Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 12 November 1947, 0930-1630, Judge Carter, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal 7 is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the Courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, have you ascertained as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom except the defendant von Weichs, who is still in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed with the examination.
ERNST VON LEYSER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - (Continued) BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, before our recess we talked about the railway security service done by your division and the last thing we discussed was Exhibit 6570, which is in Document Book 25. The blowing up of railroads in the Area 373d Division has thus come to an end. Is there anything you want to say in conclusion about this problem?
A I should like to draw attention in this connection to the fact that it was, of course, strictly forbidden to all civilians to enter the neighborhood of the railway lines. This is the reason why all civilians who were found there, especially at night, were described as suspects and it was considered that they might be connected with the sabotage acts and they were, therefore, apprehended.
Q Could you, perhaps, say something more general about the relationship between blowing up of railway lines and reprisal measures carried out?
AAs a matter of principle I should state this: Reprisal measures were not carried out by the troop for every single case, as might be suspected from the documents submitted by the prosecution. Reprisal measures were carried out only if and when the sabotage acts became too excessive in spite of the fact that there were constant warnings to desist from these acts. In order to safeguard the troops it was entirely necessary to take stringent measures.
DR. TIPP: If the Tribunal please, I would like to offer a document in this connection which is contained in my Document Book 2, on page 108; it is Leyser Document 37. The prosecution have used NOKW 1772for brief extracts only and this might give the impression......May I repeat my sentence? The prosecution have included in their documents, daily reports, from which it might be concluded that there had been reprisal measures for every single act of sabotage. In order to correct that impression, I have taken from the Prosecution Document NOKW 1772, extracts, for the Leyser Document No. 37, which I have just mentioned. These are daily reports and they show that reprisal measures were not taken for every case of a railway line blown up. I should like to offer Leyser Document No. 37 as Exhibit 31. To illustrate what I have said just now, I would like to draw attention to a few points. On page 108 of Document Book 2, there is, first, a daily report of 8 February 1944. This is a report by the 373d Division, the last sentence of which says: "Line 11 kilometers SE Prijedor again practicable after temporary destruction by blasting." Neither the intention of a reprisal measure is mentioned here nor the fact that one was carried out. The next entry is a daily report of 9 February 1944, here again a report by the 373d Division. It says: "On the railroad line Banja-Luka-Prijedor, between Kozarac and Hadzimetric, 400 meters of rails torn up, bridge blasted. Line repaired, except bridge." Here again no intention is mentioned of carrying out a reprisal measure, nor that one was carried out. Then we have a daily report of the 23d of February 1944 and about the 1st Cossack Division it says:
"...Railroad line Sisak-Zagreb blasted between Odra and Gorica. Line again practicable." In the same report there is a notation about the 373rd Division which says: "Telephone lines between Suvaja and SRB interrupted by sawing off of 15 poles in the night of 20 to 21." Then it is reported what the troop intends to do, it says: "Reoccupation of Cazin." It seems to me that this is sufficient to clear up this point. I might draw attention, in this connection, to the fact that similar cases of sabotage occurred without reprisal measures, also mentioned in my Exhibit 30, which is Leyser Document No. 35, on page 103 of Document Book 2.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q Now, witness, please continue. You said that the Division, apart from their railway security service, had also the assignment of advancing on the bands who opposed law and order, and you called these "Operations." We also have a number of incidents concerning these operations, which we should discuss now. The first report about an operation of that type is contained in Document Book 15 of the Prosecution, on page 15 of the English and Page 14 of the German. The document is NOKW-1331 and the Exhibit number is 367. I am talking about a daily report by the Corps of 6 November 1943. According to that report, which I shall hand to you, Brecovac was taken in the teeth of enemy resistance and 26 civilians who were suspected of being members of bands, (Communist Committee), were arrested. Will you tell us something about that report, General?
