Q May it please the Tribunal, I would like to point out in this connection I have already offered one document and the part which concerns this problem, I would like to refer to here. It is document 25, von Leyser, on page 74 of Leyser document book 1. I have already offered it as von Leyser exhibit 18. It is an affidavit of the Catholic Chaplain Alois Krauss, who was a division chaplain and garrison minister and worked with the 187th reserve infantry division. I would like to refer to numeral 2 of this affidavit, which is on page 75 of this document book. I quote:
Of an order that enemy commandos and therewith also all Englishmen and Americans who landed and were taken prisoners in Croatia, were to be shot at once, I have never heard, neither at the field headquarters Agram nor at our division staff. This order would doubtlessly have become known to me as the garrison priest and division minister, at least, if it had been a secret order, I should have received some sort of knowledge of it during my practical work as chaplain. I do not believe that such an order when existed. I personally met only one American soldier in the hospital at Slavonic Brod. His airplane had been shot down in a regular manner and the was brought into the hospital where he died, although he received the same medical assistance and care as every other German soldier."
The affidavit then goes on to say that the American soldier was buried with military honors and that his personal data were put at the disposal of the American Military Government.
I continue on page 3 of the affidavit, which is page 76 of the document book:
"During my service as army chaplain in Salonika Greece in the year 1942 until February, 1943 I also met in a hospital there two wounded and imprisoned flyers of the English Army.
They belonged to the Catholic faith. One was from London, the other from Melbourne, Australia; I alleviated their captivity for them as far as possible, assisted them economically and even supplied them with good English literature."
In this connection, I would like to offer a few more documents. The first of which is Leyser document No. 22, contained in Leyser document book 1 on page 67. I am offering it as Leyser affidavit of Martin Gareis dated 11 September, 1947. Mr. Gareis was General of the Infantry, retired and the affidavit was sworn to before the Mayor of Rottach on the 11th of September 1947. This affiant again under numeral one mentions his position and says:
"From middle of May until 10 October 1944 I was commander of the 264th Infantry Division operated in Croatia in the Zara-Split-Drnis area as occupation force. General von Leyser, Commanding General of the XVth Mountain Corps, was at that time my immediate superior until his transfer in about August 1944."
Figure two deals with the reprisal measures and I do not want to read it in this particular context. Figure three deals with the evacuation order and since at the moment we are dealing with this particular problem, I would like to read out No. 3:
"As an enemy landing at the Adriate coast was highly probable, an army field order for the evacuation of the islands had - as far as I remember - been issued before my time as commander of the 264th Infantry Division.
After a re-examination it turned out that many thousands would have been involved, who however would have been a great burden in the rear areas. For that reason this evacuation was limited to unreliable elements only, which was absolutely necessary for military reasons and for the security of the troops. These evacuations were executed in agreement with the Croatian offices. This was about completed when I took the command of 264th Infantry Division. There existed only an order to prepare, in agreement with the Military Administration Headquarters and the Croatian authorities, for an evacuation in case of an actual enemy landing.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Paragraph 4 deals with General von Leyser's personality and I would like to recommend its contents to the judicial notice of the Tribunal. Number 5 deals with what is most material here, the commando order and I quote:
"To the area which was assigned to the 264th Infantry Division for occupation there also belonged several islands lying off the coast, among them the island of Solta on which two companies were stationed. From the island of Lissa English troops repeatedly tried to attack the occupation forces of Solta, but without success. Prisoners were taken at these occasions, who were always treated as prisoners of war. This was a matter of course not only in the area of the 264th Infantry Division, but also with the neighboring command, for instance, I clearly remember a more important English attack on the larger island neighboring Solta. At that time numerous English prisoners were taken, among them also a Major Churchill, cousin of the English Minister, who will be able to confirm the irreproachable treatment of the prisoners.
"There can be no question at all of an extension of the socalled commando order to the area of the XVth Mountain Corps, according to which members of foreign military missions were not to be taken prisoner, but to be shot immediately. Such an order would have necessarily come to my knowledge."
The next document which I would like to offer in this connection is contained in document book 3 - von Leyser. This is von Leyser document No. 58 on page 201 of the document book. I would like to offer this document as von Leyser exhibit No. 48. This again is an affidavit of the city medical consultant and medical officer, Dr. Heinrich Francks from Gladbeck, dated 7 October, 1947. The affidavit was sworn to in Gladbeck on 7 October 1947 before a notary. The affiant says under No. 1:
"From 22 August 1943 till 18 February 1945 I was a member of the XXI Mountain Army Corps. During that time I was responsible for the medical services and the hygienic conditions in the area under the Court No. V, Case No. VII.
jurisdiction of the Corps, as well as for the removal of the wounded.
