Q When was it that the 114th Rifle Division started its march to Italy, General? And how was this march carried out?
A The march of this Division to Italy started at the Beginning of January. It was carried out under the code name "Nibelungenfahrt." One part of the Division marched along the coast roads Obrovac, Senj, Novi, and Fiumi, and another part of the Division marched along a parallel route which wound through the mountains. This march, on the occasion of which the Division was no longer subordinate to the Corps, was also used for various mopping up operations in this area because, as I have mentioned initially, this area, after the capitulation of the Italians, was still infested by bands. These marching columns which moved slowly towards Italy were quite frequently attacked, by bands. One of these surprise attacks in the area of Senj is especially well recollected by me in which there were considerable losses on both sides and where, at the time, the bands or a pant of these bands were clothes in Italian uniforms, which is a sign that after the capitulation they had received these uniforms from the Italians.
Q General, I believe this is sufficient to illustrate these tactical problems. These are only of interest to us inasmuch as it is necessary to discuss the Prosecution documents in this connection and therefore to understand them. In the course of the examination I believe we can restrict ourselves to the Prosecution material. For this reason I would now like to start discussing these Prosecution documents with you which the Prosecution has submitted against you, originating from the 114 Rifle Division. Here, again, I shall follow my old procedure of discussing them in chronological sequence. The first of the reports we find in the Prosecution is a Daily Report of the 15th of December 1943, made by the XVth Corps. This report is contained in Document Book XV, Exhibit 367, which we have repeatedly mentioned here. This particular part is contained on Page 16 of both the English and the German texts. It is Prosecution Document NOKW-1331. From this lengthy report I would like to discuss with you the fact that 14 bandits are reported by the 114th Rifle Division as shot after a Summary Court Martial.
Can you, from your own recollection or from knowledge gained from the documents, tell us anything about this, General?
A It says here that 14 bandits were shot to death after sentence by a Summary Court Martial. The shooting of bandits after a Summary Court Martial, is my opinion, in accordance with International Law. From the total report I can see here that there were several small actions carried out by the Division. One of them was in the area of Errenic, Knin and Omis. In these areas these 14 bandits were shot after a Summary Court Martial. By this I mean they must have committed some sort of an act which entailed court martial proceedings, and that this summary court martial had pronounced this particular sentence. The report also shows the total losses of the enemy. There were 44 dead; 23 prisoners; and 1 deserter. This, in my opinion, also proves that the Division did not arbitrarily shoot prisoners, but that proper court martial proceedings had taken place.
Q I would like you to leave open this page of the Exhibit which you have General. There is one more incident which I would like you to comment on and this is in the same Exhibit on Page 21 of both the German and the English texts. This is supplement to the Daily Report of the 15th of December 1943, made by the XVth Mountain Corps. The same incident has again been submitted by the Prosecution in the same book. This incident deals with the destruction of villages friendly towards the bands, northwest of Knin. Can you give us your comments on this, General?
AAs I have stated previously the 114th Rifle Division was no longer subordinate to the Corps. Where the operation "Ziethen" is concerned large parts of this Division had been subordinated to the Vth SS Corps, and a part of the Division remained in the quarters of that Corps, and a part of the Division remained in the quarters and kept carrying out mopping up operation on a smaller scale, which were mainly intended to secure the supply lines.
This document here must concern a mopping up operation of this kind carried out by a unit of the 114th Rifle Division. This can be seen from the contents of the report. The Division mentions here the capture of a camp with considerable amounts of ammunition. The Division further talks about a number of enemy losses which shows that fighting must have been taking place here, and that these villages were destroyed in the course of this fighting. There is no talk whatsoever in this report of any reprisal or similar measures. It is, therefore, merely a report which concerns combat actions.
Q When did the Division finally leave the area of the Corps, General?
A In January, 1944 the Division started its march to Italy. I believe it was towards the end of January that this march was concluded.
Q From this period there are no documents submitted against you by the Prosecution and which might concern the 114th Rifle Division; therefore, I don't think that we have to deal with any further details here. Just one last question: From other documents which are of no particular importance for the Prosecution, it can be seen that the 114th Rifle Division reported to the XVth Corps during its march to Italy. You told us that this march took place during the month of January, and before that you had said that the 114th Rifle Division was no longer subordinate to you as of November of the previous year. Can you tell us in a few brief sentences, General, why in spite of this the Division kept reporting to your Corps?
