PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Is there any objection to that, Mr. Fulkerson?
I say is there any objection?
MR. FULKERSEN: No, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well. That may be done.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. General, after this interruption we will continue. You said that the order was known to the German troops, as can also be seen from the affidavit, but nevertheless I would like to ask you whether you had the impression that this order also came in any way to the knowledge of the Russian troops.
A. Yes, during the course of the campaign we were often able to establish this fact that it was know amongst the Russians.
Q. Did this order have any kind of effect on the Russian troops as far as you could find out?
A. Yes. In my opinion, it had the effect of a boomrang because our own troops of course suffered under this and it cost our own troops very many lives because the Russian Commissars who knew about this fact that, as prisoners, they were to be shot and therefore the majority of them fought on to the very last to defend themselves, and everywhere where there were Commissars, the resistance of the Russian troops was especially strong. And the Commissars also who escaped capitivity and who remained behind their own lines or rather our own lines did not surrender as was usual amongst the Russian soldiers, but they tried to get into contact with Russian soldiers or the indigenous inhabitants and to set up nests of resistance and sabotage units.
Q. General, in this direction, did you make any kind of personal experience at all which you could tell the Tribunal about?
A. Yes, I can recount the following experience, from the first few weeks, I don't know the actual date of the Russian campaign, I went with my adjutant, Lt. Col. Roemisch, from the combat post to the forward troops. First of all, we were shot at from a machine gun which was rather near. Some signal troops who were there at the moment were collected together and we had nothing else to do except to take part in a small attack against this machine gun, and when we got nearer, the machine gun fire suddenly stopped and we saw two Russians running away and they were shot while running and then the machine gun was captured and later on I heard that one of these two Russians who was killed was a Commissar.
Such incidents frequently came to my knowledge during the course of the Russian campaign. The soldier at the front always had understanding for such courage but there was nothing else he could do if only for the fact of preserving himself. That, if there was no possibility of capturing them, he had to shoot them in battle and that is war and nothing can be helped.
Q. And, General, was such an incident in which a Commissar defended himself to the very end reported particularly by the troops?
A. Yes, of course that was reported. Such instances were also reported so that the higher quarters should see and that it should also be brought to their notice what effect this order had in the end on our own troops. That is, it actually didn't achieve what it was supposed to achieve, but the exact opposite, and in my opinion later on this order was therefore completely withdrawn.
Q. Well, witness, nothing can be said against this kind of warfare but more important is the additional question: can you please tell us anything about how captured commissars were treated by your troops?
A. The captured commissars, as the Commanding General or General Reinhardt had said, were of course treated as all other prisonersof-war, but I would like to point out the following here. Among these Commissars there were very many radical people who, as my Ic reported to me, often tried to influence the prisoners or some of the prisoners to mutiny and to take action against the guards who transported them away, and then of course these guards could do nothing else but resort to arms and they had to say this right from the very beginning; and furthermore, the escort guards because of the large number of prisoners which were made in the beginning in the Russian campaign were not very strong and perhaps the ratio was about one to fifty or one to a hundred and perhaps sometimes even more.
Q. Witness, if you had experienced such an incident, would the soldiers have reported such an incident?
A. Yes, of course that would be reported as well.
Q. Now, we can leave the subject of the commissar order and I would like you to state briefly your further military career.
A. As part of Hoeppner's Panzer Army, I went with my division as far as Petersburg and then later on towards the south of the Ladoga Lake. After the heavy defensive battles of winter 1941-42, my division came to the Wolchow sector.
In August 1942, I went to the Officer Reserve, then in October 1942, I became Major General and on the 1st of November, 1942, I was entrusted with the command of the 26th Army Corps. This was stationed south of the Ladoga Lake. In December, 1942, I was promoted to General of Infantry, and appointed Commanding General of the 26th Corps.
Q. And perhaps an additional question with regard to this, witness. If I have understood you correctly, you were with your division permanently in the frontline and as can be seen from the statements on the critical points of the fighting.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And now, General, I would like to ask you here whether and what kind of decorations you received.
A. During the French campaign, I received the two clasps to the Iron Cross first and second class. In September 1941, I received the Knight's cross to the Iron Cross, and later on I received the German Cross in gold.
Q. And now a concluding question with regard to the Russian assignment. You have just said that in October, 1942, you were promoted to Major General and already in December you were promoted to General of the Infantry and with regard to this rather rash promotion, General, what was the reason?
