The strong points of the bands in the mountains were difficult to locate because we had bad maps and in the situations which exists in the case of every air raid a large number of nonparticipants would lose their lives. The British did not exercise that consideration. I would like to recall the attack on the small town of Argos in the autumn of 1943; as far as I remember losses among the Greek civilian population amounted to over two hundred persons. Argos was not a base, indicating on map) it had no military importance whatsoever.
I should also recall the British air raids on the harbor town of Pyracus in January, 1944. I think there were air raids on three successive days. The result was that 600 Greeks were killed and over 1,000 were injured. We choose a more considerate form when conditions on the Peleoponnes became unbearable. We merely declared it a combat zone, only we should have done that earlier because soon after that declaration these surprise attacks decreased considerably and finally they ceased altogether.
Q May I once again come back to Felmy document book 3 and draw attention to document No. 76, there on page 34 I should like to read the last paragraph, this is from exhibit 36:
"In conclusion I can say.....," I may interpolate, the affiant Scheure was a Military Judge of the 117th Mountain Infantry Division.
"In conclusion I can say, that in the staff of the 117th Mountain Infantry Division the only thing I always heard about General Felmy was, that he always made difficulties concerning reprisals, he was too timid and exact, it would only cost more lives of German soldiers, and anyway only the same means could be used against partisans who today were camouflaged in civilian clothes as peaceful farmers and tomorrow fought us fully armed. Furthermore I remember a case where great dissatisfaction was expressed in our division staff about the behavior of General Felmy. At that time, General Felmy was accused of being a formalist and completely indifferent to the protection of the lives of German soldiers against the cruelties of the partisans.
I believe that me division commander himself said this, when General Felmy refused to ask his superior authorities for the use of airplanes against partisan villages."
Q General, did in the course of time any special experiences form themselves in the fighting against the bands and what use was made of these experiences?
A In the early spring or summer of 1944, I had established a band fighting school in the case of reconnaissance attacks of the Corps, which was based in the Poleponnes, particularly to teach the peculiarities of fighting against the band, which were so different from the regular fighting we were used to. In that school in particular the sub-leaders were trained who were mostly exposed to these surprise attacks, also a number of older classes of N.C.O.'s and officers and their attention was drawn to the peculiarities of partisan warfare as they were not familiar with that type of warfare and could be taken by surprise.
Q You said this morning that you had to affirm the reprisal measures as such, because otherwise the bands would have become the masters of the situation. Now, were the objects of the reprisal measures chosen indiscriminately from among the civilian population?
A No, of course not. The divisions had orders to choose the hostages particularly carefully. They used the secret field police and any other measures the troops might have found and of course they made use the services of German confidential agents. As I mentioned before, the volunteer units were used as a sort of screening agency as their men came from the Peloponnes and for that reason knew all about the various conditions in the provinces and villages, better than anybody else. Quite apart from this, their intelligence service was much better. There was perhaps an uncle in one village and an aunt in another. They just lived in the neighborhood, so that you could be quite certain that you could get a hold of the really guilty ones.
Q Whom did you include among the really guilty ones?
A Well, apart from the partisans and band members themselves, all those who sympathized with them in one form or another, who gave them assistance and above all intelligence bearers who could act as couriers or who were well known as Communist office holders, briefly all those who shared the idiological concepts of the bands and expressed it in their actions, not only toward the Germans but also toward the Greeks.
Q In summarization, we might say that the acts that the troops frequently called sabotage hostages were not sabotage hostages in the actual sense, they were reprisal measures hostages in order to use the strict term, they were reprisal hostages?
A Yes, the troops were quite well aware of this, even though they preferred the term hostages here.
Q General, in conclusion: In connection with this general examination in connection with the bands and reprisal measures taken, did you independently of concrete orders from higher agencies think about the problem whether or not reprisal measures, such as the shooting of reprisal hostages, the setting on fire of hostage's houses was legally admissible?
