we will now return to the document of the Prosecution. One preliminary question about the SS Division Skanderbeg. You have told us before that General Field Marshal von Weichs allowed you to use the SS Division Skanderbeg for technical operations and of the subordinate to the 21st Corps from case to case and you could make a request for this subordination. Did you ever make any use of this possibility and did you at any time have the SS Divisions become subordinate to you for the purpose of tactical assignment?
AA commitment of the whole Division Skanderbeg was out of the question because in my time this division was not even fully organized and I have never made use of this authority. I would like to mention, however, that smaller parts of the SS Division on the occasion of operations which were carried out by my divisions on the border line of this area from time to time a company or a battalion which was stationed there would be used when an operation against the bands took place and the division concerned would have this particular unit subordinate to it for tactical purposes only.
Q This brings me to the documents of the Prosecution, General; from your time with the 21st Corps we only have very few documents submitted against you by the Prosecution. I might say that all these documents refer to occurrences with the SS Division Skanderbeg. You have told us initially that this division was not subordinate to you and you also said that a tactical subordination of the division was out of the question. I would like to crystallize this point clearly with one more question. Did you have any authority to issue orders in a military sense for any units of this SS Division Skanderbeg?
A No, I did not.
Q I now have the first document submitted to you which was offered against you. It is contained in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution on page 112 of the English document book and on page 156 of the German text. This is document NOKW 952 of the Prosecution which had been offered under Exhibit No. 400 of the Prosecution. You Court No. V, Case No. VII.
have here a daily report by your corps dated 11 August 1944 and under the heading SS Division Skanderbeg it is reported: "During an attack East of Kukes minor own and civilian losses; 2 trucks burned out; 6 hostages hanged at the places of attack." Will you please give us your comments to this report, General?
A Towards the beginning of my examination I said that events which occurred in the area were reported also when the unit concerned was not subordinate to the corps. The channel of report concerning all units present in the area had for technical reasons to leave by the corps. For this reason the SS Division Skanderbeg, although it was not subordinate to the corps, reported to us. We then passed on this report to the Army as a report concerning the area. Besides this had been the same with my predecessor General Fehn and this procedure had been quite customary because the division had been tactically subordinate to him.
Q You are telling us, General, that this then is a territorial report if we can call it that. On the basis of this report were you in a position to take any steps?
A No, there was nothing I could order because the division was not subordinate to me. I further would like to point out that where reprisal measures were concerned the same regulations applied for Albania as it did for Croatia. By this I mean that reprisal measures could only be carried out by divisions in conjunction and with the consent of the Albanian representative of the government who used to be attached to every division.
Q. In order to clarify this problem may I ask you, General, to which order you are referring when you say the same applied for Albania as it did for Croatia?
A. I am referring to the order of Army Group F dated 22 December 1943. It was issued and signed by General Loehr to the best of my knowledge.
Q. Let's now go on discussing this problem, General. In the indictment it is stated that on or around 11 August 1944 for one attack East of Kukes 6 hostages were hanged. Was it possible for you to establish from the documents whether the attack near Kukes and the hanging of 6 hostages has ever appeared in any other document which was submitted against you by the Prosecution?
A. No, this count of the indictment has to refer to this particular document. It is not correct, therefore, that these hostages were hanged for one attack but as is shown by the document several attacks occurred and own and civilian losses had been suffered.
Q. After we have made this quite clear, General, we will turn to the next incident. This is also contained in Document Book XVI, which you have in front of you and I would like you to turn up page 157 of your document book which is page 113 of the English text. Here you find Document NOKW 1008 of the Prosecution which was submitted as Prosecution Exhibit 401. This is a IcDaily report of the 21st Corps addressed to the Army dated 30 August 1944. I believe the Prosecution did not include the whole report in its document because we have only got one entry here and I quote: "Situation in Bitolj unchanged. The anti-aircraft battery section Dossow which was surrounded near Prilep has fought free. The enemy losses, in the corps area, on the 29th:8 are: 5 estimated dead; 1 Italian deserter; 14 prisoners; 20 bandits hanged." This is the second case in all of the documents which were submitted against you where we find a reprisal measure with human life. Can you tell us anything about the hangings mentioned here?