A. Finally, I would like to say that it was due to the bravery of my soldiers my recognition and decorations for the operations of my troops in the defensive battle near Petersburg were given to me. At that time, my division was the first division from the whole army which was mentioned in the Wehrmacht report for special bravery. That was probably the reason.
Q. Before we leave Russia, General, and go over to another subject, I would like to talk about a special document. The Prosecution has offered Exhibit No. 53, Document Book II, English page No. 67, German page 52, which contains an order -- this is the famous order from the 16th of September, 1942, and this order is signed by Keitel.
The Prosecution sometimes called this order the so-called terror order. According to the subject, which is stated here, the order concerns the destruction of the communist insurgent movement in occupied territories. Did you receive this order during the Russian campaign, General?
A. No. I can't remember, because at that time, as I briefly described, we were involved in heavy defensive battles before Petersburg. That is at the front, and this order, in my opinion, according to its text, referred to occupied territory that is the rear area and not to the troops who were fighting at the front. At that time, thank goodness, I had nothing at all to do yet with fighting the bands and I also think that with regard to combatting the bands at this time there was a police regiment with us at the front.
Q. And might I ask the additional question with regard to that, General? Was this police regiment subordinate to you in any respect?
A. No, in no way.
Q. And to whom was it subordinate then, as far as you remember?
A. I don't know.
Q. And now to conclude this order which we have just mentioned, General, so that we need not have to come back to it again later on. I would like to ask you the following: Did you ever learn about this order of the 16th of September 1942 during your activity in Croatia with the 15th Corps or in Albania with the 21st Corps?
A. No, the order was then so far behind that I don't think I heard about it any more and also I think that it was superseded by new orders then.
Q. And then how did your service on the Eastern Front come to an end, General?
A. It ended one day, when I received the order that I had been appointed Commanding General of the 15th Army Corps and this 15th Mountain Corps was in the Balkans and it belonged to Army Group F.
At that time I was told that I had to report to Army Group F in Belgrade.
Q. When did you receive this order, General?
A. In October, 1943.
Q. According to the description which you have just given us of your service at the front, in late autumn 1943, you arrived in the Balkans for the first time and you have just said that you were appointed Commanding General of the 15th Army Corps and it is well known that this Corps was employed in Croatia and therefore might I ask you, General, to describe to us quite briefly once again the political situation which you found in an established fact when you arrived in Croatia?
A. The political situation in Croatia was approximately the following. The former Yugoslavian states contained two or perhaps three groups of people: The Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes. The latter group played no part at all in this sphere of my corps and therefore I need not say anything about it. Between the Serbs and the Croats, however, there was an enmity which had already been in existence for centuries which just in the last years had come to the fore by means of bloody murders on both sides, thus creating an unbridgable gap between the two groups. Through the collapse of the Yugoslav state and/or the capitulation of this state, the independent Croatian state had formed itself. That is, approximately.
DR. TIPP: I would like to interrupt here briefly, your Honor, and in order to bring rather closer to the Tribunal the situation in this time and the hatred between the two ethnic groups, I have here an affidavit in my document book. This is contained in Leyser document Book III. It is Leyser Document No. 51, German page 146, and I think it is probably the same page in the English. This is an affidavit by one of the greatest German experts on Balkan problems. It is a certain Dr. Franz Thierfelder from Munich and it has been sworn to before the bourgemeister in Graefelfing and I offer this document as Leyser Exhibit No. 12.
I would like to quote briefly from this affidavit. It is Leyser Document Book No. III, Document No. 51, on page 146. The Affiant describes first of all under figure 1 how he obtained his knowledge of the Balkans. I don't think I need to read this, and after this the expert states, and I quote:
"The Nation of the South Slavs, which today is united in the Yugoslav State, consists of three peoples: The Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes, who are not so much different from one another because of their racial origin, but because of their religious faiths, and a strongly divergent political, cultural, economic, and social development. These divergencies are responsible for the Serb-Croat differences, which became acute when, after the Danube Monarchy had been dissolved, the question arose who should take over the political and spiritual leadership in the newly created State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The quarrel for this claim to leadership has poisoned the past 30 years to such an extent that two opposing groups, Serbs versus Croats, formed who could only forcibly be prevented from clashing. It cannot be stated, for the time being, when these differences will be overcome."
