The apprehension is to be the duty of the corps but the evacuation is the duty of the Creation government -- and how noes it continue, General? We stopped at the 31st of May.
A. On the 30th of June it states in the war diary that then the 264th Division orders the speeded up evacuation of the band suspects from Split and that this was absolutely necessary for the security of the troops. I would like to add here that shootings were going on the whole time in Split and raids of some kind or another, In the period which followed the evacuation as it was ordered - was partially carried out.
Q. And now I continue with the discussion of the war diary, General, and would like to refer you to an entry which is rather earlier. It is the entry from the 30th of April 1944, English page 103 and German 147. The entry is as follows:
"The evacuation of several coastal localities which is urgently necessary is requested at army headquarters". Do you remember this, General, and which localities were referred to here and for which reasons this evacuation seemed necessary to the corps?
A. Since the localities are not mentioned here in the war diary, I can't remember any make definite statements but in general I can say that localities which seemed to be especially dangerous or points at which we had especially strong points had for military reasons to be evacuated by the civilian population, especially if it had been established that these localities sympathized with the bands or carried out espionage activities for the bands; but, since the corps could not order an evacuation by itself, it had made an application to the Army for this.
Q. And, General, can you say whether this application was agreed to; that is, whether the evacuation of these coastal localities was carried out?
A. The army agreed to the reasons provided by us but they reserved this order for the carrying out.
Q. I would like to point out here that the reservation with regard to this order by the army is also to be found in the war diary. It is the entry of the 20th of May 1944, English page 104, German page 119, and then what did the corps do, General?
A. Since as I have previously stated, the sabotage acts continued, the corps again made an application to the army and, above all, they asked that the island of Ulja and a few coastal strong points were especially to be evacuated.
Q And was this suggestion by the Corps actually accepted by the superior office, General?
A I can't remember whether afterwards it was actually carried out, but for the security of the troops at that time, as I have already mentioned, blocked zones were setup on the coast.
Q And a further question in this connection, General, which can be of interest: During the evacuations, as far as they were carried out, was there any regard taken for the civilian population, or were the evacuations just carried out ruthlessly only taking into account the military necessity?
A This can also be seen from the documents. For instance, it can be seen that all the members of the monasteries were to be exempted from the evacuation and that, of course, the monasteries themselves were to be treated carefully. This can be seen from the documents. It is one of the documents submitted by you.
Q And here, your Honors, I would like to refer again to Leyser Document No. 28, from my Document Book II, page 82. It is the supplement to the Prosecution document of the War Diary of the XVth Corps. It is dated the 20th of March, which is the entry to which General Leyser has already referred. The page 85 of my Document Book and page 84-a of the English Document Book. I would like to quote briefly from the last entry under this date: "By order of Second Panzer Army Headquarters the two coastal divisions, 264th and 392nd Divisions, are directed to exclude from the evacuation of the isles the members of the Great administrative authorities; furthermore, to spare all members of monasteries and the monasteries themselves, and to report the number of clergymen concerned on each island."
The next entry, under the 8th of April 1944, on page 85 of the English Document Book, I would like to quote: "Army Headquarters orders that in the course of the evacuation of the population in the isle and coastal region, the purely human interests of the population of the allied state Croatia be given every consideration and unnecessary hardships be avoided."
Witness, has this Army Order, to which the Corps refers here and which was passed on to the subordinate forces, also been observed by them?
A Yes, of course.
Q And now we must go back again, General, to the War Diary. As far as it has been submitted by the Prosecution. First of all with regard to this problem on which we have touched, that is, the treatment of the civilian population during evacuations I would like to submit one document. This is in Leyser Document Book I, on page 60, Leyser Document No. 20. I would like to offer it as Leyser Exhibit No. 50. This is an affidavit by a woman, Frau Gerta Onken, dated the 20th of September 1947, which was duly sworn to before a notary in Kirchzarten on the same date. I skip the introduction and read from figure 1. It is the last two lines on the first page of the document:
"I became acquainted with General von Leyser in 1943 in Zara, where I had arrived by plane to serve with the Armed Forces Welfare Organization.
