the following:
"General FELMY was known as being just and thoughtful both toward his own troops as also toward the Greek population and he, therefore, was respected by both sides and loved and esteemed like a father by the troops under his command. Beyond his official duties General FELMY protected the civilian population against unauthorized acts on the part of Italian troops. In order to secure the food supply for the civilian population, he even, at times, put the supply of the German troops on second place by cutting their rations. Offenses against his orders by the German troops were severely punished by German courtsmartial."
The next document which I am going to offer is Document 55 on the next page, page 20. This will become Exhibit 17. This is an affidavit executed by one Peter Landenberger, which I don't want to read here, since in substance it says the same as the affidavit just read by Woehrle.
The next document I am going to offer is an affidavit by Friedrich Bulach. This is Document No. 57 on page 22, and it will receive Exhibit No. 18. It says in this affidavit:
"I was assigned as a non-commissioned officer to the special staff F in Greece (Cape Sunion).
"I myself was never directly a witness to the partisan movement during my stay in Greece. Indirectly all members of the Wehrmacht were affected by it, because as a consequence of the constant surprise attacks of the bands and acts of sabotage on the railway lines (especially also in Serbia) the supply of foodstuffs for the troops in Greece was often very scarce and insufficient. That the German Military Command had no intention to make the civilian population pay for the shortage, can be proved by the fact that all members of the Wehrmacht and its units were strictly forbidden to purchase additional foodstuffs from the civilian population, although in our area comparatively large herds of goats were kept. The black market and its harmful influence upon a just Court No. V, Case No. VII.
distribution of goods was insofar effectively checked, that any kind of barter and any trading by members of the Wehrmacht was severely punished.
"I could gain only the best impression of General FELMY as a man and superior. Personally I met Herr FELMY only rarely. (For instance at inspections.)
"General FELMY never put his person or his position into the lime-light and always dealt with his subordinates as man to man. Today after five years, I cannot recollect any more, what particular events induced me to this impression, but nevertheless I have won from the observations at that time, the firm conviction (perhaps partly also from what I heard from my comrades who often came into contact with General FELMY) that he was a man, who in the execution of his duties, was guided to a large extent by feelings of humanity and common sense and who therefore considered the use of mere force to be an inadequate way for the solution of a problem and who used force only, when he really had no other choice. I always had the impression that General FELMY even intervened to a large degree in the interest of the Greek population and that thanks to his sensible and intelligent attitude, the Greek population had been spared many hardships of the war which were caused by the specially prevailing conditions, or that they had been reduced at least to a minimum."
The next affidavit which I would like to offer in this connection is one contained in Document Book III Felmy. This is executed by. one Dr. Altenburg. It is document 84 on page 52. It will be offered under Exhibit No. 19.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I object to the admission of this document. I believe the affiant Altenburg is at the present time in the Nurnberg prison and could be readily called for examination.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal I submit that the Prosecution call Dr. Alterburg for cross-examination, if they wish to do this, but I would like to read the affidavit first.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, please, there is a previous Court No. V, Case No. VII.
ruling of the Tribunal, I believe, that in the case of any affiant living or residing in Nurnberg, he be called for examination. I believe that would cover this case. The affidavit will not be admitted in evidence, but he must be called for direct-examination.
JUDGE CARTER: I think that is in accordance with the previous ruling of the Tribunal. If a witness is available here in Nurnberg the witness should be called rather than have the affidavit read.
The objection will be sustained.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal, that brings me to the end of the discussion of the first assignment of General Felmy in Greece.
Before I come to deal with the second assignment in Greece, I would like to deal with a document, which according to its date, falls between the periods between the first and second assignment in Greece. This document is contained in Document Book IX of the Prosecution, on page 28 of the English text, and page 41 of the German text. The document number is C-81 and the exhibit number is 225. The exhibit number, 225. The document concerned is an order given on the 18th October 1942 by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. It is a supplementary order to the so-called Commando Order which has been discussed here frequently. The Commando Order itself, which is NO-498 PS,Exhibit 598, has been submitted as a loose document by the Prosecution after the other document had been introduced.
Q General, did those two orders reach you at the time?
AAt the time when that order was issued I was no longer in Greece. Towards the end of August I was transferred to the Southeast with the Corps Headquarters, and the order did not apply for the East. To the best of my knowledge I did not receive it from any agency whatsoever. In spite of this fact I knew it. How I got to know it, whether I heard of it by way of conversation, I can no longer tell you.
