A. I have already stated that the local Corps Staff there told me when I arrived that I was to remain there and that the disarming and surrender were to be carried out. This whole surrender and disarming was carried out completely and smoothly, and I don't know of one single case in which resistance occurred. The Italian Corps Headquarters had tried to get the people in Corfu and Kephalonia to be sensible about this. I will talk about this later. The Italian Commander sent his own Chief of Staff in order to make Gandin surrender properly.
Q. And where was the one case in which there were difficulties, Witness?
A. Only with the one division which was on the island of Corfu and Cafalonia.
Q. Corfu and Kephalonia.
Your Honors, I now come to a new subject which will deal with the incidents on the islands of Corfu and Kephalonia. I suggest that I continue with this after the recess.
DR. GAWLIK: Dr. Gawlik for the Defendant Dehner.
Your Honor, I would like to ask the permission of the Tribunal for General Dehner to be absent from the session on Monday, in order to prepare his case.
THE PRESIDENT: The permission is granted.
The Tribunal will be in recess until 1:30 this afternoon.
(The Court recessed at 1220 to resume session at 0130.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 21 November 1947).
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
KARL HUBERT LANZ - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. SAUTER:Witness, before the recess we had stopped when you said that the disarming of the Greek Armies in Greece took place on the mainland without any major difficulties.
You have already mentioned that an exception occurred only on the two islands Kephalonia and Korfu. They are on the western coast of the Epirus. What was the situation on these two islands-Kephalonia and Korfu?
A. On those two islands there were troops of the Italian division which was under the command of General Gandin. This division, or rather parts of it, had refused to surrender and to deliver up their arms as it had been ordered to do by its own Italian superior officers.
Q. Can you tell us, Witness, how many German units, at that time, were stationed on those two islands and how large they were?
A. I'm in no position to give you an exact answer, but I can give you an approximate answer. To the best of my recollection there were, on the island Kephalonia, one regimental staff and two so-called fortress battalions. The leader of the regiment was, at the same time, the German Commander of the island. The Italian Island Commander was the Commander of the Italian Division. On Korfu there were approximately one-third of the Italian division of General Gandin. With respect to German troops there was one air-field command staff, consisting of about 100 members, and, apart from that, there were a few naval engineers. Altogether there were very weak German forces there.
Q. The Italian fortress Commander, you say, the Commander of the Island, was the Divisional Commander. That was the Italian General Gandin whose name has been repeatedly mentioned. Can you tell us the name of the German Commander of the Island?
A. That was, at the first time, Lt. Col. Barge.
Q. Perhaps you would spell the name "Barge."
A. (Spelling) B-A-R-G-E. He is, at the moment, a Gritish PW in Egypt.
Q. And do you also know, General, in order to anticipate this, the name of General Gandin's Division?
A. The Division was called the "Division Aqui."
Q. I see. Perhaps you would spell it.
A. (Spelling) A-Q-U-I, Aqui.
Q. Perhaps you could, first of all, tell the Tribunal what conditions prevailed on the island of Kephalonia and what events took place. That was the island where General Gandin himself was stationed with the bulk of his Division.
A. General Gandin was, on my request, asked by the German Island Commander to surrender his arms and to capitulate, as was done everywhere. General Gandin refused to do that. Thereupon General Gandin received also from his XIth Italian Division the order to surrender his arms.
Q. Just a moment, Witness.
A. Even this request was in vain strangely enough.
Q. Just a moment, Witness.
If the Tribunal please, it is not possible for us to produce this order which the Italian Commander in Chief Vecchiarelli issued to his Divisional Commander Gandin. Instead I am submitting another document which may show the proof for the fact that this order of the Italian Commander in Chief Vecchiarelli was sent to General Gandin amongst others. In the War Diaries which we received from Washington, War Diaries of the XXIInd Mountain Corps, we found a radio message which, in consideration if its importance, I have incorporated into Lanz Document Book V. In this Document Book we find Document No. 165, on Page 15.