"For various reasons I remained there involuntarily for a long time. General von Leyser had come to Zara a short time before a mopping-up operation in the blockaded islands and like myself had to prolong his stay involuntarily.
"During this time I often had the opportunity of conversing with him. General von Leyser had a natural and straightforward manner towards the troops and also endeavored to smooth out as much as possible the serious political differences between the Italians and the Croats in Zara.
"2. From my own experience I can state the following about the treatment of the population of the conquered islands; a) One morning a number of people, men and women in ragged clothing, who had been picked up during a partisan operation on the islands, were led into the garden of the casino. An interrogation of them was begun and was carried out in an absolutely normal and humane manner. Shortly afterwards a large part of the people were released, in particular all the women. b) A few days after the conquest of the islands I sailed over there in a boat, I found a number of people on the shore, among them also the new town commander whom I knew from my lectures.
The latter asked me to take a woman in an advanced state of pregnancy to the hospital immediately; to the joy of the population I naturally agreed at once and the woman climbed into the boat with me. At our request a truck parked on the shore in Zara actually got the woman to the hospital in time. Such a readiness among the troops to help the civilian population was taken for granted. c) When the Croatian Minister of the Interior, Lorkovic, took over the civilian administration of the islands with the regimental commander, they were cordially and hospitably received there, which would certainly not have been the case if the troops had been plundering or committing atrocities. I saw no very large destruction anywhere on the islands, above all, no artillery or air force units had been used there and the resistance had not been great, either."
Now, General, let us go back to Prosecution Document, Exhibit No. 385, in the Diary of your Corps. Here on German page 148 and English page 104 there is an entry which can be cleared up a little. Here it states "the 264th Division received the order to carry out most severe measures for plundering and lack of discipline shown by the troops in Zara." There fore, it could be concluded from this that there the troops had plundered the civilian population. Can you clear up this point?
A Zara was an old Italian fortification. In this fortification there were, of course, large stocks. As a result of the very frequent and very heavy airraids which had completely destroyed the town, the stocks were, for the most part, damaged, and the Wehrmacht goods were mostly stored in the open air. First of all, there was no other possibility of storing them or of transporting them, and the troops stationed in Zara used this opportunity to take food and cigarettes from the stocks there. Also articles of clothing were taken. This, of course, in the interest of discipline, had to be stopped, and that is the reason for this order to the 264th Division.
Q Therefore, it wasn't a question of property or goods of the civilian population, General, but they were Wehrmacht booty or German goods which the troops got in the well-known way of "organizing?"
A Yes, that is right.
Q General, now we have discussed all the documents which the Prosecution has presented with regard to the evacuation, as well as those which deal with the evacuation of the islands and those which deal with the planned evacuation of the coast. I would like to summarize your description in this way: Nothing at all was done with regard to the evacuation of the coast, which was planned in case of an enemy landing. You have also stated that the evacuation of the islands was necessary for military reasons, and you have also stated that only a very few islands were actually evacuated. According to your description the evacuation of the islands was not entirely carried out, and I think in conclusion you must say something else about this because the question of evacuations is very confusing for people who did not know the conditions there. Therefore, in concluding this chapter I would like you to clarify briefly for the Tribunal, what actually was evacuated and why these actual evacuations were necessary.
A It is correct that the evacuation was, at that time, already very confusing. But that, of course, was a result of the conditions at that time. In summarizing I can say, as far as I remember, that only those islands which were absolutely necessary for military reasons were evacuated and also then only the band suspects were evacuated. The coast itself was only prepared for evacuation, that is, plans were made if the enemy landed. With the exception of isolated, small strong points, which have already been mentioned, the so-called blocked zones were set up. That is, they were set up in the immediate neighborhood of the fortifications. This area was evacuated so that one can say that a large-scale evacuation, as was probably planned at the beginning never actually took place in the end, and it was mainly because it had been found out during the evacuation that an enormous number of men were concerned in my Corps sector alone 200,000 men.