A That is quite simple to explain. At the beginning of my examination here I commented on this fact. The Division was still stationed in the area of my Corps, and it was quite obvious that the Corps had to be informed about everything that went on in the area. This is why this 114th Rifle Division, as long as it remained in the Corps area, reported to the Corps. Furthermore there was one more reason for it still reporting to the Corps and not direct to the Army, and that was that the radio instruments of the Division were not strong enough to reach the Army with its reports.
Therefore, the 114th Rifle Division, as long as it was still located in the Corps area, kept reporting via my Corps, and we were the people who passed on these reports to the Army.
Q This, then, concludes the reports from the area of the 114th Rifle Division. I would now like to turn to the Submission of a few documents which were made out by members of the 114th Rifle Division.
I would like to suggest that I start after the recess with this submission.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for our noon recess at this time, until 1:30.
(The Tribunal adjourned at 1215 to resume at 1330.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 12 November 1947)
THE MARSHALL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems that due to an inspection that has to take place on this coming Saturday that it will be impossible for this Tribunal to hold Court on that day; so we are announcing now that there will be no Court sessions this coming Saturday as we had previously announced.
You may proceed, Dr. Tipp.
DR. TIPP: If the Tribunal please, before continuing my examination of defendant von Leyser I would like to give the names of the witnesses to the Tribunal and the Prosecution whom I intend to call on behalf of General von Leyser. All witnesses have been approved by the Tribunal. The first one will be Dr. Hans Joachim von Besser - to spell the last name - B-E-S-S-E-R. He used to be the personal ADC of General von Leyser on the staff of the XVth and the XXIst Army Corps in Croatia, I shall examine him concerning General von Leyser's personal attitude, particularly towards political matters, about his relations with the troops, and his attitude towards the civilian population.
The next witness will be Herr Kobe - K-O-B-E. Kobe was Ia of the 392nd Croatian Infantry Division, which was subordinate to the XVth Corps in Croatia. Kobe will testify as to the battle conditions in Croatia and general conditions in the area of the Division.
WITNESS ERNST von LEYSER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. TIPP:Now, to continue with my evidence on behalf of General.
von Leyser, I shall offer some documents which are concerned with the fighting done by the 114th Light Infantry Division, which I have just discussed with General von Leyser.
The first document offered in this connection is Leyser Document No. 12, which is contained in Leyser Document Book I, on page 25. It is offered as Leyser Exhibit 38. It is an affidavit, dated the 20th of September 1947, given by Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Gottfried Annuss, which was sworn to on the 20th of September 1947 before a notary public at Ueberlingen.
Under Paragraph 1 this affiant describes his military career, and inasmuch as it touches on matters here, he says that after June , 1943, he was Ia on the staff of the 114th Light Infantry Division, and in that capacity he was, from November , 1943 until January 1944, under the command of General von Leyser.
In paragraph 2 he deals with General von Leyser's personality. To read one paragraph therefrom, which is roughly in the middle of Paragraph 2, the affiant says as follows:
"In spite of the difficulties and the danger, which were connected with personally obtaining information on the spot, General von Leyser traveled frequently within his area of command and did not only visit the Division Headquarters, but also the troops, so that I gained the impression of a special conscientiousness with which General von Leyser intended to form for himself personally a picture of the real conditions of the area under his command by personal observation."
In the next paragraph General von Leyser's relations to the troops are described, to which I should like to draw attention. Paragraph 3 deals with the means of communication in Croatia. This affiant also confirms that lines of communication were highly difficult, for which reason news did not always come in at the proper time and date. Then, he continues to say in the middle of Paragraph 3:
In the daily reports of the Division to the Corps, insignificant occurrences were not mentioned. For example, mining of streets, where no damage resulted, or similar smaller incidents were only reported when they became more frequent and gave evidence of new , livelier Activity of bands in certain territories. Otherwise they were occasionally reported by telephone to the Corps.
Regarding reprisals I can say the following: An order regarding shooting of hostages in a certain proportion is unknown to me, it has also never been executed.
During the time in question I can not recall any shooting of hostages.
Real retaliatory measures were only provided for cases where sudden attacks, sabotage of railways, etc. took place within the territory occupied directly by German troops, the offenders therefore were to be found in all probability among the population living among us. Besides reprisal measures were only taken after repeated incidents in the same territory. Therefore reprisal measures, referring apparently to relatively minor sabotage, may be mentioned in the daily reports. But, in order to judge correctly, one has to consider the incidents of a certain time, which necessitated these measures to protect the troops from further sudden attacks.