Q In order to clarify this question right now in this connection, was the Commando Order practically applied during your second assignment in Greece?
A Well, I know of two cases where British officers were not treated in accordance with this Commando Order, although they were members of the sabotage unit. Instead they were treated as prisoners of war.
Q And what should have happened to them according to this order?
A They should have been turned over to the SD if they had not been killed in combat. That is what the order contained.
Q As a clue I would like to mention to yon the case of McGregor?
A I remember quite well the case of McGregor, who was a British captain, because this case was reported to me by my Arabic Battalion in the spring of 1944. This man was taken prisoner at that time together with his companion Lt. Capsis. This capture, however, did not occur during combat action. Two officers were confronted one night in the open. Captain McGregor immediately stated that he was a British officer. He wore a British uniform, and only wore a camouflage jacket over his uniform. We reported the incident to higher agencies, and explained that these two officers would not fall into the category of the Commando Order, because they were not captured during a combat action or during a sabotage act. They were just captured. Also they were not attempting to hide the fact that they were officers. Both Army Groups E and F shared our opinion, but the OKW refused this point of view, and ordered that these two officers be turned over to the SD. My 1c, Captain Kleykamp had a good idea. We reported to the OKW that the names of the two officers had, by mistake, been mentioned to the representative of the Swiss Red Cross, who generally took care of the prisoners of war, and thus these prisoners had become known to the International Red Cross. If they disappeared they would cause some excitement necessarily. In actual fact these names had intentionally been made known to the Swiss Red Cross in order to create a pretext not to have to hand them over to the SD. These statements and explanations had to be accepted. by the OKW and this agency therefore ordered that these two officers be treated as prisoners of war, and sent to a camp in Germany. That was done and the Corps Headquarters put up the guards and escorts. I am also convinced that the OKW did not submit the decision of this case to Hitler, but instead in the final analysis accepted all statements and explanations. In this way we managed to circumvent the order.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Following up these statements I would like to present the affidavit of Captain Kleykamp, the just mentioned Ic of the XVIII Corps.
This is Document Felmy 59, in Document Book Felmy II. It will he offered under Exhibit 19. On page 40 in the Document Book II we find this affidavit. Here is one chapter of this affidavit, under Roman Numeral VI "British Liaison officers with Elas." In this chapter the incident just described is mentioned by Kleykamp, and therefore I do not want to read this particular part.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, may I object to this document for the smile reason as the preceding one offered? The affiant here is, I believe, still in the Nurnberg prison, and the affidavit mentions, of course, that the person executed it in Nurnberg.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal, I just assumed that Captain Kleykamp was no longer present in Nurnberg, and I don't believe he is still here. I believe he is by now back in the British zone. Should he still be here I shall, of course, call him as a witness.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I withdraw my objection, Your Honor, until I can ascertain definitely whether or not the man is still in the Numbers prison, with the provision I be permitted to have it stricken if that should be true.
JUDGE CARTER: Is that agreeable to defense counsel?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Yes, Your Honor. As I said, I didn't want to read this Chapter VI, which says the same as has been described just now by General Felmy.
The next document which will be submitted is contained in Document Book III for Felmy, and this is Document 74 on page 28. It will be offered under Exhibit 20. This is an affidavit executed by one Franz Borstorff. This affidavit I should like to read Court No. V, Case No. VII.
"From December 1943 until 17 December 1944 I was interpreter for the English language at the General Staff of the LXVIII Army Corps which had been stationed in Greece during most of this time. I. a. it was one my tasks there to interrogate British prisoners-of-war. They often were prisoners-of-war who had taken part in operations and battles on the Greek islands, therefore not falling within the area of the LXVIII Corps. They were, however, brought to the Corps Headquarters, and the Corps Ic (this was Kleykamp) was ordered by the Army Group to interrogate them immediately and find out from them important facts, before the prisoners were transported to another place.
"On two occasions I interrogated British prisoners, who should have been treated according to the so-called command-order of HITLER. I do not know the exact contents of the order, but I know that members of Commando groups and sabotage details, as well as liaison officers with the bands had to be turned over to the SD, which had to shoot them.
"This order was not carried out by the LXVIII Army Corps. In reference to this I can make the following statement:
"1.) In the spring of 1944, in the course of an operation carried out by troops of the LXVIII Corps against ELAS partisans in the western Attika-Boeotia, two British officers, Captain McGREGOR and Lt. CAPSIS were taken prisoner. They were brought to the staff of the Corps at Athens and were interrogated by the Ic of the Corps and by me. The interrogations disclosed that Captain McGREGOR and Lt. CAPSIS were British Liaison Officers with an ELAS unit."
