Q. General, up to now we have dealt with the islands which are supposed to have been occupied. The Prosecution, however, has submitted one more document dealing with these islands, and this particular document deals with an island which is already occupied, and this document deals with the protected areas within the islands. I mean Exhibit 389, Document Book 16. This particular entry is page 79 of the English, which is page 21 of the German text. The subject of this order is "Conduct of War in the Islands." Numeral I of the document is not contained in the document book of the Prosecution, and I would like to briefly quote the contents from the photostat. To put it briefly it deals with the defeating of commando attacks on these islands. I have clarified this paragraph I would like you to give brief comments to paragraph 2, which is contained in the document book of the Prosecution?
A. This is a purely tactical order, which can clearly be seen from this subject, which says, "Conduct of War in the Islands." As you have said just now, according to numeral I it deals with commando attacks on the islands. Under numeral 2 it says, it is a pre-requisite for successful defense against such operations that the enemy should learn from the population neither anything regarding the situation nor any details concerning our positions and strength. Consequently, blocked off zones are supposed to be installed around the position, and these areas were to be evacuated, and kept free of all population. Such blocked-off areas around fortifications are used by all armed forces, and such blocked-off zones are also necessary in order to eliminate the danger of sabotage and espionage. Since these blocked-off zones were also marked by posters, this order was well known to all civilians on the islands. Whoever entered such blocked off zones without special permission had to expect to be shot. That was not only a military necessity, but it is a usual measure with all armed forces of all countries.
Q. Since in this document for the first time we have the concept of a commando operation, I would like in this connection to discuss with you the so-called commando order which has already played a considerable part in these proceedings.
The Prosecution in its case in chief has not submitted the proper commando order, but only the well known reasons for the commando order which were signed by Hitler, as was the Commando Order itself. These reasons for the Commando Order were submitted by the prosecution in Document book No. 9, under NOKW 1081, Exhibit 225. This order is on page 41 of the German version and on page 28 of the English Document Book. During the cross-examination of General Foertsch, the prosecution supplemented its evidence, and as Document No. 489 PS, which is Exhibit 598 is submitted the original Commando Order, and prior to that as Exhibit 594 there was submitted Document NOKW 2009, which were additions of the Armed Forces Commando Southeast, dated 28 October 1942. The Commando order itself is dated the 18 October 1942. General, can you tell us whether this order reached you at the time when it was issued, or whether it was passed on by you to any of your subordinate units?
A. This order is dated 18 October 1942. During the months of September and October 1942 I was not in charge of any troops, because I had been transferred to the Fuehrer Reserve. In November 1942 I had been appointed the Commanding General of the 26th Corps on the Russian Front.
Q. May I interrupt you briefly, General; you said you had been transferred to the Fuehrer Reserve. I don't know whether the term "Fuehrer Reserve" shows quite clearly what you mean to say. Perhaps you would like to tell us very clearly where you were during those months of October and November 1942, and what you did during that period?
A. It was usual, I would like to say, that before a person changed command, -- at that time I was in charge of the 269th Division, and had been supported to become Commanding General of the 26th Corps.
It was usual before taking over the new post one would spend one or two months at home on furlough, and this was called transferring to the Fuehrer Reserve. Therefore, I was at the time when this order was issued no where near the front. I did not load any troops, and therefore would have been in no position to pass this order on to any subordinate units.
Q. Well, let's continue then?
A. Besides this commando order was valid, as the order says "not for the Eastern area." As I have explained just now I did not receive it at all because I was nowhere near the Front.
DR. TIPP:
I would like to interpolate here.
May it please the Tribunal, I would like to call attention to the fact that in the Commando Order submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit 598, we have on page 4 a distribution list. In this distribution list we have all these agencies mentioned which received the Commando Order, and none of the agencies of the German Armed Forces mentioned in this distribution list were on the Eastern Front.
Q. Will you please continue, General?
A. The same applies, of course, for the reasons given for the Commando Order dated 18 October 1942. This was also not distributed in the East.
