A. I cannot recall the incident itself but those two reports show that in the village of Kordun an officer had been stabbed to death. Such incidents were not infrequent in that area in the beginning and the population, as was ordered in ovary case, was then warned and exhorted that should these incidents occur more frequently they must expect reprisal measures and here we have a case simply where the troops decided to carry out reprisal measures but this is the only case by the 392nd Division. In apprehending the perpetrator the troops again encountered enemy resistance in the village and in the fighting which ensued the houses were destroyed.
Q. As you mentioned General, you have no recollection of your own of this incident?
A. No, I do not.
Q. On further question in this connection, were those reprisal measures concerned with human beings?
A. According to the report no human beings suffered in this case.
Q. Now as far as the 392nd Division is concerned I should like to say that I will examine the witness Kobe whom I have announced and then we will be quite sure about the character of these incidents. Documents concerning the area of the 392nd Division and which concern mopping up operations we have now discussed. We shall discuss other assignments of that division in a later connection. I can now start discussing the last division which was under you in this area which was the 264th. When did that division reach your area?
A. In November the 264th Division took over from the 114th Light Infantry Division which was serving along the coast.
Q. What was the assignment given to the division when it reached the area?
A. First it had the assignment to occupy the three big harbor towns, Zara, Sibenik and Split. The 114th Light Infantry Division was withdrawn to the area around Knin.
Q. What happened to the area between and behind those harbor towns?
A. The 114th Light Infantry Division was given the assignment to clear this area which after the Italian surrendered was infested by the bands because between those three towns no safe and secure communication existed as yet.
That was the task first of the 114th Division so that the 264th Division could continue with the fortifying of the coastal positions. Equally the 114th Division was used to secure the islands in front of the coast and clear them of tho bands. The extension of the defensive positions along the coast could only be done in the form of strong points because in the case of these vast distances every division had a front of about 150 kilometers and no continuous defense was feasible.
Q. Did the division have any other assignments?
A. I need hardly say that the main assignment of the corps applied to the 264th Division of which we are now talking. They did no only have to extend and occupy the defensive position on the coast. The assignment also said that they must fortify a second defensive position along the mountain line. The assignment for the 264th Division in other words was (one) to hold the first defensive position along tho coast including the islands (two) defensive position, the foothills of the mountains, and (third) to pacify the area in between.
Q. Now, in the case of this vast area which you mentioned, that assignment was somewhat ambitious wasn't it, General? Did the division still have the possibility apart from the basic assignments to carry out mopping up operations in tho area which was also part of its orders.
A. As said before the 114th Light Infantry Division was stationed in that area and mopping up operations were to a large extent carried out by that division up to the moment when it was called over to Italy. Nevertheless the 264th Division alone would not have been in a position to occupy the whole of the area in the way it was ordered and to pacify it which was the reason why the corps was constantly given forces by the Army which were available so that the corps would be in a position to carry out the pacification of the area. Then by order of the corps this pacification was carried out up to the point that when the 114th Division left this pacification had been achieved and the area in between could at all times be used for small convoys and contact existed.
At the same time the division had carried out the pacification of the area, in the sense of the pacification report to the Army, that the various villages were fortified like strong points by the Ustasha and Cetniks inasmuch as they were not occupied by the German troops. Of course there were frequent conflicts on these occasions but thanks to the good contact and good agreement between the divisions the various commanders were in a position to segregate the Ustasha and Cetniks in the various villages and it became possible to say that this area had been pacified.
Q. Do you want to say by that, General, that there were no more destructions in that area after that?
A. No, that of course I couldn't say. What I mean was that in that area by the mopping up of the bands by the 114th Division and other elements no large scale activities by the bands occurred but the minor bands whom I have mentioned in the beginning still remained active in large numbers. I would like to say that acts of sabotage did not decrease but these were not large-scale operations or large-scale surprise attacks but they were purely acts of sabotage against the roads and lines of communication.
Q. What did the troops do against these sabotage acts?
A. The troop couldn't do anything but continously patrol the roads and if that was not enough and the acts of sabotage along the roads persisted occasionally reprisal measures had to be resorted to. There again as was ordered from above the population was warned and enlightened by posters, etc. If the sabotage acts did not decrease reprisal measures had to be taken to safeguard the troops.
