The people must come back to the Wehrmacht, that was our endeavor.
Q. But, whether or not a man was classified as suitable for a hostage or not, suitable for a hostage in the last analysis depended upon what the SD said in such a case?
A. No, the responsible divisional commanders would take a hand there with their 1c interrogating officers and their personnel. The SD did not have a free hand, they were very closely and carefully watched. All they had to do was interrogate and then they were checked up on again by us.
Q. Now let us turn to the problem of these teletypes for a minute. What was the procedure when you wanted to send a teletype message from your headquarters to the army, to the 2nd Panzer army, in the first place who drafted the text usually?
A. As I explained on direct examination, the various reports came in from the divisions, then a draft was made by the A.D. C., that is to say by the 1a, together with the A.D. C. Then the draft would be reduced to its most concise form so that it could be sent out on the teletype or Morse channel without trouble. I mentioned also that our regulations laid down specifically that a teletype letter must be as short and concise as possible so it could be passed on quickly. Then the teletype letter was sent to the chief of staff. The chief of staff then crossed out this or that perhaps and then the letter would be given to the hand of the communications officer as quickly as possible because there were always these acts of sabotage and two or three disduptions might occur daily. This thing must be sent out as quickly as possible. If there was anything which first required a decision, then of course I would be consulted if I was present. That is how it was handled usually.
Q. Were these messages coded or ciphered before they were sent?
A. No, they were secret but were not ciphered. I think you are asking me too much.
I really don't know, the communications officer would do that and then we had a signal expert there. I don't think they were ciphered first as that would have taken much longer and we would not have been able to get through with it at all.
Q. Were copies of these reports kept for the war diary?
A. What happened was this. The A. D. G. who worked on the war diary would look in at every department once of an evening to see what came in that day. He saw the chief of staff, 1a, the medical officer, etc., and asked them whether anything had happened which could be made part of the diary and then he would include it in the war diary, if it was complete. If it was still not complete, he deferred it for one or two days perhaps so that the final remarks would be correct.
Q. But a good many of these teletype reports to the army found their way right into the war diary as they were without any change?
A. Well, it depended on the man who was keeping the war diary. It depended entirely how he personally felt about it. If ho regarded this or that as of importance he included it or perhaps he asked the 1a or the chief of staff.
Q. But sometimes though actual copies of these teletypes were inserted in the war diary, were they not?
A. I cannot remember a passage where it is contained verbatim. I think as a rule they were summarized and made more concise, but it is possible that this or that term was included verbatim. That is quite possible.
Q. Well now when these teletypes were submitted to you, and you say in some cases they were, before they were actually sent out, you say you signed them?
A. As a matter of principle I initialed every document or every letter with my initials and put the date next to the initials. I did that with a persistence, because I had once made a very unpleasant experience when I was adjutant, so I put my signature and did this automatically and the experts were told very strictly they must hand every thing back to me if I should forget to put initials on them.
Q. Well, did you sign the teletypes at the bottom so that your signature was part of the message, or did you....?
A. No, at the right hand corner on top.
Q. So that if the.....?
A. Immediately under the date.
Q. Then if the teletype happens to be a copy of what was received, then it would not show your signature anyway. Then in other words the recipient of the message would have no way of knowing that you had read it or had not?
A. I think you are starting on the wrong promise there. The so things were transmitted by Morse symbols on the teletype message. The arty, for instance, received the reports but it did not have my signature. This was done by Morse dash -- dash -- dash, etc. , without signature, of course, and the actual original is a letter, and you have some of those documents in one of the document books.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q General, how many Croatian troops, I am speaking now of the actual Croatian military plus the Ustasha, were subordinate to you in your Corps area. I don't mean subordinate to you, I know you object to the term; how many were located in your Corps area?
A I also object to the term militia, it was the armed forces, the Croatian armed forces, that was how we regarded them, it was not the militia, if you will excuse me. You mean how many were stationed in my area?
Q Yes.
A That fluctuated on different occasions. I remember the 1st Mountain Battery, and then reference is made to Regiment 8, which I have seen here from the documents. On one occasion I had dealings with Pretschko and there to relieve Pretschko for about a fortnight was the 3rd Croatian Mountain Brigade which was subordinate to me tactically. It fluctuated, in other words, if they were subordinate to me it must be contained in the war diary.
