Up to that time the Croatian Government had, because of the bands, not been able to send their recruiting commanders into the district of the Operation "Panther". Therefore, apart from eliminating a source of unrest in the rear of the front, the Corps was naturally interested in having also Croatian soldiers support the struggle of their fatherland. It hoped, with this Operation "Panther", to kill two birds with one stone.
Q. One other question in that connection, General. You were just talking about recruiting measures. Were you in a position to carry out such measures on your own initiative?
A. No, by no means. That was completely outside of my sphere of activity. That was a task which was entirely up to the Croatian authorities, and the Croatian authorities and the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Zagreb to some extent were the competent authorities for this question. May I mention in connection with the teletype that here there was no discussion about a proposal on my part how to further make use of the evacuees, because this had nothing to do with my own tasks.
Q. Chronologically seen, the next document in the same document book, on Page 138 of the English text and Page 109 of the German text, we have a teletype dated the 27th of November, 1943, from the 15th Corps. This teletype has the same date as the one we have just now mentioned. Can you clear up for us the significance of this teletype?
A. Will you give me the page again?
Q. Page 109 of the German text and 138 of the English document book.
A. This teletype is a supplement to the one which we have discussed just now, dated the 27th of November, 1943. Here again, the purpose of the operation becomes quite clear; destruction of the bandit forces around Glina and destruction of the enemy bases near Petrova-Gora and Samarica.
Through mopping up the Samarica, the bands are being deprived of the possibility of supplying larger forces, and thus the main line Zagreb-Sisak-Mostar will be securer. Paragraphs 2 and 3 are of a tactical nature, and therefore of no particular interest here. Paragraph 4 contains the same proposal of evacuation which has been discussed just now.
Q. It we follow the chronological course of events, General, we will have to turn to the next exhibit, which is Exhibit 362 on Page 139 of Document Book 14 in the English text, and on Page 111 of the same document book in the German text. This Exhibit 362 is prosecution Document NOKW 022. Here on the pages which I have just mentioned, we find a teletype by the 2nd Panzer Army dated the 2nd of December, 1943, and addressed to the German Plenipotentiary General in Zagreb. What can we see from this document?
A. Under Paragraph 2, we find "it is requested to prepare the evacuation and to submit suggestions for its accomplishment as soon as possible to the 2nd Panzer Army, keeping it strictly secret as far as Croatian authorities are concerned. It is considered practical to deport the evacuated male population to the Reich for labor employment. This shows quite clearly that the Corps as such had nothing to do with the evacuation itself, but that instead the evacuation came into the sphere of the German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia.
Q. I would then like to refer back to Exhibit 361, General, which is on page 105 of the German document book and 133 of the English text. This is a teletype to the 15th Mountain Corps with the same text as was contained in the teletype of the 2nd Panzer Army to the plenipotentiary Commanding General in Zagreb. What would you say as to the significance of this document?
A. It is exactly the same text as went to the German Plenipotentiary General in Zagreb. The 15th Mountain Corps received this teletype for informational purposes; that is to say, merely for information.
Q. One more question arises from these documents. The radio message was sent off by the Army, but maybe it is possible for you, on the basis of your general knowledge, to tell us why the German Plenipotentiary General was particularly asked to keep these measures secret as far as Croatian authorities were concerned?
A. That was done purely for military reasons. Every tactical measure has to be kept secret from any authorities that have nothing to do with it. In addition to this, we frequently faced the danger that the Croatian authorities would give these facts away to the bands, later on the Croatian authorities were to be informed, which can be seen from the document.
Q. General, let's have a look on Page 112 in this same document book of the German text. The document I would now like to discuss is on Page 141 of the English text. This is Prosecution Exhibit 363, Document NOKW 074. The document which I would like to show to you, General, is a teletype by the German Plenipotentiary General, dated 4 December 1943, and addressed to the 2nd Panzer Army.
A. I would like to say that I saw this document for the first time here when I saw all the documents. The Corps did not at this time receive this teletype. The teletype shows that the German Plenipotentiary General counted on about 6,000 people who were evacuated to camps in Sisak and Karlovac which were to be constructed for these people. This was to be done by the 1036th Administrative Sub-area Headquarters, which means not by the own troops. Furthermore, the German Plenipotentiary General suggests here not to evacuate all the male population fit for military service, but only suspects, strangers in the locality and those who were seized loitering around outside of the localities.
