A. No, it was not.
Q. Then let me show you the two other documents, Witness, which are concerned with this operation. First, Exhibit 391 which is contained in Document Book XVI, on page 69 of the English and 129 of the German, and I would also like to hear your comments on Exhibit 392 which is Prosecution Document 789, on page 91 of the English and 131 of the German Document Book. Exhibit 391 is an operational report by an Infantry Reserve Regiment concerning the Operation "Schach" (Chess) of 29 May 1944 and the second exhibit is an operational report by the 1st Battalion of the 373rd Regiment concerning the same operation of 6 June 1944. Did you at any time see those two documents?
A No, as these were units participating in Operation "Schach" (Chess) and as the operation was carried out by the 69th Corps these reports would not reach my Corps at all. I might draw attention here to the fact that one document, the number of which I have forgotten, bears the entry stamp of the 69th Corps, which shows that the report did not reach us.
Q The Exhibit which you have just mentioned, Witness, is Exhibit 392. There the stamp of the 69th Corps is contained. This exhibit to make this quite clear, is contained in Document Book XVI, on page 91 of the English version and 131 of the German. Now, I think we have made it quite clear, General, that this operation was an operation carried out by the 69th Corps. Now, the only question we should clear up is what does Exhibit 390 mean. It is on page 128 of the German Document Book and page 88 of the English Document Book XVI. As I mentioned before it is a teletype letter by your Corps addressed to the 69th Corps of 20 May 1944 and this is what it says: "In the Kordun mountains an anticommunist movement is organizing. Consequently suggestion: Troops to be directed to be moderate in taking loot-booty and in destruction." What was meant by that teletype, General?
A I think the purpose of this letter is quite clear. In the Kordun Mountains which was to be cleared of bands by the Operation "Schach" (Chess) an anti-communist counter movement was about to be formed. We heard about this somehow at the time. I don't know whether we heard this through our confidential agent through enemy wireless or how. The troops knew that in the Kordun area there was a strong movement of bands as well and that the small villages in that area were strong points for the bands. The troops, as I mentioned so often before, had the assignment when mopping up in that sense to destroy anything the bands could support themselves with, by destruction of their depots and supplies. These tactical measures were not to be carried out this time because this anti-communist movement was organizing there.
After the mopping up that area could be handed over to anti-communist forces who could also use these band accomodations. Equally it was not necessary to take the supplies away because it was preferable to keep them at the disposal of the anticommunist movement. That was the purpose of this communication my Corps made to the 69th Corps, i.e. not to disperse this budding anti-communist movement.
Q To make this quite clear, General, the expression "destruction" is concerned, therefore, with strong points of bands and the expression "botty" means the depots of the bands. Is that correct?
A Yes, that is what is meant.
Q Now, in connection with the 373rd Division there is another operation which we should discuss. It is a name which frequently crops up in Prosecution documents. It is Operation "Roesselsprung". The purely tactical side of this operation should not be of too much interest here. I would like to ask you to give us briefly the alms of that operation.
A This operation "Roesselsprung", (Knight's Move), was an operation by the Army which used units of a number of corps including my own. The purpose of the operation was to disperse an important band center. The focal point was Drvar. Also a thrust was to be made into the Tenak and Dimitor Mountains. According to a report in the hands of the Army there was in Drvar Tito's Headquarters. The fighting which occurred during this operation lasted for a few days. In other words it became clear that in actual fact we had broken into a very important center of the bands where Tito's Staff was actually stationed. The main depot was in the Uvalo Potocki area.
Q I think that is quite enough as to what this operation is about. I want to use a few documents and discuss them with you concerning this operation. The first document is contained in Document Book XVI, on page 95 of the English and 143 of the German. It is contained in Document No. NOKW 1418, Exhibit 394. It is a tele type letter by the XV Mountain Corps, Department Ia, and addressed to the XV Mountain Corps, Q Department.
The date is 3 June 1944. The first striking fact in this document is that one department of your staff should address a teletype letter to another department of your staff. How did that come about.
