I said yesterday that I discussed with Field Marshal von Weichs that the disarming of the Cetniks in my area at the time would not be possible, but this must not be understood to mean that we were not able to do so. The point there was not a question of power, as I would like to put it, but it was purely a matter of expediency. The most important thing as I saw it at the time was that peace and order should reign in the hinterland so that I could carry out my main assignment, the defense of the coast and the safeguarding of the lines of supply. But I believe even that the man in charge of the Cetniks in that area, who was a cleric, also regarded this as a matter of expediency because he had to feel that, first of all, the Serbs in the Croatian area were greatly inferior in numbers in that part of the country. Now, should he have opposed us on top of that, he would have been faced, first of all, by the Wehrmacht, and secondly by the Ustasha, and thirdly by the Tito bands. He could never risk that. That is the reason why he decided that although he disliked us as the occupying power -- I am quite ready to admit that -- nevertheless it was the most expedient solution for him to be as close to the Wehrmacht as possible. In that case he was at least certain to be protected against the Ustasha, as well as against the Tito band, as far as possible. Now, I thought the most important thing for me to do was to subdue the fraternal battle between the Serbs and Croats, and I did not as the Prosecution alleges, indulge in political extermination. This might have been a simple thing for me to do if I had used the Cetniks. In that case I need not have used a single German soldier for the disarming of the natives, But I did not want to do that. And, therefore, I saw to it that the two should be segregated, but, at the same time, that put me under the obligation to see that the Serbs would be protected against the Tito bands, which I could do only by not disarming the Cetniks but by leaving them their arms so that they could fight back against the Tito bands and Communists. And that, as you might say, I used for my own purposes, for reasons of expediency, by using them for the defense of their own places so that my rear area should be more completely pacified.
Simultaneously I had to take into consideration that the order there to disarm them, which had come down from Higher Headquarters, became known to the Croatian Government and that it was the Croatian Ustasha which kept complaining that we had not disarmed the Cetniks, despite the existing order; but by putting these people in charge protecting places I could make it clear to the Croatian authorities why I did not disarm the Cetniks. I think that should be clear now, namely, that the Wehrmacht had no interest in exterminating the natives.
Q. General, an additional question to this: You are aware that the documents show that Cetnik units did certain things which had to be disapproved of by the Wehrmacht. You also said that the ethnic conflicts between the Serbs and the Croats led to excesses which the Wehrmacht was not able to suppress. Let me ask you this in this connection: In the reports which are available how are the Cetniks, these self-protective units of the Serbs minority, described? Could you tell us anything about that?
A. As a rule they are called Cetniks, but the local defense units were often described as Croat combat units. These were local defense organizations which, of course were not subordinate to us and did not amount to a military formation.
Q. Well, we will now leave this chapter, General, and talk about something else. You realize that the Prosecution mainly bases itself on orders issued and on reports which went from the troops to the corps and such reports which the Corps passed on to Higher Headquarters. In this connection I want to clear up one question first of all, namely, the way in which orders were issued. How were orders issued by the Corps, that is to say, you, to the subordinate units?
A. The most important operation orders were of course submitted to me for my signature. They then went out in writing to the divisions, but usually by teletype. All other orders of any importance were reported orally to me, and they were then passed on, having been signed by the Chief of Staff.
The usual form was: on behalf of the XVth Corps, the Chief of General Staff and then the signature.
Q. General, how were the channels of command regulated when you yourself were not at your battle headquarters?
A. If I had been absent for any length of time, for instance on leave, the question of deputizing for me would have had to have been regulated by the army. A permanent deputy would, in that case, have been appointed. But while I was down there with the XVth Army Corps this did not arise. Now, if I went away for a shorter period of time and if any important decisions had to be reached I would be telephoned or contacted by wireless, and my decision would be asked. In less important matters, which were not of basic significance, it was possible for the Chief of Staff to regulate these things in my absence. On my return the Chief of Staff would then report these matters to me orally, and that was that.
Q. You said just now that operational orders of a basic character were issued by you. Let me ask you this: When the Corps wanted to carry out an operation were you in a position to order that operation-were you in a position to order that operation independently, or did you have to obtain the approval of your superior agency for that purpose?