A During the first World war no partisan warefare such as we experienced in Greece existed at all. Even the Hague Land Warfare Convention contains only most general provisions concerning warfare against franctireurs. Above all. nothing detailed is contained concerning reprisal measures. Under International Law reprisals are admissible, but on the extent or the ratio admissible there the opinions differ, no hard and fast rule exists. The decisive factor is always military necessity, that is to say ultimately decisive is the troop commander on the spot. The impression formed in his mind, can no longer be reconstructed today after four years, perhaps you could do so on the spolt, but International Law is changeable.
For instance, submarine warfare had to be adjusted to up to date conditions and here before the International Military Tribunal this has been expressen in the judgment On Grand Admiral Doenitz by the International Military Tribunal. Customs of war become unwritten law of nations.
Court No, V, Case No. VII.
One thing is quite clear in the Hague Convention, that the occupation power is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and, equally, that the inhabitants of an occupied territory must not indulge in any illegal acts against the occupation power. Reprisals are always the consequence of illegal actions, of illegal actions of civilians.
Why were things calm in Greece in 1941 and 1942? I experienced this myself. Because the population remained calm. And why were reprisal measures necessary in 1943 and 1944? Because some of the population had been incited by the British to commit acts of sabotage of all types.
The safety of the occupation power was threatened and law and order in the country was upset. The provisions of International Law, such as described in the Hague Convention had been unequivocally violated by the Greeks. That is my opinion.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: May I once again draw attention to a document in Document Book II? It is Document No. 59. It is the affidavit by Kley Kamp. I should like to read from page 39, the last but one paragraph:
"The safety and the authority of the German troops demanded that terror and attack by the EAM and the ELAS be combatted by strong measures. Insofar as the actual culprit could not be arrested, which usually was the case, reprisal measures were a military necessity. No special ratio was applied. The original quota 1:50 to 1:100 was not even approached in the reprisal measures in the area of the LXVIII Army Corps. According to the directives of the corps, the reprisal measures were exclusively directed against active Communists and Partisan helpers (message carriers, liaison persons, leaflet distributors). They considered the fight of the ELAS their own, they supported it materially and ideally.
"The arrest of this circle must have the desired effect of intimidation. General Felmy was always conscious of the great responsibility Court No. V, Case No. VII.
which an order for reprisal measures carried with it. But this responsibility could all the more easily be borne, because all national Greek circles approved of the Battle of the German Wehrmacht against Communism and the Communist partisans and the Greek government, authorities and organizations voluntarily supported them. In order to paralyze this support through the Greeks themselves, Communist propaganda stated then, just as it does today, that the fight of the Wehrmacht was directed against the Greek people."
I would now like to introduce another defense document in the same volume. This is document Felmy No. 60, the next one in the same volume, on page 43. It is offered as Exhibit 41. This is an affidavit by Rudolf Kneschke. I shall read from paragraph 2 on page 43:
"From 18 August 1942 until 4 January 1944, I was 03 in the Staff of Felmy and during this time I acted as Ic several times. In the period, the details of which are important to the prosecution, I was on furlough in Berlin from 6 December 1943 to 4 January 1944, the day of my transfer.
"Herr Felmy always had the viewpoint that one should try to convince the Greeks by kindness of the futility of their active resistance, a viewpoint which was not understood by the simple soldiers in many cases. In this connection Herr Felmy authorized the carrying out of a number of discussions with the Nomarchs in the autumn of 1943 and he also took part personally in them, and they were conducted in a spirit of friendship and compliance. That these discussions could not have the desired result was caused by the fact that the Nomarchs, who occupied positions approximately equivalent to our Landraete or district presidents, exerted no influence upon those partisans who lived and ruled in the mountains, although they, considering the distance, maintained message service to them which functioned most efficiently.
The innumerable small attacks of the part of the Italian army of approximately 60,000 men stationed there, which numerically was far superior to the German troops, were responsible for the most part, for Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the extremely hostile conduct of the population, particularly on the Peloponnese. In contrast to our rations, the Italians had little to eat and plundered and stole wherever they could get hold of anything edible. It is understandable for every patriot that the revenge taken for that not only fell on the Italians, but also upon the Germans allied with them. On the other hand, even today it is almost incomprehensible to me, with what generosity and tolerance Herr Felmy regarded the activity of the bandits at that time.