A. The population of villages which we had taken were screened. As the members of the bands could not be ascertained wearing no insignia, those who were suspects were apprehended in order to safeguard the security of the troops. In this particular village the bands had established what was known as a local communist committee, which, of course, included the most active members of the bands. It was therefore absolutely necessary to apprehend those people in order to safeguard the security of our own troops. That is the purpose of this report.
Q. What happened to those people who were suspects?
A. They were arrested and they were screened. If nothing could be found against them they were released; otherwise they were kept in custody.
Q. Another operation by the 373rd Division is contained in a daily report by your Corps dated 8 November 1943. This report is contained in Document Book 14 of the Prosecution, on page 63 of the English and 39 of the German. It is part of Exhibit 343 and the document number is NOKW-720. Would you please give us your comments about the report which I just handed you?
A. This report describes that a unit of the Division mopped up the Kamensco Area according to plan. The population had left and the area had been evacuated. Therefore all we could have there were band strong points or at least people who were suspect of being members of the bands. As I see it, it was militarily entirely correct and justifiable if the troops destroyed the barracks which they found in that area and also destroyed any supplies of the bands which they found there inasmuch as they could not carry them with them. The arrest of people there who were suspects was also a military necessity. As I see it, it would have been much simpler and less dangerous for our own troops to do the same thing which enemy pilots would do - namely to destroy these strong points by incendiary bombs and other bombs; but in that case, innocent women and children would be killed, whereas we simply arrested them and if we had nothing against them, released them again.
Q. The next report concerning an operation is contained in Document Book XV of the Prosecution, on page 15 of the English and also of the German. This is exhibit 367 and it is Document No. NO1331. Let me hand you this report, General, and I should like to quote briefly from it: "Combat Group Muenchhausen made a surprise thrust into the area 25 kilometers east of Banja Luka. By means of strategem, 2 band leaders taken care of." What would you like to say about that?
A. This document is self-explanatory. Here we have a mopping up, operation in the course of which, 2 band leaders were shot. To use a strategem is scarcely something which violates the customs of war. I cannot tell you more about it from my own knowledge because I don't remember it any more.
Q. Then we should touch upon a daily report by the same division of 19 November 1943, contained in Document Book 14, in Exhibit 353. The document number is NOKW-786. This is on page 103 of the English and 76 of the German Document Book. This report once again produces the expression "1 bandit shot." Can you tell us something about this when you look at the document? What is meant by this expression?
A. The document explains itself. When the troop was on a reconnaissance operation they encountered an enemy patrol and on that occasion one bandit was shot - in combat, in other words.
Q. There is something else we should clear up. Why does the troop, in their reports, use the term "member of a band shot" if it is so obvious that it was a combat action, although the expression really conveys, according to the German usage, that there was not a combat action involved?
A. The German soldier uses the term "to fall in battle" for every soldier who loses his life in open battle after having fought for his Fatherland.
That expression, however, is used only if the man killed has been a soldier; but in these fightings we were facing an enemy whom the troops did not regard as a soldierly opponent and in this connection they used the term "shot" and not the term "fallen in battle." This combination of words, I should like to say, is based on an emotional thing; but, as I see it, it is clear to anybody who knows how the German soldier expresses himself.
Q. The same term, that is to say, "shot", is contained in another daily report from the area of the same division. This is the daily report of 20 April 1944, contained in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution, on page 81 of the English and page 123 of the German. It is Prosecution Document NOKW - 1416, Exhibit 389. There the Division reports that south of Dolja, 1 bandit was shot and 3 of the suspects arrested. Will you please look at the report and give us your comments about that incident?
A. Here again we have a report about a combat action which becomes clear from the fact alone that in the report one man is reported as shot and three as arrested. Had the man been shot only after having been arrested, the Division would have reported four bandits arrested, one of whom was shot.
Q. Now, I would like to ask you, General, to look at the same document book. The report you just mentioned was contained on page 123 and on the next page you will find a daily report of 22 April. Here again the 373rd Division reports that one prisoner was brought in and one bandit was shot. I think you can be quite brief about this.
