BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. General, what in accordance with your own knowledge of the English, would you say was a good translation for that term?
A. Well, I wouldn't know the technical term myself. I would have said for "anwerben" - "to engage."
Q. Now about the order itself -- was it ever carried out, the order which we have just mentioned?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Excuse me, may I ask the court interpreter whether "engage" is a satisfactory translation of the German word here involved?
THE INTERPRETER: Well, according to my knowledge of the German language, I think that "anwerben" is not the term which one would use, for instance, if a private firm engages workers. Nobody would say that a firm of businessmen would engage workers in that sense. I think "anwerben" is stronger than "engage" personally. "Engage" is "anstellen" but not "anwerben," I don't think.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. General, this order of 22 October 1943, was it ever carried out?
A. No, the order was not carried out.
Q. Why not? Because, after all, it is an order.
A. I remember this incident very well. I must confess that at the time this order was unpopular with me. It was my view that the Military Commander was not a labor exchange, and I had no possibility organizationally speaking, to carry out a measure of that sort. Now in a number of telephone conversations, I put up counter-demands. I thought if I am to recruit workers for a certain purpose, first of all I must have accommodation; secondly, I must feed them; thirdly, I must provide for them and I must guard them. I must guard them not lest they run away, but I must protect them against possible raids by the bands. In other words, I put up demands as it were, which had to be fulfilled first so that I could use them as a lure for those whom I wanted to engage.
This went on for weeks and weeks and it was not really satisfactoril cleared up. Finally, the demand contained in this order was rescinded from higher up, and as I have heard from Geitner's examination here, he confirmed this at the time, namely that the measure was not carried out, that in its place, a fact which I did not know, Italian workers were employed.
Q. General, do you recall that the witness Stadtmueller who testified here last week for General Felmy, spoke of a deportation of workers by compulsion. Did you know that event at the time?
A. If I remember correctly, Professor Stadtmueller said a few days ago that the SS gathered together workers in Athens by force and he also said that this happened about two or three months prior to the evacuation of Athens. All I can say about that is that I was no longer in Athens at that time and that during my own period of time I never heard anything about a measure of that sort.
Q. General, I am sure you will recall that the prosecution charged you that you and other generals had worked out plans and carried out schemes aimed at the extermination and destruction of the Balkan people, that is to say in your case of the Greek people. In order to give you the possibility to give us your comments on that particular charge, I should like first to discuss with you briefly how your personal collaboration with other agencies in the Balkans was handled. I would like you to tell the Tribunal first how often you contacted your immediate superior General Felber.
A. I visited him three times, apart from which I had a few telephone conversations with him. He himself never called on me.
Q. Did you discuss matters with Fieldmarshal von Weichs?
A. I saw Field marshal von Weichs only once which was as late as June or July 1943, when he was on a sort of information trip through Southern Greece without my knowing at the time that he was to become Commander-in-Chief Southeast.
Q. How often did you discuss problems with the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E, General Loehr?
A. Well, there you should make a difference between two phases. One, you must differentiate between my period of time as Military Commander Southern Greece and then Military Commander Greece. As the Military Commander Southern Greece, I went to see him two or three times, and he, I should imagine, called on me twice or three times in Athens. In the latter period of time, I went and saw him once in Salonika.
Q. What were the points of contact between you two? Because you were not really subordinate to him. Your immediate superior was General Felber, wasn't it?
A. Quite so. The reason for this visit was an argument which was concerned with the constant interference by the Army Group in my competence. It became necessary to clear things up.
Q. You had a conversation with General Loehr yourself about various points and you wanted to clear up a number of measures and you thought that conversation was necessary, did you?
A. Yes. I have given you the reason why we saw each other because it shows the duplication of work, the lack of clarity in competence and other problems. The Commanderin-Chief of Army Group E, had written me an extremely strong-worded letter. He reproached me strongly with the fact, one, that my economic and financial policies in Greece were completely wrong; two, that I only seemed to represent Greek interests at the expense of German troops; that, I thought, went a little far and I therefore answered back in the same manner. I made it clear above all, first, that I would not stand for interference within my own field of tasks and, two, that as far as financial and economic problems were concerned, I was completely dependent on the Plenipotentiary of the Reich for those things, and thereupon he invited me to speak with him personally, which we did, and up to a certain point we cleared masters up.