A The explanation is quite simple. Battle Headquarters of the Corps was in Knin and the Quartermaster was stationed in Bihac. As the Quartermaster had the assignment of registering booty, etc. there was this wireless message sent from Knin to the Quartermaster Department.
Q On page 2 of this document, General, it is reported that a hospital in Uvalo was destroyed. The same incident crops up a second time in a teletype letter by the XV Corps to the Army dated 7 June 1944. That report is contained in Document Book XXV, English on page 105 and page 81 of the German, and the third time we come across this incident on the next page of the just mentioned Exhibit in a teletype letter by the XV Corps of the 3rd of June 1944. In other words, we have the same incident contained in three different reports. Will you please tell us something about the contents of this report, General?
AAs I mentioned before, this Operation "Roesselsprung," (Knight's Move,) was a large scale operation which was to lead us right into the center of the bands. This becomes clear from the high number of losses which according to the document was suffered both by ourselves and the enemy. It also becomes clear from it that ammunition dumps, high explosive dumps, air fields, railway installations accommodation of bands, hospitals, etc. were to be found there and all these in the course of the operation were destroyed.
Q This brings us to the end of our discussion of the 373rd Division with the exception of one thing to which I shall come back. I should like, therefore, to interrupt here and offer a few documents which were written by members of the 373rd Division. The first document to which I want to have reference is Leyser Document No. 13, which is contained Leyser Document Book I, on page 29.
It is offered as Leyser Exhibit 33. From this document I should like to make a few quotations. It is an affidavit by First Lieutenant Winkelbrandt of 24 September 1947. It was duly sworn to on the same day. The affiant says at first in the introduction -- it is Leyser Document 13, in Document Book I, on page 29, and it is offered Exhibit 33. After the usual introductory formula the affiant describes his military career. Important there, is only the second sentence: "Since 15 March 1943 I was Ia of the 373rd (Croatian) Infantry Division, which, until the end of July 1944, was subordinate to General von Leyser as Commanding General of the XVth Mountain Army Corps." The affiant then describes, first, under paragraph 1, how General Leyser was always in personal contact with his troops. He then describes in the second paragraph of the same page how General Leyser made every effort to obtain direct information. Under numeral 2 we have a description of the insufficient news services in Croatia and this is what the affiant says:
The means of communication in Croatia, were due to long distances very insufficient. Communication by wire was frequently disturbed, personal information made very difficult on account of the long distances, the scarcity of fuel, the insecurity of reads and the danger from low flying planes. Division and regiments were in many cases on their own, as the Corps could not intervene in time. For example, I remember that at the operation "Roesselsprung", tactical commands of the Corps - although communicated by radio reached the Division only after 3 days.
The entries into the war diary were always made under the date, the communication arrived. One can not therefore with certainty draw conclusions from the date as to the day of the event described.
Justifications for orders were generally not customary in the Wehrmacht nor possible in the case of wireless communication.
The next paragraph deals with entries in the War Diary, to which I would like to draw attention, and the next paragraph deals with justification for orders, and the affiant says "to justify and explain orders was not usual with the German Army, and in the case of wireless communication not possible."
In paragraph 3 he deals with the bands, and this is what he says:
It can not bw denied that there were some leaders at the head of the bands fighting the German Wehrmacht. However, I could not find out how far they were responsible for the men under their command. But the methods of the bands, not being uniform, proved, that these leaders exercised little influence upon their men.
One saw very seldom, and only in sporadic cases, parts of uniforms, namely German, English, Italian or Jugoslav ones. In most cases the bandits were civilian clothes or rags. The small Soviet Star on the cap could not be recognized from a distance, also it was worn only rarely, as evidently there were not enough of them.