MR. FENSTERMACHER: May it please Your Honor, I have just noticed that this affiant is a resident of Erlangen, which is no more than 10 kilometers from here. I think the Court's ruling should apply in this case just as the same as if he lived in Nurnberg proper.
JUDGE CARTER: The difficulty is we have to have some kind of a measuring stick to handle this sort of thing. I think the reason we Court No. V, Case No. VII.
limited to Nurnberg is most of them are here in the prison and if not, they are where they could be immediately called. It Seems to me if we include Erlangen in that group, we might as well start including those which are further away. The objection will be over-ruled.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If I may add something to this, Your Honor, I am principally prepared to call this witness here.
JUDGE CARTER: Well, of course you can do as you see fit about that, but the objection of the Prosecution is over-ruled.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q I may continue with the affidavit:
"Captain McGREGOR had been dropped by parachute some time ago and had carried out the order to blow up an important bridge in Central Greece. In compliance with his orders he then established liaison with the ELAS. As British Liaison officer, among other duties, he had to supervise the distribution of the supplies dropped by airplanes (weapons, ammunition, explosives, money, etc.). His relations to the bands were no longer sufficiently good of late. Lt. CAPSIS cooperated with Captain McGREGOR; he was the interpreter. He had, by the way, been "on leave" in Athens in January 1944. and had stayed there in civilian attire for a considerable period of time. Both British officers should have been handed over to the SD after the interrogation. This, however,did not happen.
"On the contrary, the Corps held the opinion against the Army Group that the British officers had to be treated as prisoners-of-war and that they had to be taken to a prisoner-of-war camp. I am not informed about details in this matter; however, I know that this lasted several weeks. One day I received the order from the Ic, to give Captain McGREGOR's name to the Swiss Red Cross; Lt. CAPSIS' name had been registered already some time before that. Such reports were frequently made in the case of British prisoners--of-war, in order to have the Red Cross take care of them (notification of next of kin, supply with additional food and cigarettes). The Swiss Red Cross then actually took Court No. V, Case No. VII.
care of Lt. CAPSIS and Captain McGREGOR and repeatedly inquired at the Corps when they would be transferred to a prisoner-of-war camp.
"Under guard of men of the LXVIII Army Corps Headquarters, Captain McGREGOR and Lt. CAPSIS were taken to the Prisoner-of-War Camp of Moosburg near Munich at about the beginning of July 1944. They were recognized as prisoners of war.
"Concerning the treatment of both officers by the LXVIII Army Corps Headquarters, I can in addition state the following:
"Captain McGREGOR had asked to be permitted to buy cigarettes with the Greek money in his possession. By order of the Corps Ic I thereupon bought cigarettes for him and gave them to him. As cigarettes could only be obtained on the Black Market I took Lt. CAPSIS along for this purchase so that he might check on the high prices. On this occasion I complied with the wish of Lt. CAPSIS to see the Akropolis and besides that I took him by car 20 km outside of Athens to see his Greek girlfriend. At that time Lt. CAPSIS wore his British uniform and I wore the German uniform.
"All this happened with General FELMY's approval.
"Lt. CAPSIS wrote his Cairo address into my note-book and invited me to visit him at his home after the war. His address was and then the address follows."
I have repeatedly tried to get an affidavit from this Lt. Capsis in Cairo, but unfortunately I did not receive any reply from him. The affiant then goes on to describe a further incident under paragraph 2:
"First Lieutenant John LODWICK had landed on Crete as the leader of a Commando group. His order was to blow up a great gasoline depot on the island. He stayed there for some time, waiting for an opportunity. About 200,000 gallons of gasoline were destroyed by the blast. After the blowing-up he and a Technical Sergeant were taken prisoner, taken to the Greek mainland and turned over to the LXVIII Army Corps Headquarters. He had done great damage to the German Wehrmacht.
"Apart from the operation on the Isle of Crete he had carried Court No. V, Case No. VII.
out successfully several Kommando operations in the Dodekanese area. Besides that he told us that he repeatedly had made parachute landings behind the German lines on the coast of the English Channel and had carried out sabotage operations even there. Although these facts were known, LODWICK otherwise was treated as a prisoner-of-war and was turned over to a German prisoner-of-war camp, via Saloniki."
