Had the Allies succeeded at that time in occupying these islands and from there would have taken the next obvious stop, namely to invade the mainland, this would have meant that a situation had been established which would not only, as far as the Balkans are concerned but even perhaps for the whole Eastern front, would have created consequences which could not have been foreseen. I might recall here the historic events of 1913 where the collapse of the German fronts also started from the Balkans. The fact of the matter is that both the tactical and the operational situation were favorable for the Allies who were then fighting in Southern Italy only a few miles so to speak away from me, to make a landing and an invasion of the Western Coast of Greece.
Why the invasion did not take place I don't know but I could not foresee that at the time.
The second factor which influenced my actions was the attitude of my superior officers. Although I always endeavored in wartime to preserve a certain amount of independence, and I thereby faced many an unpleasant situation, in this particular situation the order and the assignment by my superior officer was as far as I was concerned of decisive importance. My superiors, all of them, insisted, starting from the army group right up to Hitler, and the pressure they put on me increased from day to day to settle the Gandin affair--as I would like to call it quite generally--once and for all. That is to say, the insurrection of the Italians at that time was to be smashed. How much pressure was put on me can be seen among other things from the orders which were issued by my superiors which I have mentioned here and I attempted to evade them inasmuch as I could.
The third factor influencing my actions particularly decisively was the things my enemy did and the attitude he took.
I think that I have endeavored to describe in a plausible and clear manner in accordance with the truth how the events developed on those two islands, and that I on my part did everything within my potentialities in order to have a peaceful and friendly settlement, but the attitude taken up by my opponent who for reasons which are not clear to me decided to attack my troops.
Court No. V, Case No. VII He even wanted to exterminate the German troops.
This attitude I say forced me to take such action as I took. All the more so as General Gandin knew that his own 11th Italian Army had laid down its arms as far as the German High Command was concerned. They had surrendered, although General Gandin had received the order by his own Italian superior quite clearly to lay down arms and to surrender as all the other Italian units had done already, and although he asked me for an order which he received. An order, which in my opinion was perfectly clear and although he must have been aware of the fact that no State of War existed between Italy and Germany.
Q General Lanz, if you asked your own conscience quite positively and without passion about the events of that time, do you today reach the result that in what obviously you thought in 1943 merely that General Gandin, who through his insubordination and treachery put himself outside the Military Law, and therefore he could be regarded and treated as a franctireur, is that still year honest opinion today?
A The attitude behind my actions and the motives why I acted as I did I have expressed since, I hope very clearly. At that time I faced a dramatic situation. I was compelled to take action and I also had to follow the call of my conscience. Of course I was no expert in International Law, nor was I a legal man. I did not even have any court marshal or legal agency in my staff. I had to follow my own conceptions of law and my conscience, and I made honest efforts to offset it. I had no doubt at the time, and I feel no doubt today that through his action Gandin put himself outside the marshal law. I am still firmly convinced of this today. As far as his soldiers were concerned, I mean the men, I could not hold them responsible for something of which they are not guilty. That I would have regarded as the wrong. That is why I passionately opposed the idea of carrying out orders which I did not regard just, but on the other hand I had to insist on having those who were responsible for this wrong, as I saw it, that is those who had caused the insurrection and themselves lead it, that those people must be brought before Court No. V, Case No. VII.
justice, because after all, I alone lost more than 300 men from my troops, and I was responsible to my own soldiers. These losses were unnecessary in my firm conviction. They could have been avoided.
Q Witness, as you have described it, you have in the case of Kephalonia and Korfu, attacked orders frequently, and in the end you moderated one order by Hitler on your own initiative when you did not receive a reply. How did your superiors react towards these independent actions on your part?
AAt that time I merely had the impression that the way I conducted myself was not very popular. I believe I expressed once before I was regarded as too slack to cope with that particular matter. After the event I found in the documents, which were given me here, that as far as judgment of my actions at the time was concerned, that this was written down in a derrogatory manner. I was reproached for not having shown sufficient severity. Two cases were held against me as far as lacking severity was concerned, one my negotiations with Vecchiarelli, and secondly my actions against Gandin.
