DR. FRITSCH: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
MR. RAPP: I also have no further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter, do you have any questions?
JUDGE CARTER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke:
BY JUDGE BURKE:
Q. What has been the period of your military service?
A. 33 years.
Q. Do you usually feel yourself equipped to write a character sketch the first evening you meet an individual?
A. No, I have already stressed that I cannot be responsible for what I wrote down this evening, probably also under other influences, and I must repeat again that they were then most secret inner thoughts which certainly I never meant to be available to anybody else.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. When were you brought here to Nurnberg the first time?
A. On the 23 August this year.
Q. And at whose request and demand, if you know?
A. I don't know.
Q. Had you been interrogated at that time or been communicated with by the defense?
A. No.
Q. At the time that you were interrogated had you been at that time communicated with by the defense or the defense counsel?
A. No.
Q. Do you know how the defendant got hold you you or made any inquiries as to your whereabouts or as to what you might know about the case?
A. I don't quite understand the question. Would you repeat it?
Q. Do you know how Dr. Fritsch or the defendant knew you might be in a position to testify about this case?
A. No, I don't know anything about that at all.
Q. When did they first communicate with you?
A. When I came back from Neustadt, and that was around about the 11 of September, the 11th or 12th of September.
Q. Did Dr. Fritsch write you or did he come to the camp?
A. No. I only found that out when we came back from Neustadt and General Hoelter told me that Dr. Fritsch placed some importance upon me, and as far as I know Mr. Kaufmann also made some indication that it was possible that the defense might call me as a witness.
Q. You mean Mr. Kaufmann of the prosecution staff?
A. Yes.
Q. He said that the defense might be interested in having you called as a witness--I mean, that was the report that came to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he make that statement to you when you were interrogated or was that the report that came to you?
A. I heard about that indirectly.
Q. Now, when you were brought here to Nurnberg what date was that and in what manner were you brought here?
A. On the 22nd August I was flown from London to Frankfurt, because I had been requested by the Historical Division in order to take part in the historical work in Neustadt, and when I arrived in Frankfurt on the 22nd August I was told on the airfield that I was coming to Nurnberg, I didn't know the reason, and I was interrogated for the first time on the Thursday following. I think that was about September 3.
Q. And were you taken to the Nurnberg prison and kept there during the time that you were here in Nurnberg?
A. Yes, with the exception of a five days interruption, which I spent in Neustadt, I spent the whole time in the Courthouse jail.
Q. Were you here twice for two different interrogations?
A. No, only one interrogation. The first interrogation was from the 1st to the 3rd of September, and then nothing else from the prosecution, only discussions with Dr. Fritsch.
Q. When were these discussions with Dr. Fritsch?
A. Mainly during the course of the last 14 days.
Q. Now, when you were interrogated by the prosecution where were you taken?
A. Over here in a room on the first floor.
Q. Do you know what the name of the room is, or what kind of a room it is?
A. When you come up the stairs it is left, the first door off the large corridor in the first floor.
Q. Do you know the number of the room?
A. No, but perhaps Mr. Hofmann knows the number.
Q. How large a room is it?
A. About as big as from this wall behind you as far as me, and then square.
Q. Were you told when you made that statement that what you said then might be used against you?
A. No.
Q. Did you have any counsel or have an opportunity to call any counsel at that time?
A. No.
Q. Did you ask for the privilege of calling a counsel?
A. No.
Q. Who was in the room at the time of your interrogation?
A. Mr. Kaufmann and his secretary, and during the first interrogation also the Norwegian Lt. Col. Follestad.
Q. And how long did this interrogation last?
A. It lasted one whole morning, two hours.
Q. And did it continue in the afternoon?
A. No, it was continued two days later, two or three days later.
There was an interruption.
Q. And who was present at that time for the second interrogation?
A. The same people, Mr. Kaufmann from the prosecution and his secretary.
Q. Did I understand you to say in your direct examination or in cross-examination, or sometime during the examination, that Mr. Rapp was present, or am I mistaken in that?
A. No, it could only be a slip of the tongue by me, but Mr. Rapp was never present. I made a mistake once and I meant Mr. Kaufmann.
