The Military Commander intervenes here in order to abolish bad conditions which prevailed amongst the population and, in order to support the population.
The next document which is Document No. 176 again shows the efforts for the securing of adequate food supplies for the indigenous population. The Military Commander for Serbia endeavored, as this document shows, to bring 5,000 tons of wheat from Roumania to Serbia and in the last sentence of his communication, dated 15 April 1944, addressed to the German Plenipotentiary General in Roumania, he points out that if these wheat supplies would not be sent the conditions in Serbia would become impossible. "Most severe effects for the troops and the population can be expected. Request urgent appeals to the Wehrmacht offices in Roumania and the Foreign Office for immediate release."
The communication of 20 December 1943 which is Geitner Document 177, Exhibit 150, is along similar lines. This is a communication by General Felber, the same General Felber who was here on the witness stand as a witness, and the communication is addressed to Reserve Grenadier Regiment 17. He very strictly forbids this regiment to confiscate homes for refugees and wherever they were used he orders that they be evacuated as soon as possible, and he also orders that where the troops withdraw the quarters of the Serbian asylum administration be left in good condition.
The next document which is Document 178 contains a report about a conference. The Defendant von Geitner participated in this discussion which dealt with the collection of the wheat and corn harvest. General Bader requests that the "food supply for the cities during the current year by all means be secured."
That is what becomes apparent from Document 178, Exhibit 151.
The next document, Geitner Document 179, proves that the Chief of Staff--that is, General von Geitner -- ordered that school buildings be released so that the education of Serbian children could be carried out properly and correctly and would not suffer any harm.
The same General Geitner orders in the next document, Document No. 180, Exhibit 153, on page 44, that trucks be put at the disposal of the population of Montenegro so that their needs might be taken care of.
The same General von Geitner forbids in Document 182, which is Geitner Exhibit 154, on page 46, that military hospitals and refugee homes be confiscated by the troops and he informs the President of the Serbian Ministers' Council about this measure; that is Minister Nedic. His Military Commander, that is Felber, forbids in the next document, Document 183, that booty be made by the troops from property of the population, so that the food supply of the population may not suffer damages in this way.
Document 184, Exhibit 156, is an unsigned copy of a report of the Military Commander Southeast, addressed to the Commander in Chief Southeast Army Group E. This document is contained on page 148 and it is Document, Geitner Exhibit 156. It show again the welfare measures taken for the population. It is expressly pointed out to the troops that villages, even during band combat, can only be destroyed within the limits of what is militarily admissible or, rather, what is militarily necessary. Paragraph 1 says that even in this case all livestock and all food stocks have to be secured. As it says literally, they are "to be placed at the disposal of the competent prefect or subprefect for the purpose of supplying the population."
The Military Commander for Serbia wanted to make it quite clear through this order that even combat action is not to be used by the troops for the purpose of plundering or for the purpose of enriching themselves at the expense of the population.
The last document which has been presented in this context is Geitner Document 185 and this again shows the efforts of General Felber, who was General von Geitner's superior, in the fight against the black market and thus also shows the care taken for the supply of the population. This again was one group of documents which belong together, according to their contents and I have presented them up to Geitner Document 185 and the last document number which I gave was Geitner Exhibit 157.
Geitner Document Book VI presents in documents 186 to 199 -that is, on pages 51 to 109 -- a group of documents which belong together because of their contents. They are all copies of excerpts from daily reports and situation reports which were found as enclosures to the War Diary of the Commander in Serbia. That is, we found those documents which were sent here from Washington by order of this Court. These documents which I will provide with exhibit numbers later on are to show the Court the constant disruptions of railroad lines, shipping communications by attacks of the bands, the constant attacks on Serbian mayors and municipal administrations, the prevention of harvesting of the civilian population by the bands. Furthermore, these reports show in Documents 186 through 199 reports about the Ustascha terror which raged in the Balkans and which was supported by Hitler. Also, these reports show repeated complaints passed on by the Commander in Chief Southeast to the OKW which, however, remained without success. These documents further contain valuable information about the activity of the Draja Mihajlovic movement, its ambiguous nature and, above all, about the effect of the reprisal measure of the German troops on these partisans. These reports show, above all, to which I attach particular importance, that only a very small percentage of the sabotage acts and surprise attacks were actually retaliated by reprisal measures, i.e. that the Generals in the Balkans tried again and again to carry out only part of those reprisal measures which actually had become necessary, but to do without the majority of these reprisal measures.