"Frequently, British and American soldiers and officers who had bailed out of airplanes, were treated in German army hospitals. Among them was a British General (Brigadier) and his assistant, a major, who organized in Albania the fight of Albanian groups against the German Army. The British Major was slightly wounded, and could soon be dismissed from the hospital. The General had a severe abdominal wound received from a shot; however after weeks of meticulous care and treatment at the hospital under my charge in Tirana, his life was preserved, and he was cured. His name, which I cannot recall, could be easily ascertained, as he was the only high officer, as far as I can remember, who was captured in this area. These British officers were taken away from the bandits' territory, where they were in a civilian house without attendance, by a German doctor in am ambulance. The general told me personally that he was glad and thankful to receive such good treatment, and that he had no other requests. Although there was extremely little space in the airplanes, he was removed by air, and not in a motor truck traveling long hours, nor by Red Cross train."
The next passage deals with the treatment of American parachuters and the affiant states that none of them were shot, hut when they were wounded they were taken care of in the military hospitals in Tirana and later on were removed in the same way just like the Americans who were not wounded.
Under numeral three the affiant says he knows nothing of the destruction of bandit hospitals:
"I repeatedly inquired about the way the wounded were cared for by the bandits. However, all I could learn was that the wounded and sick were handed over to the civilian population. I have never heard about hospitals, main dressing stations, or similar installations, as far as the Tito bandits were concerned."
Number four deals with the exchange of prisoners, the witness says:
Court No. V, Case No, VII.
"The exchange of prisoners in Croatia and Albania was such a frequent practice that it was generally known. As a patient, down with Spotted Fever at the Zagreb hospital, I talked to several other German soldiers, who also had Spotted Fever. These told me that they had been exchanged. They had been held captive by the Tito bandits."
Number 5 deals with an incident which seems suitable to illustrate General von Leyser's character. May I quote it:
"When in February 1945 the medical officer of the prisoner collecting point at Sarajevo informed me that there were spotted fever cases amongst the prisoners, I went there with a hygienist, and took all the measures for isolating, delousing, and caring for the patients, as well as delousing of the not affected ones. However, I found that there was not enough room for the sick people. When I reported to General von Leyser, he immediately ordered another building to be put at our disposal, although the town of Sarajevo was extremely crowded and did not possess many large buildings. Therefore, my request could have been rejected on very valid grounds. How serious the care for the sick was taken can be seen from the fact that both the medical officer of the prisoner collecting point, and the hygienist, as well as myself, caught spotted fever, when we attended to the care of the prisoners. This loss of 3 medical officers, who were of great importance to the Corps, as there was no substitute for them at that time, General von Leyser put up with in his anxiety for the well-being of the prisoners."
The next document, which I would like to offer in this connection is the following document: von Leyser document 59 in the same document book on page 204. I am offering this document as von Leyser exhibit 49. It is an affidavit of Dr. Fritz Heck from Thuengershein, dated 9 October 1947. The affidavit was sworn to on the same day before the Mayor. The affiant says after the initial remarks:
"From May 1943 to the end of the war I was stationed at the southeastern front as senior surgeon of the Army Medical Company 696.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
During that time, from fall 1943 till November 1944, I was posted as senior surgeon at the local hospital in Tirana, Albania.
"Having been requested to do so by Attorney Dr. Tipp, Fuerth/ Bavaria, I shall proceed to give the following report concerning the treatment given to the British Brigadier General Edmund Davies. I report this event according to a copy I made from a sick report:
"On 8 January 1944. at about 15.00 hours General Davies was seriously wounded during a skirmish in the Albanian mountains. At first he stayed in a hut for 3 days, without receiving any treatment. On 11 January he was taken into a village, where a German physician was the first time consulted on 12 January. This physician ordered on 13 January 1944 his removal to the army's local hospital at Tirana."