This document will receive Lanz Exhibit No. 62. I would, again, like to draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that this is a document which was found amongst the documents of the Prosecution and which was sent here from Washington, together with the War Diaries. The photostat of this document has been submitted, and I am reading an excerpt from this document, which refers to the order in question. I am reading from Page 15 of Lanz Document Book V. This is a radio message, dated the 11th of September, of course 1943. It is Appendix No. 30, 3-GN-54. That means "Third Company, Mountain Signal Detachment 54," No. 347, Secret, from the XXIInd Mountain Corps, to the Fortress Grenadier Regiment 966, Kephalonia, via Athens. The text of this radio message reads as follows, and I quote:
"Ital. 11th Army", that is the Army under Vecchiarelli, "has given orders to Acqui Division", which as the Tribunal will remember, is General Gandin's Division, "in Kephalonia to lay Gown their arms. Report to Corps Headquarters XXII Mountain Army Corps as soon as possible whether disarmament of Italians on island has been carried. out. How situation is at the time. Establish radio contact directly with 22nd Army Corps in Jannina." The signature "22nd Mountain Corps" and the message is signed by a Colonel in the General Staff, and there is a handwritten notice below that, saying "dealt with Bub. Cpl." That is the man who sent out the radio message. In this radio message, if it please the Tribunal, the Fortress Grenadier Regiment 966 is mentioned to which the radio message is addressed, and I beg to recall that General Lanz has just how said that two fortress Battalions were stationed in Kephalonia. This unit is identical with the unit to which the message of the 22nd Mountain Corps is addressed. I am submitting this radio message as proof for the fact that the Division Acqui and General Gandin received the order for surrender and laying down of their arms, from their superior officer General Vecchiarelli in Athens, who was the Commander in Chief. This was Exhibit 62.
Q Witness, how did things proceed after that, did General Gandin carry out the order or not?
A No, he did not carry out this order.
Q But - -?
A He constantly evaded our negotiations. Discussing further development I shall refer back to this.
DR. SAUTER: In this connection, if it please the Tribunal, I would like to submit a further document which is contained in Lanz Document Book V, Document No. 167, and the page number is 17. I shall submit this document as Exhibit 63. This again is a document which was found amongst the War Diaries of the 22nd Mountain Corps, and it was sent here from Washington.
This again is a radio message - radio message No. 17 - dated 13 September, again of course 1943. This radio message was sent at a date two days later than the radio message just read which was offered under Exhibit 62. This radio message No. 17, dated 13 September, shows as the authority transmitting the message "Kephalonia ". You can see that it is signed "Barge", and you will remember that General Lanz said just before that the German Commander on the island was Barge. The radio message is addressed to the 22nd Mountain Corps, therefore to Lanz. The excerpts which is of interest to us reads -- the photostat again was submitted. I quote: "Temporary new agreement with General Gandin. Massing of the Division with weapons eastern part Kefalonia to the West and South of Lami. Signed:Barge."
Below that we have a certification of the signature, and we cannot read who signed the certification. I am submitting this document to the Tribunal in order to prove that General Lanz's statement is correct according to which his detailed negotiations took place with General Gandin in order to avoid bloodshed.
Witness, how did things proceed on the 13th September, which is the day from which the radio message just read from Barge dated; did any fighting start then, or can you remember?
A On the 13th September the Italians opened hostilities against us very suddenly and surprising to us, although not a single shot was fired before that. Two of our ships were shot at, and there were wounded and killed, and the Italian batteries fired at the place, Lixuri, which is also mentioned in the map which is in the possession of the Tribunal. This place Lixuri situated on a peninsula, was the headquarters of the German Commander.
Q Just a minute, General, the place Lixuri, as you can see, is situated along a bay on the Island Kephalonia, to the left on the bottom of the map next to the letter "A" of Kephalonia, this is the place Lixuri just mentioned by the defendant.
You can continue now, General.
AAfter our discussions in Kephalonia had, strange enough, remained without any result and the Italians for some incomprehensible reason started open hostilities against us, -- this was the only such case in Greece - I flew with a sea plane to Kephalonia.
Q When was that?
A On 13 September, towards noon.
Q I see.
AAt that time I was of the optimistic opinion that I might succeed in achieving in a discussion with General Gandin, an adequate solution of the affair. I could really see no reason why that should not be possible. There could be no longer any doubts that the 11th Italian Army had surrendered or troop units had surrendered. The Italian Supreme Command had agreed to this surrender, and had also addressed the order to General Gandin to surrender. I could therefore see no reason why the same thing should not apply for Kephalonia and this is why I flew to Kephalonia, with the intention to visit General Gandin, and to talk to him. As my place approached the town of Argostolion, which is also on the map --- this is the capital of the island where General Gandin's staff was located -- my plane was shot at. Therefore, it was not possible for me to land there. That is, I could not go down on the wafer. It was a seaplane. Consequently, I flew to the northern end of the large bay, about 5 kilometers distant from Argostolion, and I landed there. From there I went to Lixuri to the German Commander of the Island. When I arrived there I still saw the marks of grenades which had been caused just before that by the Italian artillery. I remember quite clearly one of these marks was on the building where the Italian Island commander with his staff was quartered. I then asked Lt. Col.
