A The documents show comparatively little about this problem. From my recollection I can only say that no material evacuation was carried out of the islands. From the entries in the diary of the 30 March 1944 which is Document 1445, Exhibit 395, contained in Document Book XVI, on page 102 of the English document book and 146 of the German text, which is one month after the order was issued, up to that day the evacuation had reached a number of 1128 men, 100 women, 150 children. At the same time it was being reported that 150 to 200 thousand more were to be evacuated and an accommodation within the corps area for these people was not possible which is why the corps reported to the Army.
Q General, you said just now that according to the entry in the war diary among the evacuated there were 100 women and 150 children. According to the contents of the basic orders which we discussed only men capable of bearing arms were to be evacuated. How then do you explain this discrepancy?
A It is correct that according to that order only men capable of bearing arms were to be evacuated and that is what was provided in the special instruction but the population of the islands themselves were interested in leaving the islands, inasmuch as the danger existed that these islands would become a combat area; therefore, children and women joined their men folk who were being evacuated. As I also know at a later date that a part of these evacuees was brought back to the island again because these people felt at a disadvantage since through their voluntary report they were a disadvantage compared with the others. For this reason at a later time which I remember quite well a few of these evacuated women and children were returned to the island. Since in the course of the summer an invasion on the part of the Allies did not take place this was feasible.
Q You say then that these men and women voluntarily reported for evacuation?
A Yes, that is what I said, voluntarily.
Q Who was in charge of the actual execution of the evacuation. By this I mean the gathering together of the men in the islands and their commitment for further use?
A This again can be seen from some documents. The documents concerned are Exhibit 383.
Q I would like to have the corresponding document exhibited to you, General. It is contained in Document Book XVI, on page 63 of the English text which is page 110 of the German text. This is Prosecution Document NOKW-673 which is as you said Prosecution Exhibit 383. Would you please tell the Tribunal, General, which document, out of this exhibit, you are having reference to?
A The German Plenipotentiary--
Q First, you will have to tell us which document it is, General.
A It is in Exhibit 383, Document 673 contained in Document XVI, page 63 of the English text and page 110 of the German text.
Q And which is the communication you are referring to?
A It is a communication of the German General Plenipotentiary in Croatia dated the 26th February 1944 and addressed to the Croatian War Ministry and the Croatian Ministry of the Interior. The German Plenipotentiary was the liaison officer to the Croatian government. He was, therefore, the man in charge of all territorial tasks; that he played a part in the evacuation program had already been provided for in the basic order of the 13 February 1944.
In this communication which we have here dated 26 February 1944 the Plenipotentiary suggested that there be established a mixed committee of one Croatian Army officer, one officer of the Ustasha militia, and one liaison officer. This commission was then to deal with the seizure and transfer of the men of the classes 1904 to 1947 in collaboration with the local Croatian authorities. To this extent then this was a regular recruitment of the men in Croatia who were capable of bearing arms, carried out by the Croatian agencies. It says here further, and I quote, "Members of class 1924 and 1925 are to be sent to the Croatian Armed Forces as recruits unless they are of the Pravoslav religion and will be turned over to the competent military authorities." This then concerns a recruitment of indigenous men carried out by their own government and the next passage "D" reads, the rest of the men are available to the Fortress engineers staff for construction work on the coastal fortifications. Here again these people are committed for work within their own country.
Q. Would you say, General, that the recruitment of these men and their labor assignment was carried out by a commission of Croatian government agencies?
A. Yes.
Q. Now dealing with the question of labor commitment I would like to refer back to a document which I have already submitted. It is contained in Document Book I and it is Leyser Document No. 16 which I have already offered as Leyser Exhibit 17. This is an affidavit by the Government architect Persch which is contained on page 46 of Document Book I. I would like to refer in this connection to paragraph 3. I would like to anticipate that Herr Persch, quoting numeral 1 of this affidavit, was Chief of Construction in the staff of this organization, trained work detachment in Belgrade and I would also like to state that the organization which was trained was the organization which dealt with the fortification work along the channel coast and in other areas working side by side with the German Armed forces.