These reports finally show the Tribunal a means to decide the question whether or not the fighting methods of the partisans were in agreement with the provisions of International Law and whether the partisan troops could be regarded as regular bolligerants in the sense of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare or whether protection has to be denied to such units who commit so many surprise attacks and excesses.
From these documents I am only going to read a very few brief passages because mainly we find a repetition in these documents of all those incidents and reports which have been discussed a dozen or maybe even a hundred times.
Almost in every report you find surprise attacks, murders, assassinations committed on German soldiers, on Croatian personnel on leave, on mayors and to the administration of the communities warnings from the partisans to the mayors and municipal administrations not to supply the occupation troops with food, although such supplies are provided by the Hague Rules for Land Warfare.
In the excerpts on page 64 and following pages, which is Document 88, you can see the difficulty and involved situation which faced the Military Commander of Serbia and, of course, also the Military Commander Southeast. Then you find indication of the continuous efforts of the Military Commander for Serbia to overcome these difficulties by openly and frankly reporting to higher agencies the whole situation and the bad conditions down there and by constantly suggesting improvements in the political, economic and military sphere. These excerpts which are contained in the document submitted on page 64, Document Geitner 188, and the following pages give exact figures concerning the sabotage and surprise activity of the insurgents. They describe the effects of the Ustascha measures taken in Croatia which were favored by Hitler and by the Foreign Office and against which the Military Commander for Serbia protested in vain and they show many similar things.
At this point I believe I shall have to provide all these documents with exhibit numbers. Just a minute, please.
Geitner Document No. 186 on page 51 of Geitner Document Book VI will be offered as Geitner Exhibit No. -- I believe it is 158. Then we have the next document, Geitner 187, on page 57 of Geitner Document Book VI and this will be offered as Geitner Exhibit 159. The next document is Geitner No. 188 on page 64 of Geitner Document Book VI and this will be offered as Geitner Exhibit No. 160.
Then we have Geitner Document No. 189 on page 69 and this will be offered as Geitner Exhibit 161. Then we have Document Geitner 190 on page 75 and this will be offered as Geitner Exhibit 162. Then there is Geitner Document 191 on page 81 of Geitner Document Book VI and -this will be offered as Geitner Exhibit 163.
Geitner Document 192 on page 187 of Geitner Document Book VI will be offered as Geitner Exhibit 164. Geitner Document 193 on page 89 of Geitner Document Book VI will be offered as Geitner Exhibit 165. Geitner Document 194 on page 91 of Geitner Document Book VI will become Geitner Exhibit 166. Geitner Document 195 on page 93 of Document Book VI will become Geitner Exhibit 167. Geitner Document 196 on page 96 of Geitner Document Book VI will be offered as Geitner Exhibit No. 168. Geitner Document 197 on page 99 of Geitner Document Book VI will be offered as Geitner Exhibit 169. Geitner Document 198 on page 102 of Geitner Document Book VI will be offered as Geitner Exhibit 170 and Geitner Document 199 which is the last document in this context and the last but one document in the whole document book will be offered as Geitner Exhibit 171. This is on page 108 of Geitner Document Book VI and we just have the last document, 200, and I shall deal with that at a later date.
In these documents 186 to 190 which I have discussed briefly as one group I would just like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to a few brief notes contained in these documents; for instance, on page 52 on the top of the page.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I believe, Dr. Sauter, we will take our recess before you go into that.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until elevenfifteen.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the Courtroom will be seated.
The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal please, in a few minutes I shall have finished presenting my evidence. These documents, 188 and the following, which were the last I presented, contain among other things compilations about the sabotage acts and terror acts which occurred. If, for instance, the Tribunal would lock at the report at page 65, under paragraph 6, it says there under the heading "Sabotage and Ambush attacks", and I quote: "Total number 91 as compared with 89 in the last resort."