A. It is not possible to clarify the incident here on the basis of this short entry. The quotation which you brought here shows a survey of the whole daily report. However, it is not stated here where these bandits were hanged or who hanged them and also does the reasons for this measure is not given. Therefore, we cannot state with any amount of certainty whether this is a reprisal measure or an execution carried out after a summary court martial. I would feel inclined to assume that the latter was the case because "bandits" are mentioned here and not "hostages." We can also not say whether this hanging was carried out by any units subordinate to me or whether they were carried out by any other unit ever which I had no jurisdiction. The difficulty is increased by the fact that in this document book we only have one passage of the daily report of the 30 August 1944.
Q. In order to clarify this incident as much as possible, your Honors, I have included in my document book the whole document and you can find the whole daily report in Leyser Document Book II on page 13. This is Leyser Document No. 48 and I am going to offer it as Leyser Exhibit 53. General, first of all, I would like to show you the original. By this I mean the photostat of the whole daily report and I would like you to tell us whether on the basis of this whole report you can clarify the incident which we have discussed. The document which I have just mentioned is Leyser Document 48. It is in Document Book II on page 139. May I ask you then to discuss the whole of this daily report, please General.
A. Even this whole report does not clarify the incident entirely. The 20 bandits are only mentioned under numeral 1 which is a survey of the whole report. There is no reference to them in any other report. The following passages deal with the events as they occurred with the individual subordinate units. These reports are given merely for territorial reasons.
Q. General, I believe you made a mistake. You said the following passages deal with the events with the subordinate units and then you continue to say that the reports were given for territorial reasons.
Didn't you make a mistake?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Maybe you would like to start all over again.
A. The following passages deal with the events as they occurred with the subordinate units and the last passage deals with events which occurred in the area of such agencies as were not subordinate to me. These reports are the ones which are merely given for territorial reasons. After examining the whole of the report I can now establish that numeral 1 contains the measures mentioned and that in my opinion this measure could only have been carried out for the attack reported on the anti-aircraft battery Dossow in the area Korueck 1021. From the report of Korueck 1,021 it can be seen that this anti-aircraft unit had been attacked. Besides the anti-aircraft battery had been surrounded and had to fight its way out. On the basis of this report I can vaguely recall that this attack which caused some excitement at the time it actually took place. Of course I don't know details any longer. All I can do is I can stress that the losses of the battery on the occasion of this surprise attack were rather high. They are mentioned here and it says that there were 15 dead., 12 wounded and 3 men were missing. That is a high number of losses if one considers the fact that an anti-aircraft battery consists of about 120 men; that lets us arrive at a loss of altogether 25 percent. This surprise attack has in my opinion some connection with the hanging of the 20 bandits mentioned. But, on the basis of the whole of the report I am in no position to say clearly whether this was the execution of a sentence by a summary court martial or whether it was a reprisal measure.
Q. You told us, General, that in your opinion these 20 bandits were connected with the surprise attack on the anti-aircraft battery in Dossow.
A. I couldn't explain it in any other way.
Q. Was this anti-aircraft battery subordinated to you?
A. No, the anti-aircraft battery was not subordinated to me. It was subordinate to the air force.
Q. This report, to which you referred just now locking at the photostat, can be found under the heading "Korueck 1,021." I would like to ask you, General, what does the expression "Korueck" mean?
A. Korueck means "Commander of the rear army area". A Korueck is as a matter of principle subordinated to the Army; never to the Corps.
Q. Let us try now to further clarify this incident, General. You told us you were in no position to tell us whether this was the execution of a sentence of a summary court martial or whether this was a reprisal measure. I don't believe there would be any other possibilities. If we here are concerned with a sentence of a summary court martial which we do not know -- which would have been the agency, according to this report, who would have called the summary court martial together?
A. According to this report, the incident took place between Prilep and Bitolj. In this district there was no troop unit stationed subordinated to me. As a consequence the summary court martial could have never been called by a unit subordinate to me. Since besides an anti-aircraft battery is concerned here which was subordinate to the air force, they could have been the ones who called such a summary court martial or the competent territorial commander in Korueck.
