On all of the soldiers found dead in the valley, as I ascertained myself on the spot and the following day when the bodies were identified in Topola, several shot injuries were found; it was in part impossible to identify the bodies because of the shots which had obviously been discharged at the shortest range. The bodies of those found killed near the motor vehicles had reached a state of partly carbonization through the burning of the vehicles.
"As I had contracted a knee injury at the attack through a fall, and this injury grew worse in the course of the next few days, I had to stay in bed for some time and was incapacitated for duty. For this reason I did not take part in expiatory measures which had to be executed pursuant to orders by the soldiers of the 3rd and the 4th companies having suffered the casualties. I remember quite definitely that people at that time talked about it that the execution of these expiatory measures had been ordered "from Berlin", i.e. by higher army authorities. I can recall from what I was told by my comrades that on that occasion several hundred persons who had been interned in camps were executed by shooting. In this connection also Jews were mentioned. Whether it was solely a question of Jews, I do not know as I was not present personally on that occasion. I am unable to indicate the exact number of persons shot in atonement for the attack; I can recall, however, quite definitely that they talked about several hundred. Of further shootings resulting from this surprise attack I have heard nothing neither at that time nor later on. If anything relating to further shootings had become known to me this would undoubtedly have been preserved in my memory, since it was a question of measures in retaliation for an attack at which many of my closest friends had been killed."
The affidavit is signed, "Hermann Ellerbrake."
If your Honors please, List Document 208 has already been offered by me as Exhibit 47 to the Tribunal but there are two brief passages which I would like to read from this document.
The document can be found in List Document Book V on page 80 of that document book, 80 and 85; I repeat List Document Book V, pages 80 and 85. On the top of page 80 you find an entry for the date of 9 October:
"Report submitted by the 2nd Battalion of Army Signal Regiment 521 with interrogation of Corporal Kerbler of 4th Company of Army Signal Regiment 521 attached. See enclosure. It results from the interrogation that the German soldiers taken prisoner or wounded by Communists on 2 October 1941 near Vlacka were shot dead with machine guns. It furthermore results that the Communists are wearing the blouses, steel helmet and boots of the captured German soldiers."
That is on page 80 of List Document Book V.
I continue to read from page 85 and I would like to read the following entry there. That is the second half of the page:
"In regard to attack at Vlacka (2 October) during discovery of the corpse the testimony of the Corporal Kerbler (see 11 October) is confirmed that the Communists have robbed German soldiers of their uniforms."
If the Tribunal please, I recall that the prosecution when examining the witness Krage who also was a member of the 2nd Battalion of the 521st Army Signal Regiment doubted the fate of Kerbler. I searched for this witness and I found him. He lives in Vienna now. I would now like to submit to the Tribunal List Document 280 and this document contains an interrogation of this witness Kerbler. The exhibit number will be 56. The document in question is contained in List Document Book VI on page 1 of that document book. I would like to read this document:
"I belonged to the Army Signal Regt. 521, which was put to service after conclusion of the Balkan campaign, to repair and maintain the telephone network in Jugoslavia. Maintenance troops in the strength of 1 commissioned officer and 6 men were distributed at a distance of 50 km on the line Belgrade - Nisch. On 29 Sept. the maintenance troop in Usce was attacked by partisans and carried off.
Since searching parties of 2 Inf. units remained unsuccessful, our comp. put together a Search Commando composed of the Comp. C.O., a Lt., the First Serg. and 42 men. Loaded on 3 trucks and two heavy intercept-jeeps we departed from Belgrade on 2 October at 5 a.m. Shortly after 11 we drove through Topola. About 15 km after Topola in direction Kragujevac the road turned uphill in serpentines and became very difficult to survey with cornfields on the right hand and bushes and forests to the left. In the first car were the Comp. C.O., the Lt., the First Serg. and the driver. Then followed the first truck on which I sat together with 12 comrades. Following us came two more trucks and at the end was again an intercept-jeep. We just had turned a curve, when a shot was fired from the cornfield at our left. After about 5 seconds heave MG and rifle fire set in, bursting from both sides of the read. Our driver made a sharp turn and drove into the right road-ditch. Shots pierced the outer car walls. Suddenly I felt a red-hot burning in my back. Next to me a comrade collapsed hit by rifle shots. Others stopped moving.
