The bullet, which is still in my possession, was a soft nosed projectile, a kind of ammunition which according to my knowledge was neither used by regular British nor by the regular Greek troops.
"After a stay at the main dressing station in the penitentiary Galatas, the duration of which I am unable to state on account of a long time of unconsciousness, -- it might have lasted 2-3 days, -- I tried to go back to my combat troop. Because my wound incapacitated me to a great degree, I was transferred to a guard unit of the prisoner collecting point. The guard detachment was made up of wounded men of several parachute units. At the collecting point were besides soldiers of the Australian, New Zealand and Greek armies, also some civilians who were apprehended with weapons in their hands.
"One morning -- for the already stated reasons I am unable to fix the date, -- a parachute trooper came in order to fetch some prisoners for the transport of fallen soldiers. I accompanied the detail consisting of four Englishmen and the already mentioned parachutist. After a short walk, we reached the place where the fallen were lying. There were two men, whose uniforms, green coverall and jump trousers (the jump boots were missing), left no doubt of their belonging to a parachute division. The dead bodies showed the following mutilations: stabs in the eyes, cut off genital organs, and cuts in the abdomen in form of swastikas or similar to swastikas."
I omit the balance of this paragraph and I shall read from the next paragraph:
"Because the attitude of the English units was a fair one, according to my own observations and the statements of my comrades --, I was told for instance that English soldiers defended captured German parachutists by force of arms against the excesses of civilians, and on the other hand -- as described -- I can vouch for the participation of armed civilians in engagements, the responsible elements for these atrocities should be looked for among the indigenous population.
"The fact that a war against partisans was necessary at all, was shocking and surprising, both for me and my comrades, because even when the battle order was issued on 20 May at the home field Topolia, the unit had been explicitly prepared for a friendly inclined population and we were ordered to meet it half-way and in a correct manner."
This affidavit is signed by Werner Hilse.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I would like to have Dr. Laternser tell me whether or not I am correct in believing that the combat sector Chania which is mentioned here and, therefore, all the events mentioned in this affidavit relate only to the Island of Crete.
DR. LATERNSER: The events themselves refer to the Island of Crete but I contend that the Greek population behaved on Crete in a similar or identical way as on the Greek mainland.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: For the reasons previously stated, the objection will be overuled.
DR. LATERNSER: What kind of instructions the partisans themselves had can be seen from their basic instructions which I would like to read in part. This document is List Document 202 which I have already offered as List Exhibit 46. This document is contained in List Document IVb on page 121. I would only like to read a comparatively small part of these instructions which, in my opinion, are of importance. On page 121 in the second part of the page I shall start reading:
"For Official Use Only. Commander Serbia, Commando Staff. Belgrade 13 September 1941.
"Re: Instruction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Sebia Regarding the Operative Method of the Band Warfare.
"A member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Serbia, arrested by the Security Police, Einsatzgruppe Belgrade, had on his person the enclosed:
"Instruction of the Communist Party of Serbia for the Band Warfare.
"The tactics used up to now by the Communists at their execution of acts of sabotage and raids of all kinds, also against personnel of the army, show clearly that they are guided by these instructions.
"The instruction is sent, therefore, by the quickest way to all command authorities, offices and military units with the direction to instruct the troops immediately and comprehensively about orders and method of fighting of the Communist bands."
I shall omit the last two paragraphs and the signature is "Danckelmann, General of the Air Corps."
Towards the bottom of the page: "Copy of Translation. Partisan War."
"1) The lines of communication in the hinterland are very suitable objects for the guerilla war. Therefore, organized bands frequently push into the hinterland of the enemy, destroy railroad tracks, telegraph lines and bridges, set magazines afire, raid transports and harass the enemy in every conceivable manner."
I shall now omit the next two paragraphs and continue on page 123. The headline there is "Raids."
"During raids it is necessary to approach the enemy unnoticed and to attack him suddenly. Therefore, all movements must be carefully disvuised, even from the population."
I shall continue to read the last sentence on that page:
"At favorable places an ambush may be laid on highways used by the enemy in order to make a surprise attack against the enemy driving by."