A. Large-scale operations, such as the "Operation Panther," which we shall discuss later on, needed the approval of the Army. Smaller operations could, needless to say, be carried out without the approval of the Army, but we had to report it to the Army.
Q. I believe, General, that the channel of command, i.e. from higher up to lower down is now quite clear. Now, let us discuss the reverse procedure. How was it that the Corps informed itself about events which had occurred within the scope of the subordinate units?
A. This was done by way of reports which the Corps received from the subordinate units. As a matter of principle these reports were sent through the official channels. For instance, the battalion would report to the regiment, the regiment would report to the division; and the division would report to the Corps.
Q. Were reports from units, which were subordinate to the division, that is to say, for instance, a report by a regiment to the division or a report by a battalion to a regiment, were these submitted to the Corps?
A. Not as a rule. The divisions would compile these reports by their subordinate units into a report of their own, which was then passed on to the Corps. Of course there were exceptions to the rule. So that when the divisions submitted reports to the Corps they would now and then include reports on combat engagements which the subordinate units had performed for reasons of illustrations.
Q. But, as a rule, you say the Corps would receive a compiled report by the division so that reports from the subordinate units would, as a rule, not reach the Corps?
A. Not as a rule, no, or at least in most cases they would not reach the Corps.
Q. Now, did only units report to the Corps which were subordinate to it?
A. No, aside from these subordinate divisions there were reports, for instance, from those formations which were no longer under the Corps. Let me give you an example: The 114th Rifle Division, while it marched to Italy, was no longer under the Corps. The reason for the fact that it nevertheless reported through the Corps was that the communication lines between the division and the Army would not have been sufficient, which is the reason why that division, during its march to Italy, with its somewhat inadequate wireless equipment, first reported to the Corps and then the Corps reported to the Army. Therefore if any unit stationed in the area of the Corps reported to the Corps that did not necessarily indicate a subordination to the Corps.
Q. General, we have discussed now who reported to the Corps. The next question is what sort of things were reported to the Corps.
A. As a matter of principle, anything which was of significance for future orders by the Corps was reported to it. For instance, the divisions would report all events which had occurred in their area, including oven those which were not of a tactical character and also incidents which had occurred with the enemy and the subordinate troops, with Allied troops, with the civilian population, or units which were not subordinate.
All these things would also be reported to the Corps. That was necessary so that the Corps would be informed about everything that happened within its area.
Q. Now, when the Corps passed on these things to the Army what was included in those reports?
A. The Corps would, of course, report all important events to tho army so that the Army would also be informed about them.
Q. Now, another question, General: In which way were you yourself informed about what sent on in the area of the Corps?
A. Incoming reports went, first of all, to the Chief of Staff, who would distribute them to the various experts concerned. Anything of special importance would be submitted to me immediately, after its reception, by the Chief of Staff himself orally. On the basis of in-coming reports the concerned compiled the most important details into the Daily Reports which were passed on to tho Army. The final edition of the Daily Report was up to the Ia, the first officer of the General Staff. On every day, late in the afternoon, there was a conference about the situation in my Corps. On those occasions the Chief of Staff, the Ia, the Ic, and the IIa were there, as a matter of principle. Also, those experts who had to report anything special were there. When we discussed the situation in those conferences, first of all, the Chief of Staff would report to me the most important events of the day in broad outlines. After chat every expert would report about his special field, and on those occasions the reports were submitted to me which had come from the divisions and also the Daily Report which we passed on to tho Army. On tho basis of those reports it was also reported to me what had come in by other divisions.
I would thereupon initial the Daily Report which We sent on to the Army without reading it in detail, I would like to say, because the contents had been reported to me orally If I was absent and returned only after the conference which was held nevertheless by the Chief of staff, the reports would be submitted to me after my return and again I would initial those reports. And here again the experts concerned would submit the most important matters to me.