Further, he points out that the evacuation of the population fit for military service to Germany, which was not suggested by me, might come up against strong resistance from the Croatian Government. Negotiations may take place only after the end of the action through the Embassy. This again shows, in my opinion quite clearly that the troops had nothing to do with what use was later on to be made of the evacuees, but that that was a matter of the Croatian Government and the German Embassy.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: Court is in recess until 1330.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, we had finished before the recess when we talked about the operation Panther. The last document which we discussed was the teletype of the German Plenipotentiary General dated 4th of December 1943. In the chronological course of events we now have a teletype of the 2nd Panzer Army dated 6th of December 1943 addressed to the XV Mountain Corps. This document we can find in Document Book XIV on page 129 of the English text and on page 102 of the German text. This is Exhibit 361 of the Prosecution which has repeatedly been quoted here. Would you please have a look at this teletype of the 6th of December 1943 and tell the Tribunal the significance of this teletype.
A This teletype is the approval of the Operation Panther by the Army. Under paragraph 1 the Army agrees to the proposal to carry out the Operation Panther and in regard to the evacuation the Army under 2 ordered the following: One could count on about 6,000 evacuees. The camps for these people will be located in Sisak and Karlovac and will be set up and looked after by the 1036 sub-area headquarters. This is a local headquarters which is not subordinate to the corps. The guards for the camp were to be furnished by the corps. Under 2b it is ordered that in accordance with the suggestion of the Plenipotentiary General in Croatia only suspects, strangers, and those arrested outside of the villages are to be evacuated. The screening was to be carried out by the SD. SD groups were to be put at the disposal of the troops for this purpose.
Q May I interrupt you here for a minute, General. I would like to draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that the temporary subordination of the SD for the carrying out of this screening is mentioned in another Prosecution Document. We have a reference to this fact in Document Book XV on page 8 of the English text and 7 of the German text. This is Prosecution Exhibit 365 and the document is NOKW 1399.
It says here in the daily report of the 11 December 1943 of the 373rd Division and I quote: "SD Commando arrived with the 373rd Division." Will you please now continue with the discussion of this document which we are referring to, General.
A Under "3" it is ordered that the Headquarters of the XV Mountain Corps will examine whether the area concerned in Panther Operation can be occupied after successful operation. The Croatian government could then be requested to provide administrative personnel. Under paragraph "4" it says the evacuation is to carry the code name "Silberstreifen", Silver Stripe. This again shows that the evacuation was to be strictly distinguished from the carrying out of the Operation Panther; that this was a purely tactical operation and therefore my task was that of a tactical leader.
Q Now, the most important question in connection with this operation Panther: Which of the orders were issued by you personally for the carrying out of the Operation Panther?
A This also can be seen from the documents submitted.
Q Would you please turn to the following pages in Document Book XIV which you have in front of you, page 94 of the German text which is page 123 of the English text, this document to which I am referring here has been submitted as von Leyser Exhibit 359 and is NOKW 1370. The Operation ordered for Operation Panther is contained on those pages which I have just mentioned, that is, 123 of the English text and page 94 of the German text. Will you give us your comments to this order, General.
A This order is a preliminary order and was issued on the 17th of September 1943. It was sent to the 371st and 373rd Divisions. In this order the purpose of the operation is once again clearly defined. Under "5" it says that the Operation aims at the destruction of the bands and mopping up of the terrain according to plan in order to seize the very last depot, supplies of all types and leisure of the male population fit for military service. The last paragraph of this order is changed because of the order which had already been mentioned by the Army.
Q May I add something here. This amendment of the original order which General Leyser mentions here which is the order of the 2nd of December 1943 has also been submitted by the Prosecution and again in Document Book XIV, on page 131 of the English text and page 104 of the German text. This is a supplementary order to the order for Operation Panther. Will you please, continue, General.
A It is made clear here that the administrative area headquarters, the 1,*36th, is responsible for the evacuees which might turn up. for these people camps at Sisak and Karlovac are to be installed for the security forces; guards have to be furnished by the troops for these camps. Furthermore the order of the 1st of December is amended to the effect that not all the male population fit for military service are to be evacuated but only those people who are suspects, strangers in villages or persons seized outside the villages.
Q May I ask you now, General, to tell us briefly how this operation Panther took its course and what its result was?
A This too can be seen from the document in the final report for Operation Panther.
