in judgment over the vanquished and to pronounce verdicts? The result of this fact is a justified fear that the principles of justice will be obscured by the instinct of revenge, that might will be stronger than right!
Not the court of the victors, but the incorruptible historical recognition of future generations will pronounce judgment as to guilt or fate, as to right or wrong.