The further passages of the affidavit I do not want to read, Your Honors, it is a case-history with all its details concerning the treatment of Brig. General Davies. I would like to stress with what care, according to this report, General Davies was treated. Actually he was saved, whereas according to the report at the time he was brought to the hospital, it was expected that he would not survive. I would like to refer to the last but one paragraph of this affidavit on page 206, the affiant says here after describing the sickness of the General:
"From that time the healing process proceeded completely undisturbed. Both tubes could be shortened in the following days, and thus slowly be removed. The state of health became so improved that on 20 March the general could be transferred to the base hospital Semlin by a hospital airplane.
"Furthermore, I can certify that because of the serious condition of the wounded general, his every wish had to be granted, at my request, and that the German hospital staff behaved admirably in this respect."
After this interpolation, General, which mainly has dealt with the commando order, I would like you to continue. We had last dealt with the planned evacuation of the Island. We have to refer back again Court No. V, Case No. VII.
to the army's order of 13 April 1944, which is Exhibit 381. This exhibit you will find in document book 16 on page 55 of the English text and on page 105 of the German text. This order has been submitted as exhibit 381 and the number of the prosecution document is NOKW-674. Before you told us that number one of this order deals with the intended evacuation of the Island and Number two of this order contains provisions for the intended evacuation of the coast; was the evacuation of the coast carried out at all, General?
A In this connection, I have to point out that in accordance with this order the evacuation of the coast was only provided for in the event of an enemy landing and that for this event the necessary preparations were made. There is in this order nothing said about an actual execution of this evacuation and since no landing took place no evacuation was carried out.
Q I shall now have to deal with a different chapter, Your Honors, which will take quite some time so might. I suggest to have the recess now?
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, before the recess we were discussing the evacuation of the coast and you told us that this evacuation was only planned in case an enemy landing took place and that, therefore, the order of the 13th of February 1945 only had as its subject the intended evacuation; and now we come to the evacuation of individual localities on the coast or the planning of this evacuation.
The documents which refer to the subject are concerned a great deal with the evacuation of Split. Would you state something generally about this evacuation?
A. The army had ordered the evacuation of Split since Split was a definite band strong point. It was a port and it was a permanent center of unrest and there were very many band suspects there and many band suspects from the neighboring districts came to this place.
First I remember it was reported at the time from the corps that about 5,000 men had to be evacuated and this can be seen from a document -- I don't know the number any more.
Q. I would like to state the number of this document. It is again the war diary of the 15th Corps, NOKW-1445, Exhibit No. 395; and the entry which you have just referred to here, General, is to be found in Document Book XVI, English on page 101, German page 146.
On the 10th of March it is stated that the men to be evacuated from Split would be about 5,000. Would you please continue here, General?
A. If these 5,000 men had to be transported then at once a few hundred lorries would have had to be made available and, of course, the troops hadn't got that number of lorries; and the execution as it had been ordered was at first not possible for this reason and then the corps reported to the army about this and thereupon the army ordered, because the evacuation was practically not possible, that in Split searches should be carried out monthly for bands suspects.
Q. This order of the army is again mentioned in the war diary of the 15th Corps in Exhibit 395, English page 102, German page 147, It is the war diary entry from the 1st of April 1944--and what was the purpose of this ordered search, General?
A. Through this it was intended at least to have some control over suspect elements in Split.
Q. And then how did the matter proceed, General?
A. Again from the war diary one can see on the 31st of May there is an entry which states that the evacuation was only proceeding very slowly, that the personnel available for this was insufficient for a thorough apprehension of a large number of persons but the Croatian police had orders to wait for the arrival of a government representative and from this it can be seen that the evacuation was not just carried out at random but only people who did not belong in the place and suspects were to be located; otherwise, a search would not have been necessary; but it also can be seen from this the transport was a matter for the Croatian officers; otherwise, there would have been no need to await for the arrival of the Croatian representative.
Q. I would like to state that with regard to this point the transportation was a matter for the Croatian representatives and there is another entry about this in the War Diary. This is the entry dated the 6th of May 1944 which is to be found in the English document book on page 103 and in the German on page 148. This entry states that now the evacuation of band suspects from Split in large numbers has not been ordered by the army.
The apprehension is to be the duty of the corps but the evacuation is the duty of the Creation government -- and how noes it continue, General? We stopped at the 31st of May.
A. On the 30th of June it states in the war diary that then the 264th Division orders the speeded up evacuation of the band suspects from Split and that this was absolutely necessary for the security of the troops. I would like to add here that shootings were going on the whole time in Split and raids of some kind or another, In the period which followed the evacuation as it was ordered - was partially carried out.