Q What was the relationship between the Croatian troops and the German troops within a certain divisional area so far as tactical cooperation was concerned?
A I said before tactical cooperation was limited to a definite period of time for a certain operation. Let us assume the operation "Snowstorm" was to be started. For that operation the army then contacted the Croatian government and requested this or that unit for a fortnight to serve for this or that purpose be tactically subordinate for that purpose. Then permission was given dr disapproval, which happened also very often as the Croats were a very stubborn race and frequently refused. This would all come back through official channels to me.
Q Approximately how many kilometers of railroad were there in your area that you were entrusted with guarding?
AAs I said on direct examination, the many railway lines from Zagreb to Novska and from Brod to Vinkovci and up here to Belgrade Court No. V, Case No. VII.
(indicating on map) This amounted to about 45O kilometers and on the railway we had branch lines which went down to the south with which I was not concerned. But from time to time there was a period of time when we had to guard the strength, roughly down to here, but this was only for a short period of time.
Q And in addition to guarding the railroad you carried out these various tactical operations in the area of the Corps?
A It was the endeavor to prevent by constant tactical operations on a small or large scale the partisans from seizing the railroads.
Q Now, you had under you General, two or three division, didn't you, they moved around and varied some as a general rule; is that not true?
AAs I remarked before, there were under me the 173rd Reserve in the eastern part and the 187th division in the western part and I had the 1st Cossack Division which carried out operations and marched from east to west and finally took over this area. The lin of demarkation varied.
Q Well, now even when the 1st Cossack division was with the Corps, it was moving around in an area close to the railroads most of the time, was it not, conducting these operations "Snowstorm?"
A I don't think so. On the whole they were usually stationed near the railway lines. I can tell you in detail how they were usually stationed. First they arrived in this area and carried out an operation in the area of Fruska-Gora, then went along here always along the railway up to here. Then in this area they carried out also an operation, so in this area, if you remember the letter by Colonel Ruckser where he complains about the cossacks that always in this area they carried out operations, then in this area there then for a time they were withdrawn and made an advance in this area and finally they settled down in that area there. They were in my area between 5 October and unless I am very much mistaken to 20 November. After which one Brigade was taken away by the division staff. Then for a Court No. V, Case No. VII.
short period of time the Brigade was in my area. (Indicating on map.)
Q That is something else I didn't understand. General, now you said this morning when you left and went into Hungary, as I understood it, on 15 March that you turned over the area to the 1st Cossack Division. As I understood you, the 1st Cossack Division took over your old Corps area; is that correct?
A Yes, what happened was this......
THE. PRESIDENT: Pardon me, General, in making reference to places on the map if you will describe them by town or by locality it might be advisable. I do now know whether historians in later years will want to make a study of these proceedings they cannot be very enlightening if you refer then to this, there or certain places. If you will refer to a particular spot it would make perhaps a better record at least.
THE WITNESS: Yes, certainly, your Honor.
BY MR. FULKERSON:
Q You didn't tell me how it came about that the 1st Cossack Division took over your Corps area after you left.
A I think it was on 20 December that the last brigade of the 1st Cossack division was withdrawn from the Corps area. Unless I am very much mistaken, they were then sent to the adjacent Corps in the South.
Q That was General von Leyser?
A Yes, they left my area. I think they carried out operation "Torch" (Brandfackel) if I remember correctly. Then they came back to the Corps. I don't have the exact particulars there but I think before we left for Hungary and then from 15 March it took over the Corps area, because the LXVIIII Reserve Corps together with another two divisions went via Zagreb to Varistin in the direction of Lake Balaton in Hungary. When we marched into Hungary we made all this area free and that area was taken over by the 1st Cossacks and was there responsible afterwards.
Q Now, between the time the 1st Cossack division left, I think you said around 21st of December, was that about the time the first Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Cossack division went down to General von Leyser's Corps area, the time between that time and the time that the whole .......
A Excuse me. I am not very well informed about this point. It may well be that for a time they were stationed for themselves and then committed to the Corps of General von Leyser, but all I know is that it was during that period of time.....
Q I don't think it matters, General. What I was getting at, General, is they were out of your Corps area in any case?
A Yes, quite. On 20 December the 2nd Cossack Brigade left the Corps area.