Q. On this second period of interrogation how long were you in this inquisitorial room?
A. Two to two and a half hours again,--two hours.
Q. Were you furnished a copy of what was taken down at that time and of the statements that were made?
A. I merely read them through and signed them.
Q. And did they furnish you with a copy of the proceedings that were held there?
A. No, I did not get a copy.
Q. Did you ask for a copy?
A. I did not know that one could ask for one.
Q. This was on the 22nd of August, is that correct, or the 3rd of September?
A. What do you mean, when I signed it?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, that was on the 3rd or 5th of September. The last interrogation was on the 3rd of September, and the signing, if I am not very much mistaken, on the 5th September.
Q. You signed it on the 5th?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time did you know that there had been an application made by this defense counsel that you be called here as a defense witness?
A. No, I didn't know at that time.
Q. Are you under indictment at this time?
A. No.
Q. Is there any charge pending against you of a preliminary nature?
A. No.
Q. Do you know of any reason why you were investigated and interrogated?
A. I assume because it could be seen from the court files that I knew about the events in Northern Norway and Finnland, and therefore could give important information about it.
Q. You were not called as a witness for the prosecution after they had interrogated you?
A. No, I heard after I had been interrogated that the prosecution authorities placed no value at all upon my testimony.
Q. But they preserved it and used it in this cross-examination?
A. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all. The witness may be excused.
(Witness excused)
DR. FRITSCH: With the permission of the Tribunal I now submit my document book II.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritsch, I think we should wait until these documents are obtained from our respective offices, if you will, please?
JUDGE CARTER: Mr. Rapp?
MR RAPP: Yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE CARTER: Was this interrogation of the General made by the prosecution after he had been called as a witness for the defense?
MR RAPP: Of course not, Your Honor.
JUDGE CARTER: The dates are so close it looks like it might have been.
I thought I might ask if that was possible.
MR. RAPP: I was afraid that the Tribunal might gain that impression. The witness was obtained by us with the thought in mind of using him as a prosecution witness against the defendant Rendulic. Upon examination and interrogation at that time we decided he would be of no use in direct examination. The witness was then in Nurnberg, and discharged to go back to Neustadt or to the British P.W. Camp. During that time the defense, as usual and quite correctly, got information that this particular man was here and asked us whether or not we made any further claim, and we then disavowed at that time any further claim and turned him over lock stock and barrel to the defense for whatever use they might see fit, and from that date on we have never talked to the witness again.
JUDGE CARTER: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has the document book, Dr. Fritsch, so if you care to proceed you may do so.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, the first document is the photostat copy of this map of Norway. In the meantime I have obtained the maps which are missing from your Honors books and I would like to submit than to you now.
This is Rendulic Document II, No. 100. I give this map Exhibit No. 44.
The next document is Rendulic Document II, No. 40, and this I offer as Rendulic Exhibit 45. This is an affidavit by the former Colonel Kurt Herrmann. I would like to direct the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that in the prosecution documents the evacuation report of this Colonel Herrmann is contained. Herrmann was the leader of the evacuation staff in Northern Norway. Herrmann states in the document, to be offered by me, the following, and I read from the third paragraph:
"Formerly I was Army Adjutant to General Dietl until June 1944. From that date onwards I was the Commander of the 310th Grendadier Regiment within the XXXVIth Corps of the 163rd Infantry Division. This Regiment was stationed in Lapland (Finland) eastwards of Ivaloim, the so called Lutto sector, when I received the order to report to the Army Command regarding the taking over of the evacation Staff. This report was received at the Senior Quartermaster of the 20th Mountain Army Command approx, during the last days of October or during the first days of November, and a few days later at the Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General (Generalmajor) HOELTER. The ordered issued by the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, as previously mentioned, had, in the meantime, been passed on to the different units and the Evacuation Staff under my Command was to see to it that these orders were properly carried out. Brigadier-General HOELTER as well as the Senior Quartermaster pointed out to me that it was of particular importance that the Wehrmacht assisted the civilian population to the greatest extent.
The topic of these conversations centered around this assistance.
