A. As a rule, General Rendulic of course endeavored to direct Kammerhofer in the sense that was best for the army but he did not have the possibility to order him to do anything. Kammerhofer himself was a very active man and that is how such operations occurred without our knowledge and without our participation in them.
Q Just one more question on this phase, Witness. You throw knowledge and participation into one pot, so to speak. Now, are you also saying now that you derived knowledge of the Operation Kammerhofer only when it actually took place? You got up one day and saw the Operation Kammerhofer going around or something?
A No, I beg your pardon. I believe there is a misunderstanding between us here. I believe concerning this action Kammerhofer to which the document referred, which was submitted to me before, was known to us, but I said that where operations such as the Operation of Kammerhofer were concerned we did not always know about them before they took place, and that is what I said before.
Q But in this particular instance the Operation Kammerhofer to which we have reference, you knew about it in advance? Is that right?
A It can be assumed that where such a large-scale and long-lasting operation was concerned that we were informed about it.
Q Witness, you stated that you knew for a fact that Croatians which were recruited for labor purposes were not deported to Germany for slave labor. Will you tell us how you obtained this knowledge?
A It had been the intention of the Army and, as far as I remember-and I can say only what I remember, the Army caused no such deportations to the Reich or had them carried out.
Q Did that also hold true for Non-Croatian territory which the Army commanded?
A I would say that it applies in that area too.
Q Are you familiar with a certain Hitler Order of 1943 which made it mandatory that labor was to be transported to Germany? Can you recall that order or the contents?
A I can recall such an order. That is, I can recall its general contents.
Q Well, how did you go about to circumvent a Hitler Order in that particular case?
A I'm afraid I cannot tell you this now in detail. It's too far back.
These matters I believe were directed from case to case. The Army was particularly interested in keeping the country pacified, and I believe that that is quite obvious and clear to everybody. A deportation of civilian labor to the Reich was, without doubt, of a disadvantage for these interests of the Army; therefore, the interests of the Army could only be directed towards avoiding to transport civilian labor to the Reich. In what way in this or that case the deportation was prevented or not carried out I'm afraid I'm in no position to tell you. These matters were more the task of the Quartermaster-General. I was the Ia, and as such represented the opinion and attitude of the Army in tactical respects.
Q Isn't it true that the OKW and Hitler had the same interest at heart as the Second Panzer Army, or were they working at odds?
A I wouldn't say that they worked at cross purposes, but it is possible that the OKW and Hitler had other interests and saw other necessities beyond the interest of the Army, which we, in turn, could not be certain about.
Q And since you could not quore such interests, which one do you think should task precedence?
A This, again, would be merely a theoretical guess of mine if I answered this question, and I have to emphasize this before I answer it. I can imagine that somewhere it was very important to have labor forces available.
Q Were s-called "Hitler Orders" binding?
A Yes, they were.
Q Under all circumstances?
A Yes.
Q With the exception of this case?
A In this case they were also binding.
Q But you didn't deport any labor to Germany?
A If, in spite of the fact that this Fuehrer Order which you discussed before was valid all the time and if it had not been replaced by other orders of the Fuehrer or the OKW, then this Fuehrer Order would be binding to us; it was not carried out, then the Commander in Chief concerned would be responsible for the non-carrying out of the order.
But, as I mentioned before, the whole question of the labor assignment does not apply to my own sphere of work and, therefore, I'm informed only about the Fuehrer Order which you quoted before in general lines, but I don't know whether other orders came in afterwards. The Quartermaster-General was the man who worked on these matters.
Q I have no further questions, Your Honor.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q Colonel, I have only a very few questions to ask you, which arose from the cross-examination, and I would like to start backwards. I'm afraid we'll have to again deal with the question of who dressed up what reports. May I anticipate one statement? Yesterday we discussed the question of objectiveness in general. I don't have to repeat your testimony of yesterday because you have just repeated now, and from that discussion we came down to the question of dressing up reports and generally camouflaging messages. I would like to give you an example. Let us assume that the original order for reprisal measures of 1 to 50 and 1 to 100 existed; then, somewhere in some locality--let us call this place Potgorica--we have a surprise attack and sabotage acts accumulate. Now, reprisal measures are being carried out. Let us say a loss of about 10 German soldiers is retaliated by 20 hostages. How would the report of this event go to Higher Headquarters? Let us assume that the report was made by the Regiment.