Q. May I interrupt you. May it please the Tribunal, the final report for the Operation Panther has not been submitted by the Prosecution. We found it amongst those documents which we received additionally from Washington and I have incorporated two documents in my document book which clear up the Operation Panther and I would like to offer them here. The first document of this type is contained in. Leyser Document Book II, on page 96. This is document Leyser 32 which I shall submit as Exhibit Leyser 25. In order to keep it as brief as possible I would just like to give you very brief quotations from this document. The headline reads:
"Combat report concerning Action (Panther' from 7 December to 20 December 1943."
Under "1" it is described what the enemy situation is like and it reads:
"Communist bands between Una and Korana (Kordun division, Kordun and Banija units, totaling 5 - 5000 armed men) with their basis in Petrova Gora - Samarica continually disturb the railway-lines of Agram - Sunja Bihac and theaten the Glina.
"2. Strategical Plan: XVth Mountain Corps intends to shatter the enemy forces around Glina and to destroy or secure their supply bases in Petrova Gora and Samarica."
May I, at this point, draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that in this Strategical Plan the intention to evacuate is not contained. May I ask the Tribunal if the English Document Book is in their hands? I shall then continue.
Under "3" we find tactical details about troops and forces assigned which I don't think are of any particular interest here. Under "4" we find notes about the tactical carrying out of the action and I believe that too does not have to be read here. It seems more important to me to deal with paragraph "5" which bears the head line "Enemy Losses:" "882 counted dead, numerous wounded taken along, 191 prisoners, 21 deserters,". Then we have a figure which may possibly be of a decisive importance for the evaluation of the operation Panther. It says 96 evacuated persons.
May I remind the Tribunal that the General in Zagreb reported 6,000 people as possible evacuees whereas as an actual fact only 96 people were evacuated. Why this evacuation was kept so low is to be found the following sentence: "Villages had been evacuated forcibly by the Communists." The next passage gives own losses of the German troops. They were rather high. I may mention that 4 officers were killed; 16 officers were wounded, 66 NCO's and men were killed and 24 NCO's and men were missing. The next sentence gives an explanation for the high number of "Own Losses" and I read and quote:
"The high number of our own losses finds its explanation in the number of fights which were conducted partly with great exasperation by the enemy who had been disturbed in his winter quarters."
I shall then turn to "6" where the booty is described.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. General, may I make an inquiry. What was the size of this force that was opposing the Germans there at that time?
A. According to the reports which we had there were about 6 - 7000 men.
Q. It took on more than the nature of a band then, did it not?
A. Yes, this area was one of those areas where the bands concentrated, where they trained and where they had their depots. As a consequence of this that area was one which was mopped up. Above all this was an area where they trained the recruits which they had forcibly recruited. Therefore, this was the main reason why we took steps against this large band area and why we wanted to eliminate it.
Q. Where a force of 6,000 men is it naturally would be divided into military units, would it not?
A. That might quite easily be the case in the instance of those bands and they did give their units names.
Q. And naturally with a group of that size they would have a recognized leader, would they not?
A. These people must of course within their units have had leaders but one still cannot talk about a regular troop. They did remain bands.
Q. Well, was there anyone in command of this entire 6,000 individuals or soldiers or whatever you may call them?
A. I am afraid I can't state that; I don't know.
Q. Well, they had supply depots which would indicate that it was organized and had a definite plan of operation. Is that not correct.
A. I don't know anything about a plan of operation of the bands. All I know is that in that district above all the railway was attacked and where I was concerned it was most important that I had the commission to reach with the right flank of my corps the coast and therefore the bands would be in my rear when I reached the coast. For that reason I had to eliminate the bands which found themselves in that area because possibly in the event of an enemy landing they could become very dangerous to me. Where I was concerned it was absolutely necessary and tactically necessary that I got rid of these people.
Q. When you eliminated them what kind of a battle did you have, if any. What did you do to eliminate them. Did you engage them in battle?
A. I have tried to explain that when I talked about Sketch No. 3. With regard to that sketch I explained that the blue arrows which are contained in that sketch show the German troops which advanced into this band territory in order to destroy the bands which were there and also in order to destroy the depots and the supplies which we knew were there because we had reports about them. It was, therefore, merely and purely a, tactical operation which took place there. That was nothing like a reprisal measure. It was purely a military operation.
Q. Well, was it on a large scale basis or did you have to hunt then out, one nest at a time?
A. This operation Panther can be called a large scale operation. From our side alone we used 3 divisions for this operation. At least the greatest part of these divisions.