Then it continues on page 124:
"The destruction of railroad tracks is apt to freeze the traffic for a greater length of time. If no explosives are available the track is to be broken up shortly before the arrival of a train. The disturbance of the railroad net is to be effected especially near sharp curves or in the neighborhood of woods.
Removal of only one rail is not sufficient to impair the lines; however, it may put the railway temporarily out of commission."
The next item is: "Raiding of Transports."
1. "Above all, the strength and size of the transport, the distribution of the escorting force, as well as the direction and time of passage must be found out.
2. "The best moment to attack is during the passing of a difficult spot, that is, at a bridge, in a ravine and while driving up hill into a forest.
3. "The transports may raided openly if the strength of the escort troop offers chances of success. Nevertheless, it is of advantage of entice the escort troop away from the transport, in order to then launch a forceful attack against the transport. If the escort is too strong for a successful raid a surprise attack is imperative in which the vehicles must be damaged, the tires cut and the motor magnetoes removed."
Next, page 125:
"Here raiding from ambush is recommended. Smaller detachments, not suitable for larger sale raids, may specialize in destruction of bridges. If the transport tries flight, the horses leading the transport must be killed in order to delay the flight. Raids on strong enemy columns are not to be undertaken but after the passage of the column single groups or the train may be attacked."
Then we have "Remarks Concerning Night Fighting."
"At night the knife plays the principal part. Fire arms are to be used only in order to mislead the enemy. A night raid takes the enemy by surprise, thereby increasing the chances of success."
I shall now omit a few paragraphs and continue reading with paragraph 5 on page 126:
"The knife attack takes place in front formation."
From this page I shall not read anything else but instead turn to page 128 where we have certain clues and brief summaries. There is only one number which I would like to read on 128 and that is number 24:
"Vengeance for fighters killed in action."
That's all I would have to say in respect to this instruction of the Communist Party for band warfare. The balance of this document I recommend to the notice of the Tribunal.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Before we leave this, if your Honors please, I would like to call your Honors' attention to one excerpt from this document on page 127. "The Soldiers' Tasks," particularly No. 6:
"Be considerate towards your own countrymen; do not loot or steal but render assistance. The people should see in you the true fighter for their freedom and consider you their upright friend."
In view of the fact that several of the defendants have made reference to these instructions of the Communist Party of Serbia regarding the method of waging band warfare, your Honors will no doubt wish to examine it in some detail to see whether there are any orders for the execution or mutilation of captured German soldiers or any other orders exhorting the partisan units to commit breaches of the rules of land warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: If in this connection that fact has been pointed out, I would like to recall to the minds of the Tribunal that the witness von Sydow has testified that he read orders issued by the bands which ordered such things.
If the Tribunal please, in order to show that cruel methods were customary on the Balkans, I want to present to the Tribunal a number of newspaper cuttings which are dispersed over some of the document books. There is, first of all, List Document 125 on page 35 of List Document Book I, and I recommend this document to the judicial notice of the Tribunal.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honors please, I object to this on the same ground as I have objected to other excerpts from newspapers. They are complete heresay, unsworn statements, the author is unknown and not available for cross examination.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: To what page in Volume I do you refer?
DR. LATERNSER: It is Document Book I, page 35. In this connection, I would like to recall the fact that the prosecution themselves have submitted newspaper cuttings. I believe to recall that a newspaper cutting from Belgrade newspapers were submitted and that these were accepted.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Those newspaper cuttings submitted by the Prosecution were submitted without objection by the defense and solely for the purpose of showing that there was publication and announcement to the population of the taking of reprisal measures by the German troops and not for the truth of the statements mentioned therein.
In addition to this, I have one further objection to this particular document, it is completely outside of the period of the indictment. The clipping is dated 15 July 1947.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The objection will be sustained.