A This report, I believe, would go to superior headquarters as follows: It would go to superior headquarters in the same way as the incident took place. The Regiment would see no cause to dress up this incident to the Army in reporting it to the Army. If, in this example, it would have become necessary to dress up this report, then the reason for this could only have been that from Higher Headquarters--what I mean is the OKW--an inquiry would have come down from the Army asking how it came about that for 10 German soldiers such a comparatively small number of reprisal hostages had been apprehended and made responsible.
And in order to forestall this inquiry the Army could report to Higher Headquarters that for excesses in Potgorica 20 hostages had been shot as a reprisal measure.
Q By this are you telling us that the Regiment would not see itself forced to dress up reports to the Corps and to the Army?
A Generally speaking, this statement of yours is perfectly correct.
Q What then was the agency which dressed up reports?
AAs a rule that would be the Army.
Q Am I understanding you correctly by saying that that was because you were in direct contact with the OKW?
A Yes, that is entirely correct.
Q Colonel, I still have a few questions.
Mr. Rapp talked about the distance in battles, and you said in your answer that sometimes the distance could be so short that you could see the whites of your opponent's eyes, and what you said is that it was hand to hand fighting. I would like to go a little further back. Colonel, when the battle started what was the distance normally between the two opponents?
A. I would say it was a distance of a few hundred meters.
Q. In considering this distance of a few hundred meters was it possible to recognize insignia which were not seen on a green uniform such as were well known to the opponent?
A. I can imagine that if such insignia were striking that it could have been recognized in a distance of a few hundred meters with binoculars, but such striking insignia would make the battle difficult because at the same time it would give the aim for the opponent.
Q. Is it known to you that the partisans partly were socalled Soviet Stars?
A. That was repeatedly reported.
Q. Did you yourself ever see such insignia?
A. I myself saw Soviet Stars.
Q. And in what distance were those Soviet Stars recognizable?
A. They were only visible in a very short distance, a few meters.
Q. Mr. Rapp then asked you as of what date airplanes supplied the Balkans with weapons, etc. In this connection he touched upon the question of the hiding of arms, you remember that?
A. Yes, I was asked whether one could carry a machine gun or machine pistol under one's coat.
Q. I see. That is correct. Can you tell us anything about the number of arms that the partisans were supplied with at that time?
A. The quantity was quite considerable as far as we were concerned.
Q. I shall put my question a little more clearer; could each partisan count upon having an American or British machine pistol?
A. No, when I said that the quantities were not inconsiderable as far as we were concerned I meant that they were still not adequate to arm or uniform all partisans throughout the area.
At least that was not possible at the beginning.
Q. What kind of arms did the majority of the partisans actually have?
A. The majority merely had light arms such as rifles. There were a few machine guns and mortars.
Q. I am now talking about the individual partisans, Colonel.
A. The individual partisans only had small arms.
Q. What kind of arms were those?
A. They were rifles, guns, knives, hand grenades. All kinds of arms which they could work with their hands, rifles, etc.
Q. Were there common pistols amongst them?
A. Yes, of course there were.
Q. Colonel, you have been shown a document which I also submitted to you yesterday. This is in Document Book 14, and it is Exhibit 340. This document was submitted by me to you with reference to one particular passage. It is quite a voluminous document. Did you read through the whole document yesterday?
A. No, of course I couldn't do that. I only looked at the passage which you showed me and then I had a look at where that document originated, who signed it, etc.
Q. In answer to a question of Mr. Rapp about the necessity of reprisal measures, you mentioned the concept of tactical necessity. Is this concept identical with the concept of military necessity, or can you give me an explanation of these two concepts? May I put the question more clearly, this concept of tactical necessity, was that consciously contrasted by you with the concept of military necessity?