Q. Were they uniformed by that time?
A. You mean the bands, your Honor.
Q. Yes.
A. Of the bands I'm sure some individual people must have been uniformed as always happened but of course one cannot talk about a regular uniform of the bands because they never had any such uniform.
Q. That's all.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, one additional question. His Honor told you that a large number of bands were concerned there and you were also asked about the organization of these bands and about their uniforms. You said in reply that in spite of everything these were bands and not a belligerent unit in the sense of International Law. Maybe you can quite briefly tell us why these bands, if I may call them that, despite their strength and despite their organization, particularly in Croatia, always remained bands and can you please tell us the reasons for your opinion?
A. That such large hands existed there was a consequence of the fact that after the capitulation of the Italian Army in these areas, as I have explained before when I talked about Sketch 1, - the Italians were to begin with not disarmed and therefore gave a great number of arms to the hands. This was possibly an additional reason that in this particular district there were such numerous hands and that all these hands had joined together because they believed that they could equip themselves through the arms that they had at their disposal there. That was the danger which threaten us and that was the danger which had to be eliminated.
Q. General, I don't believe you quite realized what my question was driving at. You were talking about the organization and the number of bands but I would like you in answer to this one question which your Honor has also put to you, to state why you are of the opinion that this mass of armed men were not belligerent within the meaning of International law hut in spite of it all remained a band.
Maybe you would like to take the conditions of Croatia in consideration when you answer this.
A. Of course there can be no talk whatsoever about a regular troop because they did not fulfill in any way the pre-requisites in any way for one. They were not all uniformed but only some of them and besides even if some of the bands had leaders there still was no unified responsible leadership so that there can be no discussion of a regular belligerent. Furthermore, there was no such thing as a regular army in Croatia which could be designated as bands because the regular army which existed in Croatia was allied to us and fought with us against the bands. Therefore, there can be no talk of a regular army when referring to the bands of Croatia.
Q What you mean, General, if I understand you correctly, is that Croatia was an Allied and independent state.
A Yes.
Q And in an Allied and independent state, from the point of view of International Law, there is no possibility that any organized troops bodies can be formed against the government which can become belligerent in the International meaning of the word.
A That is correct.
Q Then, there is no possibility in International Law that such bands, even if they fulfilled all the pre-requisites, could become regular belligerents?
A Yes, that is my opinion, and it is based on the fact that there was a regular Croatian Army.
Q I shall then continue with the discussion of my Exhibit 25. I stopped at Arabic numeral No. 6, while discussing the booty. May I point out that the booty, for the most part, consisted of purely military instruments. There are mentioned here "47 machine guns, 189 rifles, 2 medium sized mortars, 3 gunsof 7.5 cm, 1 anti-tank rifle, smaller implement, several small ammunition depots, 2 field kitchens, etc." Under Arabic numeral 7 it reads, and I quote: "Although considerable parts of the enemy succeeded in escaping from complete encirclement, the principal aims of the action were attained. The winter quarters of the bands in Petrova Gora and Samarica were destroyed. A rich booty of cattle was brought back, depots were destroyed and therewith considerable damage was inflicted on the power of the enemy to wage war." May I skip a few sentences, and now I come to deal with the handwritten part of the document It says there, and I quote: "The success of the action consisted in heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy and in considerable booty. Even though the enemy could not be destroyed or scattered, he nevertheless sustained a considerable set-back, in particular as regards organization and prestige.
If I may add one remark to this document -- if it is said here. General, that the aim of the operation was achieved and, if on the other hand, we can see from the document that instead of the originally provided 6,000 evacuees, no more than 76 persons actually were evacuated, what does this conclusion show where you are concerned with the purpose of this operation?
A In my opinion it shows clearly that the aim of the operation was not to evacuate the people, but the purpose was a purely military and tactical one, which had to serve the fulfillment of my main task. This evacuation was militarily necessary in order to fulfill the tasks which had been put to me.