Q. General, about the question of reports: The Prosecution have submitted a document which is contained in Document Book XV, on page 51 of the English and page 74 of the German. The Exhibit number is 369, and it is Document NOKW-1425, the English on page 51 of Document Book 15. It is an order by the XVth Mountain Corps of the 25th of January 1944. It concerns imports to Department Ia, and it is signed by the Chief of the General staff for Corps Headquarters. I do not want to discuss this long document with its somewhat boring contents with you, General, but there are one or two points which might be of significance for these proceedings here. Let me give you the document first.
(DR. TIPP HANDS THE DOCUMENT TO THE WITNESS.)
Let me ask you a few questions: Under Roman numeral "I" we have the over-all report, whereas under "II" we have the various details. Now, in that paragraph it is ordered under "Ia" that special events and incidents outside the fighting zone should be included in the Daily Reports. Let me interpolate. I believe that special passage is not contained in the English Document Book. General, let me ask you this: What is generally to be understood in German Wehrmacht terminology by the tern "Special events"? You know that a "special event" is a German military term, and I should be grateful if you could explain it to us.
A. Under "special events" or incidents, anything had to be reported that had occurred within the area of the reporting unit, in this case in the area of the divisions, during the time under review. This includes, among other things, events which had occurred with units which although they were stationed in the area of the division were not subordinate to the division and the Corps. By this order it was to be made quite sure that events and special incidents were reported so that the Corps would be kept up-to-date about anything which had occurred within the area in the time under review. For instance, what should be included under that paragraph was events that occurred with the Croat units, Cetnik units, SS formations, and so forth. The incident concerned, of course, had to be an important one, but quite independent of the fact whether or not the unit or formation concerned was subordinate to the division or not. Later on, we shall have, I feel, to discuss documents submitted by the prosecution where we shall see how important this principal is.
Q. Would you give me my document book back, please, General. I want to put something else to you in this connection, General. Unfortunately, the paragraph to which I have reference now is not included in the English document book. In order to make this quite clear, I would like to read it briefly. It is Roman II and Arabic 3. small b. It is on page 78 of the German book. This paragraph is cOncerned with the billeting cards which had to be submitted by the division to the Corps. This is what it says: "The troops, apart from our own Army, Navy and Luftwaffe troops, have to report about all other military units (Crotian Rifle Men and Mountain Troops, other Croat defense units, Ustasha protective troops along the railways and garrisons, volunteer units, etc.
May I ask you, General, why these troops had to report bad film to the Corps although the units according to what you have said were not subordinate to the Corps?
A. Well, these troops were stationed in the area of the Corps which is the reason why the Corps had to be informed about them.
Q. General, I do not wish to discuss the other details of this order. We shall have to speak quite a lot about the reports later on in these proceedings and on those occasions we can go into the principal matters. But there is one thing I would like to ask you now. Did the troops observe this order which is so detailed an order?
A. From the documents submitted, it seems to me that it becomes quite clear that in actual fact the troops acted this way. Of course, there is one important restriction I have to make here. The troops could carry out the order only in so far as they had sufficient technical equipment for the purpose. As the lines of communication were frequently disrupted, the reports very often did not come in. Any explanation had to be kept extremely short because the reports were usually passed on over the wireless.
Q. If the Tribunal please, in this connection, namely reports and lines of communication, I would like to have reference to two documents which I have already introduced but there are paragraphs included in them which I have not read yet and I have said that I should come back to them. The first document to which I have reference now is in Defense Document Book No. 2 on page 122. This is document Leyser No. 43, which I have offered as Exhibit 19. It is an affidavit by the former Brigadier General Reinicke, dated 22 September 1947. I would like to read from this affidavit. Paragraph 3 which deals with the matter of reports. It is on page 124 of the English document book:
3) To report regularly or even periodically often became impossible owing to the very bad lines of communications. The means of communications were very poor. As we were considered a minor theater of war, we did not receive the newest apparatus and losses were replaced only grudgingly. Telephone lines were constantly cut through partisan attacks. Thus only wireless remained which naturally resulted in a heavy overload of work. Frequent breakdowns, usually at night, cut the units off, completely, from Command H.Q. Thus it happened to me, as Divisional Commander, that I could not get in touch by wireless with a regiment near Nevesinje at a time when a very critical disengaging movement was in progress, neither was it possible anymore to get in touch with them in any other way as the only road available, was impassable for dispatch riders or lone cars.