I would like to add here that at a later time I shall submit an affidavit here by John Lodwick, which was sent to me from northern France, where he is at the present time. He would like to come to Nurnber, as he said to me, but neither the American Defense Center nor the British delegation managed to decide the currency question so that he could come here.
Later on I shall also submit an affidavit by McGregor, which also arrived here. McGregor is at the moment in Northern Rhodesia, South Africa.
Furthermore I want to submit from document book Felmy 5 a document which is No. 96 on page 29. This will be offered under exhibit No. 21. This is a draft of a secret order concerning new information concerning commando and sabotage squads.
I don't want to read this document, but I would like to point out generally that this document also shows that here in the area of the 1st Panzer Division, members of commando squads were treated as prisoners of war. This brings me to the end of my discussion of the so-called commando order.
General, when and with what commission did you arrive in Greece for the second time?
A Since the intention of the OKW was to commit the corps headquarters in Tunis and since this intention had been rendered invalid through the course of the events in May of 1943 I was for the second time transferred to Greece. The corps headquarters was put in charge of the 1st Panzer Division and the 117th Rifle Division and later one or two Italian divisions. The corps headquarters in turn was subordinated Court No. V, Case No. VII.
to the 11th Italian Army near Athens and this Italian army was in turn subordinate to the army group in Salonika. The corps headquarters had the order to prevent enemy landings from the sea or from the air on the Pelopenes. The corps staff therefore went to Vidina, that is about a one hours car ride north of Tripolis.
Q In this connection, I want to submit from Felmy document book No. V, document No. 90 on page 6 of that document book. This will be offered under exhibit No. 22. This is a regulation for conduct issued by the Military Commander for Southern Greece on 11 May 1942 in the event of an anticipated enemy landing, I don't want to read the whole of this document, but only the very first part of it:
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
"A recent attempt to land, which failed, was made immediately after an air raid by a large number of airplanes under the protection of navy units. On that occasion the enemy had disguised his ships as German vessels, giving German countersigns which were in force at that time, and running with position lights. Only because of the construction of the boats the enemy was recognized in time. Similar attempts, even on a larger scale, must be expected."
This incident was apparently the immediate cause for the issuing of these directives.
This brings me to document book No. 12 of the prosecution. First of all, I would like to discuss document NOKW 1079, which became Exhibit 292 on page 37 of the English text and page 32 of the German text. This document contains an order of the Commander in Chief Southeast, dated 14 July 1943, concerning security and reprisal measures against the hostile population in the event of an enemy landing. I would like to ask you, General, whether this order ever reached you at the time and if so was it ever practically applied?
A The order reached the Corps headquarters, but actually applied it was at no time because no enemy landings took place on the Peloponnes, which would have formed the pre-requisite for the execution of this order, because it says in the first sentence of the order, "In the event of enemy landings", and so on. The measures provided in the order, as is customary, were prepared, but they never were actually applied.
Q That brings me to two more documents in this document book with which you are also charged. There are two organizational provisions concerning the southeastern area. The first one of these documents is NOKW 1523, Exhibit 297 on page 75 of the English text, which is page 66 of the German document book. This is a Fuehrer directive dated 26 July 1943. It is directive No. 48 for the Command and Defense of the Southeastern Area. In this order, among others, the LXVIII Corps is put in command of all German and Italian units on the Peloponnes, General, do you see an incrimination in the transfer of this command to your Corps?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A No, I would not know where this incrimination could be found. It was a very natural tactical measure that the German and Italian troops on the Peloponnes should be under one common head agency, one common command post. In that particular case it happened to be the LXVIII corps, which as I have mentioned just before was in turn subordinate to the Italian 11 Army, then the Italian army should also be incriminated with this document if the Corps is incriminated with it.
Q The second document of this type is the last document in that document book XII, NOKW 1437, exhibit 310, on page 160 in the English text which is page 134 in the German text. This is an order of the Commander in Chief Southeast, dated 15 August, 1943. This order concerns also a regulation of the command authority in the southeast; do you in this document see an incrimination of your person, General?
A That document contains, as you said just now, a new regulation of the command authority in the Southeast and this regulation is to apply to the higher agencies. The LXVIII is not even mentioned in this document.
Q In this connection, I would like to discuss a document contained in document book 14, because according to its content it belongs in this context. This is NOKW-1010, Exhibit 351 on page 89 of the English text, which is page 65 of the German text.