Arms were hidden by the bands when the German Wehrmacht appeared. The members of the bands camouflaged themselves as harmless civilians, and then used their arms treacherously. Their operations resembled pillage raids, aimed at obtaining economical advantages for the continuation of their resistance. They attacked only when they had a great superiority, and then mostly from ambush, during the night or when the terrain was favorable. The bands did not build systems of positions, They preferred to use abandoned houses and farms as positions. They also established their dumps in such houses or farms.
Frequently also the inhabitants of the country were severely damaged by the fight of the bands. I remember for example that the bands repeatedly attacked visitors of the market in Bihac and Bugojno, in order to prevent them from bringing their victuals to the market into the town. In Cazin the bands closed for this purpose the locality in a rather wide circle, and took away money and victuals from all visitors of the market without giving them any compensation.
Also the acts of sabotage of the bands were directed without consideration against the own civilian population. For example, I remember the destruction of the power plant in the ore-territory of Ljubja Rudnik, whereby the whole supply of current for Prijedor was cut off; or the destruction of the post office in Cazin, where all money was stolen.
It happened again and again that members of the bands who had camouflaged themselves as female Mussulmans were discovered, so that finally the wearing of the veil was prohibited.
The cruelty of the methods of combat of the bands was incomprehensible for our conception. At the relief of Cazin, in the summer of 1946 dead German soldiers were found, who after being wounded had been killed by blows of rifle butts on the back of their heads, were completely undressed and robbed of all their valuables. Near Bagojno, in the summer of 1943, a Croatian member of the division, who had lost contact with the troop, was found a few hours later, mutilated in the most horrible manner, by cutting open the abdomen and by flaying.
With these I have only given a few examples, which I have witnessed."
Under Paragraph 4 he deals with the Cetniks, and this is what he says:
4.) The Chetniks were mostly not regarded as rebels in Croatia. They fought fanatically against the Tito-bands. For this reason they sought often as support the vicinity of German troops, and occupied localities which were in the neighborhood of German troop barracks. I never witnessed enmity between them and the German Wehrmacht. On the other hand, there existed great enmity between the Chetniks and the Ustascha. In this connection, cruel incidents took place frequently, which necessitated an interference of the German Wehrmacht.
5.) Native Chetnik units in the area of the XV, Mountain Army Corps were called "Croatian Combat Units". I presume that this name was chosen, in order to make it clear to the Croatian offices, that here also citizens of the Croatian State were concerned. These native Chetnik units were primarily self protective organizations against the bands. They were not under the command of the Division in any case, but operated only in loose contact with the troops, by whom they were used to strengthen its own weak units, especially for the purpose of securing the roads. For these services they received from the Germans food and occasionally also ammunition. They carried their operations out independently, without orders from the German troops. The German troops did not exercise any influence upon their way of fighting and their procedure. They also did not announce these operations in advance. Their reports of success were in most cases very exaggerated and were not taken seriously by the troops.
In the next paragraph the affiant comments on the butchering of the wounded, so often mentioned before, in a hospital of the bands.
May I say also for the record in what Prosecution document this report is contained? We find it twice, once in Prosecution Document Book 16, NOKW 1428, which is Exhibit 393, on page 93 of the English, and page 139 of the German, and the second time it was offered, it was in Document Book 23, NOKW 1777, Exhibit 567, on page 109, page 83 of the German.
< I now return to reading from my exhibit:
Regarding the report presented to me, that in the sector of the 373rd Infantry Division, Croatian combat units destroyed a hospital of the bandits southeast of Uzbina, and that 20 dead enemies, among them 2 doctors, were reported, and that furthermore 95 wounded and sick persons were butchered, I can say the following:
I don't remember this incident. However, I can assert from the form of the report and from the Division's manner of preparing reports with which I was familiar, that in this case probably a combat report of the Chetniks was involved, as a distinction is made between dead enemies and the wounded massacred later on. The report was probably made, as it was a special incident in the area of the Division. It was probably also intended to make it possible for the higher authorities to cause an examination of this incident by the Croatian authorities, because there was no other possibility of acting against the Chetnik units, for example in a disciplinary or judicial way?