DR. LATERNSER: If the Tribunal please, there is one event which plays a part of basic importance and that is the Topola incident because this shows the treacherous methods used by the bands. I am, first of all, offering to the Tribunal List Document 165a and this will become List Exhibit 54. This document can be found in List Document Book III on page 12. It is an affidavit executed by Dr. Gasser and I would like to read it:
"From 1 March 1941 to 12 February 1942 I was a captain of the medical corps of the reserves with the IInd Battalion of the 521st Army Signal Regiment, Army Command Southeast, in the office of the IV/b.
"Ad rem: The 22 men belonging to the IInd Battalion of the 521st Army Signal Regiment who were killed by Partisans in the Yugoslavian area at the beginning of October 1941, on whom I performed the post mortem in Belgrade as physician, exhibited in part such extensive injuries that it could be immediately assumed that many of them did not fall in the battle against the Partisans, but had been only subsequently shot by them. In some cases the skulls were completely crushed, and it was striking that besides other wounds, most of them had been shot in the head at close range. As was subsequently discovered, this was the case, too. To clarify the situation, I cite the following:
"At the beginning of October 1941, because of the sharply increased danger from Partisans, a covered troop of 26 men with 2 cars and 2 trucks were started off under the leadership of the 1st Lt. Lehr of the IInd Battalion of the 521st Army Signal Regiment which was stationed in Belgrade, in order to bring food and pay to a small troop unit --"
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I object to this portion of the affidavit because it is on its face complete heresay. This affiant's information goes only as information that he had as a physician performed postmortems but regarding the preceding events he has no knowledge other than heresay.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Quite a considerable portion of the testimony introduced in this trial might fall in that category. The objection will be overruled.
DR. LATERNSER: "-- of the regiment which was situated farther out. On the way there, the troop was ambushed by Partisan and fired upon. Of the 26 men, one succeeded in escaping in the confusion of the fighting, two were taken prisoner, and one, from whom the testimony originates, fled later. And the latter stated that two men, among them one Lieutenant, had fallen in battle, while the 20 others, among them also 1st Lt. Lehr, after the fighting had stopped because of the superior numbers of the Partisans, were herede together in a body in a valley, there shot in a sitting position, first with machine guns and then killed with shots in the head from a pistol. The above mentioned person last named was 21st among the 20 who were later killed, but since he did not move, although wounded by machine gun fire, and pretended to be dead, he was not noticed further by the Partisans, and after he saw and heard nothing more from the Partisans, he slipped away from there and came to a German military hospital. This testimony of the man was substantiated by the discovery of the corpses, for two were found in the fighting area and the other twenty somewhat to the side in a heap in a valley.
"Concerning the exact date and location of the attack, as well as the names of the participants, I can unfortunately not give exact information, since my notes made at that time were lost in my former residence in Innsbruck, in Peter Mayrstrasse 25, where in October 1944 during my absence on duty in the foeld, I was totally bombed out."
The affidavit is signed, "Dr. Gasser Luis."
The next document concerning the Topola incident is List Document 173. I offer this to the Tribunal. It is contained in the same document book III on page 15 and it will become List Exhibit 55. Here again we have an affidavit. It is executed by a non-commissioned officer of the Signal Regiment and the name of the affiant is Hermann Ellerbrake. I would like to read this affidavit, starting from the third paragraph:
"From the beginning of the war until 15 February 1943 I was assigned to the 521st Army Signal Regiment of the 12th Army first as Lance Corporal, then as Corporal and later as Sergeant. During this whole period I was a member of the 3rd company of the 2nd battalion of this signal regiment.
"On 2 October 1941 a security detachment, to which I belonged was attacked by partisans between Topola and Kragujevac. The security detachment suffered some casualties on this occasion. Finally a larger part of the security detachment was overpowered by the partisans. I myself successfully at that time avoided being taken prisoner by the partisans. Subsequently on 4 October 1941 I made a written report on this attack to my company (3rd company). A copy of this report dated 4 October 1941 at that time written by me personally is enclosed with this affidavit.