Q. Did you closely cooperate anything with the Chiefs of General Staff of the two headquarters--that is to say, Military Commander Southeast and Army Group E? Was your collaboration a close one?
A. No, I always negotiated with the Commanders-in-Chiefs themselves because, after all, they were my superiors, not the Chiefs of Staff. Of course, I always called on the Chiefs afterwards and informed them.
Q. Did you cooperate intimately with the Commanding General of the 68th Army Corps?
A. Despite the fact that we were stationed the same place, our collaboration was almost zero, I am inclined to say, because our fields of task were so entirely different. Throughout that period of time, I cannot recall one single official conversation we had. I am inclined to believe that General Felmy would bear me out here.
Q. Now, there also was the 22nd Corps in the Greek area. Did you have intimate official relations with that Corps?
A. After General Lanz' departure from Athens after the capitulation, I had no immediate contact with him any longer, I saw him privately at a later period of time when he was in Athens but any official contact was negligible.
Q. Did you receive basic orders or instructions by any of your superior agencies in writing or orally which were of decisive influence on the way you treated the Greek nation and state?
A. No, I relied ultimately on the orders which we have here in this trial. My actual tasks and duties I had to find myself.
Q. While you were serving in Greece, did you at any time conceive the idea that the ultimate aim of German policy, which would include the military leadership, in the Balkans was to terrorize or decimate or exterminate the population?
A. No, never.
Q. General Felber, when he was a witness here, testified that you had applied to him to be relieved of your duties.
Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is correct. I did not ask to be relieved only once; but several times, once in writing and twice orally; and the suggestion was once made to General Felber and on another occasion the suggestion was made to Army Group E.
Q. What were the reasons why you took this somewhat extraordinary step?
A. A number of factors were of importance here, and I only want to mention the more essential ones.
For one, it was the lack of organization in the channels of command which I have mentioned before, the constant overlapping of all competencies, the lack of clarity in the lines of demarcation between the various fields of duties, the endeavors on the part of other people to interfere in my own field, in one word the chaos in the channels of command, which was prevailing down there. There was no clear-out course anybody followed; all these matters contributed to make it very difficult for me to work successfully and things became therefore highly unpleasant.
Q. Was this application for relief of yours complied with?
A. Not immediately; indirectly inasmuch as I was called away in May 1944.
Q. What was the reason which they gave you at the time?
A. No reason was given me. It might be explained perhaps through the fact that my agency was somewhat diminished organizationally.
Q. At this point, if the Tribunal please, I beg to offer Speidel Document No. 27 contained in Document Book Speidel No. II on page 50. This is offered as Speidel Exhibit No. 36. This is an affidavit by Dr. Hans Speidel, and I should like to quote the following passages:
"I served as an officer from 1914 to 1944. My last rank was that of Major General in the German Army. My last appointment was as Chief of General Staff of Army Group B. (Field Marshal ROMMEL). Following the happenings of 20 July 1944, I was arrested on orders from HIMMLER on 7 September 1944, and, after being confined for 8 months in Gestapo cellars in Albrecht-strasse, Berlin, in camps, prisons and fortress, was freed by the first French Army on 29 April 45. Even in the early stages, I was associated with the resistance forces in the Army and homeland and finally, together with Field Marshal ROMMEL, prepared the separate conclusion of the war in the west, and, with it, the removal of national socialist despotism.
On account of this activity of mine then I was arrested on 7. September 1944.
In May 1944 on hearing of the recall of the Air Force General Wilhelm SPEIDEL from Greece by the High Command of the Armed Forces-as far as I can remember by General JODL - I inquired as to the reasons. Thereupon the reply was made to me that Air Force General SPEIDEL displayed a too mild and indulgent attitude towards the Greek population and had judged the situation in the Balkans, particularly in Greece, too negatively.
Air Force General Wilhelm SPEIDEL suffered considerable service disadvantages as the result of his recall at that time." End of quotation.
When was it that you left Greece, General?