Q The case of Vecchiarelli, General Lanz, you obviously mean the obliging attitude you showed toward the Italian Commander in Chief Vecchiarelli in the problem of disarming, which I believe you described to us some days ago, is that correct-in opposition to a Fuehrer Order?
A I have described that I had attempted to oblige General Vecchiarelli as much as I could, but that this attempt was turned down in no uncertain manner, and that when I negotiated with him for the second time I, at least, advocated to leave the Italians their rifles in order not to offend their conception of honor. That was disapproved of higher up, as I now read from the documents.
DR. SAUTER: This document to which General Lanz has had reference just now is contained in Prosecution Document Book 19, page 7. It is Document 1780, Exhibit 444, and it is a judgment of General Lanz, which was bestowed on him by his Commander-in-Chief, after the events on Korfu and Kephalonia. This same matter has been mentioned here before. Perhaps Court No. V, Case No. VII.
I could read it briefly. It is the judgment of 10 July 1944, in Document 1780, Exhibit 444), and it reads as follows. Under Paragraph a his personal courage and gallantry were described, and Paragraph b reads as follows:
"He sometimes suffers from changes of moods, so that his achievements are not always even. In estimating difficult situation he does not always show that severity which he otherwise displays in his personal actions, and in his mastery of tactical combat action. Thus in the course of the disarmament of the Italian Army and the fighting connected with it, his activity did not come up to standard in two cases. It was only due to the intervention of the Commander in Chief of Army Group E that no instant disadvantages resulted from that."
Your Honors will recall that at that time the Commander in Chief of Army Group E was General Loehr, and I would ask the Tribunal in connection with this document to look at the consequences, so that it might become clear that the defendant Lanz was not only given this judgment in connection with the actions against the Italians, but that he was even disqualified because under Paragraph C it says, "Conclusion," and I quote: "He fulfills his position as Commanding General well. However, I have serious objections to his assignment as Army Commander, because he is of unstable temper." "Unstable temper" as eve allege, consists in his chivalrous attitude, and his yielding, I would also like the Tribunal to compare with this the proceeding opinion given about General Lanz before the Italian event, by the same Commander in Chief. This is the opinion about him which is given on 21 February 1943, at which time he was not yet called an "unstable character", as he was called after the Italian affair. But, and I quote from there: "Very glad to accept responsibility. Very strong-willed, He has clear trained insight for pertinent needs. Above average. Pronounced leader. Personality of outstanding qualities." And the last remark is "Commander in Chief of an Army." That means that he is being recommended to be promoted to be a Commander in Chief of an Army, and qualified for Court No. V, Case No. VII.
this position and 6 months later he was an "unstable character" b cause he hadn't had all the Italian officers shot.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q General Lanz, this brings me to a different chapter; let me ask you this, apart from the fighting on Korfu and Kephalonia, did you have any other fighting against the Italians?
A In the area of my corps was encountered the Southermost part of Albania. In this southern tip of Albania there was a large number of Italians who were part of the Italian 9th Army stationed in Albania. On 24 September 1943 I ordered the First Commando Division to disarm these Italians, and then they were to be sent to where the other Italians were. I think you have this order verbatim in your documents.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, the order now referred to is a document contained in Document Book Lanz V. It is Document 180, on page 31, which is also Exhibit 89. This is an order which is called Order No. 3 by the Corps Headquarters from the 22nd Mountain Army. The date is 24 September 1943.
"In connection with the Operation 'Treason' it is necessary that the mopping up and taking possession of the SarandeDelvine area is completed at an early date, in order to prevent that reinforcements, bandits or Italians, reach the enemy island occupation forces via Sarande."
And then comes the actual order issued by General Lanz for that purpose. I shall not read it here, and recommend it for the Court's attention. Under Number 2. It says.
"I am fully aware, and have today reported accordingly to the Supreme Commander, that by this measure the coastal protection forces in the area on both sides of Igumencia can only be supplies with 1 battalion. Considering the present situation, as our forces are fighting on Korfu, I shall put up with this."
Under Paragraph 3.:
"I shall try to secure the cooperation of our neighbor to the right." But these technical details are of no interest here.
Paragraph 5.:
"I ask the division to inform me by 26 September of the time Court No. V, Case No. VII.
lag required for the execution of this operation, which has the code name "Spaghetti," as well as of the time when it will be executed."