Meanwhile the population had been warned. If such raids took place in territories, not continuously occupied by German troops (supply routes to more distant strong points, etc.) reprisal measures were out of question, because it could be assumed that the acts were committed by groups of bands which intended to disturb the territory systematically. In such cases, so-called mopping-up operations were ordered with the goal of driving away the bands. When such operations took place, houses were certainly destroyed occasionally, which the bands had built for them to take up positions and to harrass our channels of communication. It seems to me absolutely possible, that the reports regarding such operations were also communicated falsely as reprisal measures.
In paragraph 5 the affiant deals with the enemy of the Division, the witness says:
Our enemy in Croatia could not be called a military troop, but really only a band. As they did wear a specific badge, visible from the distance, and carried no arms openly, there were no clear fronts. Their way of fighting was treacherous, as a rule they did not fight an open battle. As generally the positions and the location of the bands were not clear, and they could not be distinguished from the civilian population, they had as a rule, the first shot. Their terror was much feared by the population of the territories, which had to be vacated by the Germans after a lengthy occupation.
At the beginning of September 1943, when we started our operation to mop-up the Lika, a sudden attack was made on a telephone construction crew of our Division in the sector SO Bihac, during which the dead bodies of our fallen soldiers were mutilated horribly. The next day during the change of position of the Division Headquarters, I saw these victims myself.
In the next paragraph, the affiant deals with the Cetniks again:
The Cetniks were the deadly enemies of the Communist bands. For this reason they joined us occasionally in our divisional area in the fight against Communist bands, while they also carried out operations independently. As we did not have enough security forces, the Cetniks were also used for security tasks in our area.
In Paragraph 6 the witness deals with the liaison with the Croatian Government Department:
The connection with the Croatian Government Offices was guaranteed by the temporary presence of the Croatian Minister Frkovic at the Division Headquarters, otherwise, through the collaboration of the competent prefects, mayors, etc. This connection was particularly valued by the commander of the division, General Eglseer, a former Austrian officer who knew the Balkans particularly well. The abbot of the monastery in Banja Luka and the Bishop of Sibenik could doubtlessly testify as to our good relations to the civilian population.
The next document I beg to offer in this connection is Leyser Document No. 17 in Document Book I on page 52. I offer it as Leyser Exhibit 39. It is an affidavit by the former First Lieutenant, Adolf Schmitzhuebsch given on the 22nd September 1947 and sworn to before the Bourgemeister of the parish of Oberelvenich. He says at first:
During the years of 1943 and 1944 I was a First Lieutenant and company commander in the Light Infantry Regiment 721 which was part of the 114th Light Infantry Division. In this capacity I was subordinated till January 1944 to the 15th Mountain Army Corps which at that time was under the command of General von Leyser.
General von Leyser, in all his orders which reached me, was greatly concerned not only about the physical well being, but also about the spiritual welfare of the troops. During several inspections of units in my regiment he convinced himself of the conditions prevailing in these companies.
He scourged every discrepancy in his orders and demanded that ruthless disciplinary action be taken. From my own experience I can make the following statement about the method of fighting of our opponents: The methods of fighting applied by the bands was in every case a treacherous one. I have never seen them come out for open combat not even if they had a numerical superiority. Disguised as harmless civilians, they employed every conceivable means in order to attain their goal. Due to the fact that they promptly sacked every dead or captured German or Italian soldier and deprived them of their uniforms, many of them wore these uniforms with the rank insignias, etc. and in this manner they frequently succeeded in deceiving us. During attacks in the Kozara I have repeatedly seen that the bands sent woman and children ahead of their advance since they obviously knew the orders preventing us from doing harm to women and children in any case. A great number of able-bodied civilians were, constantly following our division fearing compulsory recruitment which was always carried out by the partians. The people, asking us for help again and again, spoke of threats and the most severe reprisals. The peasants were prevented from bringing their crops to the towns, and the fields, for the greater part, could not be cultivated. Railroad workers and other state employees were constantly in danger of persecution for exercising their duties. During my temporary assignment as burial-officer of the Regiment I gained an insight into the inhuman methods of fighting of the bands. During this assignment I have seen the bodies of at least 30 German soldiers who, evidently prior to their murder, were mutilated in the most atrocious way (cut off oars, gouged out eyes, killing through slow burning, burying them alive, driving of sharpened stakes into the abdomen or porteriors, etc.)