A. The same applies which I said before. Had the man concerned been shot after being arrested, the Division would have reported two people taken prisoner, one of whom was shot. In other words, this again was a combat action.
Q. General, then please look at page 125 in your document book. It is on page 85 of the English version. There we have a daily report by the Corps, of 24 April 1944.
This is a report by the 373rd Division about Operation Klettersteig. In the prosecution Document Book there is only a brief extract from this report. It says there "Operation Klettersteig. In the course of forward thrusts by the 3rd Battalion, 383rd Regt., into the Area Turovac-Jelovac, bandits repelled, 5 villages burned down." This brief extract did not seem comprehensible to us and I have therefore included the whole of the report into my document book. This document is contained in my Document Book 2, on page 113. It is Leyser Document 39, and it is offered as Leyser Exhibit 32. This is a daily report of 24 April 1944. I should like to read the contents of the document, inasfar as it is interesting here, into the record. Leyser Document Book 2, page 114: "Daily Report of 24 April 1944. 373rd Division: Operation 'Klettersteig': In the course of forward thrust by III/383 (3rd Battalion 383rd Regt) in the Turovac-Jelovac area, bandits dislodged, 5 villages burned down, 16 enemy dead, 3 prisoners, 1 of our own officers dead, 4 ammunition dumps blew up when villages were burnt down."
Q. General, on the basis of the whole report, could you explain to us why the villages were burnt down?
A. This is what becomes clear from the report. These small villages in the mountains, and this is why we called the operation "Klettersteig", (Mountain Pass) were used by the bands as hiding places and strong points. No less than four ammunition dumps had been established by them there. The operation "Klettersteig" meant a forward thrust to the very center of the bands. To destroy these strong points of the bands was definitely a military necessity. In Croatia the term "village" by the way, particularly up in the mountains should not be compared to any village in Western Europe. These villages consisted as a rule of a few huts and if any ammunition blew up then, needless to say, nothing much would remain of a village of that type.
Q. The last report from the area of the 373rd Division is contained in the daily report of your Corps of 12 June 1944; it is contained in Prosecution Document Book XXV, on page 104 of the English and 81 of the German. This is Prosecution Exhibit 575. The document number is NOKW 1767. This report mentions that on the 10th of June in the course of the "Urwald" Operation (Jungle Operation), a strong point of the bands was encountered and medical huts were found there too. This strong point was destroyed. Can you explain this incident also?
A. Here again the same applies as I have said just now. This is an operation directed against the bands, a forward thrust into a center of band resistance. As mentioned before the bands would also select difficult mountain areas for their basis and that is where they usually kept the ammunition and supply dumps, huts for accommodation, etc. As the bands evaded our operations the troops had only the possibility to prevent the bands in their doings by making a thrust into their very center of resistance and take them away from them. It was in the course of an operation of that sort that the troop in the case of the Operation "Urwald", as reported here, encountered a strong point of that type and that strong point was destroyed.
It is obvious that the strong point had been deserted because no mention is made of prisoners wounded or killed. As I see it, it in no way is contradictory to the laws of war to destroy accommodations used by the enemy. It would have been much simpler to send up a squadron of bombers and to destroy the area by bombs, but we didn't have them.
Q. The 373rd Division needs no longer be discussed now, General, inasmuch as it concerns the XV Corps. I shall now discuss a few Prosecution Exhibits offered against you. These are the Exhibits 390, 391 and 392; all of them are contained in Document Book XVI. The first Exhibit 390 is on page 88 of the English and 128 of the German in Document Book XVI. It is Prosecution Document NOKW 788. The letter to which I have reference now is a teletype letter by the XV Army Corps to the 69th Corps of 20 May 1944. The Prosecution made a remark when they presented their evidence and it ran something like this: "This is a teletype letter by the XV Mountain Corps addressed to the 69th Reserve Corps, one of the units subordinate to it." This observation on the part of the Prosecution is contained in the record of 6 August on page 1514 of the German and 1516 of the English record. Let me ask you again, General, was the 69th Corps ever subordinate to you?