Q. And now I continue with the discussion of the war diary, General, and would like to refer you to an entry which is rather earlier. It is the entry from the 30th of April 1944, English page 103 and German 147. The entry is as follows:
"The evacuation of several coastal localities which is urgently necessary is requested at army headquarters". Do you remember this, General, and which localities were referred to here and for which reasons this evacuation seemed necessary to the corps?
A. Since the localities are not mentioned here in the war diary, I can't remember any make definite statements but in general I can say that localities which seemed to be especially dangerous or points at which we had especially strong points had for military reasons to be evacuated by the civilian population, especially if it had been established that these localities sympathized with the bands or carried out espionage activities for the bands; but, since the corps could not order an evacuation by itself, it had made an application to the Army for this.
Q. And, General, can you say whether this application was agreed to; that is, whether the evacuation of these coastal localities was carried out?
A. The army agreed to the reasons provided by us but they reserved this order for the carrying out.
Q. I would like to point out here that the reservation with regard to this order by the army is also to be found in the war diary. It is the entry of the 20th of May 1944, English page 104, German page 119, and then what did the corps do, General?
A. Since as I have previously stated, the sabotage acts continued, the corps again made an application to the army and, above all, they asked that the island of Ulja and a few coastal strong points were especially to be evacuated.
Q And was this suggestion by the Corps actually accepted by the superior office, General?
A I can't remember whether afterwards it was actually carried out, but for the security of the troops at that time, as I have already mentioned, blocked zones were setup on the coast.
Q And a further question in this connection, General, which can be of interest: During the evacuations, as far as they were carried out, was there any regard taken for the civilian population, or were the evacuations just carried out ruthlessly only taking into account the military necessity?
A This can also be seen from the documents. For instance, it can be seen that all the members of the monasteries were to be exempted from the evacuation and that, of course, the monasteries themselves were to be treated carefully. This can be seen from the documents. It is one of the documents submitted by you.
Q And here, your Honors, I would like to refer again to Leyser Document No. 28, from my Document Book II, page 82. It is the supplement to the Prosecution document of the War Diary of the XVth Corps. It is dated the 20th of March, which is the entry to which General Leyser has already referred. The page 85 of my Document Book and page 84-a of the English Document Book. I would like to quote briefly from the last entry under this date: "By order of Second Panzer Army Headquarters the two coastal divisions, 264th and 392nd Divisions, are directed to exclude from the evacuation of the isles the members of the Great administrative authorities; furthermore, to spare all members of monasteries and the monasteries themselves, and to report the number of clergymen concerned on each island."
The next entry, under the 8th of April 1944, on page 85 of the English Document Book, I would like to quote: "Army Headquarters orders that in the course of the evacuation of the population in the isle and coastal region, the purely human interests of the population of the allied state Croatia be given every consideration and unnecessary hardships be avoided."
Witness, has this Army Order, to which the Corps refers here and which was passed on to the subordinate forces, also been observed by them?
A Yes, of course.
Q And now we must go back again, General, to the War Diary. As far as it has been submitted by the Prosecution. First of all with regard to this problem on which we have touched, that is, the treatment of the civilian population during evacuations I would like to submit one document. This is in Leyser Document Book I, on page 60, Leyser Document No. 20. I would like to offer it as Leyser Exhibit No. 50. This is an affidavit by a woman, Frau Gerta Onken, dated the 20th of September 1947, which was duly sworn to before a notary in Kirchzarten on the same date. I skip the introduction and read from figure 1. It is the last two lines on the first page of the document:
"I became acquainted with General von Leyser in 1943 in Zara, where I had arrived by plane to serve with the Armed Forces Welfare Organization.
"For various reasons I remained there involuntarily for a long time. General von Leyser had come to Zara a short time before a mopping-up operation in the blockaded islands and like myself had to prolong his stay involuntarily.
"During this time I often had the opportunity of conversing with him. General von Leyser had a natural and straightforward manner towards the troops and also endeavored to smooth out as much as possible the serious political differences between the Italians and the Croats in Zara.
"2. From my own experience I can state the following about the treatment of the population of the conquered islands; a) One morning a number of people, men and women in ragged clothing, who had been picked up during a partisan operation on the islands, were led into the garden of the casino. An interrogation of them was begun and was carried out in an absolutely normal and humane manner. Shortly afterwards a large part of the people were released, in particular all the women. b) A few days after the conquest of the islands I sailed over there in a boat, I found a number of people on the shore, among them also the new town commander whom I knew from my lectures.