Q. Let us assume for a moment in order to clarify this even further a reprisal measure would have been the case here, which would have been the agency to order or carry out such a reprisal measure?
A. Here again the order applies which has been issued by the Army Group.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q In order to make this quite clear, General, I would like to state that I believe you are referring to the order just previously mentioned, dated 22 December 1943, issued by Army Group F; this order is contained in Exhibit 397 of the Prosecution which is on page 47 of the English text and page 98 of the German text. Could I ask you now, General, to carry on with your comments?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the volume, please?
DR. TIPP: Document Book XVI, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: And the page, please?
DR. TIPP: Page 47 of the English Document Book.
That is the basic order of Army Group F, concerning reprisal measures, which General Leyser has repeatedly mentioned during his examination.
Q Will you please continue, General?
A If a reprisal measure had been involved here, the order of Army Group F dated the 22 December 1943 would be the one which is valid. According to this order reprisal measures could only be carried out in connection with the Albanian representative of the Government, and since here possible also a unit of the Air Force is concerned, this unit would have to take up contact with the Albanian Government, and only thus the reprisal measure could be carried out with the consent of the Albanian Government.
Q Did I understand you correctly to say, General, that in the area Prilep Veles where the attack had actually occurred there were no units which were subordinate to you, is that correct?
A No, in that area there were no units directly subordinate to me.
Q I may then summarize and say that these measures, irrespective of what they might have been could not have been carried out by any units subordinate to you?
A No, they could not have been carried out by any units subordinate to me.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q One additional question, you said before that Koreuck was not subordinate to you, and that the incidents had taken place in his area; perhaps you could tell us for reason of clarity for which reasons this report of Koreuck was incorporated in reports of the Corps?
A I have already stated that all units which were located in the corps area had to report for reasons of information to the corps, and that these reports would be passed on to higher agencies. This is the report of the Koreuck which was included in the daily report of the 21st corps. From this daily report, which I have mentioned before, it can be seen that for instance the German General in Albania is mentioned, who is a territorial commander, who was also at no time subordinate to me.
DR. TIPP: In connection with this channel of report, if it please the Tribunal, I would like to offer one further document, which is contained in Document Book III for Leyser, page 207. This is Leyser Document NG 60, and I would like to offer it as Leyser Exhibit 54. This is an affidavit of the former Lt. Colonel Hans Klein, dated the 7 October 1947. This affidavit was duly sworn to on the same day before the Adjutant of the camp Neustadt, Captain Washburn. Hans Klein was the 1a of the 369th Division, which was for some time subordinate to the 21st Corps. He says under numeral 2:
"2. A Corps is an operational staff. For the execution of a tactical order certain units within a fixed area are subordinated to it. Within this area there can also be offices and units which are not subordinated to it.
"I know that the 369th Division, where I was Ia, reported in its daily reports on happenings even of units not subordinated to it, if "special happenings" were in question. I think it very probably that the Corps also reported in this way.
"The office, "German General in Albania", was normally subordinated to the Military Commander in Chief. If, for example, this office is mentioned in a daily report of the Corps, one cannot conclude Court No. V, Case No. VII.
from that, according to my opinion, that it was subordinate.
"There is also the possibility that, because of especially difficult communication connections, the Corps, in its daily reports, also included the daily reports of offices not subordinated to it."
Q General, from the documents of the Prosecution there remains just one incident to be discussed. This is contained in Exhibit 403 and Exhibit 404 of the Prosecution. Both of those exhibits are contained in Document Book XVI. The first mentioned document is on page 117 of the English text, and the second one on page 120 of the English text. We will later deal in detail with these documents. The actual occurrence which forms the basis of these documents is the attack on the evacuation transport consisting of female employees of civilian offices from Tirana, which took place on 3 September, and was East of Kukes. General, first of all, without reference to the documents, can you describe this incident in all its details and connections?