"The fighting of the partisans was carried on with every illegal means. Mere malice and cunning could not defeat the German soldier, who was not distrustful in Greece as such. Two examples:
"In the late summer of 1943; a motor trap on the way from Patras to Corinth, which could have come there by accident, not by human agency, caused the unthinking descent of a garrison of some what more than a platoon of armored infantry. An attack by shooting down from the mountain slopes, about a dozen dead, the remainder prisoners, no trace of any participants, except the dead. A week later in about the same spot, a new attack, this time in vain.
"In Parnassus, October 1943: An attack in the strength of at least a battalion upon a village in which a company of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division was quartered. The entire company treacherously assassinated, the throats of most of the men cut, the skulls split. As far as I remember, one person escaped, and was heard in a court martial in order to confirm the cruelties practiced by the Partisans in violation to international law.
"In the last months of the year 1943, it became impossible for a courier vehicle to travel alone from Athens to the Peloponese. It had to be driven under the protection of an armored vehicle, if it were to be at all secure from the constantly increasing attacks. From May to November 1943, the number of bandits on the peloponnese increased from about 8,000 to 40,000 men according to reports from agents. This was less due to the fact that almost every night the British dropped Court No. V, Case No. VII.
weapons and supplies, as it was due to the tremendous support of the Partisans by the sale and the delivery of Italian material.
"I can verify the fact that for the duration of my stay in Athens and before that on the Peloponnese, Herr Felmy, in spite of all these events and still more, which I no longer remember in detail, advised quiet and reflection and did not give a single order to kill any sort of hostages."
If the Tribunal please, I should now like to continue in the discussion of the prosecution documents and the next document book I shall use will be Document Book XIII. I should like first to discuss NOKW-1552 on page 123 of the English and 93 of the German book. It is Exhibit 333. This document contains a number of daily reports by the High Command of the German Staff of the Army of September and October 1943.
On page 127 of the English which is page 97 of the German there is under "68th Army Corps" mention is made of the destruction of several villages northeast of Gythion and on page 129 in the English, which is 99 of the German, the destruction of ammunition and supply depots and of band villages in the Helikon Mountains is referred to.
May I remark here -- and I shall do that always if one event is mentioned in several documents -- the same event has been described in Volume XX in NOKW-1363 on page 76 of the English and page 54 of the German. It is Exhibit 471. This is the Ic daily report for the 68th Corps of 10 October 1943. As said before, it is the same incident which both documents describe.
Q General, what could you tell us about this incident?
AAs for the incident near Gythion, I have no recollection of them. On the other hand, the operation in the Helikon I remember for the reason that the First Armoured Division had been taken out and opportunity was made use of for a number of operations by the bands south of the Malaccian Gulf. The destruction of the ammunition and Court No. V, Case No. VII.
supply depots of the bands and of the band villages was justified, it seems to me, because this was a military necessity.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I shall now discuss Document Book XVI of the Prosecution. There is, first, Document NOKW-172, Exhibit 379, on page 47 of the English and 98 of the German text. This is Exhibit 379. This document contains a directive by the Commander in Chief Southeast dated 22 December 1943 concerning reprisal measures.
Q Did you receive this order at the time and, if so, did you pass it on?
A Yes, that is so. This order coincides with my own opinion which I always stood up for and does not contain any new points of view as far as I am concerned. The rigid ratio of hostages is not contained in the document whereas other reprisal measures are being maintained and it is left to the discretion of the responsible divisional commanders as it always was, on other superior officers who have the same disciplinary powers as a divisional commander. The only new thing here is that the political aspect is also being mobilized as it were to support the battle of the soldiers.
In the Introductory remarks, it says especially, that Ambassador Neuhacher is entrusted with the political leadership of the unified counteraction against the Communist peril in the Southeast.
Q Will you please tell us where you found that sentence?
A It is the first sentence in the document -- "The Fuehrer orders unified counter measures." It is the first sentence. This is how the order starts. That was the only new aspect that the political forces were called in as well.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The next relevant document I wish to discuss is in the same volume Exhibit 408. This is NOKW-855 on page 130 of the English and 168 of the German. This is a number of administrative measures ordered concerning the evacuation of the rear area of the 2nd Armoured Army in October 1944. This document does not really fit our present context but I would like to discuss it all the same because it is contained in the same volume.