The period of time to which reference is made here is ten days, between 21 June and 30th of June, you can see that from the entry on page 64 on top, or looking at the next ten days' resort on page 66, again under "Sabotage and Ambush Attacks", which is the period of time between the 1st and 10th of July 1942, in other words the immediately ensuing period of ten days you will find there under paragraph six under the heading "Sabotage and Attacks", the following entry:
"The number increased from 91 to 117. Besides the greater number of cases of sabotage around Nisch and in the Fruska Gora most of the attempts occurred on the western and south western outskirts of the Papuk and Psunj Pl........." (I don't know what Pl. stand for) "....which reveals the strong activity of these enemy groups."
And on the following page, page 67, there is a similar entry. In Document 188 on page 67 under paragraph 6, Sabotage and Attacks", it says: "In the Serbian-Croatian area the following cases of sabotage were reported during the period from 6 until 15 July (the figure for the period from 26 June until 5 July the preceding ten days are added in parenthesis.):" and then you have the figures which I need not read. Now the total 117 and this goes on and on, your Honors, throughout these documents until Document 191.
Now if the Prosecution would go to the trouble of comparing the figures which they can find in Documents 188 through 199, to the figures which I offered yesterday from Geitner Document Book No. 4, as Document Book 81, Exhibit 66, to be found on pages 1 through 5, then the Prosecution will find it confirmed that the figures coincide.
The Prosecution asked yesterday "How is it that Dr. Sauter has got these figures contained in Document No. 81?" And I said yesterday "One can obtain those figures if one checks over the documents which reached us from Washington."
Some of these documents I have offered as document 188 through 199 to the Prosecution and the Tribunal and who goes to the trouble of checking up on these lists - and I have just quoted the first three - then he will find that the figures contained in Geitner Document 81 and recited by me, are entirely and absolutely correct.
You can find such compilations in many other passages but I shall not read them out now. May it suffice that I have recited those three examples to the Tribunal? All I want to do now is to recommend a few special passages to the attention of the Tribunal and I always find it important to say that these documents go back to the years 1942 and 1943 that is to say, not for the purposes of these proceedings, and it is also of importance to say that these documents up until recently were in Washington and not in the possession of the defendants or their counsel.
It says, for instance, on Page 66 in Document 188, under Paragraph 2, "Serbian Territory. Now as before the Draza Mihajlovic Organization is in action. The recruiting of the followers seems to be finished to a certain degree. Equipment and arming may be considered as being insufficient now as before. The recruiting extends, besides to all stratas of the population, also the Cetnic and Ljotic organizations which are loyal to the government." On the same page, and on Page 67, on top, there is an interesting report concerning the position of the group of national Germans resident down there, their food situation and things like that, about the confiscation of harvest machines and harvest stores and other grains by the insurgents, at the risk even that a famine might be the consequence. As it says on Page 67, on top, they were apparently acting on higher orders. Then on Page 68, on top, in an entry about the Communist influence with the partisans, which was on a mounting scale, it says there, for instance, on Page 68 on top, "Acts of sabotage have generally decreased, they have only increased in Eastern and Southeastern Serbia. They are principally committed by brigand mobs who are joining to insurgent bands because of economic distress."
Similar entries are on the same page, the next but one paragraph concerning the Communist influence gaining momentum in the bands, etc. Then on Page 69, there is a reference under Paragraph 2, what areas are mostly infested and are centers of unrest. On Page 70, we find a statement on the activities by the insurgents, harvest sabotage, how they made surprise attacks on transportation, on police stations and municipal administrations, on passenger trains, on ammunition depots of the Luftwaffe, etc. On Page 72, following, there are more reports on the almost daily repetitions of the surprise attacks, and to the facts which at that time were stressed by the commanders in chief in Serbia and their collaborators, namely, that these acts of sabotage and attacks were merely a reaction on the part of the population, that is to say, that even the most stringent military measures could not keep down the population. In other words, as it is stated, that the oppositional attitude under all circumstances and the revolutionary tendencies of the population, and their contempt of death, was the reason why so many acts of sabotage were committed.