I wanted to jump off from behind. However, a shot hit me in my right upper arm. Therewith I was rendered unfit for battle right at the start. The other comrades, who could leave the car, opened fire on the partisans and kept firing to the last cartridge. In the meantime, the partisans covered by their MG-fire had advanced so far that they could easily capture those of us who survived. I was, since I could not walk, wrapped into a blanket by four comrades and carried downhill. The partisans led us to a forest clearing through which a brook ran. We had--only fourteen of us were left--to sit down in the grass on the other side of the bank. Across on the slope the partisans were busy dividing the valuables taken from us and from the deceased. On order of the captain in Serbian uniform, who apparently had directed the attack, the partisans, except for two men and the captain, left the clearing. The two partisans loaded the machine guns and brought them in position against us. The muzzle of the gun was directed towards us. Therewith each of us knew the fate that awaited us. Our Company Commander, who had been captured with us, advanced towards the slope and proposed to the Serbian captain to exchange us for captured partisans in Belgrade. One man of us should come along with several Serbs to Belgrade. However, the Serbian captain did not agree to that, even after the Company Commander had pledged his word of honor that he would see to it that 140 partisans would be exchanged for us fourteen men. When the Company Commander wanted to continue speaking he was driven back, at the point of a gun, down the slope to his place. When he sat beside us again, both partisans took up the machine guns again, on a sign by the leader of the band. Our Company Commander asked us to remain still, it would be over quickly. At a distance of hardly four meters, the two leveled their machine guns on us and pulled the trigger. I let myself fall on my back. Between the yelping and sledging"-- there is one word misprinted here--" of the MG-shots the cries of the hit comrades sounded louder and louder. Bullets whirred around my head. Suddenly I felt a hard stroke on my left side and felt the blood running warmly down my leg. The first sergeant lay close beside me and I felt his convulsive movement when hit by a bullet.
I was fully conscious and saw how my comrades turned and twisted in pain. As soon as the partisans had emptied their magazines they came down the slopes, went from man to man and put their pistols to the head of anyone still moving. I was the last in the row. It is impossible for me to describe the feeling I had. When the head of the sergeant was turned around, the pistol lowered upon him, a shot crashed, and the face of the sergeant, streaming with blood, suddenly fell beside me in the grass. The fear of death crept higher and higher into me, and I thought my heart stood still. Then I felt a hard step at my heels. With the last of my willpower I remained stiff. The partisans thought I was dead, and left. After some time had elapsed and I had gained somewhat in strength, I dragged myself up to the road. The other thirteen comrades were dead. I had three shot wounds in the back, the shot in my upper arm, and a hand grenade splinter wound in my spine.
"At 5 p.m. an infantry company arrived from Kragujevac, which, after searching the terrain, took me along to the Army hospital in Kragujevac. From there I was brought to Belgrade by way of a Fieselerstork."
"Hohann Kerbler, Vienna, Staudgasse 33.
"Vienna, 8 November 1947."
A further affidavit is attached.
"I, undersigned, Johann Kerbler, metal worker, born 6 August 1919, in Kollnbrunn, Lower Austria, residing at Vienna, XVIII, Staudgasse 33, was, during the attack of 2 October 1941, seriously wounded and transferred into the Army hospital at Kragujevac. From there I was brought, by way of a Fieseler-stork, into the Army hospital at Belgrade. I was interrogated by the new Company Commander and by the Summary Court. My statement, which I had to make in lieu of oath, was presented to the regiment by my company.
"I declare, in lieu of oath, that my description of the manner in which the soldiers who were overwhelmed by the partisans were killed is the full truth.
"Furthermore I declare, in lieu of oath, that I never belonged to the NSDAP or any of its organizations."
The signature, again, is Johann Kerbler, and this affidavit is also certified to by a Vienna notary.
I would now like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that, according to Prosecution Exhibit 79, which is contained in Document Book 3 of the Prosecution, on page 3 of that Document Book, it results that on 9 October it was reported to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast that shootings were taking place at that time. The date is 9 October; that is the date of the report.
I would further like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that also from Prosecution Exhibit 80, which is contained in Document Book 3 of the Prosecution, pages 4 to 10, it results that shootings were carried out on 9 and 11 October.
I would further like to point out to the Tribunal that the witness Krage testified--and this also results from Exhibit 80-- that altogether 449 Serbs were shot.