Of course, these men would have been sent from the other sectors; so that alone was the reason why a large-scale evacuation was not carried out.
Q You haven't yet answered one part of my question. General, as to why these partial evacuations were actually carried out as they were and why the military leadership thought they were absolutely of a military necessity.
A Where the evacuations were carried out, for instance, on the island of Sota, the territory which belonged to the blocked zones, because it was absolutely necessary from a military point of view.
Q And the last question on this subject: Who actually carried out the evacuation, your troops or the Croatian authorities? And who further supervised the evacuation, your troops or again the Croatian authorities?
A This evacuation itself was carried out on the island by the troops in liaison with the Croatian authorities. The commitment of the evacuees was not actually carried out by orders of the German troops but under orders from the Croatian authorities.
Q General, this brings us to the end of the discussion of the documents which the Prosecution has submitted with regard to the XVth Corps. At the beginning of your description you stated the tactical tasks of your Corps. You described the situation which you found when you arrived there, and you stated the way in which you wanted to carry out your tasks in the military sphere. Now, I would like to ask you whether this task had been actually carried out when you left the Corps?
A Here, I would like to go back again to Sketch 4, which has already been submitted to the Tribunal. With the aid of this sketch I would like to illustrate briefly what the military situation was in July, 1944 when I left the Corps.
In the right Corps sector the coast had been reached. This can be seen better in comparison with Sketch No. 1. The main ports were built up as defense points, and in the foothills, which went directly to the sea in the right sector, these strongpoints were built up. The supply lines from Karlovac to the forward positions were secured with strong points, as can be seen from the map.
On the left Corps sector the coastal positions, as well as in the three main ports -- Zara, Sibenik, and Split, were built up and consolidated, and the intermediate terrain was also fortified. In the same way the mountain positions were, in the main, established, and the intermediate area between the coast and the foothils was cleared on large bands. This can also be seen from Sketch No. 4. in comparison with Sketch No. 1. The red markings in Sketch No. 1 are the band forces, for instance, Biograd, Obrovac, Benkovac, Skardin, etc. Now, as the sketch shows, at the German strong-point are set down in the sketch in blue. The main supply lines in the left Corps sector from Bihac forward were also fortified and secured. In the last months the bands, by our own active operations, were so heavily attacked on their strong-points, that they no longer dared undertake large-scale attacks against us. On the whole I can say that when I left the XVth Mountain Corps the military tasks which I had received was fulfilled insofar as the coastal fortifications as had been ordered were, in the main, built up and consolidated, and that large bands were no longer in existence in the coastal areas. This is in contrast to what the situation was when I took over at the beginning to what it was at the end of my command, in that it was possible for me to go to all the places I wanted to with only a small escort. That was the situation when I left the Corps.
Q Now, before we finally leave the XVth Corps, General, I have just one more question: In a number of interrogations the leave period played a very large part. I would now like to ask you bow long, during your activity as Commanding General of the XVth Army Corps, were you on leave?
A I took over the XVth Corps on the 1st of November, 1943, and at the end of July, 1944 I left it. During this period I was not on leave at all. Of course temporarily I went to the Army Headquarters for short periods, for a few days sometimes I was with the troops, but I was never absent for such a long period that it was necessary to appoint a deputy; so my leave had no very great importance
Q And now? we will go to the next chapter of your activity in the Balkans -- to the XXIst Mountain Corps. You just said that you left the XVth Corps at the end of July and took over the XXIst Mountain Corps. In this connection, first of all, a few basic questions. To whom was the XXIst Mountain Corps subordinates at that time?
AAt the beginning of my activity there the XXIst Mountain Corps was subordinate to the Second Panzer Army, and later on it was subordinate to Army Group E.