"The orthodox Serbs, who for a certain period in the Middle Ages ruled the greater part of the Balkan peninsula and who can boast of a highly developed ancient peasant culture, have been subjected to Turkish rule for more than four hundred years, and were more strongly influenced by Oriental thinking than the Catholic Croats, whose northern provinces were not subjugated to the Turks, and who shared in the Occidental development within the Austrian-Hungarian State. As to their language there is such insignificant differences between the nations, that no difficulties are encountered at all which would impede common understanding. However, the Serbs use the Cyrillic and the Croats the Latin alphabet."
"The Serbs are a politically talented and active nation, full of national pride and the prototype of a soldierly people, who were the first in the Balkans to free themselves pf the Turkish yoke by armed force. In contrast, the Croats are of a passive nature, inclined to critical negation, without arriving at politically practical conceptions. As they were able, step by step, to secure their special rights against the other national groups within the Austrian-Hungarian State, based on legal titles, they were never in outright opposition to the Viennese Government. Their opportunism and their relatively high cultural development made them of the most reliable pillars of the poly-national state. Therefore, the Croats were determined only then to live in one State with the Serbs, if they, the Serbs, were prepared to accept an indisputable federalism. The Croats knew that they were the most important tax payers in the State, that their industries in the Save Valley and in Bosnia, their navigation in Dalmatia, were indispensable to the Yugoslav State as a whole, and that they themselves had a higher civilization than the Serbs, even up to the most recent times. On the other hand, it cannot be disputed that there is a certain inferiority complex towards the Serbs' active traits. The Serbs were convinced that the existence of the state in critical times depended on their army, and their enthusiastic love for their fatherland. The Serbs always considered the Croats unreliable separatists, while the Croats assessed the Serbs as ruthless imperialists, and an uncivilized Oriental people.
"Serb-Croat relations were severely even hopelessly, hampered by the national-political situation in Bosnia. Racially most of the Bosnian population is of Croat origin, but a considerable part are Moslems, and therefore separated both from the orthodox Serbs and the catholic Croats. In 1939, 46 percent of the total population were orthodox, 33 percent Moslems, and 20 percent were Catholics.
The compact Serb minority of many hundred thousands of people lived in the center of the country, and was forced to defend its independence against two fronts, so to speak. Thus national differences were added to the religious ones, and a catastrophe was unavoidable, as soon as the fight was brought out into the open.
"The first attempts to create a Serb-Croat federalism after 1918 failed. In the person of the Croat peasant leader Stefan Radic, who was filled with romantic ideals, the Belgrade government found itself confronted with an adversary, who was adored by the Croat people, whom he organized against the Belgrade Imperialism. "The attempt made by Kind Alexander, in whose person the SerbCroat differences actually appeared to have been reconciled, to solidify Yugoslav unity, either by dictatorial strictness or by leniency, were in 1928 successful to such an extent that Radic was willing to effect a conciliation by practical work within the cabinet. At that juncture, in summer 1928, he was shot in parliament by a Serb from Montenegine, and when he died shortly afterwards, the Croat hatred against the "Serbs' Dictatorship" reached the most extreme state. Active emigrants in Italy, Hungary, and the United States, inspired by the fanatical Lawyer Dr. Pavelic, attempted to overthrow Alexander's rule by bomb terror and propaganda. The assassination in October 1934, to which Alexander fell victim at Marseilles, has been executed by Croat terrorists, as could be conclusively proved."
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Just a moment, we will take our recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 11.15 (A recess was taken)
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
DR. TIPP: To continue reading Exhibit 12, and I shall read on page 4 of the original, roughly in the middle of the page:
The enmity between the two peoples had become perpetuated by those two deeds of blood. Solely the fears inspired by a Central Europe which was becoming powerful, the lessening of French influence in Southeast Europe, and the social danger to the country by communist undermining tactics, kept the state together provisionally. Only a total reorganization of the state could instill some hope into Yugoslavia that it would be able to retain its independence in the approaching European conflict. This reorganization took place in August 1939 by concluding the so-called "Sporazum" (Agreement), in which Croatia was given a far-reaching autonomous status within the Yugoslav State. The noticeable relieving of the tension did not last very long for the Croat emigrants, supported by National Socialist propagands, doubled their efforts to weaken the Yugoslav State. When German troops marched into Yugoslavia, following the coup d' etat engineered by King Peter II, the Croats willingly severed the bonds that tied them to their state. Dr. Ante Pavolic became the leader of the Croat State, and used now his Ustascha units to let his stored up fury go rampant on the Serb minority in Bosnia, who were literally butchered. It cannot be denied that, on the other hand, the Serbs committed similar atrocities. It appears to be evident that the Serb-Croat Union of 1918 was premature. The small section of intellectuals in both peoples, steeped in the conviction that a union of the Slavs in the Balkans is imperative, are opposed by the broad masses, who, during the past 10 years, completely separated their existence from one another, and who are only waiting for the time when they can retaliate."