I would now like to ask the Tribunal to look at List Document 178, which I have submitted as List Exhibit 10. This document can be found in List Document Book III, on page 78. On pages 93 and 95 it can be seen--and this is why I read these paragraphs on pages 93 and 95--that Field Marshal List was at Crete during the period of time from 8 October to the evening of 11 October. I have already pointed out to the Tribunal that the report dated the 9th stated that shootings were being carried out, and that shootings were only carried out on 9 and 11 October. In the evening of 11 October -- and this is shown by List document 178, which is Exhibit 10--it results that Field Marshal List returned from Crete on the evening of 11 October.
I would now like to read a short note contained in this diary, which is on page 95 of the Document Book:
"Saturday, 11 October." I am reading the third line: "1040 hours departure; 1120 hours, arrival in Tatoi. Foertsch at the airport.
Dankelmann recalled. New order by the Fuehrer with respect to authority to issue orders. More or less the same. The Navy withdraws more and more. Notice to the parts of the Wehrmacht to obey the orders of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast."
I contend that the information given by General Foertsch at the arrival of Field Marshal List referred to the two main points of importance, the recalling of Dankelmann and the new Fuehrer order about the authority to issue orders. I shall draw further conclusions from this fact in my final plea.
I would now like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to List document 208, which I have previously offered as List Exhibit 47, and from which I would now like to proceed to read a last passage. This is in List Document Book V, at page 85.
PRESIDING BURKE: Is this a new exhibit you are referring to?
DR. LATERNSER: This is Exhibit 47, which I have already offered. I would now like to read a passage from this document, on page 85, towards the bottom of the page, the last paragraph:
"13 October 1941. Police Director Loos of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast arrived at Belgrade as a counsellor of the General Commando in police affairs."
In this respect, again, I shall draw the necessary conclusions in my final plea, but in the meantime I would like to stress the fact that the report contained in Prosecution Exhibit 79, from the Plenipotentiary Commanding General to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, is dated the 9th of October. From 9th of October until the 11th of October Field Marshal List was on Crete without any contact with anybody. He returned from Crete on the 11th. And, as can be further seen from Exhibit 80 of the Prosecution-
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: That is rather a matter for your final argument, isn't it, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Your Honor, I beg your pardon. I only wanted to bring the evidence in this case in some sort of order. This brings me to the end of this document.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I have a few excerpts I should like to read, if Your Honor please. On page 90 of List document 208, which is Exhibit 46 in List Document Book V, the entry at the very bottom of the page:
"Danube, 8.10. Department of the Interior: Band of 300 men (between Rabrovo and Pozarevacka Ulava) wears a red badge on the left side of the chest. When they appeared in Pozarevacka the red and Jugoslav colors were worn together."
Then, over on page 98, the 8th line from the bottom of the page, under "Obrenovac, 16 October": "The leader of the band is a Serbian first lieutenant in uniform; the 19 year old Zivkovic from Umka has led the band from Serbia into Croatian territory. Band marched on towards Boljevci."
DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the attitude of the population towards the bands, I would like to produce some evidence in List Document 1-D, which will be given List Exhibit No. 57. This document is contained on page 79 in List document Book I. This is an affidavit of Helmuth Buekemann, and I would like to read this document. I want to start with the second paragraph:
"From September to December 1941, I and my regiment were stationed on occupation duty in Eastern Macedonia around Saloniki. During the first week numerous attacks of armed civilians on single German motor vehicles occurred in this area, as well as acts of terrorism against Greek officials and against villages unoccupied by the troops, from which the bands got their supplies by force.
"To restore order in this area and to effect the pacification desired by the population, the Commanding General of the SalonikaAegean district ordered some operations, repeated public proclamations having remained fruitless.
"The Governor of Saloniki, a former Greek General, had officially called on me at Post Headquarters and had expresses to me his sincere regret of these occurrences and of his powerlessness, at the same time promising me his most loyal support.
"A Greek Lieutenant Colonel also came to see me and offered to take part in such an operation, pointing out that before the war he had been specialist in this field at Saloniki and had himself actively carried on the fight against the bandits. In the existing circumstances we were both convinced that this was not a national resistance movement, but that it was only a case of trouble-making robbers and bandits of the kind common in this area already before the war.
