He is prepared to cease all hostilities against the German Wehrmacht, provided that we act in the same way."
So much for Zervas' suggestion. And then Lanz writes.....
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I object to the admission of this document, and, in fact, to the whole testimony regarding the relation between General Lanz and General Zervas, whether or not there was any agreement between Lanz and Zervas. I submit that if was nothing whatsoever to do with the counts charged in the Indictment, and no matter what the relations were they constitute no defense whatsoever with regard to the allegations the Prosecution has indicted General Lanz for.
DR. SAUTER: This point of view of the Prosecution is completely new. When the Greek witnesses, who were invited here by the Prosecution, were sitting here and testifying on the same witness stand the Prosecution was extremely interested......
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Pardon me, Dr. Sauter. The objection will be overruled.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q In this document No. 181 I will now read what General Lanz had to say about General Zervas's suggestion, and I quote from Page 33:
"I request the Army Group to favor me with an early decision, whether this proposal can be accepted, which I consider desirable considering the over-all situation. In that case the corresponding agreements will be made from here. Signed 'Lanz.'" At the left, at the bottom, the signature of the Colonel in the General Staff, Dietl.
Witness, then after you had received this decision of General Zervas what did you decide to do?
A I have already mentioned that I reported the matter to my superior office and that I requested the approval for the agreement to be made because it was my desire to effort to restrict the fighting with the partisans as much as possible.
I would like to emphasize once more that if it had been up to me the partisan fighting would not have taken place at all, but, at any rate, I tried to restrict it, as far as it was in my power to do so. And then I reported on. I have already stated what answer I received. And I also knew that the Army Group was rather inclined to my opinion. As a result I decided, in spite of this answer, to continue the negotiations. Then I succeeded in reaching an agreement. I will talk about that in detail later on. On principle I would like to state in this connection that I did not want to talk about this matter at all, for I am very disappointed about General Zervas' attitude towards me after this war, i.e. while I am tried here. I do not think that this attitude is a fair one in order to express myself rather cautiously. I would like to say that I met General Zervas half way, as far as possible, and I don't think he should have treated me in the way he did. I have already written to General Zervas months ago because I hoped for a fair settlement of the matter, but so far I haven't received any answer.
Q Your Honor, with regard to these negotiations between General Lanz and his officers and General Zervas and his liaison officers, there is some reference to this in the Washington documents. These documents are included in Lanz Document Book V, documents No. 182 to 189, inclusive, from Page 34 to Page 41. All these documents show and are to prove that the assertion is untrue that these negotiations were only a sham on the part of General Zervas and were carried out in order to spy on his enemy. Document No. 182, on Page 34 receives Exhibit No. 96. It shows that Zervas, in December, 1943, again sent several officers in order to take up and to continue negotiations with General Lanz. Document No. 183, on Page 35 becomes Exhibit No. 97. This proves that Zervas himself in January, 1944, that is one month later, asked for a discussion for the conduct of common fighting against Communism, and that Lanz instructed his superior office about this request of General Zervas'. Document No. 184, on Page 36 receives Exhibit No. 98. This document is particularly interesting because here in great detail the suggestions are set down which the envoy of General Zervas submitted to General Lanz about the discontinuance of hostilities as well as about the attitude of General Zervas and General Lanz towards a common fight against the Communist bands.
Under Figure 3 the paragraph reads: "Zervas desires temporary secrecy in this matter in order not to lose the supply deliveries from the Allies upon which he depends. The emissary repeatedly emphasized that Zervas had rejected all attempts made by the English to persuade him to cooperate with the EAM and will also reject this in the future. A collaboration with the EAM and the ELAS (that is, with the Communist partisans) could only be considered by him if these organizations would completely shake off their ties with Communism."
And then Document No. 185, on Page 37 becomes Exhibit No. 99. This document also shows a quite exact specification of the suggestions which Zervas made to Lanz, especially with the purpose of the common fight against Communist partisan groups. The next document. No. 186, on Page 38, receives Exhibit No. 100. This again, are very detailed suggestions of the Zervas Plenipotentiary, as well as statements about the demands which the British liaison officers made to Zervas, but which Zervas turned down, according to the report of the Plenipotentiary.