A. No, the 69th Corps was never subordinate to me. It was a Corps on the same level as the 15th Corps and subordinate to the Army.
Q. The three exhibit numbers which I have just mentioned, that is to say, 390, 391, and 392, all of them refer to the Operation "Schach", (Chess). General, what can you tell us quite generally about that operation? Was it an operation carried out by your Corps?
A. The Operation "Schach", was an operation ordered by the Army but the 69th Corps was to lead it.
I, myself, had nothing to do with it.
Q. The fact that this is not an operation by the XVth Corps but one by the 69th Corps becomes clear from a document which I have submitted. This is Leyser Document 28 and it was offered as Exhibit 28. It is the War Diary by the XVth Corps dated 1 January 1944 and it goes through until 13 June 1944. On page 85 of my Document Book II there is an entry of 19th of May 1944. I would like to quote:
"According to army field order, XV Mountain Corps with motor. Regiment 92, Mountain Artillery Battalion 54 and 1 regimental group of the 2nd Croat Mountain Brigade will participate in the operation of the LXIX Army Corps for the mopping-up of the Kordun and Banija."
Then there is an entry as to whom was to lead these units. General, under what division were these units otherwise?
A. These units were otherwise subordinate to the 373rd Division and for this particular operation they were put at the disposal of the 69th Corps and subordinated to them.
Q. You are saying, Witness, that this was an operation not by your Corps but one carried out by the 69th Corps which was not subordinate to you. But, as you said just now, you had 2 second units of the 373rd Division which usually was subordinate to you. Who issued orders to these units? How were matters reported during such operations, etc.?
A. The channels of Command and of reporting in the case of these operations were laid out very clearly. How it was handled was that the commanding unit which in this case was the 69th Corps would have the units usually subordinated to the 373rd Division and sent their orders to them which means that the newly subordinate units would receive their orders and assignments by the 69th Corps.
Q. If I have followed you correctly, General, the XV Corps in other words was not connected with this operation?
A. No, it was not.
Q. Then let me show you the two other documents, Witness, which are concerned with this operation. First, Exhibit 391 which is contained in Document Book XVI, on page 69 of the English and 129 of the German, and I would also like to hear your comments on Exhibit 392 which is Prosecution Document 789, on page 91 of the English and 131 of the German Document Book. Exhibit 391 is an operational report by an Infantry Reserve Regiment concerning the Operation "Schach" (Chess) of 29 May 1944 and the second exhibit is an operational report by the 1st Battalion of the 373rd Regiment concerning the same operation of 6 June 1944. Did you at any time see those two documents?
A No, as these were units participating in Operation "Schach" (Chess) and as the operation was carried out by the 69th Corps these reports would not reach my Corps at all. I might draw attention here to the fact that one document, the number of which I have forgotten, bears the entry stamp of the 69th Corps, which shows that the report did not reach us.
Q The Exhibit which you have just mentioned, Witness, is Exhibit 392. There the stamp of the 69th Corps is contained. This exhibit to make this quite clear, is contained in Document Book XVI, on page 91 of the English version and 131 of the German. Now, I think we have made it quite clear, General, that this operation was an operation carried out by the 69th Corps. Now, the only question we should clear up is what does Exhibit 390 mean. It is on page 128 of the German Document Book and page 88 of the English Document Book XVI. As I mentioned before it is a teletype letter by your Corps addressed to the 69th Corps of 20 May 1944 and this is what it says: "In the Kordun mountains an anticommunist movement is organizing. Consequently suggestion: Troops to be directed to be moderate in taking loot-booty and in destruction." What was meant by that teletype, General?
A I think the purpose of this letter is quite clear. In the Kordun Mountains which was to be cleared of bands by the Operation "Schach" (Chess) an anti-communist counter movement was about to be formed. We heard about this somehow at the time. I don't know whether we heard this through our confidential agent through enemy wireless or how. The troops knew that in the Kordun area there was a strong movement of bands as well and that the small villages in that area were strong points for the bands. The troops, as I mentioned so often before, had the assignment when mopping up in that sense to destroy anything the bands could support themselves with, by destruction of their depots and supplies. These tactical measures were not to be carried out this time because this anti-communist movement was organizing there.