Paragraph 6 deals with reprisal measures:
6. Retaliatory measures had become necessary for the protection of the troops and of individual military men, because the attacks and acts of sabotage, directed mainly against the railway, had reached an intolerable degree. The bands preferred for their operations usually the same spots. Their activities of sabotage could only be explained by the fact that parts of the population gave them their support. This supposition was underlined by the insults of the inquiry of the Ic. For example, I can still recall that, after acts of sabotage mines and other explosives were found in isolated houses along the railroad track near Bos n Krupa. As far as I can remember, retaliatory measures were carried out only in very rare cases, and only after previous repeated warnings.
These measures too were directed only against single farm-houses. If acts of sabotage increased considerably in one sector, the population of the adjacent villages was warned either by handbills or by the troops and called up to collaborate in combatting them. Only when in spite of this the acts of sabotage did not cease, and it became evident that the population assisted, retaliatory measures were decreed. The Division Commander made the examination and decreed the retaliatory measures after the Croatian liaison officer at the Division Headquarters had been notified in time. The latter contacted Zagreb by his own radio. Likewise the German Station Headquarters which operated in the sector of the Division, was notified. On account of the great distance, there was no direct connection between the Military Administration Headquarters at Zagreb and the Division.
7. According to the existing orders, hostages were occasionally levied by the Division. These hostages were in most cases discharged after examination and after it had been established that they were innocent, if no acts of sabotage occurred for some time. If the inquiry showed, that they had connection to the bands, then they were treated like captured bandits, and sent to the prison camp in the normal way. The Division did not deliver hostages to the Security Service (SD) or for allocation in the Reich.
8. I hardly know of cases where houses were set of fire after combat. In case an operation was directed against a certain village which was considered as being infested by bandits, and if as a result of the then developing combat houses were hit and burned - this is easily possible due to the construction of the houses in Croatia, for example the straw roofs - the troops reported that these houses "were burnt down as retaliatory measures due to an act of sabotage". On the whole, the troops had the tendency to pass reports to their superiors regarding retaliatory measures in a more severe form as corresponded to the reality, because it was known that then no further inquiries would be made from higher up.
I only remember that after a number of acts of sabotage some houses in the neighborhood of the railway track near Bosh. Krupa on the Una were burnt down. These houses had been evacuated by the inhabitants a long time before and it had been unambiguously established that they had been used by the bands as bases for their raids and as stores for explosives, etc."
Under "9" the Affiant deals with the term "Bandits who were shot dead." And I would like to call attention to that.
Paragraph 10 deals with bow persons were dealt with:
10. When prisoners were taken, they were interrogated by the division, by the Ic. I often witnessed such interrogations and never observed prisoners being compelled to disclose facts by forcible means. In case they were found to be deserts, they received preferential treatment. Other prisoners too were brought into a small prisoners camp established in the neighborhood of the division staff which had the designation "Prisoners Assembly point". As far as possible the prisoners were exchanged by the Division against German prisoners. If such an exchange had not been possible for some time, the prisoners were transported to the rear in trucks returning empty under guard by the GFP (Secret Field Police) and handed over to the prisoners camps of the regional commands. The Prisoners Assembley Point never had more than about 50 inmates. They were fed there according to regulations. Occasionally they were employed in various jobs.
Under Paragraph 11 he deals with destruction of hospitals. I quote:
11. If I am reminded of the fact that in several cases the Division reported that field hospitals of the bands had been destroyed, I can only say that these were by no means hospitals in the meaning current in Europe. The bands had rather adapted houses of farmers by some primitive devices - layers of straw, bunks, medicine drawers and similar things to sort of sock bays.
Occasionally also shacks or block-houses in a remote region were built for such a purpose by the bands. It had been ordered that in campaigns against the bands their supply bases had to be destroyed, since it was not possible to keep those remote regions occupied. Now, the above mentioned huts, which had been adapted for the reception of sick people, often represented the vital part of the bases of the bands. As a matter of fact, they were never found to be in use as hospitals.