A. I do not recall the exact day. I can reconstruct it only. From the War Diary kept by my agency, I have seen that my successor arrived down there on 10 May. I believe that I helped him to become acquainted with his duties for about eight or ten days and then I handed it over. It must have been therefore around the 18th or 20th of May. Having handed over my affairs, I paid a few farewell visits and I was prevented from leaving soon, as planned, because of transport difficulties. I had to postpone my departure from day to day so that I believe it was only towards the end of May that I left Athens.
Q. Now, two brief questions concerning your further assignments until the end of the war. What was the next appointment you were given?
A. First of all, I wasn't given anything. For four months, I didn't do anything at all.
Q. When was it that you were given your new assignment?
A. In October, 1944, I became commander in chief of the liaison staff of the high command of the air force in the Southeast. This was a lovely title, but nothing was at the back of it, because all I had at my disposal was slightly less than 200 men, with whom I was to have passport controls carried out along the roads which come into Germany from the Southeastern area, so that nobody, no soldiers, would cross the frontier illegally.
Q. When and where were you taken prisoner?
A. When the capitulation occurred on 8 May 1945, I was down in the Tyrol mountains after which I became an American prisoner of war.
Q. In how many American camps did you stay?
A. In eight different ones.
Q. How were you treated there as a prisoner of war general?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honor please, I object to that question. I don't see its relevancy or materiality in this proceeding.
PRESIDENT: Overruled.
BY DR WEISSGERBER:
Q. General, you remember my question: how were you treated as a general and prisoner of war in American prisoner of war camps?
A. Well, unfortunately I have to state that in many cases it was contrary to the provisions of the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention.
Q. Will you please give us concrete examples for this view you hold?
A. I and a group of about 25 generals had been put together by chance. We were first accommodated in mass quarters, slept on the bare floor, sometimes, in huts without any beds, which was not par ticularly tragic.
On 19 July 1945, this group of 25 generals was loaded on a truck and sent to an unknown destination. Around noon, this truck drove into a prison yard and the gates were locked behind us. This was the prison at Osterhofen in Lower Bavaria. There we had to line up in the courtyard, put our baggage on the floor and unpack. Eight soldiers of the Military Police supervised this and gave orders. Having unpacked everything, the individual generals were taken to the prison. Each one of us was carefully searched. On that occasion, gold and silver cigarette cases, watches, money and anything else of any use disappeared. Then all 25 of us were locked up in a biggish cell where we waited for about two hours. Two hours later, we were fetched out again by the military police and we were to pack again, which we did, but the luggage had become much lighter all of a sudden. Practically anything new or anything of any use was now missing, linen, leather goods, etc. Then we were once again loaded on a truck and driven away. An hour later we were delivered to the American camp at Natternberg. Let me describe to you how our reception was. We generals had to line up outside the barrack of the commandant, and there we had to stand without moving for two hours in the scorching July sun, and American soldiers always threatened to beat us. Then we and our luggage were taken individually to a room for investigation. In that investigation room, I had to undress, that is to say, to speak more precisely, everything was torn off my body so that -- and I apologize for saying this -- I stood there in my shirt. Throughout these proceedings, I had to look at the wall. When I attempted to turn around, somebody hit me on the head so that I looked at the wall again. I don't know what happened behind me. Then I was allowed to put on my trousers again, and wearing trousers and a shirt, barefoot, I was kicked in the pants and thrown out of this hut. My boots and my greatcoat and a few toilet articles were thrown after me. That was all I kept in the way of personal belongings. I never saw my suitcases again, nor did I see my personal property again. My three rings, a gold wedding ring and two very valuable signet rings, had disappeared.
The largest part of my money had vanished, and all I had was a receipt for a fountain pen, a watch and some money, and of that only half returned later on. Having been thus received, we were then accommodated in mass huts together with civilian internees, among whom were criminal elements. It was there that I learned that a number of the generals -- I think it was six, I still know some of the names -were beaten by the American soldiers during the examination.
Q. Did you not make any complaints?
A. I attempted almost daily to go and see the American commandant. I attempted to do this in writing, but it was entirely impossible. He refused to see us or have anything to do with us. He did not receive us in person, nor did he accept anything in writing. We were completely cut off from the world, but I can still tell you what unit it was which committed these excesses.