Q Would you please give us your comments on this document?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A The High Command, as I said once before, had by the end of October 1944, left the Larissa Area and gone by air to Syrmia. There I took over a defensive sector between the Rivers Save and Danube. After the fall of Belgrade, which occurred about ten days or a fortnight before this, the evacuation of the rear area of the 2nd Panzer Army had already been initiated. In this connection there was to be an area of about 5 kilometers immediately behind the main fighting line in my sector which was to be evacuated. This was an order which I could not evade as the fronts had become stationary and a sort of positional warfare was about to start. Espionage and the exchange of intelligence had to be discontinued. Then these measures also served the purpose of protecting the population. Modern warfare which brings with it Panzer operations and shelling hits far behind the troops, where fighting is fluctuating and local Greek thrusts must be held off, where a second and third defensive line must be established, where tank traps and mine barriers must be established, there you have no use for the civilian population. They are not aware of the danger in which they find themselves. Apart from this military installations, ammunition depots and such like must be established.
The main dressing stations and collecting stations for the wounded must be established in the villages and, depending on how the main fighting goes, whether you stop at the second or third line of resistance, it cannot always be avoided that whole villages or some parts of villages are fortified as strong points and supporting bases for the defense.
All this explains why the civilian population had to be evacuated from that area. It really was for their benefit and because otherwise they would only suffer unnecessary losses; but, even before this order took any effect, the High Command was transferred to Southern Hungary because there the Russians had advanced beyond the Danube.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: This brings us to the end of our discussion of Document Book XVI and I should like to turn to Book XVII.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q General, Document NOKW-044 which is Exhibit 418, has been used to incriminate you. It is to be found on page 77 of the English and page 58 of the German text. Here we find for the first time the operation known as Kalavrita. By operation, I mean both the tactical operation and the retaliation measure taken afterwards. This operation is mentioned in no less than 32 documents submitted by the prosecution; I mean passages of documents and not the documents themselves, of course.
I should like to deal with the whole matter in one stroke and anticipate those documents which mention the operation Kalavrita. They are contained in Volume XVII to XX. These are the following documents:
In Volume XVII, the one mentioned just now, NOKW-044, Exhibit 418 on pages 88 and 89 of the English and 66 and 67 of the German.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
In Volume XVIII, NOKW 670, Exhibit No. 437, on Pages 51 and 52 in the English and Pages 55 and 56 in the German.
NOKW-692, Exhibit 422, on Page 115 in the English and Page 83 of the German text.
In Volume XIX, NOKW-755, which is Exhibit 449, on Pages 75 and 75 of the English and Pates 100 and 102 in the German.
Finally, in Volume XX, NOKW-1363, Exhibit 471, on pages 77 and 80 to 84 of the English, and Pages 55, 58 and 60 of the German.
NOKW-1246, Exhibit 472, on Pages 90 and 92 in the English and Pages 64 and 65 in the German:
NOKW-1257, Exhibit 447, on Pages 95, 96, 97 and 98 in the English and Pages 67, 68, and 69 in the German.
NOKW-1555, which is Exhibit No. 475, on Page 103 of the English and Page 73 of the German text.
Finally, NOKW-1402, which is Exhibit No. 476, on Pages 110, 112, 114 to 116 in the English, and Pages 78, 79, 80, and 81 of the German.
Now, General, before I ask you to give us your own version of the Kalavrita Operation I should like to submit a few documents.
First, in Felmy Document Book V, on Page 39, Document No. 101. This is offered as Felmy Exhibit No. 42. This is an order for the movements and the combing out within the scope of the Wytina Operation on 29 August 1943. The date is 26 August 1943. This order comes from the 117th Light Infantry Division. I shall not read the details of this document, but I would like briefly to analyze its contents. It shows, on Page 40, that Kalavrita is an old centre of the bands in the Peloponnes. As early as August, 1943, a mopping-up operation was started there, but it did not lead to any success.