Already then things were seen that way. On Page 76, I should like to draw the Tribunal's attention to the entry under Paragraph 2, on Page 76, the D.M. Movement, which stands for the Mihajlovic Movement. It says, "As much as in this area between Drina and Bosna, so also elsewhere the organizing work of the D.M. "that is Draha Mihailowick," seems to be not inconsiderably impeded through differences among the subleaders. The impression is strengthened that the quality of the subleaders is in no way equal to the doubtlessly well thought out plan of a general uprising in the Balkan area. The inadequacy of the subleaders apart from their inability to subordination, becomes apparent in their desire to pretend accomplishments by exaggerated reports on the situation and success of their work, which actually do not exist. It can also be noted that the orders of the D.M. aiming at stronger activation of the movement, are in reality not being carried out." May I just remark here that this quotation is borne out by what a number of defendants have said on the witness stand, when they pointed out that this tendency on the part of the troops to boast and brag about their successes and exaggerate, and report exaggeratedly.
The following reports on the next pages, to and following, time and again, report repeated acts of sabotage. You may find on Page 79, another of those ten day reports, where for the Serbian area alone, 56, from the Croatian area, 79, which makes a total of 135 acts of sabotage and surprise attacks. That means a figure of almost 20 surprise attacks per day. It says in the footnote to this report, "Above figures only contain detailed information of reported sabotage acts, and not those individual raids and sabotage acts which occurred in some Croat areas on the occasion of the riots, which were considerably more numerous." Then on the next page, you find the reprisal acts as ordered by the Commander-in-Chief.
If you compare that to those figures on the previous page, one will be able to see whether all attacks were being retaliated for, or only a relative number of them were.
On Page 81, I beg to draw the Court's attention to the entry under Paragraph 1, General Information. This is a situation report for the period between 1st and 10th October, 1942. "Drazha Mihailovic is pressed by his deputy leaders to activate the forces within his movement, referring to disadvantages in connection with popular sentiment, if his passivity towards German actions is continued. He has given way to this pressure in so far, by ordering to remove individual Wehrmacht members and small German detachments, without leaving any trace of them behind. He still persists in prohibiting any open hostilities." You can find in it a confirmation of what has been said in numerous affidavits, that these units did not bear their arms openly, but hid them and by crafty surprise attacks they attempted to win the day. On the following pages, you find reports on welfare measures taken for the food supplies of the population, for the political appeasement of the country. I would like to draw your attention to a remark made on Page 91, in Document 194, under Paragraph 2, "Enemy Situation". This is the situation report from the period between 11 and 20 January 1943, which reads as follows: "Drazha Mihailovic allows pursuit of Communists in Serbian sector as before. The strict reprisal measure for sabotage and murder of Serbian officials have caused D.M., due to pressure from the populace which constantly becomes more hostile in its attitude, to restrict his orders almost to the point of cancelling them. In the execution of the disobedience campaign, the population should under no circumstances be endangered, so that 'no retribution measures shall be brought on'."
Defendant Geitner begs to draw your attention to this entry, which is only one example of the fact that in actual reality, reprisal measures ordered by the commander in Serbia and other areas of the Balkans must, I am sure, have made a deep impression on Drazha Mihailovic and other leaders, and up to a certain degree, thus achieved their purpose.
It is important to pay attention to those entries for the reason that at that time Defendant Geitner and other defendants in 1943, I mean, of course, could not foresee that on 23 December 1947, five years later, the question would be gone into here in Nuernberg, whether and to what degree these reprisal measures impressed the leaders of the partisans in actual fact. That is why we think the entries of the period of time concerned are of importance for us today. There is, for instance, a small entry on Page 94, to which I would beg to draw the Tribunal's attention. It says there, under Paragraph II, Enemy Position; "Band activity remains now as before directed against the local Serbian administration......The attempts of D.M. to win the support of the legal Serbian armed forces, be it through terror or by bribery, continue....The Moslem question is another focal point of unrest. The Italians watch the attacks of the D.M. Cetniks on the Moslems from the position of 'Parade Rest!" There again you see with a further example how difficult the situation was for the German administration and German generals down there.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
On Page 95, there is an interesting entry roughly in the first third of the page. It says there, "When the Italians departed", that is of March 1943, "they turned over the executive powers to the local Montenegrin Cetnik units. This threatens to bring about a renewed bloody altercation with the Moslem population, which, under the circumstances, will not be without influence on the attitude of the Albanians in the Novi Pazar and Kos. Mitvovica district. The Moslems are seeking German protection, after it has been denied them by the Italians; they should be ready to fight under German leadership."