Q And then we can place the beginning of your activity, General, at the end of July or the beginning of August, 1944. Since during the proceedings we have spoken quite a lot about the Second Panzer Army, General, I would like to ask you who commanded the Second Panzer Army, when the XXIst Mountain Corps was subordinate to you. Was it General Rendulic at that time, or was it some other general?
A When I took over the XXIst Corps General Bendulic was no longer in charge. The man in charge General d'Angelis.
Q General, who became you successor as Commanding General of the XVth Corps?
A My successor was General Fehn, who had the XXIst Corps.
Q Then, if I understand you correctly, General, there was an exchange between the Commanding Generals of the XVth and the XXIst Corps.
That is, between you and General Fehn. Is that correct?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q That is rather unusual, General. The XXIst Corps was also subordinate to the Second Panzer Army, as well as the XVth Corps. That must be rather a rare occurrence that two Commanding Generals in the same area were exchanged. What were the reasons for this rather unusual measure?
A It is correct that such an exchange was rather unusual. The reason was roughly the following: At the end of July, 1944 General Fehn, who was deputizing for the Commander in Chief of the IInd Army, called me on the telephone and told me that I was to exchange with him. First of all I tried to have this decision revoked since I had just become accustomed to the XVth Army Corps; nevertheless, Army Group F turned this down, and I was ordered, before I took over my new command, to report personally to General Freiherr von Weichs. In the last days of July a discussion took place between the Commanding Generals at Army Headquarters and I was told that on the way there I should personally report to Field Marshal von Weichs. Therefore, I went to Belgrade and I reported to Field Marshal von Weichs. He told me something like the following: He regretted very much that he had to make this change, but it was in the interest of a smooth leadership of the XXIth Army Corps and was very necessary. General Fehn had rather got stuck politically, but above all were General Fehn and the Higher SS and Police Leader.....
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Perhaps, General, you would start the sentence again.
A Well, he said that above all, between General Fehn, the SS Fuehrer Vitztum, who was the High SS and Police Leader there in Albania and the Commander of the SS Skanderbeg Division, there had frequently been disputes which were not bearable for a long period. Amongst other things, he told me that when I got there I wasn't to bother myself at all about the political affairs and, further, he said that I should make no private visits to Albanian families and to keep myself apart from this as far as possible in the same way as I had had no political activity in Croatia. Of course I should make my official visits to the Government there but otherwise I should remain reserved. Above all, he stressed that the SS Skanderbeg Division stationed there was no longer subordinate to me. This SS Division Skanderbeg was in the process of being set up there and I shouldn't worry myself about this at all and should keep my hands off it so that there would be no more friction between the SS Fuehrer, the SS Division there, and myself.
In addition, he said that of course if perhaps later on large fighting would take place - at that time part of the rear movement had already started - that then this SS Division or at least parts of this SS Division might become tactically subordinate to me; I should in every case, however, make an application to the Army, but otherwise I should not bother myself about this division at all since it was not subordinate to me. Then I went to the army conference and from there I went to Tirana where the corps was stationed and I arrived on the 31st of July or the first of August.
DR. TIPP: Your Honor, with regard to this point, which is of very great importance for General von Leyser's case, I have a few difficulties about evidence here. Your Honors know that General Fieldmarshal von Weichs at the moment is excused from the sessions and one cannot know whether or when he is coming back to these sessions and whether or not he can take his stand in the witness box and therefore with regard to this point mentioned by General Leyser I cannot call Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Field Marshal Weichs for testimony. But as a precaution with regard to this point and to another point which I will come to later, I have obtained two affidavits from General Fieldmarshal von Weichs and have included them in my document book.
I would suggest that I should be allowed to continue in the same way as was done with the affidavit of General Lindemann. That is, these affidavits are submitted for the time as affidavits and I should be allowed to introduce them in evidence. If, contrary to expectations, Field Marshal Weichs should be able to appear in the witness stand, then of course, I would agree that the affidavits be struck from the records since I would then be able to question Field Marshal Weichs about this in the witness stand, which of course is better evidence. In addition, I would like to say that I am in the happy position of having my three document books completely translated and the two witnesses I wish to bring are already here, so that I can examine General von Leyser without interruption.