Q. Now, that was one side of the fighting, but were there not also mopping up operations in that area which it took up so much time in the case of the other divisions relatively speaking?
A. There were of course, on the part of the division, again in this area, mopping up operations where an available report showed that minor bands had concentrated there and things like that.
Q. About these mopping up operations, General, we have a few reports available here which we should discuss in order to clear this up. Would you first please turn to Document Book XXV of the Prosecution. I think you have still got it there. Would you please look at page 45 in the German book, which is on page 58 of the English book. This is Prosecution Exhibit 570 which we have mentioned so often before. It is NOKW 1772. There we have a daily report by the XV Army Corps of 23 February 1942. This contains a report by the 264th Division. It is mentioned there that a courier had boon shot. Can you tell us something about that, witness.
A. It is mentioned in that report that a battalion had made a thrust towards two Croatian villages end they had made a raid at night in Komenka, 5 kilometers Northeast of Split. On that occasion a communist message center was liquidated end it was there that the courier whom you mentioned was shot. Whether this occurred during combat or while trying to escape cannot be seen from this report. In any case it was not done as part of the reprisal measure. It is also mentioned here that three suspects obviously also members of the same message center had been arrested. No mention is made here of a reprisal measure,
JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will take its afternoon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
DR. SAUTER: (Sauter for defendant Lanz) May it please the Tribunal the defendant Lanz is asking to be excused from tomorrow's session in order to prepare his own examination.
JUDGE CARTER: The leave will be granted in accordance with our usual conditions.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, before the recess we had discussed a number of mopping-up operations by the 264th Division. I would like to ask you now to turn to Document Book XVI in connection with these operations. I have reference to a report which is contained in the English Document Book on page 80, and on page 122 of the German Document Book, and will you please turn to this letter page? That is document for the Prosecution, NOKW 1416, which is Exhibit 389. The report which I have reference to is contained in the daily report of 16 April 1944 made by the 15 Army Corps. It is reported here 7 kilometers southeast of Rogosnia in the area of Sinj two bandits each shot dead while escaping. What are your comments on this report?
A. This report also shows troops were all the time carrying out mopping up operations. Obviously, on this occasion they shot armed bandits who escaped after the combat action, and two of them were shot in this action. The exact occurrence cannot be reconstructed from this brief radio report.
Q. I believe that is quite sufficient in this case. I would now like to ask you to give your attention to the same exhibit on page 125 of the German text, which is page 84 of the English Document Book. Here we have a daily report of the Corps dated 23 April 1944. It is reported here under 264th Division, in reprisal for attacks on our trucks two villages 4 kilometers northwest of Trogir were partly burned down.
The same incident has been submitted by the prosecution again in a different document. We find this same report in document book XX of the Prosecution, on page 6 of the English text, which is page 4 of the German document book. In this case it is Document NOKW 1551 of the Prosecution, which is Exhibit 458. This report has reached a very high agency. It has reached the Daily Report West of the OKW General Staff of the Army. It is dated 23 April 1944. I would like to ask you, witness, after I have clarified these circumstances, to give your comments on the facts; by this I mean the partial destruction of these two villages 4 kilometers northwest of Trogir, Can you tell anything of your own knowledge about these facts?
A. Yes, I can tell you of my own knowledge. I know that district quite well. I myself with my escorting officers went there once or twice. Northwest of Trogir the road goes on very steeply in many bends, and because mines were planted there all the time this serpentine road was at its starting and at its end secured by our own men. In spite of this fact again and again on this particular spot there occurred mine attacks. Within this stretch of road guarded by the posts on each side there were two farms, one could not call them villages. It was only possible that if mines were planted in that stretch of road that they were planted from the inhabitants of these two farms, or at least the inhabitants of these farms had to be in the "know." These people were on repeated occasions warned by the Division. They always denied any knowledge about the mines. They were told if this mine planting went on then their houses would be destroyed, and in spite of this mine blastings occurred time and again, and that is the report which is here submitted by the 264th Division.
These two farms on the serpentine road Northwest of Trogir were destroyed. It is striking, in this connection that these people disappeared before the houses were destroyed. That explains quite obviously that they considered themselves guilty. Therefore, the measure was, under all circumstances, justified, and it shows that we investigated the matter and only took a reprisal measure after all the warnings, etc, had been of no avail.