Q. General, I don't think that particular detail is of interest at the moment. Should it become necessary at a later period of time, you can always tell us. Was it not possible for you to contact anybody outside?
A. No, that was out of the question. Of course, at the risk of our lives, we attempted to smuggle letters out. I remember that I wrote a letter to Cardinal Faulhaber in Munich and one to the commander in chief of the American Army. Whether these letters arrived or not, I don't know. For the rest, we were completely isolated and it was only nine months after the capitulation that we were allowed for the first time to write a postcard and thus contact our families.
Q. Did you not insist on your rights as a prisoner of war, that you should be treated, in other words, in accordance with internatienal conventions?
A. I said before, it was quite impossible to see the commandant and talk to him. About five months or six months after we had reached that camp, a commission of American generals appeared in the camp. There were two two-star generals. It was strictly forbidden to approach those generals, but I nevertheless talked to them in the main street of our camp and told them everything which I have told this Tribunal just now.
They made notes, but nothing happened.
Q. This was the camp at Natternberg, was it?
A. Yes, this was the camp at Natternberg, of which General Foertsch has spoken before. He arrived a little later and did not witness the scenes I have just mentioned. General Foertsch had succeeded after months and months of endeavor to see the commandant. Before then, the commandant had sent for a general and we hoped that we would be told more details, but he merely had his ears boxed in a strong manner and was kicked out again.
Q. Did you have to do any work in the camp at Natternberg?
A. No, we did not have to do any work, but we all worked voluntarily. He who did not work did not get this watery soup for lunch, and we were starving.
Q. What sort of work did you do?
A. I did earth work, I sawed wood, construction work, I carried things -- heavy physical work, in other words.
Q. And how long were you in this camp?
A. Eleven months.
Q. And where did you go after that?
A. Then I and the other generals came to Dachau. We were first accommodated in the prison, and then in what was called the generals camp, and there for the first time I was treated as a prisoner of war. Three months after that, I was sent to the prisoner of war camp at Garmisch, where I was treated completely correctly and well above reproach, as a general who was a prisoner of war.
Q. How long were you in Garmisch?
A. Three months or four months.
Q. Where did you go after that?
A. I came here to Nuernberg exactly a year ago, on the 18th of December, 1946.
Q. When were you interrogated here for the first time?
A. On 9 January of this year, after 23 days, in other words.
Q. Had you been told before that period of time why you had been sent here?
A. No.
Q. When were you informed of the purpose of your transfer to Nuernberg?
A. Well, I wasn't told in clear words. After my first interrogation on 9 January, I asked why I was in Nuernberg and then I was told I was here as a witness.
Q. When were you told that you might be put under an indictment?
A. I heard this when the indictment was handed to me on 12 May 1947.
Q. How often were you interrogated?
A. Seven times.
Q. By whom?
A. The first four times by Mr. Rapp and the last three times by Mr. Crailsheim.
Q. In the case of these examination, were you under any duress?
A. I can say there was psychological and physical duress; psychological duress on account of the uncertainty of my situation, I did not know what all this was about, and the physical duress inasmuch as during these examinations a soldier was sitting behind me.
Q. Were any records of interrogations submitted to you?
A. No.
Q. Were you in a position to find out whether these records were correct in reproducing your statements?
A. No; as they were not shown to me, I could not check up on this.
Q. Did you ever sign a record?
A. No.
Q. Did you make voluntary statements in writing yourself?
A. Yes.
PRESIDENT: The Court will take our noon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken until 1335 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 yours, 15 December 1947)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please be seated.
The Tribunal is again in session.
WILHELM SPEIDEL - Resumed DIRECT-EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. WEISSGERBER:
Q General, I refer again to the last question which I put to you before the recess. It was with regard to the interrogation in the Nurnberg prison. My last question to you was whether you had ever made any written statements in connection with your interrogations.
A During the interrogations, of course, there was very much which was very unclear to me and I could not quite remember the connections at the time. I thought the questions over for some weeks and some days, and in order to establish the truth and facts, I set down in writing what I remembered and gave this information voluntarily to the interrogators.