It would without doubt be very expedient if this presentation of evidence is not interrupted here by the fact that General Fieldmarshal Weichs cannot appear in the witness stand. Therefore, I would like to ask that I can introduce for the moment these two affidavits.
MR. FULKERSON: If your Honor please, I have no objection to that proposal provided, if General von Weichs does become well enough to be seen by a member of the Prosecution and questioned about this affidavit, even though he is not well enough to come into court and testify, that the Prosecution be permitted, if it would appear that that is necessary, to submit a counter-affidavit or a supplemental affidavit to the one which Dr. Tipp has obtained. This is rather a this, in the and, will amount to taking his deposition in two affidavits but at least that way we will have the opportunity to question him, provided of course his health is improved enough to permit that about the statements which he has made in the affidavit which Dr. Tipp now proposes to introduce.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE PRESIDENT: What is your comment as to the suggestion made by a member of the prosecution staff, Dr. Tipp?
DR. TIPP: I of course have nothing against that, your Honor. I don't know sufficient about General Fieldmarshal von Weichs' health, but I think I can assume that according to what Dr. Laternser says a short interrogation by the Prosecution is quite possible.
THE PRESIDENT: By reason of the statements made by the member of the Prosecution staff and the further statement made by Dr. Tipp, you may proceed with the presentation of the affidavit.
MR. FULKERSON: And I believe that in the event that General von Weichs is able to come back into the courtroom to testify then the affidavit will be subject to a motion to strike by the Prosecution as we did with other affidavits.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will entertain such a motion if it is necessary and if it is deemed advisable. You may proceed.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q Then I offer from my Document Book II, page 118, Leyser Document No. 14. I offer this as Leyser Exhibit No. 51. This is an affidavit by Fieldmarshal Maxmilian von Weichs, sworn to in Nurnberg on the 31st of July, 1947, before the Summary Court Officer, Capt. Binder. Because it is so important, I would like to read the affidavit. It is to be found as I have already stated on page 118 of the document book, figure 1:
"1. The XV and XXI Mountain Corps belonged to Army Group F, which was under my command. Up to the end of July 1944, General von LEYSER was the commanding general of the XV Mountain Corps, General FEHN commanding general of the XXI Mountain Corps. Towards the end of July 1944, I gave these two commanding generals the order to exchange their respective mountain corps.
"2. The main reason was the existence of strained relations between General FEHN and the SS and political leader VITZTUM, which led to constant friction. HIMMLER had achieved that the SS-Division Skander Court No. V, Case No. VII.
beg was established in the Kosserow region."
I would like to interpolate here briefly, your Honor, and point out a mistake in the copying. It says SS Division Skanderberg. Of course it is the SS Division Skanderbeg. I would ask that if this mistake is in the English document book it should be corrected. It crops up again later on. And I continue:
"SS-Brigadefuehrer VITZTUM was to lead this establishment. The SS-Division Skanderbeg was placed under his command. VITZTUM received his instructions in this matter from the SS-Main Office directly. Since General FEHN as commanding general of the XXI Mountain Corps, which was in Albania where this Division was now to be activated as well, apparently considered himself likewise responsible for this activation and tried to interfere in this direction, friction ensued.
"3. In order to eliminate the friction that had arisen, I transferred the command of the XXI Mountain Corps to General von LEYSER, whom I knew from our official co-operation to be a calm and deliberate man. By this measure I meant to prevent serious difficulties.
"Before taking over his command of the XXI Mountain Corps, I summoned General von LEYSER to Belgrade in order to give him special directives: namely not to pay any attention to the SS-Division Skanderbeg and that he had better leave his hands off the matter. I explicitly emphasized that the SS was not under his command, that it operated on its own responsibility and according to directives given by the SS-Main Office. In doing so I told him that in case of larger scale actions the SS-Division might, of course, be tactically put under his command upon request."