Herr Persch is, therefore, a man who owing to his job knows all about this labor commitment. I am quoting from numeral 3 of page 47 of this document book:
"The employment of the population for construction projects in connection with the Organization Todt was effected through employment of the civilians, either on a voluntary basis, or through the assistance of the regional Croatian labor offices. This was the only and, above all, good earning possibility, especially so if one remembers that housing, food and even clothing and shoes, etc. was made available, as far as possible. The extend of care given to the native workers went even so far that canteen supplies, if available, were given to them. The employment of the unskilled native workers was usually effected in such a way that they were made available for the respective project by the regional labor offices in question, after they had previously been examined by indigenous physicians. Each worker then was again examined by physicians of the Organization Todt which frequently led to dismissal of less suitable persons.
"The supply of food was kept on the highest possible level and, aside from exceptional cases of particular emergency, was never lower then 2500 calories according to assurances given to me by the doctors and on the basis of my own findings. When the decreases in the food supply had become necessary, the troops were also affected to the same extent, and I remember very well that the physical condition of the indigenous workers in the Organization Todt, in the region of the 15th Mountain Army Corps, under General v. Leyser, could in many cases be kept on a high level only because of the fact that the Organization Todt was in a position to make its own food stocks available.
The workers again and again assured me that not only the General, but also the officers in his personal staff laid the greatest stress to an adequate care for the unskilled workers. I know these facts from own experience and from the reports of my men.
"In this connection the fact should be pointed out that the medical care for the foreign workers was in no way different from that given to our own men. The treatment of out-patients, hospitalization as well as dental care was the same."
General, dealing with this problem of labor employment of the civilian population I would like to ask you one additional question. The provisions of the Hague rules for land warfare are known to you and you realize that it is forbidden in those regulations to use civilian population of an occupied country for work tasks which according to the text of the Hague rules for land warfare are directed against their Fatherland, had you any misgivings in this direction if natives of the Croatian country were used by the German Armed Forces for the building of roads and fortifications?
A. First of all in my sector only a small number of people were concerned. Furthermore, they were Croats who had been levied by Croatian authorities. The Croatian state was an Allied State and friendly towards us. Consequently this work to the extent to which it was carried out on the fortification represented work in the interest of their own Fatherland against the common enemy and the work carried out in connection with roads, etc.
was, in my opinion, not even of a military nature.
Q. After this interpolation we shall continue, General. Concerning this communications of the Plenipotentiary General I have one more question in another context. You have already told us that you had so-called Legion-divisions. By this I mean divisions, the men of which for the most part were Croats. How did these legions get their men?
A. This was always a difficult problem. The troops were very interested in using as many Croats as possible in order to keep the stand of their men completed but the Croatian agencies, of course, divided up their recruits independently and in this process those agencies were considered first which were part of the real Croatian Armed Forces and the German Croatian Legion Divisions were not so much considered.
Q. Talking about recruitment of Croatians in Legion Divisions I would like to show to you one more entry in the war diary. Would you please turn to a page in Document Book XVI; it is page 144 in your document book and page 99 in the English Document Book. Here you have Exhibit 395 of the Prosecution which has been frequently quoted in these proceedings which is the war diary of your corps. Under the entry of the 19 January 1944 it is mentioned here that the 392nd Division has demanded authorization to drop men from military service and this request has been passed on from the corps to the Army. Can you explain to us how this request came about, General?
A. As I have already stated the Legion Division had their own authorities but there were many people who voluntarily reported for service in these Legion Divisions and that was why the 392nd Division requested to be allowed to use these volunteers and this request was passed on to the Army.
Q. Can you tell us, General, what the decision was later on concerning this request?
A. This again can be seen from the war diary and from an entry of 24 January 1944.
Q. I would like to add here, your Honor, that this particular entry that the General is referring to is not contained in a prosecution document but in an excerpt from the war diary of the corps submitted by me. This is Leyser Exhibit 28, Document 28, and the entry to which General von Leyser is referring is contained on page 83 on Document Book II for Leyser.
A. According to this entry the Army orders that the employment and recruitment of the Croatians who volunteered could not be affected as a matter of course but that this could only be done in agreement with the Croatian Army Inspector. At a later date the troops were furthermore ordered to consult the Croatian agencies when recruiting these volunteers. This request was for the moment, therefore, rejected by the Army.