. Every dead or captured German soldier was sacked. The bands did not respect the Red Cross, I myself have seen attacks 5893-A on ambulances, dressing stations or ambulance planes.
The partisans established their positions in almost every case within the villages or on scattered farms. Their supply depots were usually hidden in the mountains or in well-concealed storehouses in a village under the harmless disguise of an honest trader whom we considered trustworthy.
Only once did we carry out measures of reprisal. A village was burned down when captured, after it had been clearly established that the entire buildings had served the partisans as hide-outs. Armed roberies were carried out from this village and German soldiers had been killed there. When captured the village was completely evacuated.
Reports of enemy casulties were usually issued as follows: dead: 3, estimated number of wounded: 10. However, there were frequent exceptions from this rule. A report of "killed partisan suspects" does by no means exclude the possibility that they were killed during or as a result of combat.
This brings me to the next document in this connection which is Leyser Document No. 29 contained in Document Book II of the Defense and it is on page 27. This is offered as Leyser Exhibit No. 40. This is an affidavit by the former Col. Hans Wolfgang Schoch and on 3 October 1947 this affidavit was sworn to before the commandant of the internment camp of Dachau.
In paragraph 1 he gives us his ranks and official positions. He says:
On 1 September 1943 as colonel and regimental commander I took over the command of the 741st Mountain Infantry Regiment of the 114th Mountain Infantry Division in Croatia. While the 114th Mountain Infantry Division was under the SV Mountain Army Corps, I worked indirectly - under the command of General von Leyser.
In paragraph 2 the witness makes a few statements about General von Leyser's personality. He says that in check-ups and investigations that were carried out by him and General von Leyser, he could visit his regiment personally and insisted that he be informed very precisely.
I shall begin to quote from the next paragraph in paragraph 2:
I had the opportunity of reporting to General von Leyser on the measures which I had provided for the poverty-stricken population in the District of Sibenik in particular protection of communications with the rear zones, with the central authorities in Agram; the setting in motion of the economic processes, the assurance of food supplies, the adjustment of finances, the maintenance and repair of the railroads for military as well as for the economy and civilian transportation, the support of measures for charities and churches. In this connection I secured his full approval and recognized his deep understanding for the want and the needs of the Sibenik civilian population.
The sentiment of the population.......this is the first paragraph on page 2 of the document.
These demonstrations of gratitude were addressed spontaneously again and again by representatives of the Government and of the Churche to me personally, to my commanders, chiefs, officers, and units, as well as to the remaining troops of the 114th Mountain Division, in Sibenik, Primosten, Rokognica, Livno, and in very many other cities and communities, especially on the Dalmatian Islands.
The methods of warfare employed by the Guerrila bands, which mocked every usage of regular warfare were so utterly the rule, that I must restrict myself to mention one glaring example for the innumerable others: When Livno was taken in December 1943 the troops of the 114th Mountain Division were able to prevent in the last second the shooting of the wife of the bourgeous-Croat burgomaster of many years' service. The wife of this man who was very popular and respected among the entire population had remained in the city during the rule of the Guerrilla bands; she had been found innocent of the slightest wrong by a strict investigation and was now supposed to be executed by a liquidation-squad of the Communist bands.
The fact that ambulances and other medical installations of the regiment could travel only under powerful escort, and were under orders to do so was due solely to the frequent experience that they would be exposed to the treacherous and brutal raids of the Guerrilla bands when they traveled singly.
Constant acts of sabotage against the railroad, supplying the coastal region with food, were a matter of routine; likewise also, acts of sabotage against the port of Sibenik.
The affiant then describes a number of deeds perpetrated by the bands against the civilian population. He continues:
I did not witness any active racial or religious wars during the period of my assignment over there, although I did see their shocking traces in the form of relentless, senseless destruction and devastation of the country and of its settlements. As was reported over and over again by the population, these could not be ascribed to the war of 1941, which had blown rapidly over the country, nor to the subsequent measures of the German Wehrmacht, but to the racial and religious wars between the Serbs and the Croats.