A Towards the end of August 1944, because of the general war situation, the female employees and the wives of members of the German Embassy in Tirana were to be evacuated. The German Envoy in Tirana, Dr. Schlieb, had contacted the Special Plenipotentiary for Southeast, Envoy Neubacher, and had asked him to let this evacuation take place by plane, but Envoy Neubacher refused this request. The evacuation transport was to be carried out by motor vehicle. The transport was therefore within the scope of work of the German Plenipotentiary in Albania. He and the German envoy contacted me and asked me to protect this transport, along the supply route. The Corps took over the protection of this transport. At that time we provided an armoured scout car and a 2-Centimeter gun fixed on an armoured car. Besides, it was ordered that the road east of Kukes was to be secured, particularly by the Battalion stationed near there. The attack on this motor column took place somewhere east of Kukes, beyond the border of the area of the battalion which undertook the security measures there. It actually took place within the area of the SS Division Skanderbeg. The Battalion Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Commander there was the first one to receive the report about this attack.
Q One question in connection with this, General. You said this Divisional Commander, are you talking about the Divisional Commander of the SS Skanderbeg Division, or are you talking about a certain officer of your own units, which is a Wehrmacht unit?
A I had said before that in that area a battalion, and that of course can only be a battalion subordinate to me, had been employed for the protection of this transport. This Battalion Commander here was a member of the 181st Division, which was subordinate to the 21st Corps. This Battalion Commander, as I said, was the first one to gain knowledge of this attack, and since he had men on hand for the securing of the transport he engaged in battle and freed these motor cars and reported the result to the corps.
Q General, can you tell us any more details about the attack itself?
A The attack was carried out by a band, which according to the reports, was approximately 100 men strong. On the occasion of this attack, three women were killed. Two women were kidnapped and a number of women were also wounded. Amongst them was the wife of the German Envoy. Besides, I believe there were 30 other people who were wounded, and a fairly large number of motor vehicles which had accompanied this transport were also destroyed.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, I have another document to offer which deals with the attack itself, and this document has been drawn up by the German Envoy Schlieb, who is the man just mentioned by General von Leyser. I think it would be expedient to submit this after the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will have our recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess for fifteen minutes.
(Thereupon a 15-minute recess was taken.)
(Following Recess)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, we stopped during the description of the attack on the German women east of Kukes. You have already told us what you know about this attack and the aid your troops gave. I would like to offer one document in support of this. It is in Leyser document book 2 of the defense on page 132, Leyser document No. 45, and I would like to offer it as Leyser exhibit 55. This is an affidavit dated 25 September 1947 by the former German Ambassador in Tirana, Martin Schlieb, which was duly sworn to on 26 September 1947 before the Mayor in Teisnach. The affiant states:
1) From December 1941 until October 1944 I was German Consul General (Generalkonsul), I was Minister in Tirana since July 1944 and am therefore able to make the following statements:
2) The transport of approximately 16 German women, who were evacuated in 2 trucks from Tirana on 3 September 1944 and who were attacked by partisans approximately 20 kilometers from Prizren during the night from the 4th to the 5th of September, was under the protection of the XXIst Mountain Army Corps. After my request to evacuate these women by plane had been refused by the Special Plenipotentiary for the South-East in Belgrade, I repeatedly spoke to General von LEYSER about the protection of the convoy. Herr von LEYSER and his men then declared, that this transport was under the protection of the German Army and guaranteed that nothing would happen to the women on the way.
3) Concerning the incident itself I can state the following according to the reports of my wife who took part in the transport. My wife who sat in the first truck beside the driver, was severely injured by a shot in the neck already during the firing. Although she was weakened by serious loss of blood and always close to fainting, my wife succeeded in escaping capture by the partisans by hiding up to her neck in the Drin-river for 3 hours while tracer bullets were passing close over her head continually.
Finally at dawn help came from Prizren, driving away the partisans, numbering more than 100. During the surprise attack 3 women were killed, 3 were kidnapped and 2 severely injured. I should like to mention also that the convoy was followed by another bus occupied with lightly injured persons and one ambulance vehicle with severely injured persons, which likewise had great losses.