Q. I understood you correctly, then, General, to say that the recruitment of the Croatian able-bodied population was continuously carried out by the Croatian agencies. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. We have now deviated a little from our original subject which was the evacuation of the islands. You told the Tribunal that the evacuation was originally carried out on a voluntary basis and that later on that part of the population that was evacuated was returned to the island.
We now continue with this particular problem. I would like to show you an entry in the war diary of your corps which can be found in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution on page 146 of the German text which is page 102 of the English Document Book. Here under the 1st of March 1944 you have an entry stating that the Army requested the evacuation of the island of Hvar as soon as possible and an evacuation of the able-bodied population. May I ask you if this evacuation was carried out to the extent ordered.
A. I can say the following in this connection. It was a prerequisite for the operation against the island of Hvar, which was one of the larger islands in this area that considerable shipping space had to be available, but the corps itself was not in a position to dispose of such shipping space. To the extent which I gathered this now from the documents I myself went to Split on the 6th of February in order to discuss these matters.
Q. May I ask you a question in this connection, General. What was the office of a sea commander, and who was he subordinate to?
A. Along the coast there were certain sea commanders appointed at regular intervals. These sea commanders were subordinate to a naval office, and the corps itself had no jurisdiction over such sea commanders.
Q. May I then ask you what the result of your discussion with the sea commander was?
A. The sea commander told me at the time that for the moment he could not put at our disposal the shipping space for either the occupation or the evacuation of the islands. The reason for this was the Navy had to use its forces in a different way and needed all available space. Therefore, the project was delayed for the moment, or postponed to a later date, but at a later date it was actually executed.
Q. I would then like to continue discussing with you the war diary entries, which after all represent the most important material, in order to clarify these problems. I would like to discuss with you in the same document book an entry on page 102 of the English text, and page 147 of the German text. Here you find an entry of 15 March 1944, which discusses a mopping up operation which is to be carried out at a later date, of the islands situated before Split, Sinje and Ojketog. Were these islands at a later date occupied?
A. The pre-requisite for these operations was also that the Navy should put at our disposal the necessary shipping space. While we did not have that space we were in no position to carry out the operation.
I do recall that at a later date the operation was carried out.
Q. I would like to deal with that new, General; these same islands crop up at a later date. At the same time we have an order of your Corps addressed to the 264th Division, which is dated 7 April 1944. This order can also be found in Document Book 16, page 127 of the German, page 86 of the English. It has been submitted under Prosecution Exhibit 389, which is Prosecution Document 1416. In this order the 264th Division is instructed to carry out the mopping up of the previously mentioned islands, and it says here further, that the islands situated in front of the area 264th Division are to be evacuated from all able-bodied population. You said that this evacuation and the occupation of these islands was carried out at a later date. Looking at this order and taking into consideration all the material, can you give me more detailed comments?
A. As I have already said the execution of all these operations depended on available shipping space, and not only on the shipping space, but also the Navy had to take over the protection of these ships, and the execution of this order from 7th of April was ordered by the 891st Grenadier Regiment on 21 May 1944. This again can be seen from another Prosecution Document, which is Exhibit 574, Document NOKW 1773, which is contained in Document Book 25. On page 101 of the English text and page 79 of the German text. In this order the 891st Grenadier Regiment is instructed to mop up these islands, Nubi Ortek and Kornak. The text of this order has been taken from the corps order literally.
Q. If I remember correctly, General, you said before that the evacuation,--I beg your pardon, the occupation of these islands was carried out at a later date?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you also remember that the evacuations, as it says here, were carried out as far as possible?
A. There is no talk of these evacuations in any other document, and I don't believe they were carried out.
Q. General, up to now we have dealt with the islands which are supposed to have been occupied. The Prosecution, however, has submitted one more document dealing with these islands, and this particular document deals with an island which is already occupied, and this document deals with the protected areas within the islands. I mean Exhibit 389, Document Book 16. This particular entry is page 79 of the English, which is page 21 of the German text. The subject of this order is "Conduct of War in the Islands." Numeral I of the document is not contained in the document book of the Prosecution, and I would like to briefly quote the contents from the photostat. To put it briefly it deals with the defeating of commando attacks on these islands. I have clarified this paragraph I would like you to give brief comments to paragraph 2, which is contained in the document book of the Prosecution?