Document 190 contains a number of reports of sabotage attacks and terror measures by the partisan units and the German commanders express their desire to be assigned more military units. Then, on page 99, in the situation report for the period between 16 June to 15 July, 1943, there is the remark that if the harvest goes all right, food supplies should be secured for the near future and the population in the towns should be appeased and the insurgents are likely to further intensify their sabotage acts of the harvest. This shows how correct German commanders were to think that the administration must see to it that everybody can work and can eat if there is to be law and order in the country.
Now, if the Tribunal please, I shall not read any more documents from Document 198. I shall merely draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that it was in that period of time that a new wave of unrest swept over the country on account of air raids by the Allied air fleets, and the civilian population had to suffer from it rather badly. For instance, on Page 106, on the top, under Paragraph 4, Croatia, "The constant air attack terror has a very detrimental effect on the population living near the coast, unremitting use of air craft armament does not spare the farmer, who works in the fields, either."
This is an entry for the period between 16 March and 15 April, 1944, for a period of time, in other words, where in Germany also farmers went through that experience as they plowed their fields. A similar entry can be found on the same page, 106, under Air Situation. It speaks of bombing attacks with about 600 4-engined bombers directed against the air base at Semlin and the railroad station at Belgrade, and parts of the inner city were seriously damaged. Water and electricity supplies, as well as lines of communication, were severely disrupted. A large number of persons were killed. In Belgrade alone, 1160 civilians were killed in this one air raid, and further air raids tell the same story, as may be found on Page 106, in Document 198, and of course they did not contribute to keep the population calm.
I shall now leave this group of documents and I shall come to the last document in Document Book Geitner No. 6, which is Document 200, on Page 110, which is offered as Exhibit 171. This is an entirely different document. This document refers to the examination of the witness Wollny.
PRESIDENT WENNERSTRUM: May I ask, Dr. Sauter, if the exhibit number should not be 172? Will you check on that, please?
DR. SAUTER: Just a moment, please. Your Honor is quite right. I am most grateful that you told me this. I must correct, therefore, Document No. 200 on Page 110 is offered as Exhibit Geitner No. 172. I said we once heard here on the witness stand a witness called Wollny, who told us at the time that he saw a poster. He saw this with his own eyes in a town in central Germany, and on this poster, the American Occupation Army threatened reprisal measures at the ratio of 1 to 200. Now, by a coincidence, we find yet another witness who also saw that poster and read it.
This is the man who gave me Document No. 200 as an affidavit. His name is Hans Joachim Hammling, born in April, 1920, at Schneidemuehl. He now lives in Altenburg, in Hessen, and is a German citizen. He says, "The following statements refer to my official position as 1st Lieutenant in the 71st Replacement and Training Armored Infantry Battalion during the period from 16 April 1945 till the end of the war. In the period from 16 April 1945 till the end of May 1945 the American occupation forces posted an announcement in the public announcement box at the wall of the school building in the village of Gerenzen, Mansfelder Mountain district South Harz. The contents stated that for each soldier of the United States Army Forces who was killed by members of the Wehrwolf organization or the German population, 200 Germans would be executed by shooting. This announcement was either signed: Ordered by Military Government, or: The occupation force reponsible for this district. The then commanding officer of the Mansfeld district was Major David B. Bernstein." The affiant has signed his affidavit on 22 October 1947, and the document has been sworn to and duly certified. If the Tribunal please, this brings me to the end of the reading of those documents which at present are available to me. It may well be possible that I shall have the opportunity of submitting another two documents which as yet are not completely in my hands. One is a similar poster which was sent to me, the original poster, where it is threatened that reprisals will be taken at a certain ratio, which is of a considerable extent, by the French occupying forces. The other document, which I intend to submit to this Tribunal as soon as it has been properly translated, is an affidavit which has reference to that poster, and gives in detail statements about the fact where, when and for how long that poster was probably shown.