DR. TIPP: In order to bear out this statement of the Witness that the Commando order was not valid for the East, and that he did not receive it, I would like to offer two affidavits, both of which are in my Document Book I. The first one is Leyser Document 3 contained in Document Book I, page 5. I would like to offer this affidavit as Leyser Exhibit 45. It is an affidavit - -
MR. FULKERSON: Your Honor, please, I would like to object to this affidavit on the ground that the document shows itself that the affiant is in Nurnberg here.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, to the best of my knowledge, General Lindemann has in the meantime been taken away from Nurnberg. At least some time ago I wanted to talk to him to get a few supplementary statements from him which were important to me in some other context, and on that occasion I was told he was no longer here.
MR. FULKERSON: If Your Honor, please, I would modify my objection to this extent, if you would allow the affidavit to go in on the condition that the affiant is actually not here, and if it appears that he is here I would like the objection to stand and would like to have him here to testify.
THE PRESIDENT: Under the conditions and statements made the affidavit will be received, and if it is later ascertained by the Prosecution that the affiant is in Nurnberg, the Court will entertain a motion to strike this particular piece of evidence.
MR. FULKERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled at the present time.
DR. TIPP: From this affidavit contained on page 5 of the document book, I would like to read briefly. Under numeral 1 the affiant says:
"1. From 18 January 1942 until March 1944 I was Commander in Chief of the 18th Army to which was assigned the section between Lake Ilmen, Lake Ladoga, encircling Front Leningrad, Pocket of Oranienbaum.
2. According to my memory about the first days of November 1942 General von Leyser took over command of the XXVI Corps which was subordinated to the 18th Army until 3 September 1942 and then temporarily to the 11th Army on Lake Ladoga.
3. Against the Kommandobefehl (Order of Command) issued in October 1942 I objected most vigorously at once and convinced the authorities at the OKW that it did not need to be executed in the army because apart from other reasons it did not come into question for the Eastern conditions according to my opinion."
The following numeral 4 deals with the Commissar Order. I would like to recommend the passage to the attention of the Tribunal, but do not want to read it here in order not to interrupt the quotation.
As my next document in this connection I offer Leyser Document No. 9, contained at page 16 of Leyser Document Book I. I offer this as Leyser Exhibit 46.
This is an affidavit of Erich Freiherre Loeffelholz von Colberg, who is a retired major. This affidavit was signed in Schottenstein on 18 June 1947, and sworn to before the mayor of that place. The witness describes in numeral 1 his career, which brought him various assignments and from these assignments it can be seen how the witness is qualified for his testimony. He says under numeral "2":
"2.) I remember that during the period of my service in Norway, the Fuehrer-order was made known, according to which sabotage-troops were to be killed, on principle. At that time, I got very excited about this order, because, in my opinion, it was not compatible with military principles. At that time, any refusal to carry out this order did not occur, because in my area of command, no sabotage-troops of the enemy had been used.
When, after that, I returned to the Eastern front-line in the course of my general staff training, I noticed that there the order concerning the annihilation of sabotage-troops was not known to the troops. In particular, I can state that this order was not known in the Field Intelligence Staff (Ic) of the XXVIth Army Corps, as, at that time, I was astonished that this order which had been issued in Norway down to the detachment, in some cases even to the battery, did not even exist as an order at Corps staff on the Eastern front.
Furthermore, I testify that during the time when I served as a Field Intelligence Gen. Staff Officer (Ic) in the staff of the XXVI army corps under the command of General von Leyser, not a single case of slaughtering a sabotage troop of the enemy within the area of command of the XXVI Army Corps became known to me."
Q. After this interpolation, General, I would like to ask you one more question. It can be seen from the distribution list and according to what a few witnesses have testified to here, and according to what your co-defendants have testified to here, this Commando order was valid for the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
The directors of this office from 28 October 1942 have also been submitted under Exhibit 594 in these proceedings. The order was dated about one year prior to your transfer into the area of the Commander in Chief Southeast, Perhaps you would be able to tell us whether this order became known to you when you took over the 15th Corps, and if so whether it included the additions made by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. When I took over my command I am quite sure the order was not submitted to me. I don't know whether the Corps had it at all. I suppose when the expert reported orally I would have been briefly informed about this order if it had been with the corps at the same time as I was informed concerning the war. Of the supplementary order I did not know about at the time. I learned about it during the course of these proceedings.
Q. Can you explain, General, why the supplementary order of the armed Forces Commander Southeast was not reported to you at the time?