In paragraph 4 he speaks about prisoners:
Prisoners of war were treated by the 741st Mountain Infantry Regiment and, to the best of my knowledge, by all the other units of the 114th Light Infantry Division strictly in accordance with the Geneva Convention, even though irregular guerrilla bands were involved. They were sent on to Division Ic as per regulations.
In connection with the 741st Mountain Infantry Regiment reprisal measures, retaliations, shootings of hostages, and burning down of houses were never carried out, nor did an order to that effect ever exist. Members of the guerrilla bands were at the most "shot in battle". The one possibility of doing away with the guerrilla raids and of paralyzing the activity of the bands for a time consisted in the removal of the guerrilla depots, and, in case this was rendered impossible by the impenetrability of the terrain, in their destruction.
These depots would most frequently he set up in forest hideouts.
This brings me to the next document. It is contained in Leyser Document Book II on page 91; it is Document No. 30 and I shall give it Exhibit No. 41. It is an affidavit by Capt. Siegfried Heidenreich, sworn to on 30 September before the notary in the parish of Wehmingen. Under paragraph 1, the witness says:
1.) From March 1943 to October 1943 I was assigned as supply officer to the 721st Mountain Regiment and from November 1943 to October 1944 as commander of a Mobile Mountain Infantry Column attached to Mountain Infantry Regiment 721, which was under the 114th Mountain Division, and thereby under the XV Mountain Army Corps until January 1944.
2.) With respect to the violation of International Law by the warfare of the guerrillas in Croatia, I can make the following statements: In connection with a surprise attack on the railroad line Zogre-Banja-Luka, between Bos. Novi and Prijedor, about middle of May 1943, a German soldier was roasted to death on a spit over an open fire and then sent to us in a box-car, allegedly to provide a deterrent example. The mutilation of about 15 to 20 additional German soldiers was horrifying. By orders of the regiment I was present at tho identification of the corpses in the field hospital in Prijedor.
In paragraph 3 he speaks about their methods of fighting:
3.) Fortified positions of the guerrilla bands practically never existed. There was sufficient natural cover and protection provided by rocks etc... and, moreover, houses and farms, indeed even entire larger localities like Cetingrad and Khiuc, were used as fortified positions.
The next document I offer Leyser Document 31 which is in Document Book II on page 93 and I offer it as Leyser Exhibit 42. It is an affidavit by Capt. Herbert Mueller-George of 7 October 1947, sworn to before a notary in Munich on the same day. Here again we find under paragraph 1 what positions the witness had held. He says that he was with the Mountain Regiment 721 where he was company commander and that that regiment was later on under the 114th Mountain Infantry Division and thereby under the XV Mountain Army Corps up to the time of its transfer to Italy.
2. The enemy whom I learned to know in the Croatian theater of war was no regular soldier. The Tito partisans were led by commanders, most of whom were proven Communists, teachers, artisans, laborers. Most of the time they were clothed as civilians, or fitted out with captured Croatian, Yugoslavian, Italian, or German pieces of uniform, and only on their heads wore a red very small, five-cornered star. However, not even this insignia was worn by all members. By daylight one could hardly recognize it within 100 meters and not at all at dusk or during hazy weather. It would be thrown away, together with the arms, whenever danger was imminent, and this was proven by the remains of the fabric of the star and the freshly pulled out threads on the cap. They would then disguise themselves as harmless civilians and would deny categorically having used fire-arms or having even heard anything whatsoever, although only shortly before the din of fighting had filled the whole area. Often it would occur when troops approached localities or houses, that quietly working civilians would suddenly seize firearms and open up fire from a distance of 200 to 400 meters. Regions which were hostile to the partisans were raided with a special preference in order to enable the latter to requisition food-stocks and implements which they needed. The civilian population reacted very bitterly to this. Later on enforced conscription was applied. From this category we gained the majority of deserters, who had something to tell about the life of the partisans. At the city entrance of Prijedor two partisans were once captured disguised as Moslem women. From then on the latter had to lift their veils during check-ups. Partisan orders and mail were found under the harness of an ass which was being led by two boys. Women were favorite go-betweens for the relegation of orders; they would hide the messages in the folds of their garments.
Usually the partisans would fire on the Wehrmacht from houses, defiles wooded mountain tops, and hedges. The partisans, being constantly on the move, would at the most dig fox-holes in tactically advantageous spots and fortify houses for defense positions. Depots were commonly set up deep in the woods.