As from your testimony, General, and also from the affidavit of General Fieldmarshal von Weichs, it can be seen that between your predecessor, General Fehn, and the delegate of the Reichsfuehrer SS in Albania, SS Brigadefuehrer Vitztum, there were political frictions, I would like to ask you whether you yourself in this connection also had any kind of difficulties at all?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A Well, one can't call them difficulties, but I know that Fieldmarshal von Weichs had received a complaint or whatever you want to call it, through envoy Kasche about ma and my staff.
Q With regard to this point, your Honor, I would like to submit another document which is also contained in Document Book II on page 120. This is Leyser Document No. 42 and I offer it as Leyser Exhibit No. 52. This is another affidavit by Fieldmarshal von Weichs. I would like to refer briefly -
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, please, Before we proceed with the reading of the affidavit I think it might be advisable if we take our noon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Court is recessed until 1330.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom please take their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Tipp.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General von Leyser, my last question before the recess was whether during your activity in Albania as Commanding General of the 21st Corps, you encountered any political difficulties. I was caused to put this question to you through a preceding answer of yours, namely that General Fehn who was your predecessor in the command, was replaced because of differences of opinion which occurred between you and Vitztum in Tirana, the capital of Albania. Will you give us your brief comments on this?
A I said that I did not have any direct difficulties, but I do know that Fieldmarshal von Weichs had received a complaint or whatever you want to call it via the envoy Kasche about myself and the staff of my corps.
Q In this connection, your Honors, I have offered Leyser Document No. 42 contained in Document Book II of the Defense, page 120. I offered this document as Leyser Exhibit 52. I would like to read some passages from this affidavit. The affidavit of General Fieldmarshal von Weichs starts as follows:
"About December 1944 or January 1945, I received an anonymous letter through the ambassador KASCHE. This letter contained a brief opinion of the gentlemen of the Staff of the XXI. Mountain Artillery Corps.
"The opinion given about Herr v. LEYSER was approximately the following: "The Commanding General v. LEYSER is a rather good soldier, very kind and cooperative; at times it is hard to find out what his intentions are, at conferences he is very smart and clever. He does not cooperate with all his heart, but merely because of his sense of duty. His staff has the reputation of being reactionary.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
"Since, on principle, I do not take up such anonymous letters, I told that to the ambassador - I forwarded the letter officially to General v. LEYSER.
"It seemed very probable to me that this letter originated from a supervisory office in Albania, since the knowledge of the statements could come only from that time. It is even more probable that the origin of this letter could be found in this direction, since after 20 July 1944 the supervisory activities of the SD had considerably increased."
General von Leyser, may I put a question to this particular problem? The date of 20th of July, 1944, is mentioned here. Would you please tell the Tribunal to what event this date refers?
A This means the attempt on Hitler's life which occurred on that date, on the 20th of July, 1944.
Q I would then like to continue.
"For me this was an indication that General v. LEYSER, in accordance with the directions given by me before the taking over of the XXI Mountain Artillery Corps, was, in order to avoid incidents, kind and cooperative in his behavior and attitude towards the other officers, above all, towards the SS and police leader VITZTUM (special commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer-SS HIMMLER), with whom there were conflicts before, but he obviously acted with reserve in accordance with the orders given by me."
After these preliminary questions, General, I would like to put to you the following question; when did you take over the command of the XXI Corps?
A I am afraid I cannot give you the exact date, but I do know for sure that for instance on the 20th of July, which is the day when the attempt on Hitler's life occurred, I was still with the XV Corps. Subsequent to this, roughly about four to five days later, I want via Sarajevo to attend this conference which had been ordered by the army and than I was present at a discussion with Fieldmarshal von Weichs. To the best of my recollection, around the 31st of July I must have Court No. V, Case No. VII.
arrived in Tirana and I think it was then I took over the leadership of the Corps, roughly around the 1st of August.
Q We can then take the first of August, 1944, when you took over this command. Could that be correct?
A Yes, that would be about correct.