General, now we come to the documents submitted by the prosecution in connection with this incident. The first document is contained in document book 16, which is before you. I would like you to turn to German page 161, English page 118. Here you will find prosecution document NOKW-954, submitted as exhibit 403. On the same page you will find a teletype of Major Frank, dated 5 September 1944. It states here that: Major Frank had received an order from Oberfuehrer Schmidthuber to burn down some villages near the locality of the attack and to kill the population. The approval of the Corps is still missing. Major Frank inquires whether the Corps agrees to the carrying out of these reprisal measures and asks for an immediate reply.
In order to clear up the personalities here, I would like to ask you two questions: one, who was Major Frank?
A Major Frank was the battalion commander of the battalion that had to protect the road. The battalion, which I have mentioned before, which belonged to part of my troops.
Q And it also mentions here something about Oberfuehrer Schmidthuber may I ask you: who was Oberfuehrer Schmidthuber?
A Oberfuehrer Schmidthuber was the officer of the SS division Skanderbeg.
Q Well, how does it happen that Oberfuehrer Schmidthuber gave the order mentioned here to Major Frank?
AAs I have already stated, this attack took place east of Kukes within the area of the SS division Skanderbeg. Major Frank, who was the first to receive a report about this, as I have already said, went there and liberated this convoy.
Afterwards Oberfuehrer Schmidthuber must have been told about this because it did not appear to be very far away from where it was, and he appeared on the scene too. Then he gave Major Frank the order, as it states here, to burn down some villages and to kill the population. However Oberfuehrer Schmidthuber was not subordinate to Major Frank, that is he had no command authority over Major Frank, at the mast one must assume that according to Frank as an SS General he assumed this authority. The Battalion commander Major Frank, to whom this matter did not seem to be quite in order, therefore asked in this teletype, it is not a telephone call, he therefore asked whether this order from Oberfuehrer Schmidthuber should be carried out.
Q And what was the answer of the corps to Major Frank?
A From the documents here this cannot be seen, but higher approval to this measure was not given by the corps. This can be seen from the report of the corps, which the corps submitted to the army. The report is dated 7 September NOKW 954, Exhibit 403, I don't know the English page.
Q The German page, General?
A German page 160, English page 118. There the corps reports on 7 September, that is two days after Major Frank's inquiry, what was ordered and what was done by the corps because of this attack. And here one cannot assume that villages were burned down as a reprisal measure, and otherwise this would certainly have been contained in the report of the corps. According to this report, the corps reported, and I quote under figure 4:
"By order of Corps Headquarters, the following measures were taken after the attack:
a) Extension of the protective zones on both sides of the main road Kukes-Prizren.
b) Seizure of communists in Prizren as hostages by the 21st Waffen Mountain Division of the SS 'Skanderbeg'.
c) Employment of confidential agents with the mission to find out where the kidnapped women were and, if possible, to effect their release."
From this report, in my opinion, it can be seen two days after the attack that this order by Oberfuehrer Schmidthuber cannot have been carried out.
Q From the affidavit of Schlieb, which I have introduced and from your testimony, General, it can be seen that during the attack German women were also deported and it was most important to release these women again; therefore what measures were taken by you in order to liberate these women?
A The investigation of this incident was of course mainly a matter for the SS and Police leader Vitztum, who was responsible for police matters. Of course, the corps ordered an extensive investigation and the results showed that the attack had been made by a communist band from the area of Prizren. Since I felt myself responsible for the convoy, because the corps had taken over the responsibility of protecting this convoy, I thought, of course, I must do everything possible in order to release these kidnapped women. According to the conditions of the district there, it was first of all necessary that hostages should be taken from amongst the guilty persons. Prizren was, as I said, within the area of the SS Division Skanderbeg. None of my troops stationed there, and as a result I made contact with the SS Fuehrer Vitztum and asked him to order hostages to be taken in the area of Prizren. In addition, I discussed with him that confidential agents should be employed to find out where the women were in order to release them.
Q And then how did these negotiations continue about releasing these women?
A. These negotiations went on for a rather long time. First of all, there was no agreement reached. The confidential agents found out where the women were approximately and got into contact with the bands for the purpose of releasing the women. But the bands asked for such a high ransom of money in gold that, first of all, this had to be rejected. Thereupon the negotiations were broken off, but the hostages were seized and then it was threatened that if the women were not released the hostages would be shot. Thereupon the bands again took up negotiations through the confidential agents, but again no agreement was reached.