Q, May I ask you one question in this connection, General, was the reprisal measure which was taken here, successful?
A. Yes, after these houses had been burned down there were no more mine plantings along that stretch of road. The success was quite obvious.
Q. I would like you to remain with that report for a moment which says here further that 2 kilometers northwest of Trogir 2 suspects were arrested. Can you give us a reason for this arrest, and give your comments, General?
A. This is shown quite clearly in the report of the 264th Division. It says there that two soldiers west of Trogir were shot by bandits. In my opinion it was the duty of the division to make investigations as to who the perpetrators might have been. This was done and two suspects were arrested. I cannot see any reason why that should present a crime. Any Army would have endeavored to establish who the perpetrators were, and that is all I could say.
Q. Well, then, General, will you turn up in this same exhibit page 126, which is page 89 of the English text. This is the next report. It is a report about the arrest of the suspects and is dated the 23 April. The next report have is the report of 24 April 1944.
The entry reads "as a reprisal for surprise attack band quarters burned down." Can you explain this measure to us, General?
A. In the daily report of the 264th Division of the 22nd of April, it says that -"14 kilometers northwest of Trogia, own trucks went on mines. Subsequently the mine troops which were committed, were attacked. In this operation 6 own losses were suffered, 13 wounded, 2 trucks were a total loss and 1 truck was damaged. The bands wore partly civilian clothing and partly Ustasha caps. The result of the combing of the terrain has so far not been submitted." Here we see that a heavy attack by the bands had occurred and that considerable losses had been suffered by the Germans. Then the territory was combed out , which is also reported in the report, the troops encountered band quarters and this attack had obviously been carried out from this band nest, and so this band-nest was destroyed. In spite of the high losses on the part of the Germans, no reprisal measures against human beings were carried out. This is a proof, then, that the troops were not set on harming the civilian population but they attempted to find the bands there where they were concentrated, and they destroyed their quarters, so that no more sabotage acts could be carried out from these accommodations.
DR. TIPP: In order to clarify these circumstances I may say that the quotation to which General von Leyser had reference, which is a report of the 264th Division dated the 22nd of April 1944, is not contained in the Prosecution document but it is contained in my Document Book 2, on page 113; this is Leyser Document No. 39 which I had offered as Leyser Exhibit 25.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. We can now leave these mopping-up operations, reprisal acts, etc. From those things which we have so far discussed concerning the tasks of the 264th and of the 392nd Division, one might conclude that this band-fighting had been the most essential task of your two coast divisions. This conclusion could be drawn from the way in which the prosecution documents were submitted. Would you please tell us, General, whether this impression would be a correct one, or, if not, what the conditions actually were?
A. No, that, of course, is in no case correct. The securing of the supply lines was one of the tasks but not the most essential tasks. The most essential task which the coast divisions had was the building up and the securing of the defense installations along the coast; that was their task, and not merely the securing of the supply lines. That was a task which was carried out on the side.
Q. The building up of the coast defense installations was, in accordance with what you said before, intended to counter an anticipated landing of the Allies. Could one expect such a landing at that time and did you have any reasons -- any grounds -- for such an anticipation?
A. Yes, at that time one did certainly expect such a landing along the Adriatic Coasts In Italy the front had moved more and more towards the North and this again gave the possibility of a possible allied landing along the Adriatic Coast. Above all, there was the enemy air activity which became so strong and destroyed all localities along the coast and which again led to the conclusion that the allies might land there. Through the destruction, or rather through the bomb attacks, our own troops were comparatively little hit when the localities were destroyed, because our own units were widely dispersed in the strong points, as I have previously mentioned, but the civilian population was quite strongly hit through these attacks, and, above all, their homes. One might perhaps add the following. We also received reports to the effect that in the mountains in the rear area, airplanes landed all the time, which supplied the band members with arms, equipment, etc., and in this manner there might also have been the possibility that if this allied landing on the coast was carried out, the bands in the rear area, through the supply of their ammunition, etc., could become dangerous to us.
Q. You told us then that the German leadership in that area expected an allied landing. What were the measures taken as a possible defense against such a landing?