The next paragraph again deals with the cooperation with Crotian agencies. I shall quote briefly from it.
The Croats who went into action with us, were given their orders - usually camouflaged once-only at the last moment as informers who would notify the partisans, were common there. There for instance, shortly before an action, the Commander of the 2nd Crotian Mountain Brigade went over to the partisans. The Croatian Commander of the Airfield of Mostar was in close touch with the bands and regularly transmitted orders which I had issued to the Croation Units, which fact I successfully used in order to confuse the enemy.
The next paragraph deals with the explanations given for orders. The affiant says:
It was the general practice, that motives for the issuing of instructions to subordinates were not to be stated. Motives were only stated when measures of an exceptional kind were to be taken, or if this instruction was interfering with a different area of command. It is the duty of every officer, to take action, even when not expressly instructed to do so, if he considers it necessary.
This brings me to the conclusion of the quotation from this document and I want to now have reference to Leyser Document No. 44 which is contained on page 127 of Document Book II. It is an affidavit by Lt. Col.
General Staff Hans Klein which I offered yesterday as the last document and it was Exhibit 21. There again I have only read one or two paragraphs so far and now I should like to have reference to paragraph 4 which is on page 128 of the document book. The affiant says, I quote:
4) Message Service: In view of the unsafe conditions, personal reconnaissance on the spot was never possible without major difficulties. I myself had contact with the enemy during such reconnaissance journeys, and I also remember that one general staff officer of the Army, on a tour of inspection to the division, was first set upon in the train, and, on continuing the journey, had contact with the enemy while riding in the staff car which was lost, and, on top of this, encountered an enemy airplane, when he flew back.
The considerable difficulties of handling the troop units in this area were caused by the lack of secured signal communications. The telephone and telegraph lines between Mostar (divisional command post) and Sarajevo (corps command post) were interrupted very frequently; not only that, but they were certainly tapped.
General, let me interpolate here. Am I right in assuming that this testimony by affiant Klein does not apply to the 15th Corps but judging by the places named Mostar and Sarajevo, to a later period of time the 21st Corps?
A. Yes, you are quite right. After January 1945, the 369th Division on which Lt. Col. Klein served as Ia was subordinate to the 21st Corps.
Q. Having cleared this up. I shall continue to quote:
Long distance calls, therefore, could only be made about insignificant matters. All important matters referring to tactics and supply had to be radioed.
Radio transmission in any case would allow only telegraphic brevity, especially when matters were involved which had to be treated as "top secret" because of their contents. This shows that it was technically quite impossible to put through messages from lower to higher commands regularly and on time, all the more so as I remember quite clearly that the radio communications, for instance in the Mostar area, between the division and its sub-units failed at certain times. The superior commands, therefore, were unable to take the matter up, in each case or to reply to inquiries on time.
The important matters were dealt with in the daily reports in telegraphic style. Unimportant matters were left out altogether or discussed occasionally by telephone, according to the situation of the communication service.
As a matter of principle, orders to subordinate units give no explanations. If they have to be radioed they are to be worded in telegraphic style.
General, let me ask you something about this affidavit. I would like to have your personal comments although some of your affiants have already given us their opinion. It is rather striking in the case of these reports that they are so brief. That actual events can hardly be identified from them. The two affiants have made it clear why this was so, but if a report of this brief type was submitted but when it was not possible to recognize what had actually happened, did you, when you were in command, were you satisfied with these brief reports? Or how was it that you were actually informed about what had gone on?
A. As I said before, when we had these situation conferences late in the afternoon every day, these reports were submitted to me, and Ia or else the expert concerned had to give me precise information when I put questions to them, namely what the reasons had been, or how a special event had come about. This man would have the duty to inform himself before the conference and then pass that information on to me.
Q. In order to make this quite clear, General, let me ask you an additional question. At that period of time when the events took place, you were informed not only by these reports but also by the additional explanations given to you by the Ia and he was in a position to do so?