This document has been signed by General Lanz. It is addressed first to First Mountain Division, which the distribution list shows.
I would like to draw the Tribunal's speciaL attention to the last sentence of Paragraph 1, where it says that the Italians about to be disarmed after they are disarmed are, with a small escort to be sent on the main road, so that they can join from here the other Italians, via Lescovie to Korea, General Lanz submitted this document for the reason that he wanted to show that he saw to it always that the Italians who had been taken prisoner were transported into their P.W. camps under proper conditions.
Q General Lanz, what happened now after this order?
A By virtue of this order the First Mountain Division issued an order in its territory to have this operation carried out, an order dated 27 September.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, that order to which General Lanz has just had reference, and which was issued by the First Mountain Division, is contained in Prosecution Document Book 19 on page 126, at page 102 of the English. It is NOKW Document 867, which was offered as Exhibit 453.
Q That is the order, isn't it, Witness, to which you had reference?
A Yes, indeed it is.
Q What happened at the time?
A What we found was that some thousands of Italians who were in the Southern part of Albania, sold their arms to the bands and handed them over to them, and that a large number of the Italians had gone over to the bands.
Q General Lanz, under Paragraph 6 of the order of the First Mountain Division you just mentioned of 27 September 1943, the Document.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
NOKW 867, which was Exhibit 453, the First Mountain Division under the paragraph, "Methods of Warfare," has reference to the fact that armed individuals showing a hostile attitude are to be shot forthwith. Do you know this order and since when do you know it; this order by the First Mountain Division, which was then under your command?
AAs the distribution list shows one copy of this order was sent to my headquarters for purposes of information. I do not recall today any more whether I read the order or not, but it is quite possible that I did.
Q Well, let us assume for a moment, General, that you saw the order at the time and read it; did you have any objections at the time to these methods of warfare as ordered by the First Mountain Division, and did you have no misgivings, and why?
A This is a measure concerning methods of warfare, as it says so explicitly. That is to say, conduct of the troops in combat. As a matter of principle I had no misgivings against the troops in combat shooting an enemy who showed a hostile attitude in combat, though that after all is the essence of fighting. Therefore, insofar as it was a practical method of combat and nothing else I had no fear or misgivings, because after all troops must have the right to use their arms before the enemy does so. That is what I wanted to state as a principle.
Q Witness this fighting with the Italians and the bands) is that connected with the shooting of Italian officers by the 1st Mountain Division? Witness, in document NOKW-960) which is exhibit 448, contained in document book 19 on page 33 of the English, 32 of the German, the shooting of Italian officers by the 1st Mountain Division is reported; is this action connected with the fighting which you have described to us against the Italians and the bands?
A Yes, they are connected.
Q Did you, as the commanding general of the Corps, order the shooting?
A No, I did not order it.
Q What order did you issue concerning the treatment of Italians?
A The order was read before.
Q Is this the order of 24 September that you mean?
A Yes.
Q Well, that order was to the effect that Italians were to be disarmed and sent enroute; is that correct?
A Yes, quite.
Q I see and on whose orders was the shooting of Italian officers carried out, which is mentioned in NOKW 960?
A Without any doubt, by the orders of the 1st Mountain Division.
Q Could you imagine, General Lanz, on the basis of your order the commander of the 1st Mountain Division issued this measure?
A Well, I am sure this was ordered on the basis of the Fuehrer order of 15 September) 1943 where it says quite clearly that officers of Italian units who threw their lot in with the bands were to be shot after a summary Court martial. I believe that is what is says roughly.
Q When did you hear for the first time of the shooting of such Italian officers by the 1st Mountain Division.
A I cannot give you the date. I can only state here that I heard of it after the event.
Q Did you receive that information from the Ic report; which we have mentioned before, dated I believe 9 October 1943?
A I am not quite certain about this, I am inclined to assume that I did not obtain the information through this report; but through a report from la; which was a bit earlier. I cannot recall the distribution list which is attached to the Ic report; which is something I would remember ordinarily.
Q You mean this list, this report or catalogue which is attached to the Ic report of 9 October 1943. Well, any way, General Lanz, you heard of the shooting of Italian officers by the 1st Mountain Division after the event?
A I assume so.