"On the day of the attack after having reported to Brigadier General Stahl from the 714th Infantry Division I once more drove to the place of the attack together with a pursuit detachment, where we met another pursuit detachment arriving from Kragujevac. As we searched the terrain we discovered a larger number of members of the beaten security detachment lying dead in kind of a kettle-shaped valley. The dead soldiers as well as those found lying killed near the motor vehicles in the vicinity of the place of the attack were loaded on to a truck and taken first to Kragujevac and the following day back to Topola. The total of persons killed amounted to 22, as far as I remember.
On all of the soldiers found dead in the valley, as I ascertained myself on the spot and the following day when the bodies were identified in Topola, several shot injuries were found; it was in part impossible to identify the bodies because of the shots which had obviously been discharged at the shortest range. The bodies of those found killed near the motor vehicles had reached a state of partly carbonization through the burning of the vehicles.
"As I had contracted a knee injury at the attack through a fall, and this injury grew worse in the course of the next few days, I had to stay in bed for some time and was incapacitated for duty. For this reason I did not take part in expiatory measures which had to be executed pursuant to orders by the soldiers of the 3rd and the 4th companies having suffered the casualties. I remember quite definitely that people at that time talked about it that the execution of these expiatory measures had been ordered "from Berlin", i.e. by higher army authorities. I can recall from what I was told by my comrades that on that occasion several hundred persons who had been interned in camps were executed by shooting. In this connection also Jews were mentioned. Whether it was solely a question of Jews, I do not know as I was not present personally on that occasion. I am unable to indicate the exact number of persons shot in atonement for the attack; I can recall, however, quite definitely that they talked about several hundred. Of further shootings resulting from this surprise attack I have heard nothing neither at that time nor later on. If anything relating to further shootings had become known to me this would undoubtedly have been preserved in my memory, since it was a question of measures in retaliation for an attack at which many of my closest friends had been killed."
The affidavit is signed, "Hermann Ellerbrake."
If your Honors please, List Document 208 has already been offered by me as Exhibit 47 to the Tribunal but there are two brief passages which I would like to read from this document.
The document can be found in List Document Book V on page 80 of that document book, 80 and 85; I repeat List Document Book V, pages 80 and 85. On the top of page 80 you find an entry for the date of 9 October:
"Report submitted by the 2nd Battalion of Army Signal Regiment 521 with interrogation of Corporal Kerbler of 4th Company of Army Signal Regiment 521 attached. See enclosure. It results from the interrogation that the German soldiers taken prisoner or wounded by Communists on 2 October 1941 near Vlacka were shot dead with machine guns. It furthermore results that the Communists are wearing the blouses, steel helmet and boots of the captured German soldiers."
That is on page 80 of List Document Book V.
I continue to read from page 85 and I would like to read the following entry there. That is the second half of the page:
"In regard to attack at Vlacka (2 October) during discovery of the corpse the testimony of the Corporal Kerbler (see 11 October) is confirmed that the Communists have robbed German soldiers of their uniforms."
If the Tribunal please, I recall that the prosecution when examining the witness Krage who also was a member of the 2nd Battalion of the 521st Army Signal Regiment doubted the fate of Kerbler. I searched for this witness and I found him. He lives in Vienna now. I would now like to submit to the Tribunal List Document 280 and this document contains an interrogation of this witness Kerbler. The exhibit number will be 56. The document in question is contained in List Document Book VI on page 1 of that document book. I would like to read this document:
"I belonged to the Army Signal Regt. 521, which was put to service after conclusion of the Balkan campaign, to repair and maintain the telephone network in Jugoslavia. Maintenance troops in the strength of 1 commissioned officer and 6 men were distributed at a distance of 50 km on the line Belgrade - Nisch. On 29 Sept. the maintenance troop in Usce was attacked by partisans and carried off.