3.) None of my corps, Divisional or Regimental commanders even gave me an order to arrest persons as hostages or to shoot them as such. Thus, no hostages were even taken by my unit, and to the best of my knowledge they were not taken by the other units of the 114th Mountain Infantry Division, either. Likewise my unit never burned down houses arbitrarily as a means of reprisal.
And now I shall read from paragraph 4 which again deals with lines of communication:
4.) Reports were often varied as to style. Units would often use verbs such as annihilated, shot, killed in order to avoid using this word "gefallen" (fallen). In the fall of 1942 I rode with a Lieutenant-Colonel on the General Staff from Zagoeb to Belgrade, and I heard from him, by way of conversation, that, upon inquiry on the part of the OKW with respect to the carrying out of reprisals for the killing of Germans, he had referred to the enemy dead of the recent skirmishes as "executed hostages" in his report in order to satisfy the "armchair strategists."
5.) Our prisoners were brought directly to the battalion or to the division, if it happened to be in the proximity. The division was glad about every prisoner because the taking of prisoners in the Croatian theater of war was exceptionally difficult due to the partisan warfare. As an example of the treatment the following incident may be mentioned: A woman partisan of the telephone exchange was captured in Livno. She claimed to have been impressed into the service. At first she was kept in the field kitchen; later she was taken to her relatives in Split.
And I shall now offer the final document in this connection which is Leyser Document No. 57 which is contained in Document III of the defense, on page 194, This is offered as Leyser Exhibit 43. It is an affidavit by the former Colonel Lothar Berger, sworn to before me here in Nurnberg on 17 October 1947. May I draw attention to a misspelling in the document: It is under paragraph 1. It says there: "from 1943 onwards I was in the Reichswehr." May I have this corrected into 1932?
He first of all describes his military career. He says "in October 1943 as a commander of the 721 Light Infantry Division, I came to Croatia and at First to Zara."
"At that time the 114th Light Infantry Division was subordinate to the 15th Mountain Army Corps. This ceased at the end of November 1943, when the 264th Infantry Division occupied this area. I can fix this date so exactly because I remember that me successor for the Zara area, Colonel Schmidt, Regiment Commander in the 264th Infantry Division, was able to negotiate alone with General Von Leyser already in the last days of November on the occasion of General von Leyser's third visit to Zara. I believe that we were Army-reserves at the time to be used for mopping-up operations on the Islands local mopping-up operation "Ziethen" subordinate to the 5th SS Corps because the Reconnaissance-detachment of the SS Division Prince Eugen, aside from other foreign army units, was under my command. The operation "Ziethen" which had as its object the capture of Livnos was besides far out of the Corps area within the area of the 5th SS Corps.
Reports regarding the "Ziethen" operation were, due to signal technical reasons, dispatched via the 15th Army Corps to the Army because the range of our radio installation did not extend to the 5th SS Corps nor did we have their radio-code. The mopping up operations of my battalions left behind at Grahac, Obrovac and Zara were for the same reasons reported via the 15th Army Corps. On our march to Italy reports were for the same reasons also dispatched via the 15th Army Coprs, especially as we had some motorized radio stations put at our disposal by the Corps.
2.) From my own recollections I am unable to give any account of the 14 bandits shot in accordance with martial law which are mentioned in Document NOKW 1331 Exh. 362 presented to me. But generally speaking I am able to testify that cases of this kind were handled by us in the following manner. Prisoners were on principle handed over to the Division in order to be interrogated by the Intelligence Officer (1c). It is impossible to talk of an immediate execution by shooting. The expression "in accordance with martial law" denotes besides that regular legal proceedings were carried out by the Division.
3. With regard to the presented document NOKW 1331, Exh. 367 (page 9 of the document), the supplement to the daily report dated 15 September 1943, I am able to make the following statement:
May I interrupt here briefly? The document to which the affiant, has reference here is contained in Document Book XV of the prosecution on page 2 of the German and page 21 of the English books. To continue:
Operation "Ziethen" of which I have spoken already above, started about December 4th or 5th. I was in action during this operation myself, therefore I am able to make any statement in regards to the occurrences Northwest of Knin from my own experience. But I know that one of my Regiment's battalions, stationed at Grahac with orders to safeguard the convoy traffic artery Grahac - Knin, was not in action at the "Ziethen" operation, but had remained at its post from where it was used for local mopping-up operations.