In the next document, Document No. 187, on Page 39, which becomes Exhibit No. 101, there are, again, detailed reports from General Zervas, who complains that Communist bands have put to him too severe conditions. Under Figure 3 it states in this teletype of the 14th of February 1944, and I quote from Page 39:
"Zervas is determined to maintain the course shown towards us so far. He believes that he will be able to hold out if operations on both parts against ELAS will be coordinated."
Document No. 188, on Page 40, becomes Exhibit No. 102. Here Zervas reports that the attack by ELAS, that is the Communist groups, is to be expected daily and he talks about the interventions and disturbances on the part of the British Secret Service. And Zervas again urgently requests for strictest discretion.
Similarly important is Document No, 189, on Page 41, which becomes Exhibit No, 103. Here it states, and I quote: "Emissary of Zervas submits copy of an agreement between EDES -- EAM -- EKKA, dated 29 February, which actually had been concluded. The text of the agreement corresponds with the report of the Cairo Broadcasting Station (compare in this connection P.S. Ic/AO/, No. 609/44 top military secret). Zervas declares in this connection that he would not observe the agreement in as far as it is directed against us."
And then comes the opinion of the General Staff of General Lanz, and then on the basis of this document I would like attention to he given to the statement made by the Greek Prosecution witnesses here in this courtroom, with regard to these documents and what General Zervas himself says.
Q General Lanz, did you yourself carry on negotiations with General Zervas, or was this done through some of your officers?
A Of course it was my desire to speak personally with General Zervas because it was my honest desire into complete agreement with him as soon as possible. I was and am still convinced today that he had a similar desire, but he could not carry out this desire because he always had a little bit of anxiety, or should we rather say fear, about the British military mission which was around him. I would like to say that this provided rather an obstruction to his efforts. But with regard to the attitude of General Zervas and to his justification I would like to say one thing: I think that even today it is still my duty, as soldier, to say something in favor of my enemy. General Zervas was, himself, of course, in a very difficult position. He had a relatively small and not yet complete organization. There were about 6,000 men when I arrived in Epirus, and that is where he was. He had the understandable desire to consolidate and to built up his organization, and, of course, to spase it in order, in the first place, to put it into action against Communism. The EDES thought and, at any rate, I still think today, did not fight so much against me, that is the occupying power, at the time, as against the communists as they also did after the war and I would say they are still doing today. General Zervas was a Nationalist and conservative whose mental attitude I understood quite well. And he fought against Communism because in this Communism he saw the greatest danger for Greece, and in his judgment he was probably quite right and still is right today. And since I understood the way in which he acted it was not too difficult for me to meet him half way, all the more so because it was also my aim to prevent fighting, and that is what I expressly want to say in favor of General Zervas here. I would like to repeat again that I regret it very much that I would not have discussed the matter if I had not been forced to do so because of this energy of General Zervas.
Q Witness, then, you said that you tried to bring about a mutual ceasing of hostilities in order to protect the troops. Did this agreement actually come about or not?
A. Yes, it did. That was at the end of 1943, beginning of 1944. We had progressed so far that mutual fighting was discontinued, at least there were no more fightings with Zervas or me knowing of them. And for months there was a loyal silent which was was carried out, to the advantages of both sides i.e. these were no more losses, this non-aggression pact was kept to until the middle of summer 1944. Then it was broken off. I could say it was broken - but I would rather put it cautiously and say it was broken off - because the pressure on General Zervas by the Allies became so strong and because he had received some reinforcements, that now he went over to open fight against me. When these very violent and very difficult attacks suddenly started I, first of all, hesitated and held counter attacks back because I still hoped that perhaps it was only some local undisciplined actions on the part of subordinate officers, as whey had already previously occurred in which case General Zervas, every time, informed me that he was very sorry such a thing had happened, and that this was probably the fault of some subordinate officer. He had me told - that many times. Therefore, in July - when the attacks became more severe I hesitated to fight back. I did not want it; I had no interest. But finally there was nothing else for me to do when I saw things were really serious. Then, of course, I hit back.
Q Witness, you told us previously that during your time in Epirus, the communist bands were considerably stronger than the national units of General Zervas.
A That is correct.
Q Can you give us an explanation as to why at that time you did not prefer to work with the communist bands against General Zervas; from a purely military point of view that would probably have been more expedient. What can you say about that?