Since searching parties of 2 Inf. units remained unsuccessful, our comp. put together a Search Commando composed of the Comp. C.O., a Lt., the First Serg. and 42 men. Loaded on 3 trucks and two heavy intercept-jeeps we departed from Belgrade on 2 October at 5 a.m. Shortly after 11 we drove through Topola. About 15 km after Topola in direction Kragujevac the road turned uphill in serpentines and became very difficult to survey with cornfields on the right hand and bushes and forests to the left. In the first car were the Comp. C.O., the Lt., the First Serg. and the driver. Then followed the first truck on which I sat together with 12 comrades. Following us came two more trucks and at the end was again an intercept-jeep. We just had turned a curve, when a shot was fired from the cornfield at our left. After about 5 seconds heave MG and rifle fire set in, bursting from both sides of the read. Our driver made a sharp turn and drove into the right road-ditch. Shots pierced the outer car walls. Suddenly I felt a red-hot burning in my back. Next to me a comrade collapsed hit by rifle shots. Others stopped moving.
I wanted to jump off from behind. However, a shot hit me in my right upper arm. Therewith I was rendered unfit for battle right at the start. The other comrades, who could leave the car, opened fire on the partisans and kept firing to the last cartridge. In the meantime, the partisans covered by their MG-fire had advanced so far that they could easily capture those of us who survived. I was, since I could not walk, wrapped into a blanket by four comrades and carried downhill. The partisans led us to a forest clearing through which a brook ran. We had--only fourteen of us were left--to sit down in the grass on the other side of the bank. Across on the slope the partisans were busy dividing the valuables taken from us and from the deceased. On order of the captain in Serbian uniform, who apparently had directed the attack, the partisans, except for two men and the captain, left the clearing. The two partisans loaded the machine guns and brought them in position against us. The muzzle of the gun was directed towards us. Therewith each of us knew the fate that awaited us. Our Company Commander, who had been captured with us, advanced towards the slope and proposed to the Serbian captain to exchange us for captured partisans in Belgrade. One man of us should come along with several Serbs to Belgrade. However, the Serbian captain did not agree to that, even after the Company Commander had pledged his word of honor that he would see to it that 140 partisans would be exchanged for us fourteen men. When the Company Commander wanted to continue speaking he was driven back, at the point of a gun, down the slope to his place. When he sat beside us again, both partisans took up the machine guns again, on a sign by the leader of the band. Our Company Commander asked us to remain still, it would be over quickly. At a distance of hardly four meters, the two leveled their machine guns on us and pulled the trigger. I let myself fall on my back. Between the yelping and sledging"-- there is one word misprinted here--" of the MG-shots the cries of the hit comrades sounded louder and louder. Bullets whirred around my head. Suddenly I felt a hard stroke on my left side and felt the blood running warmly down my leg. The first sergeant lay close beside me and I felt his convulsive movement when hit by a bullet.
I was fully conscious and saw how my comrades turned and twisted in pain. As soon as the partisans had emptied their magazines they came down the slopes, went from man to man and put their pistols to the head of anyone still moving. I was the last in the row. It is impossible for me to describe the feeling I had. When the head of the sergeant was turned around, the pistol lowered upon him, a shot crashed, and the face of the sergeant, streaming with blood, suddenly fell beside me in the grass. The fear of death crept higher and higher into me, and I thought my heart stood still. Then I felt a hard step at my heels. With the last of my willpower I remained stiff. The partisans thought I was dead, and left. After some time had elapsed and I had gained somewhat in strength, I dragged myself up to the road. The other thirteen comrades were dead. I had three shot wounds in the back, the shot in my upper arm, and a hand grenade splinter wound in my spine.
"At 5 p.m. an infantry company arrived from Kragujevac, which, after searching the terrain, took me along to the Army hospital in Kragujevac. From there I was brought to Belgrade by way of a Fieselerstork."
"Hohann Kerbler, Vienna, Staudgasse 33.
"Vienna, 8 November 1947."
A further affidavit is attached.
"I, undersigned, Johann Kerbler, metal worker, born 6 August 1919, in Kollnbrunn, Lower Austria, residing at Vienna, XVIII, Staudgasse 33, was, during the attack of 2 October 1941, seriously wounded and transferred into the Army hospital at Kragujevac. From there I was brought, by way of a Fieseler-stork, into the Army hospital at Belgrade. I was interrogated by the new Company Commander and by the Summary Court. My statement, which I had to make in lieu of oath, was presented to the regiment by my company.