Q Now then, between that time, between the 20 December and the time they came back in the middle of March, you were left with only two divisons in your area?
A I had in my Corps area the two reserve divisions, namely the 173rd and 187th, to which reference was made before. I also had the Cossack division and toward the end of 1943, I had the 367th Division to which I also referred on direct examination. Then I had a number of other units, which were attached to the division, such as railway security battalions and a number of divisions which had been transferred to the area without being used for tactical purposes, because they were still being established and had served in different theaters of the war, such as in Russia and suffered many losses. They joined me and were committed somewhere near Esseg or Vukover and for instance they were stationed there and carried out local security tasks and replenished themselves.
Q Did the Croatian troops also help guard the railroads up there?
A If somehow a Croatian unit happened to be stationed near a railway line, of course they did so.
Q They watched out after particular points in the line that were susceptible to sabotage, such as tunnels, bridges, etc., just as your troops there?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
AAs on the Zagreb, Brod, Belgrade line there were at certain intervals watch towers near bridges or other important points, not always but mostly, they were surrounded with barbed wiring, and trenches had been dug.
Q How did you guarantee the security of the rest of railroads, I mean by that did you put barbed wire on both sides of the line for the whole length of it, that was impossible was it not?
A That would have been entirely impossible. There isn't enough barbed wire in the whole of the world.
Q How did you, I mean literally, how did you guarantee the safety of the length of the railroad lines..?
A Each division was given a certain sector and there they established their patrols and there operations were in the areas. In sectors where this happened so often and where the railroads would be raided frequently and the partisans would withdraw to the mountains, the divisional commander would decide that he must chase the partisans away from there and then planned and carried out an operation.
Q Where did these Cossack troops come from in this 1st Cossack divison, what was their origin?
AAs far as I know they came from Lithuania from a troop training center there. It was there they had been interned, they were trained there and from there they came down to us.
Q Well, were they originally Don cossacks, they came from the Don basin, did they?
A There were Don cossacks and Kuban cossacks, I really don't know.
Q. They were originally Russian prisoners of war. Is that where they came from?
A. No, no, certainly not. They were volunteers. They had volunteered. They, in fact, were extremely keen.
Q. You say there were about 25,000 of them in that division.
A. Yes, there were two brigades consisting of 12 or 13 thousand men, and each brigade had six regiments. It was a very strong division with modern equipment.
MR. FULKERSON: I believe that is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions of this witness?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. GAWLIK:
Q. General, on cross examination the question was discussed whether you were held responsible by the army for anything and everything occurring in the area of your corps. What were you really responsible for in your corps area?
A. I was responsible in the second instance -- because it was in the first instance it was the Croarian state -- for security and order in my area, in particular for the security of the main railway line and I had to fight against such partisans as appeared in my area.
Q. Who was responsible in the first instance for the occurrences in your area?
A. In the first instance, needless to say, the divisional commander.
Q. No, I mean quite generally, who was the first responsible agency?
A. The Croat state and its government.
Q. And who, apart from that, I mean among German agencies, was responsible?
A. The Croat state had to secure the law and order and we had to support it.
Q. Who else supported the Croat state?
A. Various agencies, the police, Croatian agencies; Croatian armed forces of course, in the first place.
Q. In order to make one thing quite clear, were you in any sense responsible for measures taken by the police?
A. I said this so often before: certainly not. Police were subordinate simply and purely from case to case in this or that unit for tactical purposes only for a certain tactical operation. This you can see from the report where it says, for instance, that the police had furnished one company for the operation, let us say, operation "Arminz". The operation lasted for a fortnight and during that fortnight I am in charge of the police for tactical purposes and for tactical purposes only.
Q. Is it, therefore, correct to ask whether you were made responsible by the army for anything which occurred in your area?
A. Of course, that is out of the question because so many things happened in my area. I am not responsible for what happened in the area to those units which are not subordinate to me.
Q. Then it was discussed what was your responsibility while you were on leave. Who appointed your deputy while you were on leave?
A. The superior agency; namely, the army. It was laid down in an army order; while the commanding general of the 69th Corps was on leave he will be deputized by this or that person.
Q. While you were on leave were you informed about measures which occurred in the corps area?
As of this point there is something wrong with the film.