"This immediate participation was, however, rejected for considerations of principle, whilst the uniformed Greek police cooperated by permanent and reliable transmission of messages and active fighting participation in the expeditions for the extirpation of this criminal post, which was also contrary to international law. The police had casualties of their own in these operations. Such an operation was, as far as I remember, carried out about the middle of October 1941, after a military motor vehicle with four Luftwaffe members had again been shot at on its way from Sofia to Saloniki about 50 kilometers northeast of Saloniki and the four men in the car had been murdered by armed bandits, according to reliable statements of the civilian population.
"The peaceful population of this area evidently welcomed this action of our troops and, to a large extent, supported it.
"The individual operations were carefully prepared by the German and Greek intelligence services, which collected all pertinent information. After that our troops received a clearly worded order from the Commanding General, Saloniki-Aegean.
"In view of the way these bandits acted--deceitfully, in civilian clothes without any recognizable badges or regular leaders, using their arms in a concealed manner--our troops had not the slightest doubts as to the legality of their defensive operations."
This affidavit is signed, "Helmuth Buekemann."
Now I would like to discuss the combatting of the bands by the troops. The first step was to frequently request more troops. In order to prove the fact of these frequent requests for troops, I would like to offer List Document 22, which will become List Exhibit 58.
This document is contained in List Document Book I, on page 41. This document also represents an affidavit which was executed by General Franz Halder, who was the former Chief of Staff of the German Army, and who is the proper witness to make statements concerning these activities.
I shall start reading from the second paragraph of this document:
"During the time of the German operations in the Balkans in 1941, I was Chief of the General Staff of the Army under the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. In this capacity I was officially occupied with leading and supplying the German troops. Upon termination of the military operations and upon the appointment of the commanders of the Wehrmacht through the OKW, I did not have any more direct connection with problems of that theater of war. I remember one exception with which I was concerned during that time with regard to the situation in the Balkans:
"During the second half of September 1941, Field Marshal List sent the chief of his staff, the then Colonel Hermann Foertsch, to the OKW in order to report there about the difficulties which resulted from the much too small number and the composition of the troops at his disposal. He advised Colonel Foertsch to report also to me, in order to prevent any protest on the part of the OKH against assigned troops to the Balkans, should the OKW be willing to comply with his request.
"I remember that Colonel Foertsch reported to me about the constantly increasing danger for the railroad and road connections through the insurgents, especially in Serbia, and he emphasized that, aside from a few country shooting clubs, only four German divisions were at the disposal in this wide and mountainous territory, and those divisions were made up by only two weak infantry regiments and one artillery unit in each case, and thus were only of limited value for combat purposes. With regard to the age class of the men, their arms and equipment and their very limited maneuverability, those units were entirely unsuited for the tasks of a fight which was being conducted by the opponent with the greatest of slyness and brutality, without the slightest regard for the rules of land warfare.
"According to the statements of Colonel Foertsch, which he made upon order of Field Marshal List, I considered the request of the 12th Army for reinforcement and improvement of its units very reasonable. Upon a calm evaluation seen also from the military point of view of the situation described, it had to be admitted that the appeasement of the occupied territories of the Balkans, which was the task of the Commander of the Wehrmacht assigned to him by the OKW, could only be accomplished through stronger, better qualified and more mobile troops. I therefore regretted very much that I could not help out Field Marshal List through the OKH. The situation at the Russian theater of war and the operations taking place at that time--preparation of the Vjasma battle, Briansk-made it impossible for the OKW to release more troops for the Southeast or to promise their release in the near future. Probably for the same reasons, without discussing it with me, the OKW rejected the request of General Field Marshal List.
"During the conversation conducted with me by Foertsch, upon orders of his commander in chief, General Field Marshal List, he also mentioned the great difficulties with regard to communications and the supply for the population of the occupied countries connected with that, as well as the questions of currency and other problems connected with the welfare of the population.
"From his short statements I could recognize the high sense of responsibility which moved Field Marshal List with regard to the population of the occupied territories, but also his disappointment about the small help which he had gotten from the OKW. In this way I could but agree with him, but, concerning this field of work, which was the exclusive domain of the OKW, I had to limit myself to assuring him of all support that could possibly be given him through the General Quartermaster."
The affidavit is signed Franz Halder.