Q General, after this interpolation, which I hope has made the political situation clear, I would like to ask you now to give us briefly a description of the status of the country inasmuch as it was important to you as a soldier?
AAs I said before, in 1941 Croatia declared herself to be an independent state.
The Chief of State, Dr. Pavelic, who called himself the Poglavnik was the head of state. Whether this establishment of a state and the actual running of the country was a happy one or not I do not wish to comment upon here. As far as I as a soldier was concerned all that mattered was the political situation as it existed and as such Croatia was an independent political entity. Moreover, Croatia had not only been recognized by Germany and her allies, but also by a number of neutral states. For instance, as I remember it, Switzerland and Sweden had their diplomatic representatives in Zagreb. Territorial and legislative power in Croatia lay with the Croatian Government, and for the administration of the country there were Croatian Government departments.
DR. TIPP: If the Tribunal, please, as for the question of foreign representatives in Croatia, I should like to offer a document in order to make the situation quite clear. It is in my document book III, page 151, and is Leyser Document No. 52. This is an affidavit by Willy Bein, who is a business man living in Ansbach, and he swore to this statement on the 18 of October 1947 before me here in Nurnberg. I should like to quote paragraph one therefore:
"I know that the neutral countries Sweden and Switzerland maintained consular representations in Zagreb, and that these consulates continued, even after the autonomous 'Independent Croat State' was established. Unfortunately, I cannot recall the names of the Consuls. On the other hand Croatia also maintained consular representations in Switzerland, as I can remember that a female employee of my firm moved to Zuerich in the fall, in order to start employment with the Croat Consulate there."
In paragraph 2 and 3 the affiant gives a few details to show how he remembers these things, and I do not think I need read it here. This document is offered as Leyser Exhibit 13.
Q General, what was the authority which under that legal status a commander of German troops held in Croatia?
A From the legal situation it becomes clear that he did not hold executive power. Croatia was not an occupied enemy country. She was an allied and friendly state. All measures taken by the German troops therefore had to take into consideration what the Croatian state wanted and had to adjust themselves accordingly.
Q How was the cooperation between German troops on the one hand and the Croatian state on the other handled?
A When I was down there the liaison officer between the German troops and the Croatian departments was General von Glaise-Horstenau. He was the plenipotentiary German General in Zagreb. All matters concerning the Croatian state had to be handled through General von Glaise-Horstenau, and then passed on to the Croatian authorities. I would like to add here that the Corps itself was not allowed to have direct contact with General von Glaise-Horstenau as the Plenipotentiary General in Zagreb. Any questions and complaints by the corps had to be passed on through the 2nd Panzer Army and it was the 2nd Panzer Army which passed it on to General von Glaise-Horstenau. It was only minor local affairs which were handled by the divisional corps, that is the liaison officers who were with them.
Q Nov, we have anticipated a little here, General. May I ask you now to continue with the chronological order. You told us last that you had received the order to report to Army Group F in Belgrade. Would you please tell us how you were informed about this new situation, which I take it was new to you at the time?
A When I, in October 1943, reported to the Army Group F in Belgrade the Commander in Chief, General von Weichs was not present. His Chief of Staff, General Foertsch, informed me briefly about the military situation. This is what he told me approximately, -- the main task for the 15th Army Group is the occupation of the Coast and the islands before it in order to establish there a defensive position as one counted on the possibility of an invasion. Of equal importance was, of course, to secure the lines of supplies and communication to those defensive positions.
For the rest he said I would be more clearly informed by the 2nd Panzer Army.
Q Let me ask you one additional question here, on that occasion or later on did you receive any political tasks?
A No, political assignments of any sort were not given me and as a soldier I would have had nothing to do with them.