Stores or food depots of the bands were destroyed only for the reason that it was impossible to carry them away because of the inaccessibility of the terrain. To destroy the supply bases of the bands was an absolute military necessity, since they were thus paralyzed for a long while in these poor and at that completely barren regions.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Now, I shall read from paragraph 12, and this is what it says:
"The males fit for military service were by law bound to service for the Croatian State. Yet, the responsible Croatian authorities did not dare to go out into the country and the Croatian police was powerless. So the induction of the population fit for military service became the more incomplete the more distant the regions were from Zagreb. On the other hand, the bands used to recruit by force the population fit for military service by raiding the regions they passed through. That is why it was a tactical necessity to remove the population from those regions which were controlled by the German Wehrmacht in order to deprive the bands of their use."
The next document I want to offer is contained in the same Document Book. It is Document Leyser 13a. It is in Document Book 1 on page 38, and it is offered as Exhibit 34. This is a picture of a destroyed village. The affiant says in his affidavit about it:
"The enclosed picture represents the village Donje Vukovsko near Bugoyno. It was taken by a non-commissioned officer of the staff, whom I knew, in May 1943. I have seen the village in this condition myself. I know that at that time there had been no fighting with the partisan bands there, the village has, as a matter of fact, been destroyed by the Croats themselves in the manner shown in the picture, since the village in question was a Serb village."
In this connection I should like to offer Leyser Document 31, which is contained in Document Book I, page 63. It is offered as Leyser Exhibit 35.
JUDGE CARTER: In Exhibit 34 are you furnishing the picture, or what is the situation there?
DR. TIPP: The picture and the affidavit, if Your Honor please.
May I ask you whether the picture is contained in the English Document Book?
JUDGE CARTER: No, there is no picture here.
MR. FULKERSEN: It is in my document book, if your Honor please.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
DR. TIPP: If your Honor please. I have another two pictures here. There must have been some mistake, and they obviously are not included in your Honors' books.
THE PRESIDENT: We need three.
DR. TIPP: I shall see whether I can find another one upstairs. I have only two down here at the moment. We only get a few numbers of the photostat copies, as a rule.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you have four or five?
DR. TIPP: Yes, I have 10 copies, and I passed them on to the office which puts together the English Document Books. I myself have no influence on the compilation. It may well be that these pictures were included in different document books, which are in the hands of different people. I myself never see the document books which are in the hands of the Court. Therefore, I couldn't find out beforehand.
MR. FULKERSEN: If Your Honor please, I believe the Prosecution has another copy of the document book, I believe there is another copy in there, and therefore we can furnish you with a copy.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me for the comments. Pardon me, Judge Carter, for intruding. The thing that bothers me is why they don't come down here right and why you should have to apologize for it.
Captain, will you get in touch with Major Schaefer and find out why they are not here and where they are? It is Leyser Document 34.
DR. TIPP: Exhibit 34, Document 13a.
THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit 34, Document 13a, and it is a picture. Inquire why it isn't here and where the rest of them are.
JUDGE CARTER: Now, will you repeat regarding the last exhibit, please?
DR. TIPP: The next document offered is Leyser 21, contained in Document Book I, page 63. It has been submitted as Exhibit 35. I would like to read a few important passages therefrom. It is an affidavit by a businessman named Willy Bein of Ansbach, dated 16 September 1947, and it was sworn to in Nurnberg on 17 Sept ember 1947.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
In paragraph 1 the Affiant describes what he has been doing, and why he is in a position to make a statement at all. He says first, as a civilian he was in Zagreb since 1938. He was a businessman, and on his commercial trips he learned about Croatia, Bosnia, and sometimes the Serbian area. In 1913 he was called up and joined the Croatian Regiment subordinate to the 373rd Division, and remained until December 1944.
In Paragraph 2, and the following ones, he describes a few experiences which he had when serving down there, and is talking from the point of view of an ordinary enlisted man.