JUDGE CARTER: The exhibit number of that please?
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q 351, Your Honor, 351. This is a provision regarding organiza tion, issued by the Commander in Chief Southeast dated 30 October 1943. The order again deals with the channel of command in the Southeastern area; do you have anything to say regarding this particular provision, General?
A Here again the LXVIII Corps is not even mentioned in one word. I cannot see what forms the basis for the incrimination.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Since we are just talking about organizational facts, I would like to read in this connection from document No. 99 in document book Felmy V, this is on page 37 of document book V for Felmy. The document will be offered under exhibit No. 23. It is an order regarding the organization in wartime of the 117th Light Infantry division. I would like to ask you, General, to describe this organization in its main parts and to tell us from this the information of a division and the relation of a division to a corps?
JUDGE CARTER: Will you give us the page number again, please?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Page 37 in document book 5.
JUDGE CARTER: Thank you.
A I don't want to discuss the individual tactical symbols, but this description shows that the 117th Light Infantry Division consisted of two Light Infantry Regiments, the 137th and 149th.
Q Will you give us the most important characteristics of a division, a regiment, a corps, etc., - only the most important ones?
AA triangle and the divisional standard, it is black and white and that is on the first line. Then follows two rectangular black signs, those are the signs for the regimental staff, the infantry regimental staff 737 and 749. Underneath there is a small triangular flag, which shows that every one of the infantry regiments contains three battalions. Under the next line, we have again a division into two parts, on the right, the reconnaissance battalion with the number 116. The anti-tank detachment 117 was equipped to fight tanks. Then under the next line is again the rectangular regimental flag and this is the symbol for the artillery regiment of the division. Here again we have the small triangular flag, similar to the one of the battalion of the infantry and we have here the detachment of the same ranks, that is the battalion of the artillery. The regiment has three battalions of different types of guns. Under a further line, there follows on the right the Engineer battalion of the division and the signal battalion of the division and furthermore the field replacement battalion of the Court No. V, Case No. VII.
division and as an annex the field reconnaissance company. Then one step further down underneath the next line, we find the so-called rear service, that is the supply columns, also the administrative group, the bakers detachment, butchers detachment, etc. In the very last column, in the horizontal column, we have the medical units of the division, the veterinary unit of the division and the motorized units or the units in charge of motor maintenance of the division, the mail units and the guard units and field gendarmerie.
Q This then is the subdivision of a light infantry division. Are other divisions quite differently organized or is it in principle the same?
A No they are not vastly different from light infantry divisions There are certain deviations, all according to the particular purpose of the division concerned but in the main points a division is for tactical and administrative purposes independent. It is a combat unit complete in itself. I might almost say it is independent. It can live by itself through its own installations. In this way the divisional commander is the judicial authority within its own division.
There again are certain limitations. He represents, so to speak, the first instance. That is, he can pronounce sentences for men only up to five year prison sentences. Sentences exceeding that limit and all matters concerning officers have to be detailed to the army and the army decides about them.
The immediate superior of the divisional commander in a tactical respect, the commanding general or the corps headquarters, has no influence on the judicial activity of the division. This influence is solely reserved for the commander in chief of the army. That would be the main points concerning this sketch.
Q General, how did the situation develop in Greece during the time between your first departure from Greece and the beginning of your second assignment there?
A In Greece during these nine months, while I was absent from August 1942 until May 1944, the situation had changed inasmuch as also in Greece the band problem had newly arisen. On the Peloponnes up to that time where we were stationed up to that time surprise attacks of bands had only been directed against the Italians although in July and August some surprise attacks on German soldiers took place also but these remained exceptions.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I would now like to offer three documents from Felmy Document Book V, the first of which is Felmy Document No. 97 on page 31.
This concerns a secret information note of the 1st Panzer Division dated 12 June 1943 regarding the band situation in Greece. I shall offer this document under Exhibit No. 24. I don't want to read this document.
The next document to offer is Felmy 94 on page 21 of Felmy Document Book V. That will become Exhibit 25. This is a report by the Military Commander Greece addressed to the Military Commander Southeast dated 6 April 1944 and this report encloses an excerpt from a newspaper, "The Democratic Flag." From this newspaper article it can be seen that the leader of the DES groups, General Zervas, had been awarded a high decoration for the successful demolition of the Gorgopotamos Bridge which had taken place some time ago.