A. The reason was because at the time it had become invalid. I only learned that during the course of these proceedings.
Q. If I understand you, General, you are telling us the order of 28 October 1942 was no longer valid when you took over your command in November 1943, is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Can you briefly explain this on hand of the documents, since you tell us that you learned of that from a document?
A. The prosecution has in Document Book XII submitted a Document NOKW 155, which is Exhibit 306. This is an order of the Commander in Chief Southeast dated 10 August 1943.
Q. May I briefly interpolate here, this order is contained on page 112 of the English Document Book.
A. Under numeral 5 of this order it says, "The order regarding the treatment of bandits hitherto authoritative. Additions to Wehrmacht Commander Southeast 1-A , 2868/42, Top Secret, of 28 October 1942 for the Fuehrer Order regarding combatting of so-called Commando operations is herewith rescinded."
Since at my time these additions were no longer valid, I don't suppose that they would have been reported to me. And, as I said before, I only learned of this rescinding order here when reading the documents.
Q. You told us before, witness, that the most material contents of the Commando Order was possibly orally reported to you. Can you, perhaps tell us what it was the expert told you at the time?
A. All he probably told me was that according to this Commando Order sabotage troops were not to be taken prisoner, but instead were to be killed. I suppose that would be what he told me roughly.
Q. If the order was valid for almost a year, at the time when you took over the post with this Corps, I suppose you were also informed whether or not this order had become acute at any time in the corps; what were you told about that?
A. In this connection I am sure I was told that this Commando order had never been applied in the area of the 15th Corps before the time of my tenure, it could have had no particular significance for my corps since the Italians were stationed along the Coast, and not German troops.
Q You were telling us then that a commando operation had not taken place before your tenure in your corps area?
A No, not to my recollection because no German troops were stationed in the area.
Q During your leadership of the 15th corps were there any commando operations in the area of your corps?
A Yes, during my tenure, to the best of my recollection, there were three such commando operations. The first was directed against the Island of Salta and I believe, according to an entry in the war diary, it took place on 27 February, 1944.
Q I would like to briefly interperlate here, your Honors. This commando operation is mentioned in the war diary of the 15th corps. It is contained in the excerpts of the war diary which I have submitted. This is Leyser document 28, submitted as exhibit 28 and it is on page 82 of my document book 2. I would like briefly to quote this entry to which General von Leyser has reference. It is the entry for 27 February 1944, which is on page 84 of the document book 2 von Leyser. Under this date we have three entries of various types. I am only interested in the last one. It reads and I quote:
"In the night to 27 February first English commando raid within the corps area on the Isle of Solta (strength 1 : 7)..."
By this is meant, in the language of the German armed forces, one commissioned officers and seven non-commissioned men.
"... The leader, who was seriously wounded, was captured."
General, I would like to ask you now what happened to the captured leader of this commando operation?
A He was treated as a normal prisoner of war, he was taken to a military hospital and the incident was reported to the army.
Q Were any other commando operations in your area at any later time, General?
A Yes, toward the middle or end of March, to the best of my recollection, there was an other operation against the Island of Solta.
This operation was a great success for the enemy, because the company stationed there was entirely annihilated or captured. This was because of treason on the part of the civilian population, which we found out later. This was also the reason why the population of this normal small place, which was situated on the island, was later on evacuated. At a later date, roughly three to four weeks later, there was yet another larger operation again directed against the Island of Solta. This was supported this time by airplanes and by gun fire from naval vessels. This operation was defeated after a fight of about three to four days. During the night the enemy took off from the Island and when we persuade the enemy, we did not manage to make contact with him, therefore, on the occasion of the second and third operation on this Island of Solta no prisoners were taken.
Q Concerning the commando, order, General, later on an additional order was issued by the O.K.W. This additional order deals with Allied Military missions. The prosecution has in this connection submitted a document, which is contained in document book 21 of the prosecution on page 73 of the English and on page 565 of your document book. Here we have document No. 537-PS, which has been offered as exhibit 488. It is rather strange that this document bears the note "draft" and has no distribution list, therefore, in accordance with the principles of the German armed forces this cannot be the order which was actually distributed. The date of this draft as 30 July 1944. Can you please give us your comments to this order, please?
JUDGE BURKE: What Volume please?
BY DR. TIPP:
Q Page 75, your Honor and page 65 of the German text and the document book is 21.