The latter asked me to take a woman in an advanced state of pregnancy to the hospital immediately; to the joy of the population I naturally agreed at once and the woman climbed into the boat with me. At our request a truck parked on the shore in Zara actually got the woman to the hospital in time. Such a readiness among the troops to help the civilian population was taken for granted. c) When the Croatian Minister of the Interior, Lorkovic, took over the civilian administration of the islands with the regimental commander, they were cordially and hospitably received there, which would certainly not have been the case if the troops had been plundering or committing atrocities. I saw no very large destruction anywhere on the islands, above all, no artillery or air force units had been used there and the resistance had not been great, either."
Now, General, let us go back to Prosecution Document, Exhibit No. 385, in the Diary of your Corps. Here on German page 148 and English page 104 there is an entry which can be cleared up a little. Here it states "the 264th Division received the order to carry out most severe measures for plundering and lack of discipline shown by the troops in Zara." There fore, it could be concluded from this that there the troops had plundered the civilian population. Can you clear up this point?
A Zara was an old Italian fortification. In this fortification there were, of course, large stocks. As a result of the very frequent and very heavy airraids which had completely destroyed the town, the stocks were, for the most part, damaged, and the Wehrmacht goods were mostly stored in the open air. First of all, there was no other possibility of storing them or of transporting them, and the troops stationed in Zara used this opportunity to take food and cigarettes from the stocks there. Also articles of clothing were taken. This, of course, in the interest of discipline, had to be stopped, and that is the reason for this order to the 264th Division.
Q Therefore, it wasn't a question of property or goods of the civilian population, General, but they were Wehrmacht booty or German goods which the troops got in the well-known way of "organizing?"
A Yes, that is right.
Q General, now we have discussed all the documents which the Prosecution has presented with regard to the evacuation, as well as those which deal with the evacuation of the islands and those which deal with the planned evacuation of the coast. I would like to summarize your description in this way: Nothing at all was done with regard to the evacuation of the coast, which was planned in case of an enemy landing. You have also stated that the evacuation of the islands was necessary for military reasons, and you have also stated that only a very few islands were actually evacuated. According to your description the evacuation of the islands was not entirely carried out, and I think in conclusion you must say something else about this because the question of evacuations is very confusing for people who did not know the conditions there. Therefore, in concluding this chapter I would like you to clarify briefly for the Tribunal, what actually was evacuated and why these actual evacuations were necessary.
A It is correct that the evacuation was, at that time, already very confusing. But that, of course, was a result of the conditions at that time. In summarizing I can say, as far as I remember, that only those islands which were absolutely necessary for military reasons were evacuated and also then only the band suspects were evacuated. The coast itself was only prepared for evacuation, that is, plans were made if the enemy landed. With the exception of isolated, small strong points, which have already been mentioned, the so-called blocked zones were set up. That is, they were set up in the immediate neighborhood of the fortifications. This area was evacuated so that one can say that a large-scale evacuation, as was probably planned at the beginning never actually took place in the end, and it was mainly because it had been found out during the evacuation that an enormous number of men were concerned in my Corps sector alone 200,000 men.
Of course, these men would have been sent from the other sectors; so that alone was the reason why a large-scale evacuation was not carried out.
Q You haven't yet answered one part of my question. General, as to why these partial evacuations were actually carried out as they were and why the military leadership thought they were absolutely of a military necessity.
A Where the evacuations were carried out, for instance, on the island of Sota, the territory which belonged to the blocked zones, because it was absolutely necessary from a military point of view.
Q And the last question on this subject: Who actually carried out the evacuation, your troops or the Croatian authorities? And who further supervised the evacuation, your troops or again the Croatian authorities?
A This evacuation itself was carried out on the island by the troops in liaison with the Croatian authorities. The commitment of the evacuees was not actually carried out by orders of the German troops but under orders from the Croatian authorities.
Q General, this brings us to the end of the discussion of the documents which the Prosecution has submitted with regard to the XVth Corps. At the beginning of your description you stated the tactical tasks of your Corps. You described the situation which you found when you arrived there, and you stated the way in which you wanted to carry out your tasks in the military sphere. Now, I would like to ask you whether this task had been actually carried out when you left the Corps?