"I declare, in lieu of oath, that my description of the manner in which the soldiers who were overwhelmed by the partisans were killed is the full truth.
"Furthermore I declare, in lieu of oath, that I never belonged to the NSDAP or any of its organizations."
The signature, again, is Johann Kerbler, and this affidavit is also certified to by a Vienna notary.
I would now like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that, according to Prosecution Exhibit 79, which is contained in Document Book 3 of the Prosecution, on page 3 of that Document Book, it results that on 9 October it was reported to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast that shootings were taking place at that time. The date is 9 October; that is the date of the report.
I would further like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that also from Prosecution Exhibit 80, which is contained in Document Book 3 of the Prosecution, pages 4 to 10, it results that shootings were carried out on 9 and 11 October.
I would further like to point out to the Tribunal that the witness Krage testified--and this also results from Exhibit 80-- that altogether 449 Serbs were shot.
I would now like to ask the Tribunal to look at List Document 178, which I have submitted as List Exhibit 10. This document can be found in List Document Book III, on page 78. On pages 93 and 95 it can be seen--and this is why I read these paragraphs on pages 93 and 95--that Field Marshal List was at Crete during the period of time from 8 October to the evening of 11 October. I have already pointed out to the Tribunal that the report dated the 9th stated that shootings were being carried out, and that shootings were only carried out on 9 and 11 October. In the evening of 11 October -- and this is shown by List document 178, which is Exhibit 10--it results that Field Marshal List returned from Crete on the evening of 11 October.
I would now like to read a short note contained in this diary, which is on page 95 of the Document Book:
"Saturday, 11 October." I am reading the third line: "1040 hours departure; 1120 hours, arrival in Tatoi. Foertsch at the airport.
Dankelmann recalled. New order by the Fuehrer with respect to authority to issue orders. More or less the same. The Navy withdraws more and more. Notice to the parts of the Wehrmacht to obey the orders of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast."
I contend that the information given by General Foertsch at the arrival of Field Marshal List referred to the two main points of importance, the recalling of Dankelmann and the new Fuehrer order about the authority to issue orders. I shall draw further conclusions from this fact in my final plea.
I would now like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to List document 208, which I have previously offered as List Exhibit 47, and from which I would now like to proceed to read a last passage. This is in List Document Book V, at page 85.
PRESIDING BURKE: Is this a new exhibit you are referring to?
DR. LATERNSER: This is Exhibit 47, which I have already offered. I would now like to read a passage from this document, on page 85, towards the bottom of the page, the last paragraph:
"13 October 1941. Police Director Loos of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast arrived at Belgrade as a counsellor of the General Commando in police affairs."
In this respect, again, I shall draw the necessary conclusions in my final plea, but in the meantime I would like to stress the fact that the report contained in Prosecution Exhibit 79, from the Plenipotentiary Commanding General to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, is dated the 9th of October. From 9th of October until the 11th of October Field Marshal List was on Crete without any contact with anybody. He returned from Crete on the 11th. And, as can be further seen from Exhibit 80 of the Prosecution-
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: That is rather a matter for your final argument, isn't it, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Your Honor, I beg your pardon. I only wanted to bring the evidence in this case in some sort of order. This brings me to the end of this document.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I have a few excerpts I should like to read, if Your Honor please. On page 90 of List document 208, which is Exhibit 46 in List Document Book V, the entry at the very bottom of the page:
"Danube, 8.10. Department of the Interior: Band of 300 men (between Rabrovo and Pozarevacka Ulava) wears a red badge on the left side of the chest. When they appeared in Pozarevacka the red and Jugoslav colors were worn together."
Then, over on page 98, the 8th line from the bottom of the page, under "Obrenovac, 16 October": "The leader of the band is a Serbian first lieutenant in uniform; the 19 year old Zivkovic from Umka has led the band from Serbia into Croatian territory. Band marched on towards Boljevci."
DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the attitude of the population towards the bands, I would like to produce some evidence in List Document 1-D, which will be given List Exhibit No. 57. This document is contained on page 79 in List document Book I. This is an affidavit of Helmuth Buekemann, and I would like to read this document. I want to start with the second paragraph:
"From September to December 1941, I and my regiment were stationed on occupation duty in Eastern Macedonia around Saloniki. During the first week numerous attacks of armed civilians on single German motor vehicles occurred in this area, as well as acts of terrorism against Greek officials and against villages unoccupied by the troops, from which the bands got their supplies by force.
"To restore order in this area and to effect the pacification desired by the population, the Commanding General of the SalonikaAegean district ordered some operations, repeated public proclamations having remained fruitless.
"The Governor of Saloniki, a former Greek General, had officially called on me at Post Headquarters and had expresses to me his sincere regret of these occurrences and of his powerlessness, at the same time promising me his most loyal support.
"A Greek Lieutenant Colonel also came to see me and offered to take part in such an operation, pointing out that before the war he had been specialist in this field at Saloniki and had himself actively carried on the fight against the bandits. In the existing circumstances we were both convinced that this was not a national resistance movement, but that it was only a case of trouble-making robbers and bandits of the kind common in this area already before the war.
"This immediate participation was, however, rejected for considerations of principle, whilst the uniformed Greek police cooperated by permanent and reliable transmission of messages and active fighting participation in the expeditions for the extirpation of this criminal post, which was also contrary to international law. The police had casualties of their own in these operations. Such an operation was, as far as I remember, carried out about the middle of October 1941, after a military motor vehicle with four Luftwaffe members had again been shot at on its way from Sofia to Saloniki about 50 kilometers northeast of Saloniki and the four men in the car had been murdered by armed bandits, according to reliable statements of the civilian population.
"The peaceful population of this area evidently welcomed this action of our troops and, to a large extent, supported it.
"The individual operations were carefully prepared by the German and Greek intelligence services, which collected all pertinent information. After that our troops received a clearly worded order from the Commanding General, Saloniki-Aegean.
"In view of the way these bandits acted--deceitfully, in civilian clothes without any recognizable badges or regular leaders, using their arms in a concealed manner--our troops had not the slightest doubts as to the legality of their defensive operations."
This affidavit is signed, "Helmuth Buekemann."
Now I would like to discuss the combatting of the bands by the troops. The first step was to frequently request more troops. In order to prove the fact of these frequent requests for troops, I would like to offer List Document 22, which will become List Exhibit 58.
This document is contained in List Document Book I, on page 41. This document also represents an affidavit which was executed by General Franz Halder, who was the former Chief of Staff of the German Army, and who is the proper witness to make statements concerning these activities.
I shall start reading from the second paragraph of this document:
"During the time of the German operations in the Balkans in 1941, I was Chief of the General Staff of the Army under the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. In this capacity I was officially occupied with leading and supplying the German troops. Upon termination of the military operations and upon the appointment of the commanders of the Wehrmacht through the OKW, I did not have any more direct connection with problems of that theater of war. I remember one exception with which I was concerned during that time with regard to the situation in the Balkans:
"During the second half of September 1941, Field Marshal List sent the chief of his staff, the then Colonel Hermann Foertsch, to the OKW in order to report there about the difficulties which resulted from the much too small number and the composition of the troops at his disposal. He advised Colonel Foertsch to report also to me, in order to prevent any protest on the part of the OKH against assigned troops to the Balkans, should the OKW be willing to comply with his request.
"I remember that Colonel Foertsch reported to me about the constantly increasing danger for the railroad and road connections through the insurgents, especially in Serbia, and he emphasized that, aside from a few country shooting clubs, only four German divisions were at the disposal in this wide and mountainous territory, and those divisions were made up by only two weak infantry regiments and one artillery unit in each case, and thus were only of limited value for combat purposes. With regard to the age class of the men, their arms and equipment and their very limited maneuverability, those units were entirely unsuited for the tasks of a fight which was being conducted by the opponent with the greatest of slyness and brutality, without the slightest regard for the rules of land warfare.