Those two documents, I would be grateful if I might submit them at some later time, as soon as they are in my hands in the proper form. For the rest, this brings me to the end of presenting my evidence on behalf of Defendant Geitner. Thank you very much.
JUDGE CARTER: Do I assume that there is to be no cross examination on the affidavit of General Geitner that came in yesterday?
MR. FULKERSON: No, if Your Honor please.
JUDGE CARTER: Very well.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Rauschenbach, for General Foertsch. If the Tribunal please, I beg to submit Document Book 4 on behalf of Defendant General Foertsch. I trust that it is in the hands of the Court. The first two documents in that document book are already known to the Court. They are the two surveys which I submitted at the beginning of the examination of General Foertsch for the information of the Court. They are not to have any independent probative value, but at the express desire of the Tribunal, I allocated them an exhibit number. I have therefore included them in them in this document book. They are documents No. 72 and 73, offered as already before exhibit numbers 14 and 15. The next document is No. 74, and it is offered as Exhibit 63. The last exhibit I offered was No. 62. It is an affidavit by Professor Adolf Lampe of Freiburg, which I had intended to submit earlier, but at that time it did not have the proper certificate, to which the Prosecution objected, and I therefore omitted it at the time. Professor Lampe, as the affidavit shows, was acquainted with General Foertsch for a long period, for instance, from the time when General Foertsch was still in the Reich Defense Ministry, and he confirms what General Foertsch has told on the witness stand about his military and political career quite generally.
It is immediately connected with the submission of the Prosecution that the defendants were, together with Ley, Sauckel, and such people, acted together in exterminating the people of the occupied areas. The Prosecution, on cross examination, put a number of questions concerning the origin and purpose of the books written some time previously by General Foertsch. This is the reason why I am submitting this affidavit.
"Paragraph 1.
"In order to facilitate a correct appraisal of my statements I shall make the following statements concerning myself and my political opinions."
(This refers, of course, to Professor Adolph Lampe.)
"Since 1922 I have actively opposed National Socialism at every opportunity which presented itself. My opposition ended with my arrest by the Gestapo in September 1944, as an assistant of Dr. Goerdeler and sent to Berlin for trial by the People's Court. Instead of details, which I will give upon request, I am enclosing, in confirmation of this, a certified copy of the 'Fuehrer Order' by virtue of which I was expelled from office in December 1944. I did not regain my freedom and livelihood until the collapse of the political system."
This certificate which the affiant mentions may be found at the end of this document, on page 12 of the Document Book. The decree reads as follows:
"Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellery." Signed by Dr. Lammers, directed to Dr. Adolf Lampe. Berlin.
"The Fuehrer has ordered your removal from the office of University Professor as I inform you in accordance with instructions, because of your participation in events connected with the attempt on the life of the Fuehrer on 20 July 1944. As a result, all rights accruing from your previous office are forfeited."
To continue, on page 5 of the Document Book, under paragraph II, I shall skip the first few paragraphs and I shall continue on page 6, last paragraph:
"I clearly remember that in April 1933 Herr Foertsch took a definite stand against Hitler. In conversations he repeatedly expressed himself very disapprovingly and told me about the intrigues which were staged against General von Schleicher, who was apparently on intimate terms with Herr Foertsch, in order to bring about his dismissal as Reich Chancellor.