A This draft, if I received it at all, I could have only received it with the 21st corps. In the meantime I had been put in charge of the 21st corps, however, I cannot remember whether I ever received this order. As far as the 21st as concerned it was not carried out during my tenure down there since, no commando operation took place down there.
Q May it please the Tribunal, I would like to point out in this connection I have already offered one document and the part which concerns this problem, I would like to refer to here. It is document 25, von Leyser, on page 74 of Leyser document book 1. I have already offered it as von Leyser exhibit 18. It is an affidavit of the Catholic Chaplain Alois Krauss, who was a division chaplain and garrison minister and worked with the 187th reserve infantry division. I would like to refer to numeral 2 of this affidavit, which is on page 75 of this document book. I quote:
Of an order that enemy commandos and therewith also all Englishmen and Americans who landed and were taken prisoners in Croatia, were to be shot at once, I have never heard, neither at the field headquarters Agram nor at our division staff. This order would doubtlessly have become known to me as the garrison priest and division minister, at least, if it had been a secret order, I should have received some sort of knowledge of it during my practical work as chaplain. I do not believe that such an order when existed. I personally met only one American soldier in the hospital at Slavonic Brod. His airplane had been shot down in a regular manner and the was brought into the hospital where he died, although he received the same medical assistance and care as every other German soldier."
The affidavit then goes on to say that the American soldier was buried with military honors and that his personal data were put at the disposal of the American Military Government.
I continue on page 3 of the affidavit, which is page 76 of the document book:
"During my service as army chaplain in Salonika Greece in the year 1942 until February, 1943 I also met in a hospital there two wounded and imprisoned flyers of the English Army.
They belonged to the Catholic faith. One was from London, the other from Melbourne, Australia; I alleviated their captivity for them as far as possible, assisted them economically and even supplied them with good English literature."
In this connection, I would like to offer a few more documents. The first of which is Leyser document No. 22, contained in Leyser document book 1 on page 67. I am offering it as Leyser affidavit of Martin Gareis dated 11 September, 1947. Mr. Gareis was General of the Infantry, retired and the affidavit was sworn to before the Mayor of Rottach on the 11th of September 1947. This affiant again under numeral one mentions his position and says:
"From middle of May until 10 October 1944 I was commander of the 264th Infantry Division operated in Croatia in the Zara-Split-Drnis area as occupation force. General von Leyser, Commanding General of the XVth Mountain Corps, was at that time my immediate superior until his transfer in about August 1944."
Figure two deals with the reprisal measures and I do not want to read it in this particular context. Figure three deals with the evacuation order and since at the moment we are dealing with this particular problem, I would like to read out No. 3:
"As an enemy landing at the Adriate coast was highly probable, an army field order for the evacuation of the islands had - as far as I remember - been issued before my time as commander of the 264th Infantry Division.
After a re-examination it turned out that many thousands would have been involved, who however would have been a great burden in the rear areas. For that reason this evacuation was limited to unreliable elements only, which was absolutely necessary for military reasons and for the security of the troops. These evacuations were executed in agreement with the Croatian offices. This was about completed when I took the command of 264th Infantry Division. There existed only an order to prepare, in agreement with the Military Administration Headquarters and the Croatian authorities, for an evacuation in case of an actual enemy landing.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Paragraph 4 deals with General von Leyser's personality and I would like to recommend its contents to the judicial notice of the Tribunal. Number 5 deals with what is most material here, the commando order and I quote:
"To the area which was assigned to the 264th Infantry Division for occupation there also belonged several islands lying off the coast, among them the island of Solta on which two companies were stationed. From the island of Lissa English troops repeatedly tried to attack the occupation forces of Solta, but without success. Prisoners were taken at these occasions, who were always treated as prisoners of war. This was a matter of course not only in the area of the 264th Infantry Division, but also with the neighboring command, for instance, I clearly remember a more important English attack on the larger island neighboring Solta. At that time numerous English prisoners were taken, among them also a Major Churchill, cousin of the English Minister, who will be able to confirm the irreproachable treatment of the prisoners.
"There can be no question at all of an extension of the socalled commando order to the area of the XVth Mountain Corps, according to which members of foreign military missions were not to be taken prisoner, but to be shot immediately. Such an order would have necessarily come to my knowledge."