Barge to inform me about the situation, because the whole situation was not quite clear to me. I asked him, after he had informed me, whether I could in some way contact General Gandin. That, after all, had been the purpose of my trip, merely to discuss things with General Gandin. Barge told me that he had a telephone connection with Gandin. Then I asked him to put me into contact by telephone with Gandin.
Q Can yon perhaps tell us what kind of a telephone connection that was?
A I believe it was a sear-cable between Argostolion and Lixuri.
Q I see.
A Yes, there was water between, of course.
Q You reached General Gandin by telephone?
A Yes, and I talked to General Gandin.
Q Just a moment. And will you tell us as clearly and precisely as possible what was said during your telephone conversation with General Gandin?
A Today, after four years, I cannot of course remember verbatim what was said, but I can still recall certain trends of thought. Substantially I told General Gandin that I regretted not to be able to come to Argostolion, as I had intended to, because to my intense surprise I had been shot at while going there. Further I told him that I was surprised that on that dry in the morning he had opened fire against German troops, and against Lixuri. I believe I said that I couldn't understand the meaning of such action. I then told him - I always mean along those lines - that it should be known to him that his Army under General Vecchiarelli had capitulated and had surrendered its arms and that he himself had received an order from the Italian Army to surrender his arms. I asked him why he didn't do that. Gandin replied, which I still remember, "the orders which I received were not clear". I believe that is the way he put it, his orders were not clear.
He asked me, as I also remember, to give him a clear order, telling him what he was supposed to do. That is what he told me. I said to him, "You will immediately receive the order from me, but I would like to point out to you that if the orders which you have are not carried out you and those responsible for this fact will be taken to account in a very severe manner." That is what I particularly stressed. He gave me to understand that if he received an order from me everything would be in order and that he would arrange for the necessary steps to be taken. That is in substance the course of my conversation with General Gandin.
Q. Witness, did you subsequently send such an order to General Gandin as you have said, an order such as he asked you to send?
A. Yes, on the very same table where I telephoned I wrote myself this order in my own handwriting, and had this order transmitted by telephone, to General Gandin. He received this order, and the text of this order is amongst the documents.
DR. SAUTER: May it please, the Tribunal, we have no opportunity to prove through documents what General Lanz has said here because he and his officers lest all their documents and their baggage on the retreat. In spite of this we are still in a position to submit to you this order, thanks to the ruling of the Tribunal that the War Diaries of the 22nd Mountain Corps and General Lanz, were to be brought here. In these War Diaries we find this order, we managed to trace it there, and I am now in a position to submit this order in documentary form, which of course, is of great importance. That the order was not created now but in 1943 is quite obvious, because it came from Washington. This order can be found in Document Book V for Lanz on page 16. It is Document 166, and it will be given Exhibit 64. It is page 16 of Lanz Document Book V. This order, which is a part of the War Diary of 22nd Mountain Corps, General Lanz's Corps, has the following text. I quote:
The Commanding General of the Dated, 13 September 1943, XXII Mountain Corps TO The Commanding Officer of the Italian Division "Acqui". i.e. Gandin.
1.) The Division "Acqui is ordered, effective immediately, to surrender all weapons, except the officers' small arms. to the German Military Commander of the island, Lieut.-Colonel Barge, as has already been done by all parts of the Italian VIII and XXVI Army Corps.
2.) If the weapons are not surrendered, the German Wehrmacht will enforce this surrender.
3.) I hereby state that the division under your command, which fired at German troops and two German ships this morning at 7.00 hours causing casualties of 5 killed and 8 wounded, has committed an open and unmistakable act of hostility," The document is signed "Lanz, General of the Mountain Infantry."
Q. Witness, in consideration of the concluding sentence that the Division Gandin has committed an act of hostility, I would like to make an interpolation; do you know when the declaration of War of Italy to Germany was issued?
A. I gathered that from the documents that were given to us in Nurnberg. According to these the declaration of war was issued on the October 1943.
Q. On the 13th?
A. On October 13.
Q. On the 13 October?
A. I knew that.
Q. And we are here dealing with the date of 13 September?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time there was not yet a declaration of war from Italy to Germany, is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Did you believe, General Lanz, that this order which General Gandin received from you on his request would once and for all straighten out this ratter difficult situation?