On Page 46 there is an enclosure. I beg your pardon; on Page 43 there is an enclosure, and it is called, "Enemy Information Paper for North and West Peloponnes." From this Enemy Information Paper it becomes clear, and I draw particular attention in this connection to Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Pages 45 ff., that the German agencies knew who were the responsible leaders of the ELAS bands and that operations were carried out only if and when the necessary reconnaissance results were available. I should like to draw particular attention to Page 46 because Kalavrita is mentioned there, after a large number of other villages are mentioned first. That is the part which I would like to read:
"Kalavrita: Responsible pol. leader of the ELAS: Vassilios Papdopulos, living in Patras, travels between the villages of Aigialias and Kalavrita and gives the new instructions of the Communist Party to the local group leaders of the EAM. Andreas Tsakinopulos, middleman between the communist organization of Patras and the subordinate commander of Aigialias.
Exposes on the "Communist organization of the province of Kalavrita district committee".
I. Georgius Karkulias, telegraph office employee, secretary of the District Committee.
II. Nikolaus Papavassilopoulos, cashier.
III. Georgios Kaklamanos, member of the district committee and responsible for "ELAS", brother-in-law of the first.
IV. The manager of the "Panellica" coffee house, Mitsos, member of the district committee and responsible man of the "National Solidarity".
V. Georgios Bres and both operate a lignite mine.
It is also illegible on the photostatic copy.
VI. Athanasios Ikonomu in the locality of "Niamata", Diakofto district, with a staff of about 80 workers, of whom Athanasios Ikonomu is the manager and pol. leader. The latter is not only the responsible man of the "National Solidarity", but he is also connected with the district committee of the communist organization of Aigion, distributes publications to the communist organization of Kalavrita through the railroad Court No. V, Case No. VII.
worker (brakeman) Theod. Ervides, who works on the Patras railroad line. Both of the latter's brothers, Illias and Nostas Ervides, are communists and are in Larissa security camp. The meetings of the Kalavrita district committee are held in the house of the barber Panag. Bratsaki in Kalavrita. The latter is a member of the Communist Party and at present is in the Larissa security camp. His wife, Amalia permits the house to be used for the above mentioned purpose. Residence of Mikos and several subordinate commanders in the northern exit of the town."
Finally I should like to draw attention to the map which is attached to this document, which gives the impression of band activity in the Northwest Peloponnes.
The next document I offer comes from Felmy Document Book III. It is Document No. 72, on Page 22, and I offer it as Felmy Exhibit No. 43. This is an affidavit by professor Dr. B. von Freyberg. At the beginning of his statements, on Page 20, he says that he was, between August, 1942 and October, 1944, a government surveyor of the reserve, with the Staff of the XVIth Army Corps. His assignment, as he says, consisted of insuring the water supply for the troops and it took him to the remotest positions and strongpoints. May I read some extracts from this document on Page 22?
"In the fall of 1943 I was ordered to explore all pass-roads running over mountain ranges as to their water-supply. I traveled all these roads by myself, unescorted, with the exception of the Kalavrita road. The latter was so unsafe that, as I was told, only units of at least company strength could have passed unopposed. An escort of such strength was not available for my purpose, so the Kalavrita road was the only one which could not be explored. I cannot make any further contributions towards the clarification of later events in Kalavrita. On 13 January, after termination of my leave, I returned to Athens with Court No. V, Case No. VII.
General FELMY in his plane, and did not hear about these events until later during conversations at table. I was not surprised, however, to hear that violent clashes took place just there, as Kalawrita was regarded as the most dangerous district in the Peloponnes right from the beginning."
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be an opportune time for us to take our afternoon recess.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal. I would like to establish a correction here. NOKW-692, Exhibit 422, is not contained in Document Book 18 but, instead, in Document Book 17 of the Prosecution and I would be grateful if the proper correction would be made.
I would now like to read from Felmy Document Book II, Document No. 65, on page 59. This will be offered under Exhibit No. 44.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that again, please?
DR. MEULLER-TORGOW: Felmy Document Document 65, Exhibit No. 44. This is an affidavit executed by August Winter. On page 59, at the top of the page, it says:
"From the end of August 1943 until the middle of March 1944 I was Brigadier General and Chief of Staff of Army Group E, which was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast."