These requests for more troops also become evident from several reports. In this connection I again want to refer to List Document 203, which I have previously offered to the Tribunal as List Exhibit 43. I want to read one brief paragraph only, from Document Book IV-B, page 163. In the first third of page 163, in Document Book IV-B, we have the following entry:
"29 August 1941. Military Commander Southeast sends Third Battalion, Regiment 433 of 174th Infantry Division as replacement for Engineer Battalion 666. This is placed under command of Infantry Regiment 734. Now comes the important part: Military Commander Southeast requests, in a teletype to High Command of the Army, General Staff Headquarters Troops Operations Division, an allocation to Serbia of armored reconnaissance vehicles and combat cars from Russian booty: Military Commander Southeast Strategic and Tactical Planning General Staff Officer", and we have the number, "1869/41. Secret."
The combatting of the bands in Serbia with military means lay in the hands of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General whose agency was especially established for this very purpose as we have heard repeatedly during the course of this trial. I want to prove now that the commission which General Boehme received when he was appointed Plenipotentiary Commanding General from Fieldmarshal List was a commission of a purely tactical nature. For this purpose, I want to offer List Document 132; this will become List Exhibit 59. The document is contained in List Document Book I on page 37 of that document book. This is an affidavit of Lt. Col. Faulmueller which I would like to read. I shall start with the third paragraph:
"Ad Rem:
From 12 January 1941 I was Captain and Quartermaster of the General Command XVIII, which was under General Boehme's command.
"On 18 September 1941 the Staff of the XVIII was transferred from Athens to Belgrade. The High Command of the Armed Forces appointed General Boehme plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia.
"While our unit was stationed in Belgrade (till the middle of December 1941) I was Quartermaster 1 and as such was responsible for providing the troops with all necessary supplies. In the Staff of the HQ of the specialists were continuously kept informed on the most important tasks and developments to enable them to act for each other in the event of furlough, disablement or sickness. In this way the Commanding General, the Chief of Staff or the other specialists officially informed me about many matters and events outside my sphere of activity.
"On the afternoon of 18 September 1941 General Boehme reported with Field Marshal List at Kifissia near Athens on the occasion of his departure to Belgrade. I was not present on this occasion. But still in the evening of the 18 September 1941, after his arrival in Belgrade, the Chief of Staff informed me and other Staff officers, that General Boehme had been appointed plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia.
He had the tactical mission to suppress the Communist uprising in Serbia. I can definitely remember, that neither on this evening nor on the following days the Chief of Staff gave any instructions as to the treatment of the civilian population.
"I have never had any knowledge of the Field Marshal List's order of 5 September 1941 concerning the suppression of the Serbian rising. In accordance with standing orders the Chief of Staff would have certainly promulgated such a fundamental order immediately after its arrival at the Staff headquarters."
At this point I would like to discontinue reading from this document and the last paragraph I would like to read into the record later on, in a different context.
Now there are several things to discuss in connection with the order of the 5th of September, which is prosecution Exhibit 42. This order as can be seen from the distribution list, was sent only to those command agencies whose areas were territories where uprisings took place.
In order to prove this, I would now like to offer List Document No. 27-G which will become List Exhibit 60. This document List 27-G is also contained in List Document Book I on page 39 of that Document book. It is an affidavit executed by General Krakau and I would like to read it:
"At that time I was Colonel and commander of the mountain infantry regiment 85 in the fifth (mountain) division. This division was subordinate to the 18th (mountain) corps and thus to the Army of List. The regiment took part in the Greek campaign and in the paratroop operations against Crete. It remained in Crete as an occupation force until 20 December 1941.
"The order issued allegedly on 5 September 1941 by Field Marshal List as Commander of the Wehrmacht South East to the higher command LXV, the Commander of Serbia and the Commander of Saloniki-Aegean, concerning the suppression of the Serbian revolutionary movement has neither been made known to me nor to the regiment."
This affidavit is signed August Wilhelm Krakau.
With the preceding exhibit which was Exhibit 59, I have already shown that this order did not reach the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia and in this case I proved that it did not reach the Commanding Officer in Crete. As the prosecution asserts, the order 5th September 1941, Prosecution Exhibit 42, contains directives. That it was interpreted in this way I will show with List Document 203 which I have offered as List Exhibit 43. I should therefore like to ask the Tribunal to turn once again to List Document Book IV-B where on page 165 towards the bottom of the page you find the following entry:
"7 Sept. 1941: Military Commander Southeast: Commander Serbia and Higher Command immediately to prepare everything necessary to calm down the country once and for all before the beginning of winter."