"The question, whether the destructions and evacuations were a military necessity, was, at the time of the order, to be answered in the affirmative. In the sector of my own regiment eastwards of Ivalo I reckoned with very strong following-up movements by the Russians and Finns, the latter now being Russia's allies. The winter, combined with the condition of the soil, was no protection against the attacking power of the Russians. This protection would only then come into effect, when owing to the season, the enemy had no possibility to entrench himself, when any kind of space was essential. In addition I had to take into consideration the evacuation and the assistance guaranteed by the Wehrmacht, as I knew that the Norwegians were fleeing from the Russians and, as this was unorganized, great dangers were involved. In fact according to my report 6000 Norwegians had fled, when the fighting got near the Norwegian border."
The affiant then continues:
"General DIETL had informed me, and I expect that the Army Command knew of it, that Russia has put forward claims regarding Northern Norway, Northern Finland and possibly North Sweden. Because of this fact, the impression that Russia now wanted to occupy this territory was strengthened. From this viewpoint the possible destruction of Hammerfest would have a special significance as it would have been easy for the Russian Naval Forces as well as for the British to establish a base in Hammerfest for operations in Northern Norway.
"The evacuation was carried out through the section commanders, in fact through the Division Commanders and so-called Sub-section Commanders such as local Commanders etc. I, with my staff, which consisted of Lieutenant HAGMEISTER, MEIER zu Rahden and two clerks received all reports and it was my task to see to it that the Wehrmacht procured the necessary transportation, food supplies and other auxiliaries for the evacuation.
In addition the Staff consisted of SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer NEUMANN, who was a representative of the Reich Commissioner and who was not subordinate to me. To NEUMANN I conveyed for instance, the requirements for transportation space, meaning shipping space, insofar as it did not concern Warships or shipments handled by the Navy. NEUMANN and the Reich Commissioner were of the opinion that the evacuation of the civilian population were their concern and jealously guarded their rights. I, in the capacity of chief of the evacuation staff, only had to see to it that the civilian population was provided with the necessary auxiliaries. I was not in a position to issue direct orders. I could, however, in case of emergency, issue orders, via the Army, to the Section - and Sub-section Commanders. Regarding the Navy there was no such possibility as the Navy was, in no way, subordinated to the Army. In this respect I had no occasion ever to approach the Army or the Command of the Navy, because my wishes which I expressed regarding civil treatment of the civilian population by the section commanders and their sub-sections, were complied with.
"I can assert that everything was done to help the civilian population and recall an instance where the occupants of an old-age institution could not be evacuated immediately as planned, because the heated ambulance craft, requisitioned for this purpose, had not arrived in time and had to be waited for. I am able to recall another instance: It had come to my knowledge that some Norwegian women on board a transport vessel which was to dock in Alta, were pregnant. As this steamer was scheduled to arrive at night, I did everything in order to have these women moved to a field hospital and finally succeeded, after having 1st Lieutenant (Medical Corps) Dr. GABBLER awakened, who, in turn, procured ambulances in order to collect these women off the boat, also, apart from this, all possible measures were taken, at the expense of the orderly retreat of the Wehrmacht, in order to assist the population in transporation matters.
"For instance an order existed that at certain collecting points cows should be kept to provide milk for infants. I myself visited one of theses collecting points at Burfjord and saw the cows to be at disposal.
I think I can confine myself to read in this. The affiant then goes on to state that no excesses wore reported to him and that there was only one incident known to him, which is submitted here as exhibit No. 506. This is the well known case of the shelling by the Navy.
The statement was certified by me on 3 October 1947 and sworn before me.
I now submit document Rendulic II No. 41, I submit this as exhibit No. 46. This is an affidavit by Ernst Erich Strassel who was chief of the propaganda company in the German army in Northern Finland under the command of General Bietl and he also remained in this position under his successor, General Rendulic. I have several statements by this affiant and will not want to read his statements again about his relationship to Rendulic. He describes what the propaganda was. I merely want to point out here this affiant as chief and leader of the propaganda company had all kinds of war correspondents under him, reporters, illustrators, radio and foreign language broadcasting reporters, news reporters, cinema units, a printing platoon and other mechanical and clerical assistants. The affiant was stationed with or in the neighborhood of the company and he states in this affidavit he was in close contact with the Army High Command and therefore he knew General Rendulic from close acquaintance. I would like to refer to this again when I come to further statements by this affiant.