A Here, I would like to go back again to Sketch 4, which has already been submitted to the Tribunal. With the aid of this sketch I would like to illustrate briefly what the military situation was in July, 1944 when I left the Corps.
In the right Corps sector the coast had been reached. This can be seen better in comparison with Sketch No. 1. The main ports were built up as defense points, and in the foothills, which went directly to the sea in the right sector, these strongpoints were built up. The supply lines from Karlovac to the forward positions were secured with strong points, as can be seen from the map.
On the left Corps sector the coastal positions, as well as in the three main ports -- Zara, Sibenik, and Split, were built up and consolidated, and the intermediate terrain was also fortified. In the same way the mountain positions were, in the main, established, and the intermediate area between the coast and the foothils was cleared on large bands. This can also be seen from Sketch No. 4. in comparison with Sketch No. 1. The red markings in Sketch No. 1 are the band forces, for instance, Biograd, Obrovac, Benkovac, Skardin, etc. Now, as the sketch shows, at the German strong-point are set down in the sketch in blue. The main supply lines in the left Corps sector from Bihac forward were also fortified and secured. In the last months the bands, by our own active operations, were so heavily attacked on their strong-points, that they no longer dared undertake large-scale attacks against us. On the whole I can say that when I left the XVth Mountain Corps the military tasks which I had received was fulfilled insofar as the coastal fortifications as had been ordered were, in the main, built up and consolidated, and that large bands were no longer in existence in the coastal areas. This is in contrast to what the situation was when I took over at the beginning to what it was at the end of my command, in that it was possible for me to go to all the places I wanted to with only a small escort. That was the situation when I left the Corps.
Q Now, before we finally leave the XVth Corps, General, I have just one more question: In a number of interrogations the leave period played a very large part. I would now like to ask you bow long, during your activity as Commanding General of the XVth Army Corps, were you on leave?
A I took over the XVth Corps on the 1st of November, 1943, and at the end of July, 1944 I left it. During this period I was not on leave at all. Of course temporarily I went to the Army Headquarters for short periods, for a few days sometimes I was with the troops, but I was never absent for such a long period that it was necessary to appoint a deputy; so my leave had no very great importance
Q And now? we will go to the next chapter of your activity in the Balkans -- to the XXIst Mountain Corps. You just said that you left the XVth Corps at the end of July and took over the XXIst Mountain Corps. In this connection, first of all, a few basic questions. To whom was the XXIst Mountain Corps subordinates at that time?
AAt the beginning of my activity there the XXIst Mountain Corps was subordinate to the Second Panzer Army, and later on it was subordinate to Army Group E.
Q And then we can place the beginning of your activity, General, at the end of July or the beginning of August, 1944. Since during the proceedings we have spoken quite a lot about the Second Panzer Army, General, I would like to ask you who commanded the Second Panzer Army, when the XXIst Mountain Corps was subordinate to you. Was it General Rendulic at that time, or was it some other general?
A When I took over the XXIst Corps General Bendulic was no longer in charge. The man in charge General d'Angelis.
Q General, who became you successor as Commanding General of the XVth Corps?
A My successor was General Fehn, who had the XXIst Corps.
Q Then, if I understand you correctly, General, there was an exchange between the Commanding Generals of the XVth and the XXIst Corps.
That is, between you and General Fehn. Is that correct?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q That is rather unusual, General. The XXIst Corps was also subordinate to the Second Panzer Army, as well as the XVth Corps. That must be rather a rare occurrence that two Commanding Generals in the same area were exchanged. What were the reasons for this rather unusual measure?
A It is correct that such an exchange was rather unusual. The reason was roughly the following: At the end of July, 1944 General Fehn, who was deputizing for the Commander in Chief of the IInd Army, called me on the telephone and told me that I was to exchange with him. First of all I tried to have this decision revoked since I had just become accustomed to the XVth Army Corps; nevertheless, Army Group F turned this down, and I was ordered, before I took over my new command, to report personally to General Freiherr von Weichs. In the last days of July a discussion took place between the Commanding Generals at Army Headquarters and I was told that on the way there I should personally report to Field Marshal von Weichs. Therefore, I went to Belgrade and I reported to Field Marshal von Weichs. He told me something like the following: He regretted very much that he had to make this change, but it was in the interest of a smooth leadership of the XXIth Army Corps and was very necessary. General Fehn had rather got stuck politically, but above all were General Fehn and the Higher SS and Police Leader.....