Q I would then like to turn to the next document which we have to deal with in this connection. It is contained in Leyser Document Book II, and it is Leyser Document No. 33, found on Page 200 of this Document Book. I am offering this as Leyser Exhibit No. 26. This is the final report concerning the "Panther" operation. It is contained in a teletype of the XVth Corps, dated the 24th of December 1943. May I, for reasons of simplicity, just quote a few paragraphs of this document and point out other parts contained in it? Under number 1 it gives the number of evacuees and there again we find the number 96, and there again we find the fact that the villages had been evacuated before by the Communists by compulsory measures. The then following figures, which deal with the booty and losses, are identical with the figures mentioned in the document which I have just now mentioned. The next paragraph is a new one, and this one is entitled "Success." And then it says here, "Results," and I quote: "The operational intention of the Croatian Main Staff to make an attack reserve out of the 8th Division has been frustrated by the action. Enterprises on a larger scale should be impossible in the "Panther" district during the next weeks. Apart from material losses, the enemy sustained a considerable set-back in the following fields:" 1) Organization of the rear areas; in 2) communications are mentioned here in this paragraph, and that "the smoothly working courier-service of the newly established postal organization has been destroyed."
; 3) "Organizations of the Communist Party" it says here, then, "the development has been reduced to its initial stages."; 4) Propaganda: "The most important idea: the population was convinced that the Communists will never be able to keep the so-called liberated districts, if matters come to a head."
Is there anything you would like to say in conclusion where these documents are concerned, General?
A I believe that these documents show clearly that the purpose of the operation "Panther" was a purely military and tactical one, and that at the time we were not concerned, as has been asserted by the Prosecution, with evacuating the population for compulsory work, but since the operation has been called a success, this report of the success cannot apply to the evacuation because there is no doubt that the evacuation failed, which can be seen by comparing the figures of 6,000 evacuees provided and only 96 actually carried out.
Q We have no dealt with the outlines of the operation "Panther," General. Now, can you briefly indicate to us how the operation "Panther" was carried out in detail, and mainly what reports you or the Corps received?
AAs every larger operation of this type, the operation "Panther" was carried out in separate sectors. The individual units were assigned certain daily tasks, and they were to report about these daily targets.
Q General, the Prosecution has submitted a number of individual documents which are concerned with this operation "Panther." They are usually individual incidents which can be found in the Daily Reports of the Corps, I think we'll now take these individual reports one by one and deal with the assertions of the Prosecution. I shall again proceed in a chronological order so that we can see the course of the operation clearly. The first report of this type we can again find in Document Book XV, on Page 11 of the English version and Page 11 of the German version also. This is Exhibit 366 of the Prosecution, and it is Document No. 728.
I shall have this document submitted to you and I would like to ask you a brief question as to that. It is a report of the 373rd Infantry Division, to its Corps. The Prosecution will probably see incriminating in this report that three bandits were shot and throe villages were described as burning. I shall later on deal with another point of this document. Would you please give us your comments about this report, if you can, to the extent to which I have indicated it here?
A This report shows quite clearly that the report concerns the combat actions carried out on that particular day. In accordance with orders the unit reports 1 man captured. And it furthermore reports that three bandits were shot during the combat action. And as far as can be observed three were wounded. Two villages were set on fire, while these actions were taking place, and that is quite possible because the houses have straw roofs in this district. That has nothing to do with reprisal measures of any kind.
Q What you are saying then, General, is that this report is merely a report of a combat action?
A Yes, that is all it is.
Q Then, the 373rd Infantry Division further reports in this report that one bandit, who made a false report, was shot to death. I don't believe this incident would have taken place during combat action. And may I ask you, therefore, General, whether you can clarify for us this rather striking incident?
A It so happens that I can remember this particular incident. At that time, on the basis of information which was gained, a man had offered himself to help the troops since he know the villages well. He wanted to be a guide for the unit, but he did not do this, and in the end he was shot because he deceived the unit.
Q I think that will conclude our discussion about this particular document. Let us turn to the next one. We have it in the same Document Book, on Page 3 of the English text and on Page 2 of the German text.
This is Exhibit 364, which is Document NOKW-1136. The report to which I refer here is a report of the 1st Cossack Division, dated the 16th of December 1943. You have that report in front of you, General, and I would like you to give us brief comments about it. May I emphasize that in this document there is some talk about the destruction of villages?
A Here again we have a document which resulted from the operation "Panther." The Division states here that the area has been mopped up and it further reports that the villages have been evacuated and that there was no furniture of any kind and no installations left in these villages. However, 45 shelters had been built up. This quite clearly and obviously refers to band strongholds. The houses there had been prepared as defense posts. The destruction was, therefore, an absolute military necessity.
Q Well, we will now turn to the report which comes next in chronological order. This report again is contained in Document Book XV, on Page 1 of the English and Page 1 of the German texts.