Q Were any documents available to you to refresh your memory, and in order to clear up the questions brought up by the Prosecution?
A No, I had no documents at all.
Q Did you have the possibility to obtain an attorney for yourself?
A No.
Q And that brings us to the chronological end of the matters under discussion here. I must refer back again to two incidents which should have been discussed earlier, but at that time, for certain reasons I could not bring them up for discussion. The first one is an incident which is contained in Document Book XVIII of the Prosecution, Prosecution Exhibit No. 437, on Page 53 of the English text and Page 56 of the German text. This is the Ic evening report of the Military Commander Greece, dated the 10th of December 1943, and its contents are the report of the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters 538.
It concerns the shooting of 10 hostages in reprisal for the murder of a woman Frau Hapers. This report in itself can be interpreted as if this measure was carried out by the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters and as if you yourself had some responsibility in this matter. After careful consideration my client has done his very best to remember something about this case, -- (It is on Page 53) and he has come to the conclusion that neither he nor the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters had anything to do with this reprisal case. Therefore, my client has also included this incident in his compilation of the reports from the band combat area of the Higher SS and Police Leader which is set down in Speidel document No. 60, Speidel Exhibit No. 30. This report of the Higher SS a Police Leader in Boehia is included as No. I. The day before yesterday I received an affidavit which can clear up this matter, and from which it can also be seen that my client had nothing at all to do with it.
Your Honor, I know that it is very poor affair if the Defense produces affidavits at the very last minute, which are not contained in a document book and which are not even translated; but, nevertheless, I would ask that this be not interpreted as negligence, but I would ask the Tribunal to take into account all the difficulties which the Defense has in trying to collect material for its case. Addresses of persons who can give any kind of evidence are sometimes only made available at the very last minute and so it happens that affidavits can only be produced at a very late date.
THE PRESIDENT: Inquiry might be made of the Prosecution as to their attitude; it might save some time.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I can appreciate Dr. Weissgerber's difficulties. I have no objection, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: To its being read into the record and submitted in form later?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: He may do as he pleases on the matter, Your Honor. I have no objection whatever.
DR. WEISSGERBER: Your Honor, then I would like to read the affidavit of Frau Irene Keilich. It is Speidel Document No. 74, and is contained in Speidel Document Book V. I would like to offer this affidavit as Speidel Exhibit No. 37.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, please. Pardon me. Is there to be a Document Book V, Dr. Weissgerber?
DR. WEISSGERBER: Your Honor, I am still waiting for a few affidavits from abroad. I hope that they will arrive one day soon and I would like to compile them, together with this Keilich affidavit, into a supplementary document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Just so it's put into some book so we'll have access to it later.
DR. WEISSGERBER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, then.
DR. WEISSGERBER: Frau Keilich states: "From January 1940 until April 1944 I was the personal secretary of General Wilhelm Speidel, and accompanied him as such to his various offices abroad. The last one was from September 1942 onwards in Greece. General Speidel's tolerance is shown by the following incident: -
In an area which had always been a center of strong Communist bands unrest, the Kobeis the Wehrmacht had taken over a large farm. The director of this farm was an agriculturalist, who was daily in danger of his life. Nevertheless he received from General Speidel strict directions according to which the guard of soldiers which was available to him, was only to be used in case of self-defense. On a journey to Athens Dr. Magers' wife was shot to death in her car. General Speidel shared the indignation of Dr. Magers, but, nevertheless, he rejected reprisal measures, (shooting of hostages) which the latter demanded because in this way the guilty persons would certainly not be punished and, therefore, new unrest would arise."
The affidavit was given on the 12th of December 1947 before the notary in Landshut, and it is duly certified. I hope that this clears up the case of Frau Magers.