Q Did you report to Field Marshal von Weichs?
A No, I said that the Field Marshal was absent on an official trip and I therefore could not report to him on that date but later on I made up for it.
Q If I understand you correctly, General, you were to be given more detailed information as to your assignment from the 2nd Panzer Army?
A Yes, the Commander in Chief at that time was General Rendulic.
Q Now was that done, how were you informed in the end?
A General Rendulic informed me briefly about the over-all military situation in the Balkans and in Croatia in particular. He told me that originally the Coast line had been occupied by Italian troops, that now after the capitulation of the Italian Army, it was to be occupied and guaranteed by German troops. The measures against the Italian Army had been concluded in September, but it was the same as the army group told me, that an enemy invasion or landing at the coast should be expected. He summed up the orders for the 15th corps in three points.
First, after new forces had arrived in the sector held by the corps there would be first on the right sector, the coast should be reached first of all and there I should expect enemy resistance as the Italians had left a large number of arms with the bands in that area.
Second, the main assignment of the corps was to occupy the coastal area and to establish a defensive position on the coast.
Third, it was important in that connection to secure the lines of supply and communications. In addition it was important to disperse and smash the bands in that area so that if possible they would be eliminated before the expected invasion would occur.
For the rest, General Rendulic told me that first of all I should form an opinion about the corps itself and then later I was to contact the army again a second time so that the most important measures could be discussed.
Q Did you do that in fact later on General?
A Yes, this is an entry in the war diary. It can be seen that on 5 November I had a second conference with the Army.
Q What was that second conference about General?
A The agenda of that conference is part of the documents. The most important thing was....
Q May I interrupt you briefly, General? May I draw the Tribunal's attention to one point. This agenda of the conference, which the General has made reference to just now, the prosecution submitted an extract of is in exhibit 367. This document is in book 15 on page 25 of the English version and page 224 of the German book. There is only a part of the agenda included in the books i.e. paragraph 6. I may repeat, it is in document book XV, exhibit 367 on page 35 of the English book and page 24 of the German. In order to make it quite clear what this conference was about, I have in my document book the whole agenda of this conference, which was contained in the original exhibit. This is in document book Leyser 1, on page 18 and it is document 10.
JUDGE BURKE: It has been given as exhibit No. 307 and later 367 which is correct.
DR. TIPP: 367 is correct.
JUDGE BURKE: Very well.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, let me give you the photo static copy of this agenda and you might tell the Court briefly what was mentioned at this conference.
A This conference was concerned first with the replacement of the 114th Rifle division and a number of tactical questions. As far as point 6 is concerned, which the prosecution submitted, I would like to say this. I can still remember that the intended transfer of the staff of the corps from Banja Luka was discussed. I also remember that General Rendulic drew my attention to the special importance and significance of Banja Luka, the position of that place therefore was essential for reasons of prestige.
Furthermore it was well known, even then, that the bands wanted to conquer Banja Luka and this is in my opinion why this remark is made here.
Q Could you also tell us why the position of Banja Luka for reasons of prestige was of importance to both sides?
A Banja Luka used to be the old capitol of Croatia and that is the reason why both sides thought it most important to hold the town.
Q Under paragraph 6 in this document it is stated that General Rendulic suggested to shoot 1,000 suspected as hostages at once and to arrest another 1,000; can you remember that particular remark?
A I cannot remember that too well. If General Rendulic gave me figures at all at this time, then he merely mentioned them jokingly. He did not mean it seriously. You must bear in mind that Banja Luka is a small town of four to five thousand inhabitants, which fact alone makes it clear, as I said that in a small town of that sort you cannot arrest 2,000 suspects and shoot them.
Q The most important thing in this connection. Was Banja Luka later abandoned as the basis for the staff?
A Yes it was, Banja Luka was abandoned by the end of February and the corps staff went to Knin.
Q And was it on that occasion that any hostages were apprehended or even shot?
A No, it was not necessary, there was no reason to do so.
Q May I now offer Leyser document 10 as exhibit 14? To correct this part of our discussion, you will note there is an initial at the end, "E.B"; can you tell us who initialed it?
A I asked myself that question when I read the document here again and I cannot find out. All I could say is perhaps that from other documents, perhaps the name might be Ebbinger or something like that, but no such man was on my staff, therefore, I could not state what these initials stand for.