A. That was quite impossible.
Q. Did you have any authority to issue orders to the corps while you were on leave?
A. Of course not.
Q. Did the deputy have the same authority which you had when you led the Corps?
A. The deputy was in that case the commanding general when I was on leave. He was the responsible commanding divisional officer as I would have been.
Q. Who is responsible for the period of leave for events occurring within the area of your corps inasmuch as the corps can be made responsible at all?
A. The competent deputy but only for the corps to whom he can issue orders, exclusive of police, exclusive of Croats or any other authorities.
Q. Then on cross examination the army order was discussed of 15 September 1943. In how far did this amount to a special regulation for Croatian conditions?
A. It was entirely different from anywhere else, any other theaters of war, but there we were dealing with a sovereign and friendly state. That entails entirely different conditions.
Q. Did the German Wehrmacht in Croatia have the right to interfere with the sovereignity of this independent state?
A. No, we did not have that right.
Q. Did the Wehrmacht in Croatia have the right to arrest Croatian citizens without further ado?
A. That was the right of the sovereign state of Croatia only.
Q. Now, if something of that sort was to be carried out what conditions had to be fulfilled first?
A. That could only be carried out after having contacted the Croat government.
Q. Now, from the wording of this order of 15 September 1943 in paragraph 5 one can see that the responsible officer can in urgent cases act independently. Can you, General, tell us whether the divisional commanders in Croatia at any time availed themselves of that possibility?
A. I think I am safe in saying with certainty that that provision was never made use of at all.
Q. The prosecution has quoted a number of daily reports, teletypes, the probative value of which may be debated, which I will do in my final plea. Let us assume, General, that certain events have taken place. Now, can you give us your comments in how far the Croatian government took part in the measures?
A. Croatian agencies, as a matter of principle, carried out these measures.
Q. Perhaps we should make a distinction between two things, the ordering of a measure and the carrying out of it.
A. I emphasized before that both the ordering and the carrying out as a rule was carried out by Croat agencies. Exceptions might have occurred but they are covered by the army order.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt, please? Before we take our afternoon recess I want to call to Dr. Gawlik's attention the fact that the Tribunal has been furnished with Document Book V for Dehner and this is called to your attention so that you may make such use of at such time as you desire in the presentation of your case.
The Tribunal will be in recess at this time for fifteen minutes.
THE MARSHAL: The Court will be in recess until fifteen-fifteen.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. GAWLIK:
Q. General, on cross-examination it was discussed as to what importance could be attributed to your initials on documents. It has been said that there were two possibilities: One, that you saw only the draft; and two, that you saw only the final draft. Is there not a third possibility, General, also?
A. Yes, I possibly didn't see anything at all.
Q. Can it be then that you saw neither the draft nor the final version?
A. Yes, it is possible.
Q. General, a large number of documents has been submitted here which concern the LXIXth Corps. Did this Corps order any one of the reprisal measures mentioned in these documents?
A. No, never.
Q. Did the Corps order the carrying out of one of these reprisal measures?
A. Never.
DR. GAWLIK: If it please the Tribunal, I have no further questions to put to this witness on re--direct examination, but I intend to submit a few documents.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed with the submission of your documents.
DR. GAWLIK: I am offering from Dehner Document Book II, Pages 20 to 21 of both the English and the German texts, Dehner Document No, 12, which will become Dehner Exhibit No. 16. This is an affidavit executed by Helmut Lother.
The affidavit is dated the 4th of October 1947. The affiant Lother makes certain statements in this affidavit concerning the political and religious attitude shown by General Dehner. In the first paragraph he makes statements concerning the fact that he has the necessary knowledge to make such statements, and he states:
"I was a member of the staff of the 106th Infantry Division from the time of its formation until 31 October 1943, as an official with the rank of an officer. In this capacity I had the opportunity to get thoroughly acquainted, with General DEHNER.
I often discussed in a small circle of friends with General DEHNER seriously and in detail political and religious problems. On these occasions he was never afraid to criticize party measures openly and severely, even, and in particular, before officers of his staff who, as fanatical party members, believed to have to welcome, justify and defend each measures. General DEHNER opposed in particular the attitude of National--Socialism towards the church, and this not only with words in a small circle, but also with deedy before the entire division."