I am then going to read from the same page, approximately from the 10th line from the bottom:
"A particularly strong Communist revoluntionary group had settled down in the area of Kalavritha and had organized there, as we found out afterwards, a fortified center of resistance. This group of revolutionaries currently maintained contact with the Communist forces of the EAM stationed in the mountains north of the Gulf of Corinth and from there it was supplied with weapons and ammunition. The group of revolutionaries in Kalavritha permanently threatened the strategically important connections of the road along the coast and the railroad Corinth-Patras, as well as the road from Tripolis to Pirgos. Thus there was some danger that, at the decisive moment, namely in case of an attack from outside across the sea against the west coast of the Peleponnese and into the Gulf of Patras, the supply lines of the forces assigned for coastal protection would be cut off.
Therefore, it was an absolute military necessity to defeat the group of revolutionaries in Kalavritha, to eliminate it permanently, and for this purpose to annihilate their base. What particular measures were necessary for this purpose could only be decided by the leading Division Commander on the spot....."
Since we are dealing with this particular document book and that particular page, I would like, at the same time, to read the second paragraph, on page 60:
"The decision for a military action against the revolutionary center Kalavritha was issued at the time by the Commander of the 117th Light Infantry Division, Major General von LeSuire, who was charged with the defense of the Peleponnese against attacks from without and its protection against revolts from within. The intention in general had also been communicated to the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E by Corps Headquarters LXVIII A.K. and had his approval. I do not remember the text of the communication. Also the result of the move was reported to the Commanderin-Chief of Army Group E. According to the prevailing custom, the report contained the result of the battle as well as the casualties on the enemy side resulting from this battle and the fact that the places forming the strong point of the revolutionaries and which were stubbornly defended by the enemy had been destroyed. I cannot remember any details of the report."
In this connection I would like to offer a second affidavit executed by General Winter which is contained in the same document book on the following page, page 61. It is Document 66 and it will become Exhibit 45.
I do not want to read that particular document.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, I would like to ask you to give us the preamble to the so-called Operation Kalavritha, which is under discussion here. Perhaps you could do this briefly?
A. Approximately in the second half of October 1943 the 5th Company of the Light Infantry Regiment 149 on the occasion of a reconnaissance patrol got into the area Kalavritha, which was known to be a band center of resistance. On that occasion members of the regiment were captured.
Q. Will you please show us Kalavritha on the map?
A. (Indicating on map) Kalavritha is southeast of Patras and is connected with a cable car to the coal mine there. The regiment attempted to negotiate with the bands through intermediaries in order to effect an exchange of prisoners. For many weeks these negotiations did not lead to any result and thus it came that at the beginning of December attempts were made to start a relieving action and liberate the prisoners. Around that time, I believe it was the 7th of December, the regiment learned, through two wounded of the 5th Company who had escaped being slaughtered, that the bulk of the 5th Company was detained somewhere near Kalavritha by the bands and that its members had been tortured and mutilated. It is now fairly obvious that, as a consequence, the members of the troops were very excited.
DR. MEULLER-TORGOW: May it please the Tribunal. In this connection I should like to refer to one document used during the evidence for General Geitner. This is contained in Geitner Document Book 5, and it is Document 119. This document book will be submitted shortly by Dr. Sauter. The document concerned is an affidavit executed by one Gruber, who makes statements about the Kalavritha Operation. From Felmy Document Book III I am now offering Document 76.
...I beg your pardon, I have already offered this document but there is one passage in this affidavit which I would like to read. The affidavit was executed by the former military judge of the 117th Division Dr. Scheure; I have already read parts of this affidavit but I would now like to read from page 34 in Felmy Document Book III. I am reading only the second passage on this page:
"A witness in the court martial which I had to conduct against Captain Schober on the grounds of cowardice, described - he had been severely wounded and had played dead - the whole cruelty of the murder of the defenseless German soldiers. They had to sit down at the edge of a gorge, had to cover their heads with their coats, then they were executed by machine gun fire from three sides. Since Captain Schober's death was also confirmed, I dropped the proceedings. This cruelty, violating international law, excited the German soldiers enormously. Every village inhabitant was suspected of being a partisan, since, during the operations, the villages were usually found empty and caches of arms were discovered in many of the villages...."