A. Military necessity to us is a very special term. A tactical necessity is something different. A tactical necessity is a means of achieving a certain military necessity.
Q. Now, according to this definition which you have issued, Colonel, when you talked about reprisal measures in this connection would you designate that a military or tactical necessity?
A. No, purely as tactical necessity.
Q. In this connection you were further talking about the Ic/AO, and you said in this connection that you were not informed about the reports of this Ic/AO; would you to begin by telling us what Ic/AO is?
A. The Ic/AO is the counter-intelligence officer.
Q. He was subordinate to the Ic, was he?
A. Yes, he was subordinate to the Ic.
Q. And the Ic in turn was subordinate to you, is that correct?
A. No, not quite. The Ic was only subordinate to me in his capacity as the man who worked on the enemy situation reports, but he was not subordinate to me in his capacity as counter-intelligence officer.
Q. To what agency would the channel of command of the counter-intelligence officer lead?
A. The directives to the counter-intelligence officer, as far as I know, wore channeled through a special channel from the counter-intelligence department of the OKW to the counter-intelligence department of the Army Group, and then down to the counterintelligence office of the Army.
Q. And what was the Supreme Agency in this respect?
A. That was the OKW.
Q. One more question about this affair Kammerhofer; was this operation, if I may call it that, in its essential parts a matter of the Army or was it police measures with which we are concerned with here?
A. In the very fact that this operation was called by us operation Kammerhof we can see that the Army disassociated itself from this operation.
Therefore, this is merely a private affair of Kammerhofer which he carried out with the units which were under his command.
Q. What kind of units were those?
A. They were police units.
Q. Colonel, then there was some talk here about the selecting of hostages; I think you will remember the longish discussions which you had on this point. Mr. Rapp was driving at the question of the executions. I understood your answer there not quite clearly. Do you know who it was that executed the hostages who had been selected, or don't you know who it was?
A. NO, I don't know who it was, and I believe that is what I said quite clearly before.
DR. FRITSCH:
I did not understand you before.
I have no further questions to put on redirect examination.
DR. LATERNSER: May it please the Tribunal, to begin with I would like to point out two errors in translation which I found out. Before the recess there was some mention about the supreme agency when we talked about the reprisal measures, and the translation was "a very high agency", but it is the highest agency, the supreme agency. Has the translation been corrected now?
Then further when the witness talked about the highest agencies this was translated with "higher agencies", and I would like to know from the interpreters whether this has been corrected now to "highest agencies". It is in this connection that I would like to put a question to the witness.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Colonel, if you talk about the supreme agency in this connection, if you said reprisal measures were ordered by the supreme agency, whom did you mean by that?
A. I meant Hitler himself.
Q. And if you talk about the highest agency, whom do you mean by that?
A. I mean the Fuehrer Headquarters or the OKW.
Q. Not the Army Group?
A. No.
Q. And then another point which I would like to discuss with you; if a country is occupied then the occupying troops exercise two kinds of authority, they have operational power, troop leadership, and they have territorial power, which includes executive power. Is this subdivision into two kinds of powers, into operational powers and territorial powers, known to you?
A. Yes, it is.
JUDGE CARTER: We will recess until 1:30.
THE MARSHAL: The Court will be in recess until 1330.
(Thereupon the noon recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 4 November 1947)
TEE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW (For the defendant Felmy): May it please the Tribunal, would it be possible to excuse General Felmy from attending these session on Wednesday and Thursday so that he can prepare his defense?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It's agreeable to the Tribunal.
MR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Thank you, Your Honor.
DR. LATERNSER (For the defendant List): May it please Your Honors, may I ask whether there will be a session on Tuesday, November 11th of next week? I understand that it is Armistice Day.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: If it's agreeable, Dr. Laternser, the Court does not expect to be in session on Tuesday nor on Monday, but we do expect to work the following Saturday.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much, Your Honor. In other words, on Monday and Tuesday of next week there will be no sessions, but there will be a session on Saturday of that week. May it please the Court, do you expect to sit all day on that Saturday, or do you expect to sit only in the Morning?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The present plan is to sit all day.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you, your Honor.