A. This is a purely tactical order, which can clearly be seen from this subject, which says, "Conduct of War in the Islands." As you have said just now, according to numeral I it deals with commando attacks on the islands. Under numeral 2 it says, it is a pre-requisite for successful defense against such operations that the enemy should learn from the population neither anything regarding the situation nor any details concerning our positions and strength. Consequently, blocked off zones are supposed to be installed around the position, and these areas were to be evacuated, and kept free of all population. Such blocked-off areas around fortifications are used by all armed forces, and such blocked-off zones are also necessary in order to eliminate the danger of sabotage and espionage. Since these blocked-off zones were also marked by posters, this order was well known to all civilians on the islands. Whoever entered such blocked off zones without special permission had to expect to be shot. That was not only a military necessity, but it is a usual measure with all armed forces of all countries.
Q. Since in this document for the first time we have the concept of a commando operation, I would like in this connection to discuss with you the so-called commando order which has already played a considerable part in these proceedings.
The Prosecution in its case in chief has not submitted the proper commando order, but only the well known reasons for the commando order which were signed by Hitler, as was the Commando Order itself. These reasons for the Commando Order were submitted by the prosecution in Document book No. 9, under NOKW 1081, Exhibit 225. This order is on page 41 of the German version and on page 28 of the English Document Book. During the cross-examination of General Foertsch, the prosecution supplemented its evidence, and as Document No. 489 PS, which is Exhibit 598 is submitted the original Commando Order, and prior to that as Exhibit 594 there was submitted Document NOKW 2009, which were additions of the Armed Forces Commando Southeast, dated 28 October 1942. The Commando order itself is dated the 18 October 1942. General, can you tell us whether this order reached you at the time when it was issued, or whether it was passed on by you to any of your subordinate units?
A. This order is dated 18 October 1942. During the months of September and October 1942 I was not in charge of any troops, because I had been transferred to the Fuehrer Reserve. In November 1942 I had been appointed the Commanding General of the 26th Corps on the Russian Front.
Q. May I interrupt you briefly, General; you said you had been transferred to the Fuehrer Reserve. I don't know whether the term "Fuehrer Reserve" shows quite clearly what you mean to say. Perhaps you would like to tell us very clearly where you were during those months of October and November 1942, and what you did during that period?
A. It was usual, I would like to say, that before a person changed command, -- at that time I was in charge of the 269th Division, and had been supported to become Commanding General of the 26th Corps.
It was usual before taking over the new post one would spend one or two months at home on furlough, and this was called transferring to the Fuehrer Reserve. Therefore, I was at the time when this order was issued no where near the front. I did not load any troops, and therefore would have been in no position to pass this order on to any subordinate units.
Q. Well, let's continue then?
A. Besides this commando order was valid, as the order says "not for the Eastern area." As I have explained just now I did not receive it at all because I was nowhere near the Front.
DR. TIPP:
I would like to interpolate here.
May it please the Tribunal, I would like to call attention to the fact that in the Commando Order submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit 598, we have on page 4 a distribution list. In this distribution list we have all these agencies mentioned which received the Commando Order, and none of the agencies of the German Armed Forces mentioned in this distribution list were on the Eastern Front.
Q. Will you please continue, General?
A. The same applies, of course, for the reasons given for the Commando Order dated 18 October 1942. This was also not distributed in the East.
DR. TIPP: In order to bear out this statement of the Witness that the Commando order was not valid for the East, and that he did not receive it, I would like to offer two affidavits, both of which are in my Document Book I. The first one is Leyser Document 3 contained in Document Book I, page 5. I would like to offer this affidavit as Leyser Exhibit 45. It is an affidavit - -
MR. FULKERSON: Your Honor, please, I would like to object to this affidavit on the ground that the document shows itself that the affiant is in Nurnberg here.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, to the best of my knowledge, General Lindemann has in the meantime been taken away from Nurnberg. At least some time ago I wanted to talk to him to get a few supplementary statements from him which were important to me in some other context, and on that occasion I was told he was no longer here.