A Yes, quite. Of course, sometimes there were delays in these things. As these two affiants have made quite clear, it took some time in some cases before we could inform ourselves what had really happened and it might in some cases take a day or two until I was finally informed but in any case the expert in question had the duty to investigate the matter and inform me about it.
Q Before dealing with the various individual reports on which the prosecution have essentially based their case, let me ask you a few basic questions about the reporting. Do these reports submitted by the prosecution give a complete and reliable picture of the situation at the time?
A They do not. By no means.
Q Why not, General?
A First of all, the chronological order of the reports show that they are not complete. Secondly, they include only brief extracts from these brief reports and thirdly these extracts have been selected from a certain point of view. Namely, only those things which appear to be incriminating have been submitted, but not the events which led to them-led to a reprisal measure, and that although very frequently the reason why a reprisal measure was taken can be seen from the reports themselves. But above all what is lacking are the reports which are so important, nor can it be seen from these documents what telephone calls have taken place in order to clarify the reasons behind the event.
Q Now the affiants have stated, General, that as a rule it was extremely difficult for a report to be delivered in time. Let me ask you,General, do you concur in this opinion? Is that the experience you had yourself?
A It is indeed. The lines of communication were frequently disrupted and therefore the reports could not reach us in good time.
Q Now, General, let us discuss a few of these reports and I would like you to give us your comments first on some reports submitted and which have reference to Cetnik units and Ustasha units. You said before, General, that no military subordination can be claimed in the case of the Cetnik units, and you have also stated that the Ustasha units were subordinate only for tactical purposes.
Why was it that in actual fact in order to make this point finally clear, were there reports about events which concerned these units?
A The reason was, as I said before, quite clear. Through these reports the corps was to be informed about anything that had occurred in the area, and what was worth knowing. Then there was another reason applicable for these reports. Through the special conditions under the ethnic struggle, these units often became guilty of cruelties which the Wehrmacht of course disapproved of as a matter of profound principle. The troops themselves and certainly the Commanding Officers were unable to do anything about it because these units were not subordinate to them, and these units were not under their disciplinary authority. This is the reason why all these events were reported to the corps and the corps passed it on to the army and it was hoped that through this method the Croatian authorities or the German Plenipotentiary General von Glaise-Horstenau could take active steps. That the troops frequently reported incidents which we shall describe later on, so that active steps would be taken by somebody becomes clear as I see it from the formulations which these reports contained.
Q If the Tribunal please, in this connection of reports concerning units which were not subordinate, I should like to offer a document which is contained in Document Book I. It is Leyser Document No. 19 and it is in Document Book I Leyser on page 58. I beg to offer this document as Exhibit 22. It is an affidavit by Eberhard Einbeck from Hamburg. The witness says under paragraph 1--it is on page 58 of Document Book 1. I shall read from paragraph 1:
"I have known General von Leyser since 1 June 1944. General von Leyser was commanding general of the 15th (Mountain) Army Corps, of which I became Chief of Staff on the same day."
I shall skip the next paragraph. Equally I shall skip paragraph 2, but I shall come back to it later on in these proceedings, and I beg to quote from paragraph 3. "I confirm the fact that the corps headquarters had to report to the army about all occurrences in the corps area.
This included actions, incidents, etc., involving Croatian and Cetnik units which were not under the command of the corps headquarters."
General, in this connection, a further question. When you received a report of this type which concerned a Cetnik unit or let us say a Ustasha formation, did you have to take any steps because of these reports?
A I had no possibility to do anything about these incidents, just as little as the divisions had. All I did therefore was to pass on these reports to the army, but of course what I could do was to pass on these reports to the Croatian liason officers who were represented on the Corps 2nd the divisional staffs, and I could ask those gentlemen to take active steps if possible, but that was all I could do.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q I wish you would comment on that feature or give some further explanation as to the liaison between the Croatian government or the Croatian military forces. I notice in this paragraph it says the division commanders had to investigate the facts of the case and decide on necessary measures in agreement with the Croatian liaison agencies. Now, what part did the Croatian units have in taking such action as was taken?