A. To begin with, it was ordered at that time that all the islands along the coast were to be occupied. Along the Adriatic Coast there are numerous small and larger islands which, of course, could become quite important in the event of a landing. As a consequence, it was part of the task of the division which was committed along the coast that they would gain possession of these islands, some of which were occupied by the bands.
Q. You are telling us, then, about the building up of the coastal defense and of the occupation of the islands along the coast. Were there any other measures which were carried out or which were planned, which were intended to serve as a defense against a possible landing?
A. Apart from everything else there was, of course, the evacuation, which served as a preparatory measure for the building up of the defense strongholds. By this I mean the evacuation of the civilian population to the extent to which it was necessary, for military reasons.
Q. If we come to the chapter of evacuation now, General, there is an enormous number of documents which have been submitted by the prosecution in this connection. Before I shall go into any discussion of these individual documents, I would like to hear your personal opinion. For this reason I would like to ask you what was your fundamental attitude towards such evacuation measures, generally and in particular?
A. I considered evacuations in areas which either are a combat area or in a short while might become a combat area, absolutely justifiable from the point of view of International Law. In this connection we have to consider the fact that such evacuations arc not only carried out in the interests of the own troops but also serve as a protective measure for the civilian population, Every individual who has experienced , as a soldier, the hardships and sufferings to which the civilian population is exposed in a combat area, will understand this point-ofview, in my opinion.
Of course an evacuation always means hardship but it entails even more hardship for a civilian to remain and live in a combat area is quite obvious, I think, and I do not have to mention it particularly. To support my point of view, I would like to point out that, for instance, on the occasion of the French campaign, the French evacuated completely their Northern provinces. In the same way, to the best of my knowledge, the British, after the French campaign, evacuated their Southern coast, because they were afraid that we might carry out a landing there. All these tings show that an evacuation is , or might be, an absolute military necessity. Apart from all this, down there we had to take into consideration the fact that there were many people amongst the population who were opposed to us. These were people who either would carry out sabotage acts again and again, as was shown quite clearly, or who would spy on us and find out our positions and give this information to the enemy or something else , - that those people, in the event of a possible enemy landing, would even fight against us. All these factors, in my opinion, show that an evacuation was a tactical and military necessity.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q To become a little more concrete, General, did you consider it necessary, because of the situation as you have described it now, to evacuate the whole population or was the evacuation to restrict itself to certain parts of the population?
A I would like to answer your question as follows. Seen from a military point of view, it is, of course, easiest to evacuate the whole civilian population from the combat area. This means considerable hardship for the civilian population concerned. We down there carried it out in this way that, to begin with, we only evacuated those people who might be of immediate danger to us. Besides, the evacuation of the whole population living along the coast on the islands would have been very hard for the population and, on the other hand, it was extremely difficult to accommodate such a large number of people anywhere else, tor that reason, as I said, to begin with, we restricted our measures to the so-called band suspects.
Q This term "band suspects", General, crops up again and again during these proceedings. Would you like to tell us what you mean and meant by a "band suspect"?
A By "band suspect", one meant those people whom one would suspect of having participated in combat actions or whom one would suspect at least of sympathizing with the landing enemies.
In my opinion, as I have already stressed, it is absolutely justifiable from the military point of view to evacuate such people. To the best of my knowledge, for instance, in the Japanese war, the Americans evacuated the Japanese population along the west coast of the States and transferred them to the interior of the country for reasons of military necessity. I also believe that for America the danger of a landing on the part of the Japanese was of not such an immediate danger and not so closely anticipated as a possible Allied landing along the Adriatic Coast in Croatia.
Q One additional question, General: was this planning of the evacuation and also of the execution of this evacuation carried out against Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the will and wish of the Croatian population or was it done with their consent or was it possibly even done at their request?
AAll evacuations which were at all carried out in that area were all carried out only in connection and with the consent of the Croatian authorities.
Q You have told us before when you described the sphere of tasks of your two coastal divisions that these two divisions had the order to occupy the islands. The occupation of these islands was a prerequisite for their evacuation. In this connection I would like to ask you were actually all islands which are very numerous along the Croatian coast occupied?
A We had the most varying reports about this fact as I have previously said.