The next document which I would like to offer in this connection is contained in document book 3 - von Leyser. This is von Leyser document No. 58 on page 201 of the document book. I would like to offer this document as von Leyser exhibit No. 48. This again is an affidavit of the city medical consultant and medical officer, Dr. Heinrich Francks from Gladbeck, dated 7 October, 1947. The affidavit was sworn to in Gladbeck on 7 October 1947 before a notary. The affiant says under No. 1:
"From 22 August 1943 till 18 February 1945 I was a member of the XXI Mountain Army Corps. During that time I was responsible for the medical services and the hygienic conditions in the area under the Court No. V, Case No. VII.
jurisdiction of the Corps, as well as for the removal of the wounded.
"Frequently, British and American soldiers and officers who had bailed out of airplanes, were treated in German army hospitals. Among them was a British General (Brigadier) and his assistant, a major, who organized in Albania the fight of Albanian groups against the German Army. The British Major was slightly wounded, and could soon be dismissed from the hospital. The General had a severe abdominal wound received from a shot; however after weeks of meticulous care and treatment at the hospital under my charge in Tirana, his life was preserved, and he was cured. His name, which I cannot recall, could be easily ascertained, as he was the only high officer, as far as I can remember, who was captured in this area. These British officers were taken away from the bandits' territory, where they were in a civilian house without attendance, by a German doctor in am ambulance. The general told me personally that he was glad and thankful to receive such good treatment, and that he had no other requests. Although there was extremely little space in the airplanes, he was removed by air, and not in a motor truck traveling long hours, nor by Red Cross train."
The next passage deals with the treatment of American parachuters and the affiant states that none of them were shot, hut when they were wounded they were taken care of in the military hospitals in Tirana and later on were removed in the same way just like the Americans who were not wounded.
Under numeral three the affiant says he knows nothing of the destruction of bandit hospitals:
"I repeatedly inquired about the way the wounded were cared for by the bandits. However, all I could learn was that the wounded and sick were handed over to the civilian population. I have never heard about hospitals, main dressing stations, or similar installations, as far as the Tito bandits were concerned."
Number four deals with the exchange of prisoners, the witness says:
Court No. V, Case No, VII.
"The exchange of prisoners in Croatia and Albania was such a frequent practice that it was generally known. As a patient, down with Spotted Fever at the Zagreb hospital, I talked to several other German soldiers, who also had Spotted Fever. These told me that they had been exchanged. They had been held captive by the Tito bandits."
Number 5 deals with an incident which seems suitable to illustrate General von Leyser's character. May I quote it:
"When in February 1945 the medical officer of the prisoner collecting point at Sarajevo informed me that there were spotted fever cases amongst the prisoners, I went there with a hygienist, and took all the measures for isolating, delousing, and caring for the patients, as well as delousing of the not affected ones. However, I found that there was not enough room for the sick people. When I reported to General von Leyser, he immediately ordered another building to be put at our disposal, although the town of Sarajevo was extremely crowded and did not possess many large buildings. Therefore, my request could have been rejected on very valid grounds. How serious the care for the sick was taken can be seen from the fact that both the medical officer of the prisoner collecting point, and the hygienist, as well as myself, caught spotted fever, when we attended to the care of the prisoners. This loss of 3 medical officers, who were of great importance to the Corps, as there was no substitute for them at that time, General von Leyser put up with in his anxiety for the well-being of the prisoners."
The next document, which I would like to offer in this connection is the following document: von Leyser document 59 in the same document book on page 204. I am offering this document as von Leyser exhibit 49. It is an affidavit of Dr. Fritz Heck from Thuengershein, dated 9 October 1947. The affidavit was sworn to on the same day before the Mayor. The affiant says after the initial remarks:
"From May 1943 to the end of the war I was stationed at the southeastern front as senior surgeon of the Army Medical Company 696.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
During that time, from fall 1943 till November 1944, I was posted as senior surgeon at the local hospital in Tirana, Albania.
"Having been requested to do so by Attorney Dr. Tipp, Fuerth/ Bavaria, I shall proceed to give the following report concerning the treatment given to the British Brigadier General Edmund Davies. I report this event according to a copy I made from a sick report:
"On 8 January 1944. at about 15.00 hours General Davies was seriously wounded during a skirmish in the Albanian mountains. At first he stayed in a hut for 3 days, without receiving any treatment. On 11 January he was taken into a village, where a German physician was the first time consulted on 12 January. This physician ordered on 13 January 1944 his removal to the army's local hospital at Tirana."