Then I submit document Rendulic No. II 42 as exhibit No. 47. This is also an affidavit by Ernst Erich Strassel, chief of the propaganda company, who has just been mentioned. I will read individual parts of it, first of all in the third paragraph.
JUDGE BURKE: What is the exhibit 42, please?
DR. FRITSCH: It is exhibit 47.
JUDGE BURKE: What is exhibit 47, in what document book.
DR. FRITSCH: It is an affidavit by Ernest Erich Strassel, dated 27 October 1947.
JUDGE BURKE: What document.
DR. FRITSCH: The document is Rendulic No. II 42.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I believe that document also got the No. 41 in the English document book, that is at least the way I have it.
Dr. Fritsche: I am sorry Your Honor, obviously there is another mistake of the copying department, may I again draw your attention to document 41. This is the general affidavit by Ernest Erich Strassel, dated 25 October. Then the next affidavit instead of No. 41 should read No. 42, document No. 42, that is Strassel's affidavit dated 27 October. It is on the English page 6. This document No. 42 is Exhibit No. 47. I read the third paragraph:
As far as the evacuation is concerned I only gained some personal experiences by witnessing some details and assigned my reporters to the various phases of its execution. I recall that the Army has done much in order to relieve the difficult situation of the population in accordance with orders issued by Generaloberst RENDULIC, for instance the placing at disposal of vehicles, gasoline, food supplies, field kitchens, medical personnel, medical supplies and so on. The troops and population were on good terms, not only because pity was the ruling factor, although the troops just coming from Finland had no chance yet to fraternize with the Norwegian population. Looting and excesses of any kind were prohibited and threatened with severe disciplinary action. To my knowledge serious frictions occurred nowhere.
I now read the fifth paragraph:
"I have not experienced cases of atrocities or lack of consideration by German troops in the treatment of the population. I also have never heard of this either. In the prominent Stockholm newspapers however, at the time of the evacuation, continuous atrocity reports appeared therein describing the sufferings and deprivations of the Norwegian population, including women and children, caused by German troops. These reports were made to appear quite genuine by additionally submitting photos.
The leading news agencies such as Router, Associated Press, etc. covered those descriptions for the whole world. All cases, which were reported immediately to the Army Command through the German Military Attache in Stockholm, have been thoroughly investigated by the Germans and in many cases Norwegian representatives were present at these investigations. These natters were handled by me and forwarded to Stockholm for clarification. There it was ascertained that mostly it was a case of many Norwegians having reached the Swedish border in a pitiful, half-starved and frozen condition and who had followed the order of the London Norwegian Civilian Government to try and escape the evacuation. They had made their way into the mountains, either in groups or singly, and tried to reach the Swedish border. Many succeeded. Some, however, did not make it owing to the extreme winter conditions and the impassable terrain and some reached the Swedish border in a completely exhausted condition. These unfortunate people were then used for a large-scale baiting of the German troops. The Army of course had, as far as I know, no objection that these people went to Sweden, because it was only important they they reached safety.
I have not heard of cases of Norwegian civilians having been shot during the evacuation. The health condition of the population was normal, as far as I was able to for an opinion. The partly essential evacuation of the seafaring fisherfolks on cutters and boats did not represent a particular burden or a perilous strain to them.
An order was issued that the burning of homes was only to be effected after complete evacuation of the population and the passage of German troops. The houses and villages of the territories to be evacuated served as quarters to the troops and rear-guards, and if they were burned down according to orders, it happened long after the civilian population had moved. At remote bases in the Oedmark and on smaller islands it happened that the German troops left with the population on account of communication difficulties and lack of transportation.
In these cases the individual commanders had to make their own decisions in order to bring soldiers and the civilian population into safety in time and as ordered.
During repeated talks with General RENDULIC I learned that RENDULIC attached great importance to it that the evacuation of the population was carried out in good understanding between the troops and the civilian population. This was fully realized by the soldiers not only because any kind of friction would have made the task of evacuation more difficult but was in accordance with his fundamentally friendly attitude toward the Norwegian population."