Q. Forgive me if I interrupt you. You said you received reports?
A No, orders. We had the most varying orders about this fact. At one time we were told all islands were to be occupied and then again we were told only some islands were to be occupied and in the end it happened that only those islands were occupied which were of special tactical importance.
Q You said, General, that the corps received a great number of orders. May I ask you to clarify who was the ultimate agency which issued those various orders? I mean who was the ultimate agency which issued those orders? I mean who was ultimately the author or orders concerning evacuations, et cetera?
A In the final analysis, these orders came from the OKW. By this I mean the orders which islands and whether any islands at all were to be occupied.
Q Why was the occupation and the securing of these islands of such vital importance, General, that even the OKW apparently with individual orders dealt with this problem?
A To judge this one has to know the local conditions. These islands were so numerous and they were along the coast so that they could Court No. V, Case No. VII.
have become of a vital importance for a possible enemy landing. Besides, on these island there was a large number of band members and from these islands, with the help of the bands, there was a very active smuggling of arms from the islands to the mainland. This alone established one reason why one should at least mop up all those islands and clear them of bands and another reason was that the islands which had tactical importance would all the time be occupied in order to control all those islands and in order to prevent the smuggling of arms which took place all the time.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like to refer to one document which I have already offered as an exhibit. This is Leyser Document No. 16 in Document Book I on page 46. I have offered it as Leyser Exhibit 46; I beg your pardon -- Leyser Exhibit 17. This is an affidavit of a Regierungsbaurat Person who, as I have said when I introduced this document, deals with a number of items to which I shall refer back during the course of the examination. To the problem of evacuation, I would like to state the document to which I am referring. It is Document Book I, page 46, and the numeral to which I am having reference is numeral 4. In this document book it is contained on page 48. The affiant here deals with the evacuation of the islands and he says here - and I quote:
"The plan for the evacuation of the Islands along the war important coast was an obvious matter, at a time when these islands developed into increasingly efficient bases for the bands. These bands, becoming stronger and stronger, concentrated on the archipelage which was difficult to be kept under control; they interrupted the German sea supply lines, fired at motor vehicle convoys moving along the coastal highway and terrorized the population from their hideouts.
"I remember a case from own observation when an Italian seagoing tug, sailing under the German flag, ran aground on a reef south of Lussinpiccolo (January 1944) and was shot to pieces and blown up by heavily armed civilian bands. The crew consisting of Italian civilians Court No. V, Case No. VII.
and 5 German sailors were killed, except one who succeeded in hiding. Subsequently we rescued him.
"The islands were used by the Allied powers as bases for their special details and sabotage teams. Here exchanges and discussions with leading enemy commands took place according to reports I received from natives on the island of Asinelle where I was stranded for several hours after weathering a storm."
Q General, we will now refer back to the question which I had put, and to begin with I would like you to answer the question in whose hands the carrying out of these measures seen on a large scale was. By this I do not only mean the area of your corps but the whole coast which was threatened by a possible landing.
A The order for the execution of this measure was given by the army because it was a tactical measure. The execution was a matter of the difficulty in collaboration with the Croatian authorities and with the Croatian agencies. The corps within the scope of its tactical task issued the orders in this respect. The occupation of the islands was, for instance, the task of the 15th Mountain Corps. This task had been transferred to this corps and the corps then issued the orders to subordinate units. The operations themselves were then carried out by the divisions.
Q Regarding the problem of the occupation of the islands, we have comparatively little material in these documents. Therefore, I can at the moment only show you one document. I would like you to turn up in document Book page 48 of your document book which is page 63 of the English document book. Here you will find prosecution exhibit 570 which is Document NOKW-1772. We have submitted here a report on an operation to the 15th Mountain Corps by the 264th Artillery Regiment dated the 3rd of February 1944. The Prosecution has from this report, which is signed by a Lieutenant Frank dated the 3rd of February 1944, included in its document books the following excerpt: "By order of the 891st Infantry Regiment, all men capable of bearing arms were arrested and evacuated to Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the mainland. According to statements by the population, the bandits evacuated Prestko in the same night."