MR. FULKERSON: If Your Honor, please, I would modify my objection to this extent, if you would allow the affidavit to go in on the condition that the affiant is actually not here, and if it appears that he is here I would like the objection to stand and would like to have him here to testify.
THE PRESIDENT: Under the conditions and statements made the affidavit will be received, and if it is later ascertained by the Prosecution that the affiant is in Nurnberg, the Court will entertain a motion to strike this particular piece of evidence.
MR. FULKERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled at the present time.
DR. TIPP: From this affidavit contained on page 5 of the document book, I would like to read briefly. Under numeral 1 the affiant says:
"1. From 18 January 1942 until March 1944 I was Commander in Chief of the 18th Army to which was assigned the section between Lake Ilmen, Lake Ladoga, encircling Front Leningrad, Pocket of Oranienbaum.
2. According to my memory about the first days of November 1942 General von Leyser took over command of the XXVI Corps which was subordinated to the 18th Army until 3 September 1942 and then temporarily to the 11th Army on Lake Ladoga.
3. Against the Kommandobefehl (Order of Command) issued in October 1942 I objected most vigorously at once and convinced the authorities at the OKW that it did not need to be executed in the army because apart from other reasons it did not come into question for the Eastern conditions according to my opinion."
The following numeral 4 deals with the Commissar Order. I would like to recommend the passage to the attention of the Tribunal, but do not want to read it here in order not to interrupt the quotation.
As my next document in this connection I offer Leyser Document No. 9, contained at page 16 of Leyser Document Book I. I offer this as Leyser Exhibit 46.
This is an affidavit of Erich Freiherre Loeffelholz von Colberg, who is a retired major. This affidavit was signed in Schottenstein on 18 June 1947, and sworn to before the mayor of that place. The witness describes in numeral 1 his career, which brought him various assignments and from these assignments it can be seen how the witness is qualified for his testimony. He says under numeral "2":
"2.) I remember that during the period of my service in Norway, the Fuehrer-order was made known, according to which sabotage-troops were to be killed, on principle. At that time, I got very excited about this order, because, in my opinion, it was not compatible with military principles. At that time, any refusal to carry out this order did not occur, because in my area of command, no sabotage-troops of the enemy had been used.
When, after that, I returned to the Eastern front-line in the course of my general staff training, I noticed that there the order concerning the annihilation of sabotage-troops was not known to the troops. In particular, I can state that this order was not known in the Field Intelligence Staff (Ic) of the XXVIth Army Corps, as, at that time, I was astonished that this order which had been issued in Norway down to the detachment, in some cases even to the battery, did not even exist as an order at Corps staff on the Eastern front.
Furthermore, I testify that during the time when I served as a Field Intelligence Gen. Staff Officer (Ic) in the staff of the XXVI army corps under the command of General von Leyser, not a single case of slaughtering a sabotage troop of the enemy within the area of command of the XXVI Army Corps became known to me."
Q. After this interpolation, General, I would like to ask you one more question. It can be seen from the distribution list and according to what a few witnesses have testified to here, and according to what your co-defendants have testified to here, this Commando order was valid for the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
The directors of this office from 28 October 1942 have also been submitted under Exhibit 594 in these proceedings. The order was dated about one year prior to your transfer into the area of the Commander in Chief Southeast, Perhaps you would be able to tell us whether this order became known to you when you took over the 15th Corps, and if so whether it included the additions made by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. When I took over my command I am quite sure the order was not submitted to me. I don't know whether the Corps had it at all. I suppose when the expert reported orally I would have been briefly informed about this order if it had been with the corps at the same time as I was informed concerning the war. Of the supplementary order I did not know about at the time. I learned about it during the course of these proceedings.
Q. Can you explain, General, why the supplementary order of the armed Forces Commander Southeast was not reported to you at the time?
A. The reason was because at the time it had become invalid. I only learned that during the course of these proceedings.
Q. If I understand you, General, you are telling us the order of 28 October 1942 was no longer valid when you took over your command in November 1943, is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Can you briefly explain this on hand of the documents, since you tell us that you learned of that from a document?
A. The prosecution has in Document Book XII submitted a Document NOKW 155, which is Exhibit 306. This is an order of the Commander in Chief Southeast dated 10 August 1943.