Q Now let us to on with our chronological tale; when did you leave the XV corps for the first time?
A I believe according to an entry in the war diary it must be 3 Oct. 1943. I arrived at the airport and was welcomed by the chief of staff, Colonel Pfaffreth, and the adjutant.
Q Your predecessor General Lueters was present I suppose on that occasion?
A No, he was not present. My predecessor, General Lueters was just drafted at that time, that is to say he was in charge of a large scale operation. He used that period of time between my arrival and the time I took over in order to find out how the land lay.
Q. From a number of documents it becomes clear that General Lueters was at first called commander in chief of the German troops in Croatia, his staff had been transmitted to the staff of the XVth army corps and that change was done a few weeks before your arrival. Could you tell us, General, what the decisions which your predecessor was in charge of as commander of the German troops in Croatia and what changes there were in his sphere of tasks just before you took over command?
A. In the coastal area there were originally no German troops. Through the capitulation of the Italians this situation changed and the German troops had to take over the protection of the coast, which meant a complete reorganization and the agency Commander of the German Troops in Croatia was dissolved and changed into the staff of the XVth Mt. Corps was purely a troop staff whose tasks were purely tactical ones. They had no territorial authority of any kind and all tasks arising from the territorial commission from the position of the Commander of German Troops in Croatia were, as the reorganization went on, transferee to General von Clause Horstenau, he was the German Blenipetentiary General in Croatia. To whom there were subordinate all Administration Sub Area Headquarters.
Q. You say witness do you that unlike General Lueters you held no territorial authority?
A. No, I no longer held these powers. The commander of the XVth. Mountain Corps was a purely tactical position without territorial authority without any judicial authority. My tasks were purely tactical ones.
Q. Let me ask you an additional question, you said gust now you had no judicial authority; do you mean by that that you hold no judicial authority over German troops?
A. No, I had no judicial authority as far as German troops or any other troops were concerned.
Q. When did you finally take over the command of your corps?
A. I see in an entry in the war diary I finally took over the corps on 1 November 1943.
Q. Let me ask you in this connection, General, a question which was of importance before in this trial, did you as commander of the XVth Mountain Corps hold the famous executive power?
A. No, in no sense of the word this became clear also from the description which I gave about the legal status of Croatia. Only in very special cases would it have been possible to transfer executive power into my hands.
Q. When did you for the first time concern yourself with these questions. I mean by that your collaboration with the Croatian authorities and the whole problem of executive power?
A. Well, I think it was fairly early in the first days when I was not even officially in charge of the corps, yet one day the Minister of Interior called on the staff of the corps, together with the Envoy Kasche, they informed me about the political situation and explained to me about executive powers.
Q. Kasche, if I am correctly informed, was the German Envoy?
A. Yes, he was the German Ambassador in Croatia.
Q. General, will you now tell us about the conversation you had in the early days of your stay down there, may I point out that this conference is laid down in a document, which the prosecution has offered. It is part of the war diary of the XVth corps and the passage I have reference to is in document book XXV, page 15 of the English and page 13 of the German.
It is prosecution exhibit 561. This is an entry of 23 October 1943. General, let me hand you this document and ask you to tell the Tribunal briefly about this conversation?
A. The entry in this document shows that on 23 October 1943, that is to say before I was actually in charge of the corps, the German Minister Obergruppen Fuehrer Kasche, the Croatian minister of the interior Norkovic and the Minister for the Devastated Areas arrived at the corps headquarters. As we can see from the entry, Minister Dr. Bonac, who was the chief of the civil administration and representative of the Croatian government with the corps were present, that alone shows that I had no administrative authority in this area.
Q. Is it true witness that Minister Dr. Bonac, as the document says, was designated as chief of the civil administration in the operation area.
A. Yes, he was the chief of the civil administration in the operation area of my corps.
Q. Then, General, you also mentioned another Minister, that is the Minister for the Devastated Territories; can you tell us what these territories were?
A. That was territory devastated in the Croatian area. This devastation had been extended and made worse by the Italian troops when they left the country, but this title of the minister and his tasks prove that these devastations were not carried out by the German Wehrmacht as has been alledged.
Q. You mean, witness, that a state would hardly send a minister with that title to the armed forces of another state it the devastations were carried out by the armed forces of the very state with whom he is accredited as a Minister plenipotentiary; is that correct?