I would like to give you, General von Leyser, Document Book II of the Defense for this purpose, please. You have here Leyser Document Book No. XXXVII. It has already been offered as Leyser Exhibit 24. On page 108, General, you will find the complete report about this evacuation of the islands. Would you briefly give us your comments? I want to correct myself. I made a mistake. I did not offer this document as Leyser Exhibit 24 but as Exhibit 31. The page is correct--page 108, Document Book XX.
q. Looking at the total report we can clarify the operation. A unit of Regiment 891st received the order to mop up and occupy the island Ulinn? This mopping up was carried out, The bands which had before occupied the place Prestko on the island, had, when the German troops approached, evacuated Prestko. There was no fighting contact between the German troops and the bands. The transfer to the mainland of men who were capable of bearing arms was necessary because on the island itself there were to be left only comparatively small German forces. Therefore, the danger existed that this small German occupation force might be exposed to oppositions from this population which was opposed to them. Apart from that it was well known that the bands would recruit all those men on the islands who were capable of bearing arms. For this reason the evacuation of these islands was absolutely necessary for purely military reasons.
Q. Well, we will not deal with the focal point of the problem, General. By this I mean the order which was given for the evacuation. And we will also deal with those measures which were actually taken in this direction. First of all, a preliminary question, which I think of the greatest interest to the Tribunal; On the occasion of the evacuation of the islands and the evacuation of the coastal area, were necessary measures actually carried out or weren't they?
A. As I have already said, this question was greatly discussed, and there were many orders about this problem, but comparatively little actually happened.
Q. If I understand you correctly, witness, the evacuation measures were only carried out to a comparatively small extent. May I ask you why this was the case and why one deviated from the original plan? Whey weren't the evacuations carried out in the same manner as had been originally ordered?
A. Seen from a purely military point of view, it would of course, have been most expedient, as I said initially, to evacuate everybody. However, this was not done because it would have represented a considerable hardship for the civilian population. In the course of the occupation and mopping up of the islands we discovered that such a large number of civilian population was involved that we wouldn't know where to accommodate this large number of people. In the documents we have a short remark where the Corps reports that roughly 250,000 people are involved.
Q. One question: Do you mean that 250,000 people were involved who were to have been evacuated according to the original plan, or were there 250,000 people who were actually evacuated?
A. I mean there were 250,000 people who were to be evacuated, I must have expressed myself unclearly. And these two reasons make it clear why the order could not be carried out in such a harsh manner and that subsequently it was ordered that only those islands should be evacuated which were of a vital military importance, to begin with, only the band suspects were evacuated and everybody else was only supposed to have been evacuated in the event of an actual landing.
Q. May it please the Tribunal, I would like to submit a document to further clarify this point. This document is contained in Document Book I of the Leyser Defense on Page 55. This is Leyser Document No. 18, which I am offering under Leyser Exhibit No. 44. This document is an affidavit by Eberhard Hans Artur Einbeck, dated the 30th of August 1947. The affidant is Eberhard Hans Artur Einbeck, residing in Hamburg. The affidavit was sworn to before a notary in Hamburg on the same date.
Under numeral 1 the affidant describes his military career. In this connection it is only of interest what the Witness says in his last entry: "From 1 June 1944 to the end of the war I was Chief of Staff with the XVth Mountain Army Corps, of which General von Leyser was the Commander until the end of July, 1944." Under Numeral 2 the affidant deals with the evacuation of the Adriatic Coast, and the affiant says the following:
"Ideas about the evacuation of the Adriatic coast were exchanged between army and corps before my time, for when I took up my post it was clear to the commanders that put of humanity for the civilian population they could not be responsible for evacuating the coast. The evacuation of the Adriatic coast would have been absolutely necessary for tactical reasons. The fact that it was not carried out enabled the population to obtain a fairly accurate survey of the extension of our coastal bases in spite of preventive measures placing these areas off limits. The work of the enemy intelligence service was thereby rendered substantially easier. This disadvantage was deliberately accepted by our commanders because it was clear to them that out of consideration for these people a complete evacuation of the population in the coastal bases could under no circumstances be considered, It is quite possible that untrustworthy elements were evacuated in individual cases; I cannot give any details about this. It is a fact that the greater part of the Adriatic coast was not evacuated.
3.) Evacuations of individual persons who were suspected of being in contact with the enemy were all carried out in conjunction with the Croatian authorities. It was a territorial matter for the execution of which not the corps but rather the authorized German general in Agram, Glaise von Hortenau was responsible.