I shall skip the next paragraph; and the affiant goes on to say:
"In particular I have a vivid recollection of his manly opposition against party-inspired measures of the Army Command, aiming at the suppression and elimination of the spiritual welfare within the sphere of his division."
The next document I shall submit from Dehner Document Book III, from Pages 25 and 26 of both the German and the English texts, Dehner Document No. 15, which will become Dehner Exhibit No. 17. This is an affidavit executed by one Dr. Bruno Seuser, dated the 6th of November 1947.
Seuser was Chief Physician of the German hospital at Vinkovci, in Croatia. This can be seen from the first paragraph, where the affiant says:
"From the middle of December 1943 up to March 1944, I was Chief Medical Officer of the German hospital at Vinkovci, in Croatia. General Dehner was, at that time, Corps Commander at Vukovar. For this time, and for the area of the LXIXth Reserve Corps, which was under the command of General Dehner, I can testify as follows:"
I have submitted this affidavit as evidence for - at least as far as General Dehner's Corps was concerned, the German troops in Croatia did not appear as enemies and suppressors of the Croatian population, but that instead they did everything to help the Croatian population and to support them. This becomes apparent in detail from this affidavit, particularly so it becomes apparent how the installations--the German military administration installations--like medical installations etc. in Croatia were put at the disposal of the Croatian population.
I shall further offer from Dehner Document Book IV, Page 52 of both the German and the English texts. This is document No 18 and it will become Dehner Exhibit No. 18. It is a copy of an excerpt from Prosecution Document NOKW-048, Exhibit No. 357.
I further offer from the same Document Book, Dehner Document No. 19, which will become Dehner Exhibit No. 19. This is a copy of an excerpt from the Prosecution Document NOKW-049, Exhibit No. 356.
I further submit from the same Document Book, Dehner Document No. 20, which becomes Dehner Exhibit No. 20. This is a copy of an excerpt from Prosecution Document NOKW-052, Exhibit No. 335. The page number is 54 in Dehner Document Book IV.
I further submit from the same Document Book Dehner Document No. 21, on Page 55 of Dehner Document Book IV, of both the German and the English texts. This will become Dehner Exhibit No. 21.
I further offer,-if I may add something to the last document mentioned--this is a copy of an excerpt from Prosecution Document NOKW-073, Exhibit No. 373.
I further offer from the same Document Book, Dehner Document No. 22, on Pages 56 to 61 of both the German and the English texts. This will become Dehner Exhibit No. 22.
I further submit from the same Document Book, Dehner Document No. 23, on Pages 62 to 64 of Dehner Document Book IV. This will become Dehner Exhibit No. 23. This is a copy of an excerpt from the Prosecution Document NOKW-079, Exhibit No. 350.
I further offer from the same Document Book, Dehner Document No. 24, from Dehner Document Book IV, Pages 65 and 66. This will become Dehner Exhibit No. 24. This is a copy of excerpts from a document of the Prosecution, NOKW-1758, Exhibit No. 549.
I further submit from the same Document Book, Dehner Document No. 25, on Page 67 of both the English and the German texts. This will become Dehner Exhibit No. 25. This is a copy of excerpts from Prosecution Document NOKW-073, Exhibit No. 373.
Concerning these documents contained in Dehner Document Book IV, Dehner Exhibit No. 18 to No. 25, I would like to state the following: I have submitted these excerpts because they were offered by the Prosecution without being contained in the document book of the Prosecution, although these are excerpts of extreme importance. Only the knowledge of these excerpts gives a clear and complete picture.
Because these excerpts contain a large number of reports concerning a larger number of surprise attacks which were carried out by band groups and directed against the Croatian population, against the police, and against the German Armed Forces. Only after having rend the documents in their entirety--at least to the extent to which we have it available--we can get a correct picture of the situation which, in turn, shows, as I am trying to prove, that there can be no mention of the fact that a reprisal measure followed every attack by the partisans which was carried out in Croatia. Instead it was only a very small percentage of these surprise attacks which were retaliated.