And now follow the words to which I attach particular importance:
"Opinions concerning this."
I would now like to deal with the OKW order of 16 September which the Prosecution have submitted as Exhibit 53. I repeat prosecution Exhibit 53. I contend and I am going to proceed to prove that the exhibit submitted by the prosecution is not a complete one. To show this, I am submitting List Document No. 171 as List Exhibit 61. This is contained in List Document Book III on page 21. This is a copy of the prosecution Document C-148 which was presented by the prosecution during the IMT trial as USA Exhibit 555. What I am submitting to the Tribunal as List Exhibit 61 is a certified copy of this document. So that the order may appear completely in the record, I shall unfortunately have to read it as a whole:
"The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
FST Section L (IV/Qu) Fuehrer's Headquarters 16th September 1941 Top Secret 40 copies 20th copy Subject:
Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.
1.) Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.
It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed by Moscow, which is also responsible for the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet. In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that nationalist and other circles will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.
This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centers of disturbance."
2.) The measures taken up to now to deal with this general insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with the most drastic means in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time. Only this course, which has always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can restore order.
3.) Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following general directions:
a.)It should be inferred, in every case of resistance to the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.
b)In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic measures should be taken immediately on the first indication, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier's life. The way in which the sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect.
The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with threat of more severe measures, does not accord with these principles and should therefore not be followed.
c)The political relations between Germany and the country in which the disturbance is taking place, are no criterion for the censuring of the military authorities in occupation. Rather, it should be borne in mind and so represented in propaganda, that stern measures also rid the inhabitants of the Communist criminals and are thus to their own advantage.
Clever propaganda of this kind will consequently not result in the severe measures against the Communists having an undesirable reaction on the well-disposed sections of the population.
d)Forces formed from the local inhabitants will generally fail to accomplish such acts of violence. They should on no account receive further support, for this involves increased danger to our own troops.
On the other hand, the fullest use can be made of rewards and remuneration for the population, in order to ensure their cooperation in a suitable way.
e)Where, in exceptional cases, court martial proceedings should be instituted in connection with Communist insurrections or other offenses against the German occupying Forces, the most severe penalties are indicated. In this connection only the death penalty can constitute a real deterrent. In particular, acts of espionage, deeds of sabotage and attempts to enter the Armed Forces of a foreign power, should as a matter of principle, be punished by death. Sentence of death should also as a general rule, be passed in cases of illicit possession of arms."
"4.) The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories are seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay to all military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection."
The document is signed by Keitel.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: At this point we will take our usual afternoon recess.
DR. LATERNSER: I have only the distribution list to read, your Honor, just four more lines, then I have finished this reading, which I do not enjoy particularly.
Distribution List:
Armed Forces Commander Southeast, first copy.
The Military Commander Serbia, second copy.
Military Commander Salonica-Aegean, third copy.
Military Commander Southern Greece, fourth copy.
Commander for Crete, fifth copy.
Then follow further agencies which received copies from six to forty.
That brings me to the end of this document.
(A recess was taken.)
(AFTER RECESS)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honors, shortly before the recess, I was reading OKW order dated the 16 of September, and at the end I read the distribution list. Your Honors, I have just looked at the English document book, and I have discovered the following: The distribution list in the English document book is not in correct order. If you will look at the second line, where it says, "second", it is one column too high. It must be one line lower. I would ask that this be corrected.
I would like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the first five copies went directly to these agencies according to the distribution list, -- that is they were direct orders. Now the way in which the individual agencies received this order, I would now like to prove.
First of all, I submit document, List No. 29, as Exhibit No. 62. This is in Document Book 1, page 40. This is an affidavit by General Pemsel. I would like to read parts of it, from the second paragraph onward:
From the end of September until the end of November 1941 I was tactical chief with the rank of a colonel, of the general staff of General BOEHME as chief of the general staff of the 18th (mountain) army corps.
The directive of the op. staff of tho O.K.W. of 16 September 1941 to shoot 50 to 100 (Serbs) for every killed German, is known to me. The directive (order) came over the teletype and, as far as I know, did not have any further additions by the A.O.K. 12.
I just wanted to read this much of the document in this connection.
With regard to the same point, that is in which way this OKW order was distributed I would like to submit List Document No. 132, as Exhibit 63. This is Document Book 1, page 37.