ULLRICH von VARNBUELER - Resumed RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Witness, just before the recess we spoke of the two forms of power, the operational and the territorial one. Now, who had the operational power in the Balkans?
A. The operational power lay with the Commanders in Chief of the area concerned.
Q. You say areas. Doesn't the operational power concern subordinate units which happened to be stationed in a certain area?
A. Yes, it concerns those areas or units which happened to have been stationed in that area.
Q. In other words, operational troop units must be stationed somewhere, of course, but that does not mean that is the area of the Army?
A. No, it need not be so.
Q. You said that the Commanders in Chief were the holders of operational power. Who held territorial power?
A. The territorial power lay in the hands, in our case, of the Governments of Croatia or Albania.
Q. And who held it in Serbia?
A. I don't know the details there.
Q. Do you know whether there was an agency called "Military Commander Southeast" in the Balkans?
A. Yes, the agency existed.
Q. What sort of an agency was that, an operational one or a territorial one?
A. It was a territorial agency.
3. Now, who was responsible for law, order, and security -- the territorial, or the operational power?
A. It was the territorial power.
Q. In whose competence lay the reprisal measures?
A. Well, actually they should come under the territorial sector.
Q. Because they were to maintain law, order, and security I suppose?
A. Yes, quite.
Q. In other words, competence for reprisal measures was with whom?
A. It was really with the territorial power.
Q. Colonel, you were asked about destructions in Southern Hungary which, as you said, the Corps did not carry out. Was that destruction vitally necessary for the survival of the Corps? In other words, were they deemed by you as an absolute military necessity?
A. No, I was not quite clear on that point. Destruction of vital necessity for the Corps, for instance, of bridges etc., were of course carried out. When I answered that question what I meant to say was that these were purely destructions of a more general economic nature which had also been ordered and for which we could not say that direct military necessity existed, and, for those things, the modifications which I made apply.
Q. Thank you very much; I have no further questions.
DR. FRITSCH (For the Defendant Rendulic): May it please the Tribunal, I have no further questions from this witness.
MR. RAPP: Your honors, I have just a couple of questions I'd like to straighten out.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Witness, regarding the weapons with which the partisans were reinforced -- I'm especially referring to the automatic weapons -- do you recollect, off hand, just how many automatic weapons, such as the Schmeisser machine pistols, were standard issue in the German Rifle Company?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you give us the figure?
A. A German Rifle Company had about 12 machine guns and a fairly large number of machine pistols, which fluctuated. I am inclined to put it that in one company this was between 20 and 50.
Q. And what was the so-called "Sollstand" of a company? That is, the Table of Organization?
A. When I was company commander, which goes back so long that I do not recollect these details very precisely for me to be able to make a statement on oath about it ...
Q. Well, you don't expect me to pin you down 10 men, more or less, but you certainly ought to be in a position, as an officer, to tell us whether a company had 200 men or a thousand men. I mean, just....
A. You mean how many men? I think the Translator did not make that quite clear. Certainly the strength of a company amounted to between 120 and 180 men.
Q. So, taking the most optimistic basis of the available Schmeisser machine pistols, you had about, to each six men, about one machine pistol. Is that right?
A. That might be roughly correct, yes.
Q. Witness, have you ever heard, prior to coming into this Courtroom today, about an expression called "Operative Gewalt," and, if so, will you tell us where?
A. I heard that term frequently throughout my military career.
Q. And what was meant by it?
A. "Operational power" was that power or authority which was concerned purely military and operational masters.
Q. Is it the some as executive power?
A. No, the executive power is something else.
Q. How will you tell us, witness, whether anybody who has territorial powers couldn't also have at the same time operational powers?
A. That is possible in theory. As far as I can judge it, that state of affairs prevailed at first for instance in the part of Germany which the Allied troops had occupied.
Q. Now you were asked witness whether or not only those who had territorial powers could order executive measures and you answered that in the affirmative, isn't that right?