Q You assume that, do you. I see, now did you take any action or cause any action to be taken or did you do nothing and if so, why not?
A Yes, I remember it today. I asked General von Stettner to enlighten me about the fighting at the time and in connection there with I was told about the shooting of these officers. I asked why this had been done, as in my own order I had ordered a different procedure. As far as I can still remember this, the divisional commander reported to me that it had been established that about 3,000 or 4,000 Italians had for several days joined the bands and fought against us in the area between Sarando, Telvine and Kuc, that 3,500 Italian prisoners had been taken in this fighting and that some of the officers had been found to be guilty, namely to have joined the bands in order to fight us, and were to be shot by virtue of the Fuehrer order after a summary court marshal.
Q General Lanz, this action on the part of the 1st Mountain Division General von Stettner, who was its commanding officer, was really not in harmony with your own order, namely to have these officers taken prisoner and sent away into a camp, did you as the commanding general at that time do anything after the divisional commander had reported to you? I mean for instance against von Stettner the divisional commander or against the officers under him?
A In this particular case any measure I could have taken would have had to be taken against the divisional commander, providing that the facts as they were would have caused me to do anything. The order, which I had issued on the 24th, I had started on the assumption that the Italians would not fight but that they would surrender. In actual fact, however, the Italians took part together with the bands in the fighting, with the result that the facts of the case, such as outlined in the Fuehrer order of 15 September applied in this event. This is the reason why I could not take action against Stettner for not having followed my orders. The basic conditions had changed. I would have had to take action against him as matters stood, because he had carried out the Fuehrer order and that in a case were everything was quite clear and obvious.
Q Why do you think the facts of the case were so clear and obvious General? Can you tell us what the Italian units concerned were when the Commanding General of the 1st Mountain Division had the Italian officers shot?
A They were those Italian units who were stationed in Southern Albania, as I told you before, -- that is to say, doubtlessly elements of the Italian 9th Army who as early as 10 September as I recall it, had capitulated in Tirana.
Those Italians had joined the bands and together with the bands they fought us. That meant that the provisions of the Fuehrer Order 15 September applied and there could not be a doubt that under International Law they were Italians who really had been German prisoners of war and, as such joined the bands and had fought against us. Anyway, the situation was that to indict the Divisional Commander or put him before a court martial, I could not do in view of these facts.
Q If the Tribunal please, may I point out here two or three provisions of the German Penal Code which probably can be applicable for what these Italian officers did? These provisions of German military penal code have been offered in a different context before in Lanz document No. 4. There is document 127 on page 36 and document 128 on page 37-38. The one document deals with what is known as military treason and the other one deals with mutiny and military insurrection. I would appreciate it if the Court took judicial notice of these provisions in this particular context.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If your Honor please, I would like now to object to the admissibility of these documents in evidence on the ground that they show on their face that they are completely irrelevant and inapplicable to this situation. Your Honors will note that paragraph 91B of the Reich Penal Code applies to those persons who at home or who as Germans abroad do certain things. The Italians, of course, committed these acts not within Germany but rather without Germany, and they of course were not Germans when they committed them.
This paragraph and the succeeding paragraphs which relate to insubordination and active opposition and military mutiny are internal German army provisions which apply only to German soldiers. Since the relationship between the Italian soldiers we have been talking about and the German troops is not a relationship of superior to inferior, there can be no taLk about insubordination or mutiny or as paragraph 97 points out assault on a superior. I submit, therefore, that all three documents are completely irrelevant.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled. The matter of relevancy, it seems to me, is more a matter of argument than competency.
DR. SAUTER: If the Tribunal please, the objection which has just been raised could be anticipated. That is the reason why I also would like to draw attention to the next document which has also been given an exhibit number before which was Exhibit 28 offered in a different context before; but this will fill the gap which the prosecution have found.
In the opinion of the prosecution, it should apparently that a prisoner of war in Germany or abroad is not committed by law at all, and of course the military penal code did not oversee this and therefore, in paragraph 161 of the military penal code, it was laid down which I have offered as document 129 in Lanz Document Book IV. May I quote this paragraph verbatim, so that the Tribunal will at once see what it reads like? I quote:
"A foreigner or German who, in a foreign area occupied by German troops, commits an action punishable in accordance with the laws of the German Reich, against German troops or those belonging to them or against an authority in occupation on instructions from the Fuehrer is to be punished in the same way as if this action had been committed by him in Reich territory."