And then I just read one paragraph which concerns the town of Kirkenes:
"The town of Kirkenes I saw last approx, at the beginning or the middle of 1944. Kirkenes was for years the main objective of the Russian Air Force which tried to paralyze the harbor of Kirkenes, the latter being the supply base of the polar sea front. I have visited Kirkenes several times and experienced three to four air-raids daily. The last time I visited Kirkenes it was half destroyed on account of the continuous Russian air raids."
The statement is sworn to by me here in Nurnberg on 27 October 1947.
And now I submit document No. II, No. 43. I would like to draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that the pagination, on page 9 of the document book is wrong, again it should be document No. 43 instead of No. 41. I submit this document as exhibit No. 48. This is an excerpt from the war diary of the 20th Mountain Army. I would like to draw the Tribunal's attention to the report of 2115 hours. It states here:
"The Army Command rejects the proposition made by the Naval Command Norway of the subsequent destruction of Vardoe, as the Army Command cannot see any advantage by this action."
The next document is Rendulic II, No. 44. This is on page 10 of the English and this will be Exhibit No. 44. This is also an excerpt from the War Diary of the 20th Mountain Army. I will point out the report of 07.00 hours in which it is stated that now an order from the OKW has arrived concerning the transfer of various divisions and of the Staff of the XVIII Corps.
And then the next document, Document No. 45 -- this will be Exhibit No. 50 -- is on page 11 of the English text. This also is an excerpt from the War Diary of the 20th Mountain Army, a Daily Report from the 16th of September 1944.
The report for 1730 is important here. I will read it:
"Ia of Armed Forces Commander Norway reports that 2 exceptionally large convoys have been located in the Arctic Sea of which neither the direction nor the strength and composition could be ascertained. The convoys are for the first time under the command of the British Admiralty."
The next document is Rendulic II, No. 46, and I submit this as Exhibit No. 51. This is also an excerpt from the War Diary of the 20th Mountain Army dated the 26th of September 1944. That is two days before the issuance of the well-known OWK Order.
I am sorry. I withdraw that.
I point here to point and would like to read from line 9 onwards:
"The appearance of a large convoy, sighted in the Bay of Kola and consisting among others of 2 battle ships, 12 destroyers, 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers and a shipping space of a total of 230,000 gross registered tons, indicates an intended attack against the Liza front. There are, so far no indications of intentions to effect a landing."
And the next document I submit is Rendulic II, No. 47 and this will be Exhibit No. 52. This is also an excerpt from the War Diary of the 20th Mountain Army dated the 18th of November 1944 and I refer to the report of 2325 hours which states:
"In connection with American press reports about an imminent landing of American troops, the Fuehrer has ordered that extreme watchfulness be kept up in the Norwegian Theatre and that a check up be made on all measures of defense."
"Then I submit Document II, No. 48. This will be Exhibit No. 53. This is another excerpt from the War Diary of the 20th Mountain Army dated the 8th of November 1944. In the entry of 1115 hours there is a note which runs as follows:
"Vice-Admiral Brinkmann, acting for the Commander in Chief of Navy Command Norway, was given the responsibility to guarantee a smooth cooperation between the Army Command and Naval Offices and to advise the Army Command on all matters of transportation by water and costal defense within the scope of naval tasks."
The report is dated the 8th of November 1944.
And the next document I submit is Rendulic II, No. 49, and this will be Exhibit No. 54, English page 15. This is an affidavit by Ernst Erich Strassel, whom I would like to point out again was the Chief of the Propaganda Company. Strassel states the following with regard to the Russian propaganda and the German measures taken to counter this: in the extreme North - at times up to 100 different leaflets were dropped on the German troops within one month - always endeavored to play off the purely Austrian Units of the Army (pre-eminently Styrians, Carinthians, and Tyrolese in the mountain divisions of the Arctic Sea front) against the Germans from the "Altreich" (Germany proper). Even in the days of General SCHOERNER and Generaloberst DIETL the Russian propaganda had attempted again and again to effect a weakening of solidarity between Austrians and Germans and to paralyze particularly the fighting spirit of the Austrian units.