I was currently informed about these negotiations because at that time I felt myself more or less responsible and had taken over the protection at the time. The negotiations themselves, of course, since it was a police matter, were carried on, as I have said, by the SS Police Leader Vitztum for Tirana.
Q. General, now another question with regard to a prosecution document in this connection: I am again referring to Document Book No. XVI of the prosecution, English page 121, German page 162. Here you will find prosecution document NOKW-953 submitted as prosecution Exhibit 404. This is the war diary of the 21st Army Corps. On the 16th of September 1944 it is mentioned that Corps Headquarters had told the 21st SS Division Skanderbeg which was responsible in the area east of Kukes that the shooting of hostages for the attacks should not yet take place. There is mention of attacks General, therefore between the 15th September when the women were kidnapped and the diary entry on the 18th of September there was another attack.
A. I have just seen that from the war diaries.
Q. Now, with regard to this incident to which the defendant is here referring, I would like to refer to a document which was amongst the ones which came from Washington. It is an extract from the war diary of the 21st Corps.
I have included it in my document book Leyser No. II on page 116. It is Leyser Document No. 40 and I would like to offer it as Leyser Exhibit No. 56. From this document I would like to quote the paragraph which refers to the second attack. It is the entry for the 15th of September 1944 and it runs:
"Another band attack on motor convoy column east of Nukes results in heavy own losses. Among the 11 dead commander of the 1st Army Coast Artillery Regiment 945."
If I understood yon correctly, General, the entry in the War Diary mentioned above refers to the two attacks: the one on the women and the other one on the 15th of September which resulted in 11 dead among the German soldiers, is that correct?
A. Yes, the two raids: the one on the 15th and the one on the 5th.
Q. And now another question: here it is mentioned, General, that you directed the SS Division Skanderbeg not to carry out the shooting of the hostages. How did this directive arise?
A. I can remember this very well. At that time on the 18th of September my Chief of Staff came to me and told me that he had heard that SS Fuehrer Schmidt-Huber had now lost his patience after the repeated attacks and wanted to have the hostages shot but, as I have already mentioned, the negotiations regarding the release of these women had started up again and so I thought it was quite wrong and senseless to have this reprisal measure carried out before the negotiations were finished. They might even come to a favorable end and, therefore, the bands would have released the women. As a result of this I thought it was my duty, in spite of the fact that the SS Division Skanderbeg was not subordinate to me, to intervene in this matter and to send this teletype to the SS Division Skanderbeg.
From this entry it can also be seen that it was not an order because I gave the reason why these shootings would not be carried out. If the SS Division had been subordinate to me, then there would have been no reason to give a justification for the order.
That is not usual in the German Wehrmacht. I thought it was important that the reprisal measures at this moment should not be carried out and that the women should he set free, whatever happened.
Q. And was the shooting of the hostages carried out later on, General?
A. Later on I heard nothing more about a shooting of hostages.
Q If I understood you correctly before, you said that the return of the kidnapped women had been made dependent by the bands upon payment of a large ransom. Is that correct, General?
A. Yes, this was a regular robber attack which is quite usual in the Balkans and they asked, as I said, a large ransom; but, as I have already described, this wasn't paid and then I don't know how the negotiations went on because, as I have said already, on the 2nd of October I left the place and when I came back in the middle of November the corps had already left Tirana. Because of the great retreat movement, the corps station was no longer in Tirana but in Skutari. SS Police Leader Vitztum and the SS Division Skanderbeg were no longer in contact with me and, therefore, I received no information about how the matter was concluded.
Q. And that finishes the discussion of the documents, General. That which the Prosecution has submitted in connection with the 21st Corps. According to your testimony, then, in all these documents there is no incident which occurred with units which were under your command. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct. A part of the documents submitted do not concern me because they occurred before my time and the other part also doesn't concern me because it all concerns troops which were not subordinate to me.