May I quote from paragraph 2:
"On 9.6.1944 I had the opportunity in Velika Skocaj, south of Bihac, conversing with natives of the country whose language I knew fairly well from working many years in Zagreb. They expressed their joy at being able to sleep at home again, since there were German troops in their village. Up to that time the men had been compelled to spend the nights in safety with German troops some distance away because it was the custom of the partisans to raid the village at night and they used to carry off with them any male inhabitants whom they found there. Many murders had been committed by the partisans; the inhabitants had been literally plundered of all they had. In spite of their great poverty, the joy of the inhabitants at having German troops with them was attested by their lavish hospitality.
"During our march to Petrovac with the baggage-train I was repeatedly able to ascertain that the surrounding villages were deserted. In this connection I must remark that there are no villages in the German sense in this entire region. The villages consisted only of a few farms, most of which were widely scattered. During the march I observed how the civilians were returning to their villages along with the German Wehrmacht. Upon our arrival at Petrovac, to which the main part of its population was returning with our baggage train for the first time, I noticed a frightful poverty. A widow, who was one of the few who had Court No. V, Case No. VII.
experienced the rule of the partisans in Petrovac, told me how the partisans ruthlessly used to requisition the farmers' cattle, and they themselves had to live only on grass, wild fruits and the like. Her husband had been murdered by the partisans.
"On 22.6.1944 an engineer detachment of Domobranen was attacked from ambush by a group of partisans a little outside of the base near Vrtoce and massacred to the last man. We were sent out to reinforce them, but could only rescue their dead bodies, which had been butchered in the most brutal fashion and completely looted. There were 40 corpses and it could be seen very clearly that the soldiers who had been shot had been killed with bayonet stabs. The remaining 18 engineers had been carried off; we could see clear traces where they had been dragged over the ground.
"Around 11.9.1944 Petrovac was evacuated again. On this occasion I noticed how the inhabitants moved out again with our baggage train, with all their property in about 150 carts.
"The partisans with whom I have come in contact in battle, or whose corpses I have seen after battle - I still remember, for example, 9 dead men after a fight near Brotnja on the Una at the end of September 1944 - could not be considered soldiers by their clothing. They were civilians wearing the clothes of the local region. At the beginning of July 1944 we brought back a wounded man near Ostrelj who had been attacked by a partisan in German uniform. On 7 October 1944 during a security operation near Kupirovo I saw for the first time 7 or 8 fleeing bandits in English Khaki uniforms."
The next, paragraph deals again with the Cetnik units:
"There was no hostility between us and the Cetnik units; on the contrary, there was a thoroughly good understanding between us. I remember that the Cetniks in our bases used to build their own primitive huts and lived in them by themselves. They drew their rations with our battalion in Petrovac every Monday. It was a constant irritation to us German soldiers that they could not be ordered into action Court No. V, Case No. VII.
and some stayed at home when we were sent out on active service. Moreover, they carried out their operations on their own initiative and slept all day long in our quarters. It was only during air raid alarms that they had to man one single observation post."
Q After this interpolation, General -
JUDGE CARTER: We will take our morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: Court will recess for 15-minutes.
(Thereupon a 15-minute recess was taken.
Court V Case VII THE MARSHALL:
Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed, Dr. Tipp.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, after we have talked about the documents, we shall now continue. At the very beginning, you said when you described the area of the 373rd Division, that this division also had to defend the area of Banja Luka. As you said at the time, Banja Luka was for some time the headquarters of the corps staff. I would now like to ask you, witness, whether you personally had an opportunity to observe the fight of this division against the bands.
A Yes. On the 31st of December, 1943, Banja Luka was attacked by strong band forces. For all practical purposes, these forces occupied the town area for some time and devastated it. Besides the building which housed the corps headquarters, all other main buildings were also in the hands of the bands, and the bands were also fighting for isolated strong points in houses. In this manner, I could observe the fight which also concerned my own house.