Now, when Austrian general, in the person of Generaloberst RENDULIC, took over command, the Russian propaganda, versatile and always quick to respond, immediately took advantage of this fact and caused consternation and anxiety among the German troops (who just had learned of Finland's surrender!) by disseminating news as for instance that this Austrian General would now withdraw the Austrian troops from combat, or turn the Army over to the Russians. This ever increasing agitation was bound to cause battle weariness and a loss of confidence in the commander's efficiency. The award of the gold modal warded off this blow, attempted by the enemy, and removed a looming danger.
This affidavit was certified by me on the 27th of October 1947.
And Rendulic II, Document No. 50, is now submitted as Exhibit No. 55. This is another affidavit by Ernst Erich Strassel. This is on page 16 of the English. This is a description of the relations between Rendulic and Reich Commissar Terboven as experienced by the affiant according to his statement. I read from the third paragraph:
"From the time of Redulic's arrival in Norway a very strained relationship existed, between General REDULIC and Reich Commissioner TERBOVEN. These relations were marked by various differences. It was not by accident that, from the very beginning, these frictions became evident in my scope of work, for TERBOVEN insisted in all matters concerning press and radio, TERBOVEN insisted in all matters concerning press and radio, on his "Prerogative of Sovereignty", which he legally sustained by a respective Fuehrer Decree. In opposition to this, RENDULIC was of the firm opinion tint the press and radio were not to be run on political Party-lines but should be run in correspondence with military principles.
"My position caused the first serious clash of opinion when - at the beginning of the retreat in Northern Norway - MUELLER, a deputy of the Reich Commissioner, took steps with my superiors in Berlin to relieve me of my position, and to replace me by a man, who was evidently more agreeable to the Reich Commissioner, and who had already reached Oslo.
RENDULIC immediately protested strongly against this intrigue by telephing to the Office Chief of Army Propaganda with the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, Major-General von WEDEL, and succeeded in letting me keep the position of a company leader.
This telephone call was made from Alta in Northern Norway.
The affian then reports about some other rather serious differences of opinion between the Reich Commissar and the defendant General Rendulic. I would like to recommend those passages to the Tribunal's attention.
And I read on page 2 of the document. I would like to point out something and there to continue reading. It is on page 2, a few remarks under A, B, C and D. It is on page 18 in the English:
Once RENDULIC even said in a large circle that in the future either he or the Reich Commissioner would carry the responsibility for measures in Norway. The decision as indicated in this formulation did not come about however, as - a few weeks later -- RENDULIC's work in Norway came to an end by his being placed in charge of the Army Group Courland. In informed circles, however, the opinion prevailed that his recall from Norway was a result of his frank attitude towards the person and the policy of the Reich Commissioner, who through his good political connections had succeeded in obtaining a transfer to Berlin and to Fuehrer Head Quarters. TERBOVEN's opposition to the interview which RENDULIC had had published in the Norwegian press on the occasion of his taking command had shown that the Reich Commissioner did not agree with RENDULIC's policy advocating a conciliatory attitude and appeasing policy towards the Norwegian people.
RENDULIC was no politician, just a soldier. I had to draw the conclusion from his remarks and from his entire attitude that he did not agree with the policy. He was very deeply interested in the consolidation of the relationship between the Wehrmacht and the Norwegians. In reference to this, the above mentioned interview plays an important part. According to my memory, this interview was given shortly before Christmas 1944 and appeared in the entire Norwegian press, distributed through the Norwegian telegraph office. This interview was intended as a conscious attack against TERBOVEN and his policy. RENDULIC was of the opinion, that the personal conduct of TERBOVEN and of his collaborators was, as he expressed himself, the attitude of political party bosses, in particular in their dealings with the Norwegians, and through this interview he wanted to oppose these things and to clarify his position. Apart from this, this personal address was meant to represent an approach of the Wehrmacht to the Norwegian population. Therefore this interview culminated in the following statement which corresponds with RENDULIC's entire personality: "I am an enemy of severity in any form." RENDULIC claimed openly to be a friend of the Norwegians find of their great cultural representatives with whom he had been in close contact as a human being and as cosmopolitan, from the time of his early youth.