The further passages of the affidavit I do not want to read, Your Honors, it is a case-history with all its details concerning the treatment of Brig. General Davies. I would like to stress with what care, according to this report, General Davies was treated. Actually he was saved, whereas according to the report at the time he was brought to the hospital, it was expected that he would not survive. I would like to refer to the last but one paragraph of this affidavit on page 206, the affiant says here after describing the sickness of the General:
"From that time the healing process proceeded completely undisturbed. Both tubes could be shortened in the following days, and thus slowly be removed. The state of health became so improved that on 20 March the general could be transferred to the base hospital Semlin by a hospital airplane.
"Furthermore, I can certify that because of the serious condition of the wounded general, his every wish had to be granted, at my request, and that the German hospital staff behaved admirably in this respect."
After this interpolation, General, which mainly has dealt with the commando order, I would like you to continue. We had last dealt with the planned evacuation of the Island. We have to refer back again Court No. V, Case No. VII.
to the army's order of 13 April 1944, which is Exhibit 381. This exhibit you will find in document book 16 on page 55 of the English text and on page 105 of the German text. This order has been submitted as exhibit 381 and the number of the prosecution document is NOKW-674. Before you told us that number one of this order deals with the intended evacuation of the Island and Number two of this order contains provisions for the intended evacuation of the coast; was the evacuation of the coast carried out at all, General?
A In this connection, I have to point out that in accordance with this order the evacuation of the coast was only provided for in the event of an enemy landing and that for this event the necessary preparations were made. There is in this order nothing said about an actual execution of this evacuation and since no landing took place no evacuation was carried out.
Q I shall now have to deal with a different chapter, Your Honors, which will take quite some time so might. I suggest to have the recess now?
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, before the recess we were discussing the evacuation of the coast and you told us that this evacuation was only planned in case an enemy landing took place and that, therefore, the order of the 13th of February 1945 only had as its subject the intended evacuation; and now we come to the evacuation of individual localities on the coast or the planning of this evacuation.
The documents which refer to the subject are concerned a great deal with the evacuation of Split. Would you state something generally about this evacuation?
A. The army had ordered the evacuation of Split since Split was a definite band strong point. It was a port and it was a permanent center of unrest and there were very many band suspects there and many band suspects from the neighboring districts came to this place.
First I remember it was reported at the time from the corps that about 5,000 men had to be evacuated and this can be seen from a document -- I don't know the number any more.
Q. I would like to state the number of this document. It is again the war diary of the 15th Corps, NOKW-1445, Exhibit No. 395; and the entry which you have just referred to here, General, is to be found in Document Book XVI, English on page 101, German page 146.
On the 10th of March it is stated that the men to be evacuated from Split would be about 5,000. Would you please continue here, General?
A. If these 5,000 men had to be transported then at once a few hundred lorries would have had to be made available and, of course, the troops hadn't got that number of lorries; and the execution as it had been ordered was at first not possible for this reason and then the corps reported to the army about this and thereupon the army ordered, because the evacuation was practically not possible, that in Split searches should be carried out monthly for bands suspects.
Q. This order of the army is again mentioned in the war diary of the 15th Corps in Exhibit 395, English page 102, German page 147, It is the war diary entry from the 1st of April 1944--and what was the purpose of this ordered search, General?
A. Through this it was intended at least to have some control over suspect elements in Split.
Q. And then how did the matter proceed, General?
A. Again from the war diary one can see on the 31st of May there is an entry which states that the evacuation was only proceeding very slowly, that the personnel available for this was insufficient for a thorough apprehension of a large number of persons but the Croatian police had orders to wait for the arrival of a government representative and from this it can be seen that the evacuation was not just carried out at random but only people who did not belong in the place and suspects were to be located; otherwise, a search would not have been necessary; but it also can be seen from this the transport was a matter for the Croatian officers; otherwise, there would have been no need to await for the arrival of the Croatian representative.
Q. I would like to state that with regard to this point the transportation was a matter for the Croatian representatives and there is another entry about this in the War Diary. This is the entry dated the 6th of May 1944 which is to be found in the English document book on page 103 and in the German on page 148. This entry states that now the evacuation of band suspects from Split in large numbers has not been ordered by the army.