A. At that time I was optomistic enough to believe that, especially after General Gandin, had, as I have described, told me on the telephone that he would act in this way.
He himself asked me to give him such an order. I had described the situation to him and now there could be no doubt about anything. He knew his army had surrendered. He had an order from his own Army. He furthermore had an order from me. He knew my attitude that I wanted to deal with the situation without applying force, and he gave me to understand that everything would be in order. I flew back to Joannina and told my officers, and that everything would be allright. I was firmly convinced that that was so.
Q. And that was on 13 September 1943?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. You flew back to Joannina and what did the Italian General Gandin do?
A. He contacted Lt. Col Barge and continued negotiations with him. If I recollect correctly he agreed on a surrender of arms in three different stages. I believe on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of September, Lt. Col. Barge reported this to me and asked me whether I would agree to this procedure. I did not want to start a dispute and had Barge informed of my agreement to a procedure that General Gandin undertook his surrender in three stages. I said that I had to demand, however, that it was started on the very next day. If he agreed to do that I would consent to the procedure and General Gandin was to be informed that his Division, as well as all other Italian Divisions, would be eventually transported to Italy. If he surrendered and delivered his arms, as was done by all others, nothing would happen to him. That is what I asked to be told to him. All was bona fide, because I believed everything would be in order.
Q If it please the Tribunal, this fact can also be proven as having been related correctly through the war diary which came from Washington. I would ask the Court to read a document in Document Book V on page 18 of this document book. It is Document No. 168, which will be offered under Exhibit No. 65. The following document on page 19, which is Document 169 will be offered under Exhibit No. 66.
First of all, I am going to read from page 18, Document No. 168, it is an excerpt from a teletype message No. 141, dated 14 September, 1943, that is the day after the 13th of September which we had discussed.
"SECRET - From Headquarters of the XXII Mountain Corps To High Command of Army Group E Saloniki."
From this healing you can see that it is a message from the defendant Lanz to his immediate superior the Commander in Chief of the Army Group. The report reads and I quote:
German Island Commander on Keffalonia reports:
"Surrender of arms to be effected in 3 stages:
1.) In the Argostolion area on 14 September 1943;
2.) In the area comprising the southeastern part of Keffalonia on 15 September.
3.) In the Samni area on 16 September. There, the disarmed troops will be collected.
To this plan General Gandin has promised his full support for evacuating the positions and the handing over of weapons. Evacuation in the area around Argostolion already in progress."
That is the end of the report from the Island Commander to Lanz. Lanz goes on to report and I quote the next passage:
"I (meaning Lanz) intend waiting for today's results. If the handling over of weapons is completed. I agree to the above proposal. Failing that, the surrender will be enforced tomorrow."
The message is signed "Lanz, Commanding General XXII Mountain Army Corps."
Then the file note of the diary and then an illegible signature, General Staff Major.
From the same day, 14 September, 1943, we have the next document, which is Document 169, Exhibit 66. I am reaming from page 19, an excerpt from the war diary. "XXII Mountain Amy Corps, Headquarters, Commanding General, Corps H.Qu., dated 14 September 1943. To Lieutenant Colonel Barge", that was the Island Commander of Keffalonia. I quote:
The order I submitted yesterday in writing to General Gandin remains effective; I agree to your proposal by which the handing over will be done on 14, 15, and 16 September. General Gandin has to be informed that his division, after peacefully surrendering their arms, will be returned to Italy like all other Italian divisions.
Report to me by 20.00 hours today over the radio whether the surrender of weapons has taken place as scheduled for 14 September.
Signed, General Lanz.
These are the two documents, which are to confirm what the witness has just now told you about September 14th.
General Lanz, how did the events on Keffalonia develop after this, did General Gandin keep his promise or did he not?
A General Gandin unfortunately did not keep his premise. The arms were not surrendered. It was reported that a pant of the Italian Island Occupation Forces refused to surrender their weapons and it was further reported that three Italian commanders, who wanted to give up their arms, were shot at by their own troops. Therefore the situation was that a resistance group, or whatever I want to call it, was in Keffalonia, which dominated the opinion there and refused the delivering up of arms and retained their hostile altitude toward us.
After this report had been received I had, to make a decision. In the meantime, my superior agency had rather unpleasantly taken me to task and pressed me continuously to take action and kept after me as to what was the matter with Keffalonia and General Gandin, why this matter was not in order, why I did not take any steps against them and why I did not take any decisive action.