The next document to offer is Felmy Document 100 on page 38 of Felmy Document Book V and this will be offered as Exhibit 26. This is an Order of the Day issued by the Commander of the 117th Light Infantry Division dated 16 August 1943. It reads as follows:
"Soldiers of the Infantry Group of the 117th Light Infantry Division.
"For the first time larger forces of the young 117th Light Infantry Div. are going into action, in order to clear in cooperation with their Italian comrades as ordered, extensive areas of the Peloponnes from bands. Difficult marches and perhaps also hard days of fighting are ahead of us. Heat, dust, exertions and a shrewd enemy will demand of us endurance, cunning and courage. I know that every one of you will do his duty wherever he may be.
"Manliness and discipline are the basis for success also for the operation. During it nothing of what was learned is to be abandoned.
"Smart and firm in the hands of the leaders everyone of you is obligated through his appearance and attitude on the march, during battle and while resting, wherever he may be, to feel as a proud member of his division, Not plundering,murdering, burning like bands do we go about our task, but justly and if necessary by energetic action will we bring this operation to a successful end.
"Against lack of discipline, damage to the reputation, honor and arms of our Division, thievery and plunder, I shall have to proceed with the utmost severety. May everyone take notice of this in advance lest he may suffer severest punishment."
This order of the day is signed by the Commander of the 117th Light Infantry Division, General von LeSuire.
Q General, as of what date did the band situation in Southern Greece become quite different?
A Comparatively soon after the collapse of the Italian forces.
Q In this connection was there an organizational change concerning the channels of command in Southern Greece?
A Yes, on 9 September I had taken over the provisionally created Army Group (Armeegruppe) Southern Greece and the task of this Army Group was, firstly, to regulate and transport the members of the 11th Italian Army. That was an organizational task and the parallel tactical task was, as it had been before, defense against an enemy landing which now not only threatened the Peloponnes but also Attica, Boetia and the islands. These were times of a great tension again. If the allies made use of this weakness of our and attacked, then Greece would have been theirs. We could have never prevented that.
Q How long were you in charge of the Army Group Southern Greece?
A Roughly, four weeks until it was dissolved around the 1st of October or rather in the first days of October.
Q What effects did the dissolution of the Army Group have on the 68th Corps?
A The 68th Corps took over the tasks of the Army Group and had to leave the Peloponnes with its staff. They went to Psychikon which is a suburb of Athens and is quite near. The corps area had, therefore, been extended to twice its previous size and corresponded to the area usually under the jurisdiction of an army.
Q How were the troops under your command distributed within the Corps area?
A The 117th Light Infantry Division remained on the Peloponnes in addition to which there were three fortress battalions and, in the course of the winter, further fortress battalions were added. These new, together with the old, battalions formed 41st Fortress Division. This 41st Fortress Division was stationed in the coastal sector for the permanent security of that area while the bulk of the 117th Light Infantry Division was intended to he a mobile unit and was kept in reserve. The 1st Panzer Division had been withdrawn and transferred to the East, approximately around the same time when the Army Group was dissolved during the first days of October 1943.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The court will be in recess until three-fifteen.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will he seated, please.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may continue.
DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, the last thing you talked about before the recess was the distribution of the units under your command within your Corps area. Did you, at that time, think it expedient to safeguard the whole of the coast?
A No. In view of the fact that the forces were relatively too weak to repel an Allied landing I suggested to the Army Group, as early as September, 1943, to evacuate the whole of the coast-line on the Peloponnes and to get the troops to take up bolt positions in the interior of the country where there were very few thoroughfares. The country was mountainous; so this seemed the obvious thing to do. I thought about a defense along the same lines as in Italy. Offensive ideas we could not afford anymore after the 1st Panzer division had left.
Q And what was it you hoped to achieve thereby?
A To shorten our supply lines for one thing, and to intensify the defensive power of the troops. The Allied forces would have had less opportunity, in the event of a landing, to annihilate isolated troops committed in coastal sectors. Instead of that they would have to fight laboriously to reach the interior of the mountainous country.
Q Was this proposal of yours successful?
AArmy Groups E and F had given their consent, but, as usual, OKW turned this proposal down. They ordered, as they had always done, that the coast must be the mainline of fighting. And that eliminated the advantages which I have just sketched briefly. The troops were scattered over several areas.
Q General, would you please show us, on the map, the geographical situation and the communication lines as well as the places where the troops were committed on the Peloponnes in Boetia and in Attica?