After the mopping up that area could be handed over to anti-communist forces who could also use these band accomodations. Equally it was not necessary to take the supplies away because it was preferable to keep them at the disposal of the anticommunist movement. That was the purpose of this communication my Corps made to the 69th Corps, i.e. not to disperse this budding anti-communist movement.
Q To make this quite clear, General, the expression "destruction" is concerned, therefore, with strong points of bands and the expression "botty" means the depots of the bands. Is that correct?
A Yes, that is what is meant.
Q Now, in connection with the 373rd Division there is another operation which we should discuss. It is a name which frequently crops up in Prosecution documents. It is Operation "Roesselsprung". The purely tactical side of this operation should not be of too much interest here. I would like to ask you to give us briefly the alms of that operation.
A This operation "Roesselsprung", (Knight's Move), was an operation by the Army which used units of a number of corps including my own. The purpose of the operation was to disperse an important band center. The focal point was Drvar. Also a thrust was to be made into the Tenak and Dimitor Mountains. According to a report in the hands of the Army there was in Drvar Tito's Headquarters. The fighting which occurred during this operation lasted for a few days. In other words it became clear that in actual fact we had broken into a very important center of the bands where Tito's Staff was actually stationed. The main depot was in the Uvalo Potocki area.
Q I think that is quite enough as to what this operation is about. I want to use a few documents and discuss them with you concerning this operation. The first document is contained in Document Book XVI, on page 95 of the English and 143 of the German. It is contained in Document No. NOKW 1418, Exhibit 394. It is a tele type letter by the XV Mountain Corps, Department Ia, and addressed to the XV Mountain Corps, Q Department.
The date is 3 June 1944. The first striking fact in this document is that one department of your staff should address a teletype letter to another department of your staff. How did that come about.
A The explanation is quite simple. Battle Headquarters of the Corps was in Knin and the Quartermaster was stationed in Bihac. As the Quartermaster had the assignment of registering booty, etc. there was this wireless message sent from Knin to the Quartermaster Department.
Q On page 2 of this document, General, it is reported that a hospital in Uvalo was destroyed. The same incident crops up a second time in a teletype letter by the XV Corps to the Army dated 7 June 1944. That report is contained in Document Book XXV, English on page 105 and page 81 of the German, and the third time we come across this incident on the next page of the just mentioned Exhibit in a teletype letter by the XV Corps of the 3rd of June 1944. In other words, we have the same incident contained in three different reports. Will you please tell us something about the contents of this report, General?
AAs I mentioned before, this Operation "Roesselsprung," (Knight's Move,) was a large scale operation which was to lead us right into the center of the bands. This becomes clear from the high number of losses which according to the document was suffered both by ourselves and the enemy. It also becomes clear from it that ammunition dumps, high explosive dumps, air fields, railway installations accommodation of bands, hospitals, etc. were to be found there and all these in the course of the operation were destroyed.
Q This brings us to the end of our discussion of the 373rd Division with the exception of one thing to which I shall come back. I should like, therefore, to interrupt here and offer a few documents which were written by members of the 373rd Division. The first document to which I want to have reference is Leyser Document No. 13, which is contained Leyser Document Book I, on page 29.