The Army Group in turn was being pressed by the O.K.W. and in the final analysis by Hitler himself. Thus, there was an increasing nervousness among all present because the affairs on the Islands of Keffalonia and later Korfu could not be put in order, as expressed by the Army Group. In this matter I was more or less held as the responsible person who was too slack to put matters to order there. In actual facts, all I had tried was to endeavor in my negotiations with General Vecchiarelli to deal with the situation without any dispute or hostility.
I now had, whether I wanted to or not, to make a decision to take steps against the Italians in Keffalonia. I informed myself among my staff which of the troops were at my immediate disposal, whether there was sufficient shipping space to transport troops to Keffalonia. That was not quite easy as the Island was in the Adriatic Sea and there could be no doubt that the two fortress battalions and one company, which was also stationed on Keffalonia, would be surpressed by the Italians and that was what almost happened. I therefore ordered to the 1st Mountain Division to send two battalions, one Mountain Artillery Battalion and to the 114th Rifle Division to send one Rifle Regiment immediately to the collecting point from where these troops were to be provisionally transported to Keffalonia.
That happened in due course. I reported to the Army Group, which in the meantime became rather unpleasant and unfriendly, that the troops had been sent to Keffalonia and that as soon as they arrived there the Italian surrender of arms would be enforced.
Q Did any fighting come about later and if so, who started the attack?
A On the basis of the relation of strength, the Italians were the ones who attacked. The Italians first of all attacked our troops, the two fortress battalions stationed there.
One battalion on the northern part of the Island faced a very difficult position, so that for some time we thought that battalion was lost. At first there was nothing I could do because I had no forces. When the troops, which I had mentioned before, arrived on the Island they landed on the southwest corner of the peninsula Lixuri. The Italian Coast Battalions shot with considerable strength at the landing troops and considerable losses were suffered. The area of the landing had to be transferred to another spot, but eventually we managed to land the troops. The troops were collected and were first of all committed, to relieve the Germans on the northern part of the Island, to defeat the Italians who were there.
Q If it please the Tribunal, I would like to ask the Tribunal to accept a few more documents, which I am submitting for the purpose of giving the Tribunal an opportunity to check on the truthfulness of General Lanz' statements. These again are three documents, which we found among the War Diary entries of the XXII Mountain Corps when these arrived from Washington. The documents concerned are contained in Document Book Lanz V, Document No. 170 on page 20, Document No. 171 on page 21 and Document No. 172 on page 22. Document No. 170 is offered under Exhibit 67, Document No. 171 will become Exhibit 68 and Document No. 172 will become Exhibit 69.
I will first of all read from Document No. 170 on page 20. This again is an excerpt from a Radio Message which has been submitted in photostat, it is radio message No. 38, dated 14 September, that is the same day on which the two previously read orders were dated. This Radio Message, dated 14 September 19.00 hours was transmitted from Keffalonia and addressed to the XXII Corps -- Top Priority. From the signature you can see that the transmitting post Keffalonia is identical with the German Island Commander, whom we repeatedly mentioned, Lt. Col. Barge. I will read from the message and I quote:
"Negotiations about details concerning the surrender have delayed surrender and evacuation for 14 September as was originally scheduled. Tomorrow the following will be taken over: 1 Naval Battery 15 em."
I may add that that seems to be the battery, which General Lanz mentioned before, that it was put at the disposal for transport to Kephalenia, the only battery. The radio message continues:
"Divisional Staff has already evacuated Argestelien. Negotiations are difficult because Italian soldiers fired on 3 commanding officers, who were prepared to hand over weapons. Leaflets concerning Italy's capitulation are urgently required."
The radio message is signed "Barge" and there is one addition "by telephone to Commanding General," then the initial "L", 22.05 Hours and the certification "Arnold."
The next document, which I am going to read, is the one on the next page, document No. 171, which I have offered as exhibit 68 for Lanz. This again is an excerpt from a radio message No. 145. It bears the same date, 14 September from XXII Mountain Corps Headquarters to Brigadier General Helle, X. Airforce Corps, Athens. The radio message reads:
"Refusing to surrender arms, General Gandin refers to the promise which Lieut. Colonel Busch of your staff has allegedly give him on 13 September 1943. I request information what promises, and on whose orders, Lieut. Colonel Busch has given the Italian General Gandin."
The radio message is signed: "Lanz, Commanding General, XXII Mountain Army Corps."