The second document which I would like to discuss with you at this point, General, is Speidel Document No. 72, which is contained in Speidel Document Book IV, Pages 34 and following. I offer this document as Speidel Exhibit No. 38. This is a compilation from the War Diary of the Military Commander Greece, and it includes those surprise raids and sabotage acts which occurred from the 21st of November 1943 until the 22nd of January 1944; and from the 22nd of March 1944 until the 17th of May 1944. The following are the reasons for the dates which are set down here for this compilation, for instance the 21st of November 1943, is the beginning of War Diary No. 4 of the Military Commander Greece. The period of time in between -- that is from the 22nd of November until the 22nd of January 1944; and March until May 1944 -- are selected because during the period in between General Speidel, as he stated this morning, was absent from Athens and was on sick and convalescent leave in Germany. I think it is expedient to submit this compilation to the Tribunal, because it includes those reports as they are set down in the War Diary by the Military Commander Greece for the periods given, and there are altogether 94 cases of sabotage and surprise raids, for which according to the War Diary reprisal measures were not taken or at least they did not come to the knowledge of the office of the Military Commander Greece.
Q General, what I wanted to ask you about this compilation here was, have you looked through the War Diary or the excerpts set down here, and can you tell us whether the incidents as set down here were contained in this form in your War Diary?
A I have carefully looked through the War Diary, and the contents of this compilation corresponds with the statements in the War Diary.
Q And this brings me to the end of this part as well. Now, General, I think it is necessary for you to state something quite briefly about the accusations of the Prosecution that you took part in the extermination and decimation policy of the German High Command and that you took part in this consciously. I think that your nonparticipation can be shown by my talking to you about the aid for the Greek population, in which you helped and in which you participated. First of all, one question: Who was responsible for the feeding of the Greek population?
A First of all, the Greek Government.
Q Did you, as Military Commander, also participate in the solution of this problem? -- because the feeding of an occupied country is of course a problem?
A With regard to your first question, I must add a supplementation. I said that the Greek Government was responsible, but it was never in a position to feed the population alone. A decisive part in this matter was played by the International Red Cross. And as a third factor there was the Special Plenipotentiary of the Gorman Reich, who, on his own part supported the Greek Government and also the International Red Cross, and he himself made essential contributions to the feeding of the population. I myself, in my capacity as Military Commander, did everything possible to give aid, insofar as I could support the work of these three people. I helped them in various ways -- mainly in close cooperation with the President of the International Red Cross, at that time Sandstroem a Swede. I can cite a few examples: Once I made available large quantities of fuel, even though the Wehrmacht fuel supply at that time was unfortunately very low. Further, I made all facilities available to the representative of the International Red Cross at that time, with regard to escorts for his trips, identity papers, personal recommendations etc.
Finally, in districts which were very difficult to negotiate, I placed food stocks of the Wehrmacht at the disposal of the Red Cross for the population, to be returned later.
Q And were these measures of aid restricted to the large Greek cities, such as Athens and Salonika, or was aid also given to the rest of the country?
A The distress was the same everywhere. Perhaps there was more in the large towns and also on the plains because the countryside could never feed itself entirely. Now, the aid given by the International Red Cross in the provinces was extremely limited and complicated because Army Group E had ordered so-called blockade zones. This means that in large areas which were thought to be infested with bands, the International Red Cross was not able to give aid. I myself, on my own initiative, decreased these blockade zones considerably; and in this way I made it possible for the food supply to be effective -- also, in those area infested by bands. My idea in this connection was that the population should not suffer from the band activity. I wanted to support and to help the population. The fact that through this error occurred could not be avoided. And, of course, I had some arguments with the Army Group because of this.
Q And wasn't there a danger that transports with supplies of the International Red Cross would fall into the hands of the bands?
A Yes, that happened. It could not be avoided. I myself found two passages in the documents which report about plundering of International Red Cross goods.
Q I would like to mention these two passages. One is contained in Prosecution Document Book XVIII, Exhibit No. 434, Page 19 of the English text and Page 22 of the German text. It states that "truck convoys of the International Red Cross were attacked 40 Km SW of Joannina; trucks and escort plundered." The second passage in the documents submitted here is to be found in Document Book XVIII, Prosecution Exhibit No. 437, Page 35 of the English and Page 45 of the German text.
Here it states "7th of April 1944 two Km north of Ithea surprise attacks on trucks of the International Red Cross on behalf of the Swedish Red Cross; Professor Gistadel was slightly wounded, and the driver seriously wounded."
Those are the two passages you were thinking of, General?
A Yes.