Q Then in order to finish the 21st Corps, General, I would like to ask you a few brief questions. You said previously that on your return around about the 16th of November 1944 the Corps Staff was already in Skutari--and then how did the military position develop in this area?
A. As I said, at that time the movement of withdrawal had started from the Balkans. The corps was concentrated in the area of Potowica and there the Corps was, first of all, completely encircled; and then I received the order to break through with the Corps along the coastal road in the direction of Mostar, but this was no longer possible for me because in the meantime the British had landed and the resistance was so strong that I could not break through in this place. I, therefore, decided to go another way and broke through with my corps in the direction of Sarajevo. I was successful and in the area of Sarajewo the corps remained, until about the middle of March. From the middle of March onwards the retreat movement started up again and the Corps then retreated in the direction of Zagreb via Brod. Shortly before Zagreb I became sick and then was taken to a hospital in Gastein where I was made a prisoner of war on tho 10th of May.
Q And then, General, on the 10th of May 1945, as an officer you were made an American prisoner of war.
A. Yes.
Q. Since that time have you been released as a prisoner of war?
A. In my opinion, I have not been released, but I was told that I would be released and therefore, I said: "It couldn't go on like this. There must be some regulation concerning it"; and, therefore, I was told that I had to sign this paper and I said, "I won't do that." Thereupon I was threatened and, therefore, I said: "I will sign it as an order." I was in a certain sense forced to do it.
Q In order to get this clear, General, since the 10th of May, 1945 you have never been at liverty?
A No, I have never been free.
AAnd now, one more question: During the period between your return to the XXIst Corps in the middle of April, 1944 and the time when you want to the hospital in April, 1945 were any reprisal measures carried out by your Corps or your troops?
A No, at this time no reprisal measures were carried out, because....
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Pardon me just a minute please.
General Leyser, before we get too far away from the comment that you just made. I wish you would relate the circumstances under which you were directed or, as you say compelled to sign some order, or to sign some paper. Where did this happen, and who was present? How was it handled? What was said to you? Anything of that nature?
A On the 18th of December of last year I was brought here to the jail in Nurnberg in Garmisch where we were in camp we were told that it was very urgent that before Christmas we had to be interrogated. Therefore, on the 18th of December 1946 we arrived here. Until the 3rd of January of this year I was locked up in a cell. I was allowed to talk to nobody. Every eight days or so I was let out of the cell. At that time I made two applications as to why I was here, but I didn't get an answer.
Q If you'll speak just a little slower, General Leyser, please.
A I just said that I made two applications so that I should be told why I was here, but I received no answer. On the 3rd of January -it could perhaps have been the 4th, I would not like to say that that was the exact date -- several gentlemen, amongst them General Rendulic and General Dohner, were also called to the office and were told that we were to be released. We said, at that time, we must have some kind of papers. There was a captain there who explained......
Q What was his name? What was his name?
A I don't know the name.
Q Did he give you his name?
A No, he didn't state his name.
Q Do you know any of the officers or men who were present -- do you know their names, or were their names given to you?
A No, no name was mentioned to me at all. The Captain stated that he came from Dachau and that his job was to release us generals. And he said he had the commission from the Army to do this. But he didn't present any papers, and thereupon we said that that wasn't valid or correct. But we were told that we were to sign. I then told him that this was only being done under force; so since I was doing it under orders I then signed my name.
Q What did you sign?
A This was the release paper which every prisoner of war has to sign when he is released. And this, of course, is an indication that he is released and free, but we were not released. We had to sign the paper, but the paper was not given to us. Therefore, we were not released. I couldn't recognize this, since a release can be effective only if one is set free. But I was not set free. As a result, on this release paper I signed my name and indicated that I had signed by force and also "under orders."
Q Did you write that on the paper?
A Yes, I wrote that on the paper. This paper is down in the office, and those words are written on it. I didn't get the release paper.
Q You state that you were forced to sign it. Now, what did you mean by that? What happened?
A The officer concerned told us that if we didn't sign, then he said we would then be exposed to some kind of disciplinary action. That was a kind of threat. Thereupon we were sent back to our cells. Then, on the 6th of January, about three days later, I was interrogated for the first time. During this interrogation I was told nothing about.....