Q The Prosecution has further submitted a number of documents incriminating you. I would like to discuss these documents with you in chronological order. The first document which I would like you to have a look at is contained in Document Book 13, on page 102 of the German Document Book and on page 131 of the English text. This is document NOKW-951 of the Prosecution which had been offered as Prosecution Exhibit 334 and the entry which I am mainly concerned with is in Document Book XIII of the English version on page 131. I assume that the Prosecution made a mistake when submitting this document. This document represents an excerpt from the War Diary of the XXI Mountain Corps from the period of the 1st to the 30th November, 1943. The 100th Infantry Division reports here under the 15th of November, 1943, that on the occasion of Operation 505, reprisal measures were carried out against two Italian officers.
Will you make your comments to this report in order to keep the record clear?
AAs is clear from the date, this must be an error on the part of the Prosecution because as we have just established, I took over the leadership of the XXI Corps only on the 1st of August, 1944, and these incidents reported here occurred in November, 1943. For that reason, I cannot be concerned with these happenings.
Q One other document to which this same circumstance applies has been submitted by the Prosecution in Document Book XV. It is contained on page 73 of the English document book and on page 100 of the German text. This is Prosecution Document NOKW-931 submitted as exhibit of the Prosecution Exhibit 371. This again is a report from the 100th Infantry Division which at that time was subordinate to the XXI Corps.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
This particular report is dated the 13th of December 1943 and furthermore we have in the same document a report of the 17 December, 1943. Both these reports, according to the text of the document, are addressed to the headquarters of the XXI Corps, not to the headquarters of the XV Corps. Will you please clarify these circumstances too, General?
A The same applies which I said before. Since I only took over command of the Corps on the 1st of August, 1944, this particular report is dated way before my time.
Q A third document of this type has been offered in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution; it is contained on page 53 of the English text and on page 102 of the German document book. This is Document NOKW-833 of the Prosecution which was submitted as Exhibit 380 of the Prosecution. Here we have a report of the same agencies dated the 4th of February, 1944. I might assume then, General, that the same applies here as did for the document which we have discussed before.
A Yes, the same applies here.
Q After we have clarified these points, we shall now start to discuss the actual tasks of the XXI Corps. First of all, I would like you to answer the following question. In what area was this Corps stationed?
A The XXI Mountain Corps was stationed, first of all, in the area of Albania and Montenegro. The headquarters of the Corps staff was in Tirana which is the capital of the independent state Albania.
Q What units were subordinate to you when you were with the XXI Corps?
AAt first, I had two divisions subordinate to me: The 181st Division and the 297th Division.
Q. Did you, at a later time, have any other units subordinate to you, General?
A. Later on, during my time as commander of the 21st Corps, I had many other divisions subordinate to me.
Q. Can you briefly, in order to inform the Tribunal, tell us how large, approximately, was the area of your corps sector?
A. Every division had approximately a coastal sector of 250 kilometers. I believe that illustrates best the size of the area which was under the command of the corps.
Q. Will you please also tell us something about the assignment of the 21st Corps?
A. The 21st Corps had approximately the same task as had the 15th Corps. By that I mean securing of the coastal area against a possible enemy landing.
Q. You said that two divisions were subordinate to you, one of each of which hand to secure and to defend a coastal area of 250 kilometers. Was it possible for these troops also to take care of the security of the hinterland? As you know, this securing of the hinterland has played a considerable part when we discussed the tasks of the 15th Corps.
A. I'll like to say, in this connection, that the rear area of the 21st Corps, when I took over the command, was very much quieter than it was when I took over the command of the 15th Corps; but the divisions had several rifle battalions at its disposal for the securing of this area who were to be in charge of the securing of the supply lines, et cetera. Besides, in this rear area which had been newly attached to Albania, the so-called Kossorew district was occupied by the SS Division Skanderbeck, so that there certain security of supply lines could be achieved by the units already stationed there. This division as I'd like to stress again, was not subordinate to me as we have established before.
Q. General, what were the opponents whom you had to face in that particular area?