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I don't wish to enter into any extended legal argument at this time on the point, but I would like to point out very briefly that the term "foreigner" obviously refers to foreign civilian rather than to enemy soldiers.
If it were meant to cover the actions of enemy troops, it would be contrary to Article I of the Hague regulations relating to belligerent status. The acts of the Italians were committed in areas not occupied by German troops but only in areas on which German troops were stationed. The acts themselves were carried out in areas occupied by the Italian troops themselves. Finally, their actions were not actions punishable in accordance with the laws of the Reich. If that was so, fighting by enemy troops in the course of a war could not possibly be considered in violation of the internal laws of the German Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit seems to have been previously admitted without objection. I don't know what there is we can do about it now. I think probably the right to road it exists in whatever relation it has to the case. We will give consideration to it. The Tribunal will adjourn at this time until two o'clock.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 24 November 1947)
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. The Tribunal is again in session.
HUBERT LANZ: Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Continued BY DR. SAUTER (Counsel for defendant Lanz):
Q. General Lanz, now I come to the last count of the indictment figure 6-H of the indictment. The indictment in this count charges you with the deportation and forced labor of the civilian population and with having erected concentration camps and I ask you: did you ever indulge in that kind of activity end did you ever ore er this kind of organization or the setting up such installations?
A. I can be very brief about this. Cases are known to me in which during tactical operations band suspects were temporarily set to work on road construction within my area. This road construction was not only on supply roads in our interests but also in the interests of the civilian population. This work was fundamentally only undertaken in those areas free from the bands, that is, outside the fighting area.
With regard to deportation of the Greek population from my area, I remember nothing at all about this. I know that in one case -- I think this was in Autumn 1943 -- it was reported that prisoners should come to work in Germany and at that time I ordered that the people should remain in the corps area, in order to participate in the road construction work mentioned and, in addition, I know that individual communist agents who during raids were captured, arrested, for instance in Joannina , were sent to Army Group E in Salonika, according to orders, for interrogation; but these were always only a few persons.
With regard to the existance of concentration camps in my area, I can state quite definitely that there were no such installations within the area of my corps.
Q. General Lanz, I can't offer you any prosecution documents in connection with this because the prosecution has not submitted any documents against you with regard to this charge but, nevertheless, I submit to the Tribunal some affidavits which comment on this matter in the area of General Lanz and in which one can see the truth of his denials of these matters.
DR. SAUTER: I will net read all the affidavits in detail. They mainly only say what the defendant Lanz has already said. They are the following affidavits , in Document Book III, Lanz No. III, No. 75 -this is a document by affiant Dr. Max Zugbaum. This is Document 75 on page 34 and this becomes Exhibit No. 90.
In the same document book, the next document No. 76, page 36, by affiant Max Prollius, Corps Adjutant and personnel officer with Lanz's staff -- and this receives exhibit number 91.
And the then the next document , No. 77 on page 37 -- this becomes Exhibit No. 92 . This is given by the Ia for the staff of Lanz, the affiant who has already been mentioned many times, Christian von Loeben.
Then in the same document book, the next document, Document No. 78 on page 38 -- this receives exhibit number 93. This is given by the Ic with the staff of Lanz, the affiant who has also been mentioned many times, Gebhard von Lenthe.
And then, in conclusion , one affidavit in Document Book V, Document No. 157, on page 4 of the document book, Document Book No. V. This receives exhibit No. 94. This affidavit is given by Ulrich Buerker who was with General Lanz as Chief of Staff of his army corps. I will not read the contents of these affidavits. I would ask that judicial notice be taken of them.
Q And now, General Lanz, I come to a few individual cases which are not set down in the written Indictment, but which are set down in the documents which were submitted subsequently. In this connection you will have an opportunity to comment on your relations to General Zervas, who was, at that time, leader of the National bands in Greece. I would refer you to the document which has already been read during the Case in chief of the Prosecution, namely. Document NOKW-478, Exhibit No. 493, in Document Book XXI, German Page No. 83, English Page No. 91. From this document it can be seen that you sent to General Zervas, through a truce bearer, the order to evacuate the coastal area, to return the prisoners, and to fix a demarcation line so that clashes with Zervas troops should be avoided. At that time Zervas turned down your request as we have already heard. And now, General Langz, what can you tell us about your attitude towards Zervas and his National troops and about your own relation to the leader of the National partisans, General Zervas?