It is offered as Leyser Exhibit 33. From this document I should like to make a few quotations. It is an affidavit by First Lieutenant Winkelbrandt of 24 September 1947. It was duly sworn to on the same day. The affiant says at first in the introduction -- it is Leyser Document 13, in Document Book I, on page 29, and it is offered Exhibit 33. After the usual introductory formula the affiant describes his military career. Important there, is only the second sentence: "Since 15 March 1943 I was Ia of the 373rd (Croatian) Infantry Division, which, until the end of July 1944, was subordinate to General von Leyser as Commanding General of the XVth Mountain Army Corps." The affiant then describes, first, under paragraph 1, how General Leyser was always in personal contact with his troops. He then describes in the second paragraph of the same page how General Leyser made every effort to obtain direct information. Under numeral 2 we have a description of the insufficient news services in Croatia and this is what the affiant says:
The means of communication in Croatia, were due to long distances very insufficient. Communication by wire was frequently disturbed, personal information made very difficult on account of the long distances, the scarcity of fuel, the insecurity of reads and the danger from low flying planes. Division and regiments were in many cases on their own, as the Corps could not intervene in time. For example, I remember that at the operation "Roesselsprung", tactical commands of the Corps - although communicated by radio reached the Division only after 3 days.
The entries into the war diary were always made under the date, the communication arrived. One can not therefore with certainty draw conclusions from the date as to the day of the event described.
Justifications for orders were generally not customary in the Wehrmacht nor possible in the case of wireless communication.
The next paragraph deals with entries in the War Diary, to which I would like to draw attention, and the next paragraph deals with justification for orders, and the affiant says "to justify and explain orders was not usual with the German Army, and in the case of wireless communication not possible."
In paragraph 3 he deals with the bands, and this is what he says:
It can not bw denied that there were some leaders at the head of the bands fighting the German Wehrmacht. However, I could not find out how far they were responsible for the men under their command. But the methods of the bands, not being uniform, proved, that these leaders exercised little influence upon their men.
One saw very seldom, and only in sporadic cases, parts of uniforms, namely German, English, Italian or Jugoslav ones. In most cases the bandits were civilian clothes or rags. The small Soviet Star on the cap could not be recognized from a distance, also it was worn only rarely, as evidently there were not enough of them.
Arms were hidden by the bands when the German Wehrmacht appeared. The members of the bands camouflaged themselves as harmless civilians, and then used their arms treacherously. Their operations resembled pillage raids, aimed at obtaining economical advantages for the continuation of their resistance. They attacked only when they had a great superiority, and then mostly from ambush, during the night or when the terrain was favorable. The bands did not build systems of positions, They preferred to use abandoned houses and farms as positions. They also established their dumps in such houses or farms.
Frequently also the inhabitants of the country were severely damaged by the fight of the bands. I remember for example that the bands repeatedly attacked visitors of the market in Bihac and Bugojno, in order to prevent them from bringing their victuals to the market into the town. In Cazin the bands closed for this purpose the locality in a rather wide circle, and took away money and victuals from all visitors of the market without giving them any compensation.
Also the acts of sabotage of the bands were directed without consideration against the own civilian population. For example, I remember the destruction of the power plant in the ore-territory of Ljubja Rudnik, whereby the whole supply of current for Prijedor was cut off; or the destruction of the post office in Cazin, where all money was stolen.
It happened again and again that members of the bands who had camouflaged themselves as female Mussulmans were discovered, so that finally the wearing of the veil was prohibited.
The cruelty of the methods of combat of the bands was incomprehensible for our conception. At the relief of Cazin, in the summer of 1946 dead German soldiers were found, who after being wounded had been killed by blows of rifle butts on the back of their heads, were completely undressed and robbed of all their valuables. Near Bagojno, in the summer of 1943, a Croatian member of the division, who had lost contact with the troop, was found a few hours later, mutilated in the most horrible manner, by cutting open the abdomen and by flaying.
With these I have only given a few examples, which I have witnessed."
Under Paragraph 4 he deals with the Cetniks, and this is what he says:
4.) The Chetniks were mostly not regarded as rebels in Croatia. They fought fanatically against the Tito-bands. For this reason they sought often as support the vicinity of German troops, and occupied localities which were in the neighborhood of German troop barracks. I never witnessed enmity between them and the German Wehrmacht. On the other hand, there existed great enmity between the Chetniks and the Ustascha. In this connection, cruel incidents took place frequently, which necessitated an interference of the German Wehrmacht.