In the course of the following years, Herr Foertsch doubtless changed his attitude toward National Socialism at first, whereas I definitely persisted in my disapproving opinion. There was an extensive discussion about this between us in our correspondence. The thought never even remotely occurred to me that Herr Foertsch could in any way misinterpret my very definite criticism of National Socialism or consider himself obliged by this to take any measures against me. I tried to explain to myself his own change in attitude by the fact that as an enthusiastic soldier he naturally had to reach a positive attitude, considering that under National Socialist leadership his own sphere of activity experienced a development which had previously been considered impossible, whereas I, as an economist, had to keep in mind the perniciousness of the National Socialist economic policy and its consequences. I expressed myself to this effect to Herr Foertsch and received an answer which thoroughly confirmed my supposition. Herr Foertsch was firmly convinced that in the last analysis the military circles would keep the leadership in their hands. In June 1939 during one of my many visits to Berlin, as frequently happened, I also passed an evening in the home of Herr Foertsch. Here the specific problem of Armed Forces and Party was very thoroughly discussed. I recall that Herr Foertsch made use of a comparison and said that the Party river flowed into the broader river of the Armed Forces so to speak as a tributary so that for a time one would probably have to perceive a 'brownish' coloration of the entire river which resulted from the influx; however, he thought that there could be no doubt that the main stream would then cover up the color of the tributary. He described his various official positions and the attitude which he had adopted in them towards Party authorities. From this it definitely appeared that he had never made the slightest concession which seemed to him professionally unacceptable, but for his part had always decisively claimed the 'role of the main stream' described in the comparison and moreover had been able to have his own way."
To continue on page 8, the last paragraph:
"Late in 1941, or early in 1942, I wrote to Herr Foertsch that it was now high time for the supreme military authorities to realize their great political responsibility and that only they had an opportunity to place things on a fundamentally different basis who would still leave some reason for hope. Herr Foertsch replied that he shared my point of view completely; to this he added clearly enough that, unfortunately, civil courage and military courage were very seldom connected."
To skip the next paragraph and continue with the next one:
"Taken all in all, there can, therefore, be no doubt that Herr Foertsch:
"1) had fundamentally changed his temporarily favorable attitude after he recognized the irresponsibility of the Party's activity, to which, in the beginning, he granted 'extenuating circumstances' so to speak, and when its growing preponderance over the military authorities had become clear to him;
"2) that above all else he was a teacher, a leader of men in the best sense of the word and not a 'ferocious soldier';
"3) that, because of his very sense of responsibility toward the nation, he showed a fundamentally humane attitude at every opportunity.
"Even although I have no detailed knowledge of the "measures for which Herr Foertsch is in any way responsible, I am positive that he certainly always made an extreme effort to depart from orders contrary to his views as much as he was able and at great personal risk in order to do the best that was possible to alleviate the sufferings of the people in the conquered territories even if perhaps he could not prevent injustice completely.
"I remember that he wrote with the deepest sympathy abotrt the sufferings of the Greek people during the first period after the occupation"of the country and, as further appeared from his letters, did everything to change things for the better insofar as any opportunities for this were offered to him. From my personal knowledge of Hermann Foertsch I account hint one of those officers of the old school who, hampered by tradition and long years of training were not able to recognize that the way of high treason, which in itself, namely, under normal national conditions, is a disgraceful way, had become, through Hitler's misdeeds, a way of honor."
The next affidavit is Document Foertsch No. 75, offered as Exhibit No. 64. It may be found on page 13 of the Document Book - affidavit by Professor Schramm, who is a professor of history at Goettingen. Schramm, between March 1943 and May 1945, kept the Mar diary of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff and for that reason he can give us a few important impressions. Under paragraph 3, on page 14, he says:
"In the period from March 1943 to May 1945 I kept the Mar Diary of the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces. Therefore I got a glimpse of all the more important military documents, outgoing and incoming. Had General Foertsch of his Commander in Chief made a proposal at this time which was a sign of cruelty or a lack of a sense of justice, this would have been impressed on my very accurate memory, for that would have occasioned me to alter an opinion which I already held for a dozen years. This is not the case, however. The correspondence between the Army Groups in the Southeast and the Fuehrer Headquarters disclosed, rather that Hitler worked continually as an agitator, and the military authorities endeavoured openly, or in a roundabout way, to conduct the war also in this theatre in accordance with the traditional rules of war.