Q. May I briefly interpolate here, this order is contained on page 112 of the English Document Book.
A. Under numeral 5 of this order it says, "The order regarding the treatment of bandits hitherto authoritative. Additions to Wehrmacht Commander Southeast 1-A , 2868/42, Top Secret, of 28 October 1942 for the Fuehrer Order regarding combatting of so-called Commando operations is herewith rescinded."
Since at my time these additions were no longer valid, I don't suppose that they would have been reported to me. And, as I said before, I only learned of this rescinding order here when reading the documents.
Q. You told us before, witness, that the most material contents of the Commando Order was possibly orally reported to you. Can you, perhaps tell us what it was the expert told you at the time?
A. All he probably told me was that according to this Commando Order sabotage troops were not to be taken prisoner, but instead were to be killed. I suppose that would be what he told me roughly.
Q. If the order was valid for almost a year, at the time when you took over the post with this Corps, I suppose you were also informed whether or not this order had become acute at any time in the corps; what were you told about that?
A. In this connection I am sure I was told that this Commando order had never been applied in the area of the 15th Corps before the time of my tenure, it could have had no particular significance for my corps since the Italians were stationed along the Coast, and not German troops.
Q You were telling us then that a commando operation had not taken place before your tenure in your corps area?
A No, not to my recollection because no German troops were stationed in the area.
Q During your leadership of the 15th corps were there any commando operations in the area of your corps?
A Yes, during my tenure, to the best of my recollection, there were three such commando operations. The first was directed against the Island of Salta and I believe, according to an entry in the war diary, it took place on 27 February, 1944.
Q I would like to briefly interperlate here, your Honors. This commando operation is mentioned in the war diary of the 15th corps. It is contained in the excerpts of the war diary which I have submitted. This is Leyser document 28, submitted as exhibit 28 and it is on page 82 of my document book 2. I would like briefly to quote this entry to which General von Leyser has reference. It is the entry for 27 February 1944, which is on page 84 of the document book 2 von Leyser. Under this date we have three entries of various types. I am only interested in the last one. It reads and I quote:
"In the night to 27 February first English commando raid within the corps area on the Isle of Solta (strength 1 : 7)..."
By this is meant, in the language of the German armed forces, one commissioned officers and seven non-commissioned men.
"... The leader, who was seriously wounded, was captured."
General, I would like to ask you now what happened to the captured leader of this commando operation?
A He was treated as a normal prisoner of war, he was taken to a military hospital and the incident was reported to the army.
Q Were any other commando operations in your area at any later time, General?
A Yes, toward the middle or end of March, to the best of my recollection, there was an other operation against the Island of Solta.
This operation was a great success for the enemy, because the company stationed there was entirely annihilated or captured. This was because of treason on the part of the civilian population, which we found out later. This was also the reason why the population of this normal small place, which was situated on the island, was later on evacuated. At a later date, roughly three to four weeks later, there was yet another larger operation again directed against the Island of Solta. This was supported this time by airplanes and by gun fire from naval vessels. This operation was defeated after a fight of about three to four days. During the night the enemy took off from the Island and when we persuade the enemy, we did not manage to make contact with him, therefore, on the occasion of the second and third operation on this Island of Solta no prisoners were taken.
Q Concerning the commando, order, General, later on an additional order was issued by the O.K.W. This additional order deals with Allied Military missions. The prosecution has in this connection submitted a document, which is contained in document book 21 of the prosecution on page 73 of the English and on page 565 of your document book. Here we have document No. 537-PS, which has been offered as exhibit 488. It is rather strange that this document bears the note "draft" and has no distribution list, therefore, in accordance with the principles of the German armed forces this cannot be the order which was actually distributed. The date of this draft as 30 July 1944. Can you please give us your comments to this order, please?
JUDGE BURKE: What Volume please?
BY DR. TIPP:
Q Page 75, your Honor and page 65 of the German text and the document book is 21.
A This draft, if I received it at all, I could have only received it with the 21st corps. In the meantime I had been put in charge of the 21st corps, however, I cannot remember whether I ever received this order. As far as the 21st as concerned it was not carried out during my tenure down there since, no commando operation took place down there.