A The Croatian troops--that is to say the regular Croatian army or militia, who were for tactical purposes under the division, were not under the disciplinary or judicial authority of the divisional commander--they had their own judicial authorities and their own disciplinary arrangements. Now if those troops became guilty of any irregularities, what was done was to regulate these matters within the Croatian armed forces. What happened was, roughly, this, I assume that within a battalion of a Croatian regiment an irregularity occurred and it then, of course, became the duty of the Croatian superior officers to take steps.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not interested in that. I am not interested in disciplinary matters as far as the Croatians are concerned. I am interested in the sentence just prior to the one I read, where it says: "The execution of reprisal measures for the frequent acts of sabotage was in accordance with an order issued by the higher authorities assigned to the Croatians." Then follows the sentence, I quoted, What part did the Croatians have in these reprisal matters, if any? I am not interested in the discipline of the Croatian units, what part, if any, did they have in the reprisal actions?
THE WITNESS: I see, Your Honor. In the order it says that reprisal measures have to be taken by divisional commanders in agreement with the Croatian Liaison agencies. The decision about that is with the Croatian liaison officer, as the order says.
THE PRESIDENT: This is not an order. This is an affidavit here. This is an affidavit in which that is mentioned. It is not an order.
THE WITNESS: This affidavit has reference to the order as it existed at the time, because the affiant bases himself on these orders. What happened was roughly this, let us say an act of sabotage had occurred within the divisional area. This was reported to the division. Now, on the basis of many and frequent acts of sabotage within the area of the division, the population was told before in all probability that if another act of sabotage would occur, that is committed against the railway line, then a reprisal measure would be taken. Now, there would be a conference between the divisional commander and the liaison agency of the Croatian government. In the course of that conference those two people had to come to an agreement on what sort of a reprisal measure was to be taken and how it would be carried out.
The last word was then with the Croatian liaison officer. It would have been possible that the divisional commander would say in this event,"In this case here I think a reprisal measure is important," whereas the Croatian liaison officer might say, "Well, let us wait a little longer", in which case that particular reprisal measure would not have been carried out, because under the existing order it was the Croatian officer who held the decision.
THE PRESIDENT: Undoubtedly, it is quite possible there may be orders or documents that support this statement made in the affidavit. Do you have in mind any such documents, General?
DR. TIPP: If the Tribunal please, may I interpolate? This order to which Your Honor has referred, and if I understood the witness correctly he had reference to the Army Group order issued on 22 December 1943, signed by General Loehr.
THE WITNESS: That is quite true, yes.
DR. TIPP: That order has been submitted in Document Book 16 of the Prosecution. It is Exhibit 379. In the English book it starts on page 47 and on page 98 in the German.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there other such documents that refer to such joint action on behalf of the Croats and the German authorities?
THE WITNESS: This one is the decisive order which was applicable during my period of time.
THE PRESIDENT: What I am getting at is, are there other orders which show that was the general policy, or is this the only one instance?
THE WITNESS: All orders which existed previously, as far as I can remember always said that as far as the carrying out of reprisal measures was concerned the divisions arranged with the subarea headquarters, that is the territorial agencies, and by this order of General Loehr, to which I have referred, it was then especially ordered through an agreement, I think Ambassador Neubacher was concerned therewith, that Croatian Government Liaison officers should be attached to these various agencies, and that it was those who had the decision.
THE PRESIDENT: That answers my inquiry unless you have further information along that line.
Q Now, General, about this order which is contained in Document Book 16, the order issued by the Army Group. I would like to put one question to you. Was that order which came from the Army Group an order which was applicable in an individual instance, or was it an order of a basic nature applicable for the ensuing period of time, so that the reprisal problem would be regulated for once and for all?
A This order by the Army group did not merely apply to an individual incident, but this was the decisive order. It was to be observed as a measure of principle for all reprisal measures if such measures became necessary.
Q Was this order rescinded while you were still down there?
A No, it was never rescinded at all. It always applied.
Q It would therefore be true to say that all reprisal measures which were issued after this order would be referring to this basic order of 22 December 1943?