A. It is not quite true in this exclusive sense, I said that it was up to the territorial commanders.
Q. Do you want to say by that statement witness that that does not exclude the fact that other people, who did not have this territorial power, could also order reprisal measures?
A. As a rule this would be excluded, but I can imagine that in areas where the territorial competence is not sufficient other people would carry out such measures.
Q. Did the 2nd Panzer Army have territorial powers in those areas which it occupied?
A. No, they did not.
Q. Did you have it in any parts or in none?
A. After much effort on our part, we obtained it in a certain sector of the coastal area but only, if I remember it rightly, in about May of 1944.
Q. Now witness, any execution of reprisal measures or as a result of reprisal measures, which were carried out by order of the 2nd Panzer Army and within the area of the 2nd Panzer Army took place despite the fact that the 2nd Panzer Army did not have territorial powers; isn't that right?
A. I did not quite understand the question. I think there was some interruption on the sound system or something.
Q. We will repeat it. You said that the 2nd Panzer Army did not have any territorial powers anywhere?
A. Yes.
Q. We know and you know that reprisal measures were carried out within the territory of the 2nd Panzer Army by order of troop commanders under the jurisdiction of the 2nd Fanzer Army; now isn't it a fact then that these executions took place despite the fact that the 2nd Panzer Army did not have territorial powers?
A. Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: May it please the Court, about the last point I would like to put a question. Colonel, as far the measures to which Mr. Rapp has wade reference just now, where those reprisals ordered in cooperation with the territorial agencies?
THE WITNESS: Yes, of course.
DR. LATERNSER: And a final question, did you and I at any tine discuss the joints which I have asked you about outside this courtroom?
THE WITNESS: No.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much, no further questions.
JUDGE CARTER: Are there any further questions by the prosecution or by the Tribunal?
The witness will be excused.
(The witness is excused.)
DR. FRITSCH: If it is agreeable to the Tribunal I should like first to continue briefly with the submission or documents and I wish to submit those documents which are available to me at the moment, which refer to the southeastern Balkans.
I offer first document Rendulic No. 7 A in Volume I. The Tribunal will recall that this is a picture which unfortunately was not included in the English version of that document book. I have meanwhile received more copies of it. I have shown it to the prosecutor. I do not know whether meanwhile it has reached the Court, if not I could hand it over now.
JUDGE CARTER: I don't think they have been presented here.
DR. FRITSCH: For this document I have reserved exhibit No. 6. May I say briefly what this picture is about. Is is a snapshot from the Time Magazine. In my opening statement I pointed out that I shall endeavor, as far as present-day conditions in the Balkans arc concerned and which are typical for that part of the world, to submit material about them.
At present all I have in that respect is this photograph. It comes as I said from the "Time" periodical. It shows a photograph where two men of the Government troops are identifying their comrades of whom they have only their cut-off heads.
MR. RAPP: Your donor, I object to the introduction of this particular document on the basis of rumor or hear-say evidence.
DR. FRITSCH: If the Tribunal please, may I point out that hearsay evidence surely is something else. This is a pictorial report from an official American newspaper, which in my opinion as far as actual conditions are concerned, should be of probative value.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I did not know that Time is an official American newspaper. I know it is a newspaper, but I don't know where Time is gathering its information. This picture could be taken in India or any other place. I don't recognize those people as being members of the Greek national army.
JUDGE CARTER: It appears that the incident occurred at a time other than we have under discussion hero. While I doubt if it has much probative value, we will let it in for what it is worth.
MR. RAPP: Very well, your Honor.
DR. FRITSCH: If the Tribunal please, this brings me now to document 126 in volume 1. That document is unfortunately not complete and I shall not offer it as an exhibit at the present time. As no agreement has been reached as yet about identification numbers, I should be grateful if the Secretary General would reserve for this document No. 36.
JUDGE CARTER: What document do you refer to, Dr. Fritsch?
DR. FRITSCH: Document No. 126 for Rendulic, it is in supplement 1. Now this brings me to supplement 2. I offer Rendulic document No. 60 in volume 1, supplement 2 as exhibit No. 37. I beg your pardon, may I ask whether the Court has supplement 2 in its hands?
JUDGE CARTER: Supplement 2 has not been delivered to the Tribunal, possible this is it.
DR. FRITSCH: I beg your pardon, Your Honors, I was told yesterday that it had reached the Court. Mr. Rapp tells me that he has not obtained a copy yesterday, but only received it from me this morning, but he is kind enough not to object to the document from the point of view of observing the time limit. I am not talking about document No. 60, supplement 2, which is offered as exhibit 37. This is an affidavit by Horst Grunwald, a police officer who as a company leader of a rifle company in the Mountain Rifle Regiment 13 served in the Balkans from September, 1942 to October, 1944. I shall read paragraph I of that affidavit. This is what the affiant says:
"On 9 February 1943 I with my company, which was then going into action for the first time and was stationed in this area, went into combat against superior partisan units at Srdici-Kovacevici. I saw I saw with my own eyes how my reconnaissance troop was shot up from a group of houses at close range and how the wounded were killed by partisans in civilian clothes who immediately rushed to the spot and stabbed them several times with daggers and bayonets."
And I shall read the next paragraph:
"When we launched the attack again after about 10 days and went across the old battle field, my men found those who fell on 9 February 1943 in the following way: stripped completely naked and unburied, faces trampled in, eyes gouged out, in some cases the sexual organs cut off and the bodies perforated with holes from bayonet stabs."
And the I shall read No. 11.
"On 23 July 1944 one company of my combat unit was attacked suddenly from the flank in the course of an enterprise South of the Nevesinje Stolac road and had to yield groud temporarily. In the course of this incident the medical officer of the company and three stretcher bearers who wanted to carry the wounded back, were mown down by machine gun guards, although they were clearly wearing Red Cross armlets. Except for the medical officer who was lying seriously wounded, they were all killed. When we found him after a few hours he was dead too. Inhabitants of the house standing close by recounted that his moaning and groaning had drawn the partisan's attention to him arid they had killed him slowly and with torture."
Now 111.
"In August 1943 a company of the 7th Armoured Rifle Division which had been commissioned to cover the road at KISELJAK was warned towards evening by a German-speaking woman that a large unit of partisans was alleged to be at HAN P10CA drinking, and could easily be captured. The company went lightly armed into the village which lay in a basin-shaped valley and was wiped out by shots from all sides except for a remainder of about 10 men who were able to save themselves by means of a brook* On the next day the village was taken by a motorized rifle platoon* On this occasion.
Lieutenant KRAUSE of Danzig was found lying in a maize field having been seriously wounded by a shot in the spine, and he was taken to a hospital in SARAJEVO. There he was interrogated about his observations on the day described above. I was present myself at this interrogation and can therefore testify from what I heard myself that KRAUSE gave the following particulars on the behaviour of the partisans after the company had been wiped out:
When sudden fire was opened on them KRAUSE was near the Maize field in which he was found and could therefore crawl into the filed inspite of his severe wound so that he was not discovered. He could observe what was going on about him and ascertain the following:
1. All the wounded still living and lying near were killed by the partisans by stabbing or shooting in the neck.
2. The company commander lying near him who was already dead, was first of all stripped of all clothes and his shoes and then dismembered with a carpenter's tool.
3. The N.C.O.s of the company were laid out on the road in a row with their heads in the earth and their identification discs laid on their backs."
I shall not read paragraph IV. This is the question of uniforms. The affiant says that as a rule the partisans did not have nay uniforms.
This brings me to paragraph V:
"The partisans were never mobilised in large self-contained units after the manner of a combat troop. They rather appeared in very small formations and groups (TROIKA--three men), inorder to surprise--attack and cut down small units or individual objects such as motor vehicles of all sorts. As far as I know prisoners were never taken by them, according to what I saw, the wounded were killed on principle. But I know from stories tole me that higher German unit commanders in individual cases were spared by the partisans in order to get a greater number of partisans in exchange for them, each according to rank.