This brings me to the presentation of documents contained in Dehner Document Book V. From this Document Book I, first of all, submit Dehner Document No. 30. It is contained on Pages 83 to 84, in Dehner Document Book V, and it will become Dehner Exhibit No. 26. This document is an excerpt from the "Frankfurther Zeitung." The excerpts is dated the 18th of April 1941, and I am submitting this exhibit in order to prove that Croatia was an independent state, with its own sovereign government. It becomes apparent from this document that the government was organized in a certain way, and it also becomes apparent, who the members of the Croatian Government were.
I further offer from Dehner Document Book V, Dehner Document No. 27, which will become Dehner Exhibit No. 27, on Page 73 to 77 of both the German and the English texts. This is an affidavit by Hans Harald von Selchow. The affidavit was executed on the 5th of September 1947. von Selchow was "from 1 October 1943 until April 1945 Chief of Staff with the German Plenipotentiary for Croatia." His last military rank was Colonel of the reserve. His statements, therefore, refer to that particular period of time when General Dehner was Commander of the LXIXth Reserve Corps.
The affiant comments, first, on the question of whether Croatia was a sovereign state and regarded as such by Germany, or whether it was supposed to have been regarded as an occupied enemy territory, and in answer he says under (1) "Croatia was not regarded by Germany as an occupied enemy country, but as a sovereign state in alliance with Germany." Under (2) he gives more detailed reasons, and he says: "Croatia had her own independent government, exercising power of authority in this territory. At the head of Croatia there was a Chief of State, Dr. Pavelitsch. At the side of this Head of State there was a Croatian Government." He further goes on to say: "The german military commands and the Reich offices, existing in Croatia, did not exercise executive powers. The German forces needed for all measures they might have taken, the consent of the Croatian Government. This applied, for example, to the requisitioning of buildings for purposes of the Wehrmacht. I remember, for example, that the Commander in Chief Southeast received an allocation of quarters only after consent had been given by the Croatian authorities.
The affiant goes on to say that "a number of foreign states, as Hungary, Rumania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Japan, were represented by ministers with the Croatian Government. It is possible that some more states were represented by ministers; but I cannot recollect this today. German forces were not allowed to carry out requisitionings in Croatia. The Croatian Government did not require the approval of German Army Command agencies in carrying out their administrative tasks, nor the approval of any other German office in Croatia.
MR. FULKERSEN: Before Dr. Gawlik goes any further I'd just like to ask him whether this witness is in Nurnberg now.
DR. GAWLIK: No, the witness is no longer in Nurnberg.
MR. FULKERSEN: He is not in Nurnberg now?
DR. GAWLIK: No, he's no longer here.
"There was no German military administration in existence in Croatia.
"The German plenipotentiary General in Croatia was, during the time of my membership in this office, the liaison between the individual military command agencies - Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), Army Group, Armored Army High Command 2, on the one hand, and the Croatian government on the other hand. He had not the authority ordinarily wielded by a Military Commander in an occupied country. His activities mainly consisted in submitting proposals to the Croatian government, in forwarding decisions taken by the Croatian authorities to the German command agencies, and in acting as intermediary when Croatian authorities and German command agencies had differences of opinion, and the other way round. "The Croatian State was always bent on preserving its authority and did not tolerate any interference by German agencies, above all by command agencies, in the sovereign rights of the Croatian State."
Under "3" the affiant makes statements concerning Croatia's own Armed Forces.
Figure "4" deals with the question of executive powers, and the question goes: "Did General Dehner ever have the executive power in the area of the LXIXth Reserve Corps?" And the answer is: "As far as I know, he had not. The executive power was, also in the area of the LXIXth Reserve Corps, in the whole area of the Croatian State, in the hands of the Croatian authorities."
In Figure "5" the question reads: "To whom were the police units, which were employed in Croatia, subordinated?" And the answer states: "The police units which were employed in Croatia, were under the command of area police chiefs, and these in turn under that of the Delegate of the Reichsfuehrer SS in Croatia, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Kammerhofer who was directly subordinated to Himmler. Those statements apply to the period during which I was Chief of Staff in Croatia."
Under II-6 reprisal measures are being dealt with. "Who ordered the executions of reprisal measures of Croatia?" And the answer: "The Croatian authorities. The German forces were only able to propose the imposition of reprisal measures. Such a proposition was submitted either through command channels via the corps, the 2nd Armored Army and the German Plenipotentiary General, or, in urgent cases, via the Croatian Plenipotentiaries with the Division Staffs."