Then the War Diary letter, then "secret" and on the left you have the certification from "Loeben. General Staff Major." That is the same General von Loeben, who has furnished a number of affidavits which have been submitted to the court.
The answer to this inquiry of von Loeben to the Air Force General in Athens can be found on the next page, page 22, Document 172, which has been offered as exhibit 79. Here again we have excerpts from a radio message No. 0677, dated 14 September 1943 ---- the same day -Enclosure No. 53, to General Lanz, Commanding General XXII Mountain Corps Jannina, relating to teletype message Lanz 143, 14 September 1943:
"The military Commander Southeast instructed me to bring General Gandin to Vienna by plane to report to the Duce." That is Mussolini. "Lieut. Colonel Pusch was instructed to take care of this mission. The mission was unsuccessful as General Gandin refused to fly to Vienna. He has not been promised anything after his refusal."
Then, we have the signature, Holle, Brigadier General X, Airforce Corps Headquarters, the war diary numbers and "Secret."
Witness, when did you for the first time learn that General Gandin at the very last moment stated that he had been made any promises by a Lt. Col. of the Air Force and what did you learn about this; did you take General Gandin's statements seriously, or if not, what did you think about the whole thing?
A I cannot remember the details of the Busch affair. I only recall the whole affair through reading the documents here. At the time I had been under the impression that General Gandin tried to find a pretext not to surrender his arms. Even today, after examining the whole affair thoroughly, I feel inclined to still assume this attitude of Gandin's. He gave new reasons continuously in order not to surrender his arms, although he knew quite well what the situation was, his army had ordered the surrender, his army had surrendered and I had issued an order to surrender his arms. He could not help being aware of these facts, but he always tried to find a reason not to have to surrender his arms. Eventually he simply forced me to use force against him. Originally, I did not want to do that.
Q Was the Island Kephalenia stormed by German troops after that?
A I said that the German troops, one battalion, which on the north island, was stuck there between rocks and the sea was relieved and the Italians were defeated. I myself have later inspected that area. That gave me the hope that the Italians would realize everything was quite senseless, which it was.
When I flew to Kephalenia the second time I took leaflets along which were especially produced in Joannina, many thousands of leaflets, in order to drop them over the Italian front and to try and make these people reasonable at the very last moment if possible. In the meantime, after for days there had been an uncertain state of affairs, pressure was exerted by the Army Group and all of a sudden a Fuehrer Order arrived.
Q Just a moment, witness. Perhaps before you come to that chapter you can tell us whether you yourself led the battle of Kephalonia or did you commission another officer to do that and if so who was the officer who was in charge of this; I am asking you this question because it is a question which will play a part on later occasions?
A I had mentioned that originally the German Island Commander, who was the commander of the two Fortress Batteries, Lt. Colonel Barge had been the man in charge. Barge honestly tried to cope with General Gandin, but he did not succeed. I am sure it was not his fault that he could not deal with him. After the troops had to be sent to Kephalenia, which I have just described, a commander of these troops arrived with them, a Major von Hirschfeld. For tactical reasons among others, I appointed Major von Hirschfeld Island commander of Kephalenia and Lt. Colonel Barge after that time only had the area of the peninsula Lixuri left to him. Later on Barge left Kephalenia and was transferred because they were not satisfied with him because he did not take strong enough measures. He was later in Crete where he was taken as a British Prisoner of War. I believe he is in Egypt today.
Q If Your Honors please, I would like to submit one further document from document book 5 for Lanz. This is document 173 on page 23, which will receive exhibit No. 70. I am submitting this document in order to show that in spite of the contradicting and delaying actions of General Gandin, the German agencies and General Lanz tried again and again to Prevent bloodshed. This document is dated 15 September.
I have read just before three documents from the proceeding day, the 14th of September, those were exhibits 67, 68 and 69 and exhibit 70 is the one we are dealing with now. It is dated 15 September, 01,00 Hours, Top Priority, a radio message from Lieut. Colonel Barge to General Lanz, Reply to No. 83/43, Secret:
"Relating to 1) Part of the Italian troops refuse to surrender their weapons. 3 commanding officers were fired at who wanted to execute this order.
"to 2) General Gandin himself requested me to see him once more. I informed him that after peacefully surrendering their weapons, his division will be returned to Italy."
The radio message is signed Barge, Lieut. Colonel, the German Island Commander and below on the left hand side we have the certification by a certain Herbst.
I would like to ask the Tribunal, because of the second remarks, under paragraph 2, to compare this sentence with the sentence which is contained in General Lanz' order to General Gandin.