5.) Native Chetnik units in the area of the XV, Mountain Army Corps were called "Croatian Combat Units". I presume that this name was chosen, in order to make it clear to the Croatian offices, that here also citizens of the Croatian State were concerned. These native Chetnik units were primarily self protective organizations against the bands. They were not under the command of the Division in any case, but operated only in loose contact with the troops, by whom they were used to strengthen its own weak units, especially for the purpose of securing the roads. For these services they received from the Germans food and occasionally also ammunition. They carried their operations out independently, without orders from the German troops. The German troops did not exercise any influence upon their way of fighting and their procedure. They also did not announce these operations in advance. Their reports of success were in most cases very exaggerated and were not taken seriously by the troops.
In the next paragraph the affiant comments on the butchering of the wounded, so often mentioned before, in a hospital of the bands.
May I say also for the record in what Prosecution document this report is contained? We find it twice, once in Prosecution Document Book 16, NOKW 1428, which is Exhibit 393, on page 93 of the English, and page 139 of the German, and the second time it was offered, it was in Document Book 23, NOKW 1777, Exhibit 567, on page 109, page 83 of the German.
< I now return to reading from my exhibit:
Regarding the report presented to me, that in the sector of the 373rd Infantry Division, Croatian combat units destroyed a hospital of the bandits southeast of Uzbina, and that 20 dead enemies, among them 2 doctors, were reported, and that furthermore 95 wounded and sick persons were butchered, I can say the following:
I don't remember this incident. However, I can assert from the form of the report and from the Division's manner of preparing reports with which I was familiar, that in this case probably a combat report of the Chetniks was involved, as a distinction is made between dead enemies and the wounded massacred later on. The report was probably made, as it was a special incident in the area of the Division. It was probably also intended to make it possible for the higher authorities to cause an examination of this incident by the Croatian authorities, because there was no other possibility of acting against the Chetnik units, for example in a disciplinary or judicial way?
Paragraph 6 deals with reprisal measures:
6. Retaliatory measures had become necessary for the protection of the troops and of individual military men, because the attacks and acts of sabotage, directed mainly against the railway, had reached an intolerable degree. The bands preferred for their operations usually the same spots. Their activities of sabotage could only be explained by the fact that parts of the population gave them their support. This supposition was underlined by the insults of the inquiry of the Ic. For example, I can still recall that, after acts of sabotage mines and other explosives were found in isolated houses along the railroad track near Bos n Krupa. As far as I can remember, retaliatory measures were carried out only in very rare cases, and only after previous repeated warnings.
These measures too were directed only against single farm-houses. If acts of sabotage increased considerably in one sector, the population of the adjacent villages was warned either by handbills or by the troops and called up to collaborate in combatting them. Only when in spite of this the acts of sabotage did not cease, and it became evident that the population assisted, retaliatory measures were decreed. The Division Commander made the examination and decreed the retaliatory measures after the Croatian liaison officer at the Division Headquarters had been notified in time. The latter contacted Zagreb by his own radio. Likewise the German Station Headquarters which operated in the sector of the Division, was notified. On account of the great distance, there was no direct connection between the Military Administration Headquarters at Zagreb and the Division.
7. According to the existing orders, hostages were occasionally levied by the Division. These hostages were in most cases discharged after examination and after it had been established that they were innocent, if no acts of sabotage occurred for some time. If the inquiry showed, that they had connection to the bands, then they were treated like captured bandits, and sent to the prison camp in the normal way. The Division did not deliver hostages to the Security Service (SD) or for allocation in the Reich.
8. I hardly know of cases where houses were set of fire after combat. In case an operation was directed against a certain village which was considered as being infested by bandits, and if as a result of the then developing combat houses were hit and burned - this is easily possible due to the construction of the houses in Croatia, for example the straw roofs - the troops reported that these houses "were burnt down as retaliatory measures due to an act of sabotage". On the whole, the troops had the tendency to pass reports to their superiors regarding retaliatory measures in a more severe form as corresponded to the reality, because it was known that then no further inquiries would be made from higher up.