A Soon after I arrived in Epirus, after I had found out about the situation there. I came to the decision that I should try to reach an agreement with the leader of the National partisans.
Q And how did you arrive at this idea?
A I have already mentioned that my actual task in Greece was to protect the west coast and the islands in front of this coast against an Allied landing. Of course, it was understandable that I would have liked to commit all of my available forces for this purpose, but I couldn't do that as long as numerous partisans were in my area who forced me to occupy myself with them. Therefore, it was obvious that I was trying to restrict these fights against the partisans as much as possible because I had not interest at all in these fights with the partisans. It would have been much more pleasant for me if there had been no partisans at all because then on the one hand all the losses and all the fighting would have been saved there, and I could have used all the forces for my actual military task, namely the protection of the coast. But as long as this was the care I tried in some way or another to make some agreement with the partisans in order to stop the mutual fighting.
This was quite an obvious idea.
Q Then, General Lanz, with regard to this limitation of the fighting against the partisans, did you try to do this only in the interest of your own troops, or were there other points of view which seemed important to you at the time?
A The other point of view was the one I have already mentioned, that I wanted to have my hands free for my actual military tasks, that is, to protect the coast. Another point of view was the desire which I had all through the war, i.e. to save my troops so many losses. I wanted to avoid the fighting. And thirdly, there was also the desire to spare the population the fighting. As the situation was that this fighting would affect the whole country and the people would have to suffer under it. And so all these three points of view were decisive for me and induced me to come to some kind of an agreement with the partisans to restrict the fighting.
Q And then what did you do in order to achieve this aim?
AAfter I had been for about three weeks in by Corps Area and had found out through the liaison of the leader of the International Red Cross, who was called Bickel, what was going on, I tried to get into touch with General Zervas, as leader of the National partisans.
Q And when was that?
AAs far as I remember, that was the beginning of October, 1943.
Q That is, about four weeks after you had arrived in Epirus?
A Yes. If wasn't quite four weeks.
Q And these efforts of yours to get into touch with General Zervas through the liaison of Mr. Bickel and the International Red Cross and to reach some agreement, did this have any success?
A First of all, these efforts only had a partial result or success. I must comment here that, of course, my efforts to make some agreement with Zervas were properly and regularly reported to my superior authorities and I also said that I thought it very desirable to reach an agreement with the National partisans because this would be to the interest and advantage of everybody.
And, thereupon, after I had made this request to the Army Group, I received notice from the OKW that negotiations with General Zervas would only come into the question if he delivered up all his arms. Of course it was quite clear that no negotiations could come about on such a basis.
Q That's what the OKW told you. And what was General Zervas' own attitude? What was the answer you received from him?
A General Zervas informed me that he was fundamentally in agreement with the stopping of the mutual fighting as he wanted and endeavored to play some kind of political role in Greece afterwards and as he therefore was interested in protecting the people in Greece. That was about the same line as I took, but nevertheless there was an obstruction on the part of General Zervas insofar as around General Zervas there was a British military mission who thought quite differently about these things.
Q Your Honors, in the Washington documents there is a teletype which has some reference to the negotiations between General Lanz and General Zervas, and also bears out what the Defendant has just stated. This is contained in Lanz Document Book V. It is Document No. 281, on Page 33, and it receives the Exhibit No. 95. This is and extract from a teletype, dated the 8th of October 1943, from the XXIInd Mountain Army Corps Headquarters. That is it is from Lanz, to the Chief of the General Staff of Army Group E in Saloniki. I read from Page 33, and this teletype reads as follows:
"The Swiss delegate of the International Red Cross, Herr Biekel, together with the perfect and the Bishop of Jannina, has contacted the bandit leader Zervas, and submitted to me today this man's proposal as follows:" writes Gen. Lanz:
"Servas notices the increasing sufferings of the Greek population because of his bandits' activities and our counter measures. He intends to play a leading political part in future Greece, and, for this purpose, aims at getting the people's support.