A Collaboration with the communists, even if I think about it in retrospect, did not come into the question at all from my point of view. You are certainly correct when you say that I should have combined with the stronger force military speaking, this would have been correct, but this did not enter into the question at all.
I would like to explain the following about this. As my task from the very first day I always only saw the prevention of an Allied landing in Greece. That was my actual task. The fighting against the bands which arose in addition to this and which I regarded as very unpleasant and from a military point of view highly undesirable was forced upon us. This fight was already going on when I arrived there.
We had nothing against the Greeks; in any case, I certainly had nothing against them and we did not want anything from the Greeks. I also told this to the authorities in Joannina shortly after I arrived there. I called the authorities to me and told them in a very frank manner how I looked upon my task there and that I certainly did not intend to take any action against the Greek population or against Greece if I were not forced to. I wanted to maintain peaceful relations with the population.
My actual military - and the only task I had - was to prevent an Allied landing. And this attitude was also the decisive one for the fact that I concluded this agreement with Zervas because Zervas was after all the national or the conservative element, if I may put it like that, against communism there. In addition, as a soldier, I felt myself rather more innerly obligated to Zervas as an old soldier than I did to any communist leader, but the decisive thing was that we felt no enmity towards Greece or towards the Greeks and that it was in the interest of Greece that I supported Zervas against communism.
Q Witness, you remember that here a Greek witness Tryandaphilidis was examined. This witness maintained that the two Greek Sarandis and Michalakis, as the envoys of General Zervas, were traitors and spies. Is that correct according to your experience?
A In my honest conviction, that is not correct. I can only explain this in the following way: today for political reasons, it isn't very pleasant for General Zervas to admit that at that time he worked together with me. I completely understand that, but I regret it all the more that it was set down in this form, that it came out in this form. These two people with whom we worked were properly identified, they had letters from Zervas with his seal etc.
Q Your Honor, in this connection, I offer some more documents in evidence. First of all, Document No. 54 in Document Book II, Lanz Document Book II, Document No. 54 on page 75, which has previously received Exhibit No. 40 -this document, Exhibit No. 40, has already been submitted by me in another connection and I have already read figure one.
With regard to the Zervas matter, the second part of this document in of importance - this is on page 77 in the middle and it goes on to page 79. I won't read this document in detail. I would ask that judicial notice be taken of it, and then you will see that the affiant confirms that the two negotiators named, the Greek officers Sarandis and Michalakis had handwritten letters of authorization from General Zervas with his seal on them and many of the various documents which these officers showed were personally signed by General Zerva Therefore, today General Zervas cannot possibly deny these authorizations and agreements.
Then, in a similar manner, another document concerns the Zervas matter. This is Document No. 55 in Lanz Document Book No. II on page 80, English page 80, Document No. 55, an affidavit by General August Winter, Chief of Staff with Army Group E. From this affidavit again, which I do not intend to read, these agreements and negotiations between Lanz and Zervas can be seen. In this connection belongs the next but one document this is Document No. 57, which receives Exhibit No. 105. The previous document was Exhibit No. 104.
I repeat Document No. 55 becomes Exhibit No. 104 and Document No. 57 receives Exhibit No. 105. These documents are contained in Document Book II on page 86 and following. The last-mentioned document is also from a collaborator of General Lanz on his staff, called Erdmann, and he gives exact details about these negotiations and this cooperation between Lanz and Zervas, and here I would like to offer another document from Document Book Lanz No. V, Document No. 190, on Page 42. This receives Exhibit No. 106. This is an affidavit -
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Pardon me, before you start reading the exhibits, I believe we will take our afternoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until threefifteen.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Court is again in session.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, before the recess I stopped at Exhibit 106, which is Document 190, page 42 in the Document Book Lanz V. This is an affidavit by Robert Heumann, who served on the staff of Lanz as AC from November 1943 until the end of the War. In his affidavit he confirms the collaboration between the troops of Lanz and those of Zervas against communist attacks along the Arachtes front. I need not read the details of the affidavit as of the others. I recommend the contents of all the affidavits which I mentioned before to the notice of the Court. They are all of them duly signed, sworn to and properly certified.
Q Witness, you have told us that the arrangements made between yourself and Zervas were observed throughout many months. Why were they finally-roughly as from July 1944, as you said, no longer observed. Can you tell us anything about the reason why?
A I believe I mentioned before that the ultimate pressure applied by the allied military measures to Zervas became so strong on the one hand and also on the other, which I have indicated, and he had allied troops and what we call the Greek exile troops, he received from the ports of Parga and Amuzia, and that thereupon he began to attack me. I also mentioned before that I hesitated to answer back, because I still hoped that these were slight deviations from the official attitude on the part of some of Zervas' leaders or perhaps on the part of Zervas himself, but finally I had to realize that they meant business, and therefore I had to get my troops to hit back at Zervas in the interest of my own troops and that was done at that time until by September, General Zervas once again approached me.
Q Why did he approach you and on what occasion?
A He did so quite obviously because of the evacuation, which became apparent. The situation is that connected with events in Roumania, Bulgaria and the Russian advance, the situation became more and more severe, and the evacuation of Greece was inevitable if you didn't want to lose your troops.
Thereupon, Zervas once again contacted me.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal please, this becomes clear from a document which is contained in Lanz Document Book IV. The number is 135, and it is on page 54. It is offered as Exhibit Lanz 107. This is an affidavit given by Bruno Willers, who between October 1943 and the end of 1944 was Lanz's first general staff officer. He describes the details of the propositions made by Zervas in order to facilitate the reoccupation of the evacuated area by Zervas troops before the Communist bands would do so. I need not read the very detailed descriptions of this affidavit, but I recommend it to the judicial notice of the Court.
Q Now, what went on during the evacuation itself, what were the relations between yourself and Zervas?
A It was quite understandable that General Zervas was himself interested to occupy the areas which I evacuated before the communists would take them. That was the salient point of the matter. I said before that the communists were much stronger than Zervas, and of course he wanted to occupy the evacuated areas with his own troops before the communists would pour in. That was entirely plausable to me, and I expressed my sympathy to Zervas's proposition. I emphasize once more I thought that I would do the Greeks a service thereby. I had nothing against the Greeks. They had done nothing against me.
Q What was the offer General Zervas made towards you before you left Epirus concerning your own person and your troops?
A Well, for instance he asked me that I should give him the guns and heavy weapons in these areas. I couldn't do so because I had to fight in other theatres of war, and I needed my arms. I explained this to him in a friendly way. Then he asked me to join his ranks with his troops. I still recall what proposition he made to me according to the treatment I would be accorded, and the treatment my troops would be accorded. He intended to use us against the communists because he alone would be too weak, and that is why he made this offer to me. I should join him with my troops and fight the communists with him.
A similar proposition was made by Zervas to the 104th Division, as I know this was quite in accordance with the situation of the time. It can be seen particularly clearly from the fact that when I evacuated Joannina in an entirely orderly manner Zervas immediately occupied Joannina. We have seen pictures of that here. The town was completely intact, but he didn't stay there very long when the communists attacked him, and the consequence of that was that he and a large part of his troops had to flee to the island of Korfu. He had to leave the country so to speak. At least, Korfu was Greek, but he had to leave the mainland. The communists were so strong that they forced him to do that. I believe I am not saying too much when I assert that General Zervas, at that time when I was present in Epirus, based his survival and the existence of his Edes troops on the fact that I and my troops behaved loyally towards him. Had that not been the case the communists would have probably eaten him piece-meal.
Q How, General Lanz, was the evacuation of Epirus run by you, did you have to do any fighting, were any destructions carried out, did you have things blown up, etc.?
A The fighting during the evacuation was relatively small. I and General Zervas had agreed, but of course I had to do a certain amount of fighting against the communists, because I had no contact with them, which I had no intention of having anyway. As far as the blowing up is concerned the situation was that there was a plan for the whole area for the explosions of bridges, roads, etc. and other traffic situations. I gave instructions that only the most important installations be blown up. In Joannina since nothing was blown up at all, -- I believe one single bridge across the road was blown up in the neighborhood, but these explosions were all on a very small scale, according to the original plans. I did that in order to spare the country, and in this particular moment there was no military necessity as a compelling factor in that sense.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal, pleases in this connection I recommend to the notice of the Tribunal three documents, which I now offer in evidence. One is contained in document book Lanz I. This is document No. 19 on page 66, and the important and relevant matters for our case are mentioned on pages 70 and 71. I offer it as Exhibit 105. I beg your pardon, Your Honor, I mean Exhibit 108. I apologize. I shall not read this affidavit. It is a highly detailed account. The affiant is one Dr. Lindner a general practitioner, who as medical officer served on the staff of General Lanz in Joannina. The affiant on page 70 and 71 describes General Lanz's attitude towards friend and foe, particularly as to the welfare measures he took on behalf of the sick and wounded in hospitals irrespective of nationality. He then describes General Lanz's farewell from Joannina. That he did not leave the town like an enemy, but like a friend and protector. And on page 72 the witness sums up in the last paragraph all his impressions and observations to the effect that he, as a physician and friend of humanity, can only say the highest things about General Lanz, particularly from the point of view of the things General Lanz did on the retreat to help and look after the civilian population in every way he could.
This was Exhibit 108.
The next document in this quotation is contained in Document Book II, which is Document 56 on page 81, which will be offered as Exhibit 109. The affiant is called Lenthe, who in great detail describes the collaboration with Zervas, and the welfare measures taken by General Lanz on behalf of the civilian population in Epirus, as well as his cooperation with the Red Cross. It is not without significance in the present context to look at another document in Volume II, which is page 86. It is Document 57. This was offered previously as Exhibit 105. Some of it has been read previously for different reasons. Here again an official who served on General Lanz's staff describes the human conduct of General Lanz, which was above reproach, particularly during the evacuation of Epirus, and the retreat from Joannina. All these affidavits were properly sworn to and duly certified and always signed by the affiant concerned.
I recommend it to the attention of the Court, although I shall not read it in detail.
Q Witness, this it seems to me brings to an end the discussion of the cooperation of General Zervas. I would like to discuss a few documents with you now, with which you were incriminated in the course of this trial. First of all is NOKW 1010. It is contained in Document Book 14 on page 92 of the English version. I repeat Document Book 14, page 92 of the English and page 65 of the German. It is NOKW 1010, Exhibit 351. This is a basic order for the Commandos in the Southeastern area. It is dated October 30, 1943. What was the connection between yourself and this order? Why I ask you is the prosecution has asserted that you are concerned with this order somehow?
A If I received this order, which I cannot see from the distritution list, I probably read it. Whether I passed it on to the divisions I do not know. As I see it this is purely an organizational order which brought nothing new into my life. That is all I can say about this order.
Q The prosecution maintains that responsibility exists on your part concerning a document contained in Document Book 16, on page 47 of the English. This is NOKW 172, and is Exhibit 379. This is an order by the Commander in Chief Southeast of the 22 December 1943, concerning reprisal measures. Were you connected with that order?
A This is the order by General Loehr which has been mentioned before so frequently issued just before Xmas. I no longer remember whether I received it before I went on leave or not. The beginning of January I went on leave and I can no longer be quite certain. The order as compared to earlier orders issued before my time contained a few modifications. I assume that my agency massed on the order to the divisions, but I am not sure. That is all I can say about that one.
Q Then the prosecution incriminates you, witness, with a document which is contained in Document Book 17 on page 87, of the English version, page 65 of the German. It is NOKW 044, Exhibit 418, and connected therewith is another document which is contained in NOKW 20 on page 83 of the German and page 117 of the English. This is Document NOKW 1402 and Exhibit 476. Both documents refer to the destruction of villages. Were you connected with those orders?
A. It was not I who ordered these measures and when they were carried out I did not know anything about it, but I think I was informed about it afterwards through the usual channels. There are three band villages in the neighborhood of Agrinion and as far as I know, the I-A of the division gave his comments about the matter as he knew the details of the event. I don't know them myself and I would therefore be grateful if the remark made by the I-A could be read.
Q. This I-A of course is better informed about these things than the defendant and the I-A in this case is the affiant Willers and the remarks made by the affiant Willers are contained in document book Lanz No. 3. It is document No. 81 on page 43 and this is offered as exhibit 110. This affidavit, which is properly certified and duly sworn to was given by the first general staff officer Brune Willers, who in his affidavit given his comments on the destruction of these three villages north of Arginion. I shall only read paragraph 2 on page 45 and the affiant says:
"The communities north of Agrinion were situated right on the main maintenance thoroughfare Agrinion-Arta-Joannina and were occupied by our own troops, who lived there in the best of relations with the peaceful population. However, in the mountains north of Agrinion, which ascend right on the east side of the street, there were a few mountain villages, which were known as hiding places for bandits and which were not inhabited by peaceful citizens. These mountain villages were attacked and mopped out by us several times because they were the starting point for the bandit attacks. The report in question of 16 December 1943 must be concerned with one of these mopping up operations, because as far as I recall, practically no other communities north of Agrinion were destroyed."
(Signed) Brune Willers. It is duly sworn to and certified.
The defendant Lanz wishes to prove thereby that the way the report puts things mainly retaliation measures for three villages is hardly the right expression, it is a wrong formulation.
In the same document NOKW 044, contained in volume 17, there is on page 67, which is page 90 of the English, a report that there was an act of cable sabotage in Sarande and after that a few hostages had been shot. Do you know that case?
A. I don't recall it. I found it here in the documents nor have I had any evidence for it, although it is known to me that acts of cable sabotage occurred time and again in the area of my corps. I believe I have mentioned it even before that we attempted to get rid of this nuisance by establishing a special blocked off area, and similar measures, but as a matter of fact we did not succeed right until the end in completely preventing those acts of sabotage. They occurred time and again. The case mentioned here is not known to me, I do not recall it in any case, therefore I cannot give you my comments in detail.
Q. May it please the Tribunal, as far as that is concerned, there are three affidavits available, which I need not read in detail, but which I call to the Tribunals attention. One is in Lanz document book 3. This is document 98 on page 67 of the German and page 68 of the English. This will become exhibit 111. It is given by a first lieutenant and company commander in the Mountain Signal division.
The next document after that is No. 99 on page 68, which will become exhibit 112. An affidavit by a lieutenant who was with the same corps signal detachment. This is to repeat, exhibit 112.
In document book Lanz No. 4 we have on page 69 document No. 142 which will be given exhibit 113. This is given by an officer in the same corps signal battalion and he was in charge of a communications repair detachment. These documents again were properly sworn to and duly certified. They are to prove what General Lanz has told us just now, that although these were measures which he did not order, but of which perhaps he received knowledge afterwards.
Now, General Lanz, let me draw your attention to document NOKW 970, which is contained in volume 19 on page 107 of the German and page 80 of the English. This was exhibit 450. It is a report by the 1st Mountain Division concerning matters which you were not supposed to order, but of which you were informed--so it is alleged--afterwards. What can you tell us about that?
A. This occurred in the period of time before I took over command. I explained once before that on 9 September 1943 I took over the command of the area of the troops and these matters occurred in August, the last on the 4th of September.
Q. The prosecution then asserts without giving details that there was a responsibility with which you can be charged concerning document NOKW 1104, which is exhibit 461, volume 19, page 85 of the English page 111 and following pages in the German. This concerns witness a number of troop reports where the destruction of the village of Neochoraki is reported; were you connected with that or what can you tell us about it?
A. This is a measure taken by the troops without my having done anything about it. It is possible that it was reported to me afterward through channels, if it was reported to me afterwards I am in no position to state for certain now, merely that a village was destroyed in the course of a mopping up operation.
The various reasons I do not find, all I can deduce is that it must have been a combat operation and I really cannot say anything further about this.
Q. General, from the same report it can be seen that five Italians, who were apprehended wearing civilian clothes and three Greek policemen were shot to death for plundering. Were you informed about that at the time and how?
A. I believe I briefly touched on this matter once before. Why the five Italians, who were caught wearing civilian clothes were shot, I do not know. I can only express an assumption namely that they were people who were to be apprehended or captured and resisted arrest or attempted to escape, but I really don't know precisely. It is quite obviously a measure taken by the local troops on security service similar to that taken in the case of the Greek policemen who were shot for plundering. I can give no detailed explanation because I do not have the evidence and documents at my disposal and I cannot recall details of the event. I don't even know if I was informed about it at the time.
Q. The same document NOKW 1104 contained in volume 19 on page 113 and English page 87 and on page 95 of the English version, page 120 of the German there are two reports mainly that in the case of the village of Kompoti and near Arta seven bandits during a mopping up operation and eight civilians were shot to death shile digging trenches, do you remember these reports? The prosecution asserts that somehow it might be your responsibility?
A. What I recall in this case is that in the area of Arta fighting occurred with the bands.