Q General, would you please talk a little more into the microphone? It is rather surprising, General, isn't it, that such an important place as Banja-Luka can be taken by surprise by the enemy in this manner and occupied by them? What were the reasons for this?
A The reasons were that the occupation forces of Banja-Luka consisted first of all mainly of Croatian militia. These people during the night of New Years Eve from 1943 to 1944 had been taken by surprise by the bands, and at the same time an uprising had taken place within the town so that these troops were more or less surprised. We then succeeded by gathering together the few forces which still remained, and by committing the whole corps staff, in holding the town of Banja-Luka until such a time when the army put at our disposal a Panzer Grenadier detachment.
After important street fights by the individual units, the encirclement of Banja-Luka was broken and the town for the moment was liberated. The bands, of course, on the occasion of the attack on BanjaLuka, put all their forces into the obtaining of this town and I believe they did that for two reasons. One reason was that it was the headquarters of the corps staff, and another main reason was that BanjaLuka was the capital of Croatia. The bands attached great importance to conquering this town and the Croatian government, on the other hand, was very interested in the bands not conquering the place. That was the reason why the fight for Banja-Luka was of some importance for the bands.
Q You said just now, General, that the bands devasted the town. Can you give us some comments on this statement from your own recollection?
A Of course I can deal here with some details that I remember. I may put it this way; the bands plundered in a creul manner. They murdered and raped. I myself saw that in one house, in a room, there were three to four children and as many women who were on one heap and were dead, beaten or shot to death. In Banja-Luka the Bolshevist terror was as bad as it could possibly be, and it was the same as I had noticed in 1919. Amongst other things in the guard room where the wounded and sick were lying all of them were murdered, and the only exception was one man who had succeeded in escaping to the attic and hiding there. I believe this description is sufficient to describe the conditions there at the time. There can, of course, be no talk when describing these people of a regular belligerent army.
Q May it please the Tribunal, I would like to offer two documents to illustrate this point. These documents will bear out General von Leyser's statements. The first one of these documents is Leyser Document 23. It is in Leyser Document Book I on page 70 and I am offering it under Exhibit 36. This is an affidavit by Otto Witscher from Dortmund. This affidavit was duly sworn to on the 18th of September in 1947 in Dortmund, and in number 1 the affiant describes the justification for his statements. He says:
"From October 1943 to October 1914 I was a Captain in the reserved and Company Commander of the 3 Vehicle Transport Unit 993 assigned to the XV Mountain Corps. In this capacity I gained first hand knowledge of the exceptional difficulties in acquiring supplies."
Numeral two deals with surprise attacks on supply vehicles I would just like to point out this paragraph.
Figure three deals with the return transport of prisoners which I do not want to read, but I do want to quote numeral four. It says here:
"On the occasion of the raid on Banja-Luka on New Years Eve 1943/44 one of the men in my company was in the ward in Banja-Luka with influenza. All the patients in the ward were taken from their beds by the bands and were shot in an adjoining court yard with the exception of one, who feigned death after he had been wounded and was released shortly after. I was able to examine the interrogation of this man myself in due course."
In addition, I would like to offer in this connection a document from Leyser Document Book II. This is Leyser Document No. 55. I beg your pardon, it is in Document Book III. It is Leyser Document 55 and it is on page 170 of Leyser Document Book III. I am offering this document as Leyser Exhibit 37. This document consists of one affidavit and one picture. I am afraid I only got these pictures at the very last moment from the photostat department, and I am now submitting them to the Tribunal. May I ask your Honors to add these pictures to Document 55 in Document Book III. This picture is self-explanatory and from the affidavit I would like to quote briefly.
"The picture which I handed in was given to me by a member of the 15th Mountain Corps. According to his statement, it represents 3 Moslem partisans who were captured during the fighting around Banja-Luka on New Years Day. 1944.
I would like to draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that this picture shows that the prisoners did not wear any uniform nor did they bear any insignia which can be designated as recognizable from a distance. Witness, after these comments, shall we now continue?