This again is a report by the 1st Cossack Division, this time dated the 2 of December 1943. The report mentions that one bandit was shot. Maybe, on the basis of the report which you have in front of you, you can explain these facts to us.
A Here again we have a report of a combat action because the sentence before that reads: "1 Commando Unit was attacked by partisans in the Bijenic district; 22 horses and 12 vehicles were lost." That is the sentence that precedes the sentence, "1 bandit was shot." When this attack was repelled the enemy lost one dead.
Q In this same report it is further stated that 71 male inhabitants fit for military service were apprehended. Maybe you can give us an explanation of this, General.
A The explanation for this report can be seen from the general purpose of the operation "Panther." As I have previously stated, this is a band district which was to be mopped up. And from the final report, which was just mentioned, we see that the Communists had evacuated these districts under duress.
Every adult able to carry arms, who had remained in this district had, therefore, to be either a bandit or at least a bandit helper. Otherwise, he would have been included in the evacuation measures of the bands and would have been taken away. And if we were to secure our supply lines we had to avoid that this area, after we were leaving it, would again become a band area. That was the reason why these people were, first of all, apprehended, because they seemed to be band suspects. After a proper examination they were later on again dismissed if nothing could be found against them.
Q General, there is one other report which belongs to this complex of the operation "Panther." This time it is a report of the 371st Division. We find this report in Document Book XV, on Page 24 of the English text and also Page 24 of the German text. This is Exhibit No. 367 of the Prosecution, which is Document NOKW-1331. The report, as I have already said, is one of the 373rd Division's reports, dated the 21st of December 1943. I assume that the Prosecution submitted this report because it is mentioned here that in mopping up Samarica two bandits were shot to death. Maybe you can explain to us this sentence with in the frame of the whole report.
A This again is a report of a combat action. In mopping up Samarica the Division had advanced far enough to reach a large supply depot of the bands. That is what the report shows us. These depots were, for the most part, well guarded, and they were also camouflaged. And it was unlikely that such a depot would fall into our hands without any fighting. I, therefore, assume that there must have been combat action there, and on the occasion of this combat action the enemy lost two.
Q That then concludes the detailed and individual reports resulting from the operation "Panther." I would now like to ask you, was this "Panther" area kept occupied subsequently or was it at a later time given up?
A The "Panther" area was not immediately given up in all its parts, but I think the 1st Cossack Division remained in the area of Glina until the middle of January. After that the Cossacks were withdrawn because they were employed in the guarding of the railroad lines.
Q I would like to point out that the occupation of this area through the 1st Cossack Division and the later withdrawal from this area can also be seen from a document of the Prosecution. These facts are mentioned in the Document NOKW-1425 of the Prosecution, which is Exhibit 369. We find this in the same Document Book XV, on Page 15 of the German text and on Page 47 of the English text. This document is a report of the 1st Cossack Division, dated the 24th of January 1944. General, would you give us your comments on this document, as far as it is of interest here?
A. This document says amongst other things, and I think that is quite important, that when Clina was evacuated twothirds of the population followed the Cossacks. This, to me, seems to be an indication that the population would rather go along with the Cossacks then remain with the bands. That seems to be a good sign for the Cossacks and a bad one for the bands.
Q. We shall now leave the problem of the operation "Panther," with which we have dealt for such a long time now, and we shall now turn to another operation, which is also mentioned in the Prosecution documents. By this I mean the operation "Ristow" which was carried out by the 373rd Division. This operation is also mentioned in the last exhibit mentioned, No. 369, which is on Page 44 of the English document Book and on Page 45 of the German Document Book. Do you have that document in front of you, General? On Page 1 of this document we have a Divisional order of the 373rd Infantry Division, dated the 22rd of December 1943, which gives a mission for the 383rd Infantry Regiment. In order to expedite matters here, I would just briefly like to indicate what we can see from this document. According to its contents the Regiment had to mop up and comb through the area south of the Sana, and to destroy the enemy wherever he might be found. The document further says that the population capable of bearing arms is to be arrested and, supplies and cattle are to be taken away. First of all, can you tell us something about the aims and purposes of this operation?
A. To begin with, I would like to mention that this order of the Division I saw for the first time here in Nurnberg. Such orders, as I have mentioned before when I was talking about orders, did not generally reach the Corps. But in as far as actual facts are concerned I would like to say the following: