MR. RAPPL Well, Your Honor, assuming that Dr. Rauschenbach's argumentation would be correct, then the other certificates he has included in this document book would be rather ambiguous, it seems to me, or "superfluous" to use the correct expression. Either the last certificate is not applicable or the individual certificates are not applicable to the last. As it stands now, I don't think it should be left to the discretion of Dr. Rauschenbach which certificate as applicable at what particular time, we want to know that these things have been properly translated and certified.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you questioning the last certificate found on page 55a?
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, as far as the certificate from the affidavits are concerned, I am not questioning it. I am merely questioning when it is applicable and when it is not applicable. There are three additional certificates included in this document book. Either they are to supercede the certificate on the last page or the certificate on the last page rules out the previous certificates. I don't know the action to take, your Honor. I am only worried about this particular case.
THE PRESIDENT: If either one of these certificates is correct, then what is the occasion for the objection?
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, my original objection was that I do not know which certificate is applicable to which translation. You have one master certificate so to speak at the end of the book. If that is to be used, then what is the point for other certificates in the book?
THE PRESIDENT: If they are there and they are superfluous, what is the difference?
JUDGE BURKE: Well, isn't it a fact, Mr. Rapp, that some of the other certificates have references to attestation, rather than to translation?
MR. RAPP: That is true too, Your Honor, but there are also other certificates in here which have reference to translation. For instance, if Your Honors turn to page 16a, for instance, you have there a lady by the name of Perry certifying that a translation of a previous document submitted is correct, 16a; the same appears again on page 33a.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled. The court will give consideration to these matters in its final determination.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honor, now to conclude, I would like to add that I could not answer the questions of the prosecutor, because as defense counsel we have no influence at all on the technical Translation Division.
The next document is Document No. 13a, Exhibit No. 11. This is an expert opinion of the former Chief of the General Staff of the German Army about the position of the Chief of the General Staff of the Higher German Command in the 1939 to 1945 war. This Document 13a, Exhibit Foertsch 11 was sworn to before the competent American officer in the Neustadt Camp. This expert opinion is in regard to the responsibility of the Defendant Foertsch and everything charged to him by the prosecution from his position as Chief of the General Staf. This is so important that I must read the whole thing, so that it will be understandable. I begin:
"I give the following expert opinion in virtue of my knowledge of conditions in the German Army and my service experience which I have gained as chief of the General Staff of the Army in the period from 1935 - 1942.
1) The official instruction concerning duties and rights of a Chief of the General Staff of a higher command (in the following briefly referred to as "Chief") is contained in the secret printed regulation 92, (Dv. g 92) "Handbook for the General staff service in wartime" Part I. I had this regulation revised as Chief of the General Staff soon after I took office so as to establish clearly in the regulation, too, the point of view of absolute responsibility of the commander of the troops (in the regulation called "Fuehrer" or "oberer Fuehrer" (higher commander) which up till then had been established only by written orders.
H.Dv. g 92 stresses in Part I, Section III, A, No. 2 that the instructions given in the regulation concerning the activity of the separate organs of the staff are only to serve as "general principles" on the basis of which commands had to prepare separate instructions for service in the staff. To draw these up consistent with the needs of the service was the business of the "Chief" who was responsible to his "oberen Fuehrer" for the smooth running of the staff. To guarantee uniformity of staff work throughout the army, the important position of the chiefs as regards duties and rights was fixed in the regulation in so far as possible without getting lost in red-tape.
2) The "Chief" was responsible to his "oberen Fuehrer" only. His responsibility to him consisted in promptly creating and clarifying the foundations necessary to reach a conclusion; the presentation of all important matters at the right time briefly, sifting the essential in such a way as to facilitate the reaching of a conclusion without a biased attitude to an already formed opinion, further, after the conclusion had been reached by the absolutely responsible "oberen Fuehrer", in using all means in the power of the chief to carry out the will of the "oberen Fuehrer" and in furnishing the superior offices promptly with the necessary notices and reports as intended by the "oberen Fuehrer", Dv. g 92, Part I, Section III, No. 4, stresses expressly that the "Chief must exert every effort to carry out the will of the "oberen Fuehrer" even if the views and resolves of the letter deviate from his own. To this "carrying out of the will" of the "oberen Fuehrer" belonged a clear giving of commands which expressed the will without any ambiguity, the mustering of all available aids to the uniform carrying out of this will and supervision of prompt execution of the commands given. The "Chief therefore, had to report to his "oberen Fuehrer" if he confirmed that subordinate officers did not carry out the orders given by the "oberen Fuehrer", or not entirely or not soon enough.
The responsible commander of a subordinate office was responsible for carrying out the orders issued to the subordinate offices.
3) Concerning the responsibility for the orders given and decisions reached Dv.g.92.
Part I: Introduction No. 2 says:
'The Fuehrer bears the responsibility for the deed. The General Staff Officer is advisor and helper.'
Section III, Figure 4, 'The decision and responsibility rest with the Oberen Fuehrer alone."
The person elaborating the orders was responsible to the "Oberer Fuehrer" who was authorized to issue the order for the form and manner of the giving of the order which were to express his will correctly and in due course.
"4) Concerning the authority to give a signature Dv.g.92 Part I, Section III, No. 11 says: 'The Chief of the General Staff examines all drafts before they are submitted to the "Oberer Fuehrer". He is authorized to sign documents which have no fundamental significance and contain no judgment as to value of the recipient."
MR. RAPP: I would like to inquire from the Translation Branch if they don't have a word to translate "Oberer Fuehrer" properly. I have known that particular word for several years and it seems to me it is pretty easy to translate it correctly.
JUDGE BURKE: What is your contention as to the translation?
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, there are numerous translations that are possible. The English language provides several for these. I don't want to suggest them, but I do not think that a German word should get into the English record, because it means nothing to a lot of people.
JUDGE BURKE: May I suggest that the original be handed to the translator for use now and subsequently.
THE INTERPRETER: I would suggest for "Oberer Fuehrer" the use of "Higher Officer".
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Yes, as the prosecutor just stated, there are several possibilities. It could be, perhaps, "Higher Commander".
MR. RAPP: That would be perfectly acceptable to us, Your Honor, I was only quibbling so that those who don't speak German know what we are talking about. "Higher Officers" is perfectly correct.
JUDGE BURKE: Is that agreeable to you, Dr. Rauschenbach?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Yes, I agree with that.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed then.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: "This makes it quite clear that fundamental orders and decisions were not to be signed by the 'Chief' but 'by the Higher Commander.' The signature formula for documents which contained no fundamental orders and could therefore be signed by the Chief is set forth in Dv. g. 92 Part I. Section III No. 11. This formula indicated that the person signing does not draw on the order by virtue of his own authority of command, but as representative of his command, therefore with the 'higher commander' as the responsible person who alone was responsible for the activity of his official agency.
"The 'Chief' had aLways to use this formula when he signed as representative of his command. In this case the official designation of the Command Post always stood at the head of the letter. The only case when this formula was not used, was when the 'Chief' issued a written command within his personal sphere of command. The personal sphere of command of the 'chief' was the staff of the command at the head of which he stood and over which he exercised disciplinary power. Orders to the staff therefore were headed with the designation: 'The Chief of the General Staff of the ...... Command' and were signed merely with the name of the 'chief' personally authorized here to give orders."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Rauschenbach, we will take the noon recess at the regular time.
THE MARSHAL: The court is in recess until 1:30.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, please, I would like to make one statement regarding a correction of the transcript of the record. Your Honors will recall that on the 18th of August, during the testimony of the Greek witness Papas, there was a mistranslation regarding the words "Steel Helmets". The translator stated that the words "Steel Helmets" should not have been used, and rather the word "style" in Greek should have been translated "appearance".
If your Honors will make this notation in the transcripts of the record on page 2193 of the English record for the 18th of August, the 7th line from the bottom of page 2193, which should now read: "Answer: Yes, I could very easily see. The appearance of the Italians and their uniforms was entirely different from that of the Germans."
The reference in that answer to "Steel Helmets" should be stricken.
And then on the next succeeding page, page 2194 of the English record, the 11th line from the top of that page, the answer should read: "I couldn't exactly give you a very detailed description of their uniforms, but in any case I could tell you their appearance is different."
The reference there to "Steel Helmets" should also be stricken.
Dr. Weisgerber, counsel for the defendant Speidel who was interrogating the witness Papas, as heard the record of that date proceeding and agrees to the change in the record which I have just given your Honors.
Now, if I may make one comment regarding the submission of the documents for the Defense. Your Honors will recall that throughout the presentation of our direct case we submitted a photostatic copy of each document which we offered into evidence to the Defense Information Center 24 hours before we submitted it in the Court.
We have not received any photostatic copy of any of the documents which Dr. Rauschenbach offered into evidence this morning. The problem is simply this: We have received a copy of the English Document Book and a copy of the German Document Book, and we can compare the two and pick out any translation errors; but if the German Document Book has been mistranscribed from the original document, that error wouldn't necessarily be perpetuated in the English translation, and unless we have a photostatic copy of each document offered into evidence 24 hours in advance we cannot ascertain whether the translation of the original document is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: I see no objections to your having it, provided the German counsels are given cooperation by the necessary departments. Are you in a position, Dr. Rauschenbach, to furnish, through the necessary departments, photostatic copies of these various documents?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I am sorry, Your Honor, this is something completely new to me. I have been defense counsel in Case One, and Case Four, and I have also participated in the IMT, and up to this time the Defense has not been asked to do this. They have not been asked to submit photostatic copies besides the German and English Document Books. That the Prosecution does this, as far as I know, has a special reason. While we Defense counsel leave our original documents, that is, affidavits, letters, etc., with the Secretary General, the Prosecution on its part has the original, only submitting a photostatic copy, while the actual original remains in the Document Center, and I believe that is the reason why the Prosecution makes photostats at all, and has them made. We, however, submit the original documents.
They are with the Secretary General, and up to this time nobody has had the idea, not even the other Courts, that besides, we still have to furnish also photostatic copies. I am afraid that would involve a technical procedure, which is complicated as it is, and this procedure again would have to be carried out by departments in this Court-House here, and would therefore be subordinate to the Chief of Counsel, and I think that is a completely new problem here.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I am not aware that the procedure which I have suggested be followed is a new procedure here. I believe, however, that the reason why the Prosecution files photostatic copies with the Defense Information Center is not, as Dr. Rauschenbach puts it, because we do not file the original document, but rather because we want the Defense to be able to sit down with the photostatic copy, the German Document Book, and the English Document Book, to see that they all correspond. I think your Honors will be able to appreciate the necessity for a photostatic copy being available in advance to the Defense for thus reason: Should the German typist mistranscribe anything from the original document, or should the typist forget to include in the German portion of the document something which is in the original, we would be unable to tell, from examining the German Document Book copy and an English Document Book copy that was the case.
THE PRESIDENT: Is where any rule in connection with this matter that has been set up in the Rules of Procedure?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The rule is somewhat unclear, your Honor. Rule 17 provides as follows: "Prosecution to file copies of exhibits -- Time Required. The Prosecution, not less than 24 hours before it desires to offer any record, document, or other writing, in evidence, as part of its case in chief, shall file with the Defense Information Center not less than one copy of each record, document, or writing, for each of the counsel for defense, such copy to be in the German language.
The Prosecution shall also deliver to Defense Information Center at least four copies thereof in the English language."
Rule 18 simply talks about the number of copies and exhibits which are to be filed with the Secretary General.
Your Honors will note that there seems to be nothing in Rule 17 which binds the Prosecution to file photostatic copies in advance with the Defense Information Center. That is the policy which we have followed and, I believe, has been followed by the Prosecution in other cases.
THE PRESIDENT: May I suggest this, Mr. Fenstermacher, Rather than take up the time of all these people here who are interested in this proceedings, unless it is necessary to do it right away, that you and some representative of the defense meet with the Tribunal in chambers and we work it out that way?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Very well, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: May I suggest that we have a conference at four-thirty?
You may proceed.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I shall proceed then with the reading of the Document Foertsch 13-a. That is exhibit 11. It is pant of the document - it is page 4 of the document under paragraph 5. It reads as follows:
"An exception is given to the generally stated, valid rules in Numbers 3) and 4) if the situation demands an immediate decision in a question which acquires fundamental significance and the "higher commander" is absent or cannot be reached immediately. Dv. g 92 Part I, Section III, No. 4 disposes of it in this way: 'If the situation demands a speedy decision and if the higher commander is absent and cannot be contacted immediately, the chief of the General Staff is obliged to decide and to order. Such orders are to be marked expressly as emanating from the command not from the person of the Chief of General Staff.' This says that in such an exception the chief can indeed give orders and is even compelled to give orders but assumes the responsibility outwards for the activity of his command. From this it is evident without being mentioned in the regulation that the decisions and orders of the chief had also in such a special case to be prompted by the effort to act as intended by his higher commander.
6.) "With the word 'current matters' such matters were designated in office language the settlement of which required no new fundamental decisions on the pant of a superior but which the collaborator could work out by virtue of existing regulations or fundamental decisions already on hand.
"The conception 'current matters' is not defined in any military regulations as far as I know and is therefore to a certain extent flexible in its use in staff operation."
7) I shall not read from paragraph 7, but instead, on page 6 of the document, roughly about line 8. It reads:
QThe chief has no right to announce his differing opinion to those above him or to make it know to those below. That would have been a lapse into the "official channels of the General Staff" which were usual in the first World War and the entire elimination of which was the aim of the order issued in 1938 about the abolition of the coresponsibility of the Chiefs and the resulting revision of Dv. g. 92 in 1939.
"The right of the Chief which existed in Ludendorff's time in such cases to record with reasons his differing opinion and to file it, was cancelled by suspension of the co-responsibility of the Chief in the year 1938. Therefore one possibility only remained for the Chief on whose conscience the instructions of his commander weighed heavily; that was to request his release. In so far as it was a question of clear orders from superior offices, such a request for release would have been tantamount to insubordination and would have entailed the lawful consequences of such.
8) The appointment to the position of "Chief", was ordered through the army personnel office by the commander in chief of the army acting on the suggestion of the Chief of the General Staff of the army.
"A "Chief" had no influence on his appointment, he might ask to be recalled in exceptional cases for example for health or other personal reasons."
Then under "8", page 7 of the document, we find: The question as to whether the Chief, on his own initiative, could refuse to carry out orders which reached his command post can be answered in this way that lawfully no such possibility existed."
Your Honors, merely in order to clarify this of the index, this document 13-a is not mentioned in the index because it was inserted later. I would appreciate it, therefore, if the Tribunal in the table of contents would insert after figure "13" which was Exhibit 10, this Exhibit 11 as 13-a, which is called "Sworn Expert Opinion."
I have one question to put to the defendant concerning a typing error which is also in the typewritten original. It is on the first page and it is a mistake which the prosecutor pointed out to me. When the sworn expert opinion starts, it reads:
"I am giving this expert opinion by virtue of my knowledge of conditions of the German Army and my service experience which I gained as Chief of the General Staff of the Army in the period from 1935 to 1942.
Q I ask you, witness, from what time to what time was General Haider Chief of Staff to the Army?
A I cannot give the exact date but I would say as of 1938.
Q So that, in place of 1935, it should probably read 1938?
A "1935" is by no means correct. It can only be a typographical error.
DR. RASCHENBACH: I shall then present Document Foertsch No. 14. That will become Exhibit No. 12. This is an affidavit by General Warlimont which regards the personality of the defendant Foertsch as well as his position as Chief of General Staff and also events which then took place in the Balkans. This document and the next one, those are the two last ones in this document book, will then lead me immediately to the events in the Balkans itself. The affidavit reads as follows, under "1" on page 47 of the English text:
I became acquainted with Foertsch in the twenties, at first during official dealings. I, soon, felt attracted to him, mainly by his equally well developed nobility of heart and mind which, joined with a subtle and indulgent humor, characterised his always sober-minded, outstanding personality.
On this basis grew up in the war years 1942-1944, a cooperation supported by unlimited confidence, also steadily increasing friendly relations. Common interests of a non-military nature, among others in religious, philosophical, historical, literary fields led us to devote always some hours to these interests, on the occasion of mutual official visits, even in time of war."
I will pass over the next sentences and shall continue under figure "2" on the next page of the document:
"Foertsch's influence" - I beg your parson; I do want to read one sentence. I shall only pass over the next sentence and I shall read from the very top of the page 48:
"He hated, from his innermost soul, abuses as he encountered them in the licentious soldiery of the insurgents of the Southeast and in the orders given by Hitler in connection with this state of affairs."
Then under "2":
"Foertsch's influence on his commanders according to my impression was kept principally within the bounds prescribed by his position as Chief of Staff -- that is, first advisor of his Commander-inChief."
One question regarding this to the witness?
Q Witness, what was General, Warlimont's position at that time?
AAt the beginning of the war he was Chief of the department, Land Defense in the Armed Forces Operational Department of the OKW and later his official position was called Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff.
Q I thank you.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I shall then continue where I interrupted.
"His counsel was founded on an always serious and most careful penetration of the problems and, even formally, was characterized by an exemplary military attitude. His influence found particular expression in. the effective support of his Commander-in-Chief in their constantly repeated efforts to master the insurgency in the Balkans insofar as possible by peaceful means, to remedy abuses, and, as far as possible, to give all the care imaginable to the suffering population, especially in Greece.
"3.) To official discussions and reports in the OKW, for which Foertsch relatively often came to headquarters, he always brought with him constructive proposals fortified by a thorough study of all interrelations. Furthermore, he took pains, in regular preliminary discussions with me, to gain facts for the most convincing tactics of report, in order to secure the best possible audience and acceptance of his proposals.
Nevertheless, in view of the given conditions, it was even for him as Chief impossible to carry through conceptions opposed in principle to the directives once they were decreed by Hitler. Keitel, in accordance with his perpetual stand, declined to permit even a mere discussion of Hitler's orders. Yet, Jodl, too, received such remonstrances generally without a word and had to deny himself the making of deductions, if it was clear that he could accomplish nothing against Hitler's pleasure."
FOERTSCH, under these circumstances, has repeatedly taken advantage of our mutual good relationship in order to elude HITLER'S orders after all."
The examples which follow I shall later quote in the proper context, when I shall deal with the events concerned during the submission of my evidence.
I shall continue on Page 4 under Numeral 5. I believe that it is Page 4 also in the English document book. That is on Page 50.
"5. To my knowledge, FOERTSCH had made himself unpopular and suspect in party circles through his former activity in the OKW. Particularly GOERING and HIMMLER watched over him, his activity and his influence with an open distrust.
"I remember that at the time FOERTSCH resigned from the Staff South-East in the spring of 1944, HIMMLER submitted a complaint to KEITEL against the conduct of the Staff and that in this connection he mainly suspected the influence and the person of FOERTSCH.
"6. FOERTSCH, in conformity with his character, again and again endeavored to obtain an assignment for op-rations at the front. Aside from his aspiration of being actually enabled to practice his soldierly profession through such an assignment, he has repeatedly admitted to me his leading motive that the subordination of his own conviction and his own will to that of the Supreme Commander - as it is fundamentally required from a Chief - could not satisfy him. He would rather finally obtain a position in which he could say of himself: 'sic volo sic jubeo'".
JUDGE CARTER: My Latin is a little bad. Would you mind translating that?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I shall do that. It should read: "As I want it I shall order it," or the meaning is, "At last I can order the way I want to do it."
This brings me to the last document in this Document Book, which is Document 15 and I shall offer it as Exhibit 13. This is an affidavit by Dr. Otto Campe from Hamburg, who was an Ordnance Officer with General von Greiffenberg who was Chief of the 12th Army prior to Foertsch.
That is the witness who was on the witness stand here yesterday. He said the following, and I shall start with the third paragraph; that is the fourth paragraph in the English Text. It begins:
"At the beginning of May 1941 FOERTSCH himself became Chief of the General Staff of the 12th army, replacing GREIFFENBERG, while I, at the same time, became the personal Adjutant of the Supreme Commander, Generalfeldmarshall LIST. During the following period the relationship between FOERTSCH and myself became closer and closer. I can say that, in spite of the difference in rank, it was indeed an amicable relationship.
"The relations between the German occupational troops and the Greek population in 1941 were very good at the beginning, only gradually they grew worse as a result of the mounting difficulties in respect to supply. In personal conversations FOERTSCH has frequently expressed his regret that there were only small possibilities for the Armed Forces to help the Greek population.
"I cannot remember any particulars any longer since in the meantime 6 years have passed and I have no records referring to this matter. However, I can state with certainty that FOERTSCH showed a kind disposition towards the Greek population and had understanding for the hardships which in any case are more or less necessarily arising from an occupation; every act of excess and every offense of theft on the part of German members of the Armed Forces was severely punished" On the third page of this affidavit, last paragraph, I shall continue?
"FOERTSCH knew that I was constantly in contact with General OLBRICHT and that the latter was the center of an active counter-movement. My visit in Belgrade in October 1943 was for the purpose of finding out whether a joint action of all supreme commanders was feasible, an action through which OLBRICHT hoped to influence HITLER. FOERTSCH did not consider it possible to get all supreme commanders under one head, In spite of this however, he did not refuse to cooperate as far as he himself was concerned."
This concludes the presentation of Document Book I and I shall proceed with the examination of the defendant.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I assume that, in accordance with the previous ruling of the Tribunal, if the Prosecution makes timely application the affiants may be brought to Nurnberg for cross examination purposes, and failing to produce them without due cause shown will give grounds for their affidavits being stricken.
THE PRESIDENT: That has been the attitude of the Tribunal in connection with the Prosecution witnesses and I see no reason why it should not be applicable to the Defense, keeping in mind the difficulties at all times of obtaining these various witnesses and subject to a further motion on behalf of the Prosecution or interested parties.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: If the Prosecution wishes to cross examine one or other witnesses who have given affidavits, I am certainly prepared to give information where these people can be reached and found. Most of them, in any case, are in the hands of the occupation forces.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. Witness, I shall now turn again to your actual activity in the South East. What was the task of the army in the South East?
A. when I became chief of staff of the 12th Army the campaign was concluded and only the conquest of Crete was still to be expected. For this purpose the 12th Army had merely to perform auxiliary services through reinforcements, supplies, and too, by putting the Fifth Mountain Division at their disposal. The task of the Army was at that time to occupy the areas which had been assigned to the German troops for occupation and to start with the preparation for the preventing of an invasion.
Q. What was the significance of this task in the framework of the general war events?
A. Seen on a large scale the South East meant three things. First of all, the large southern flank of the Russian thratre of war -secondly -
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me just a minute. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. Will you please continue?
A. Secondly, the route to Africa for supplies and reinforcements; and, thirdly, the air bases for the Eastern Mediterranean area.
Q And what was tho main prerequisite for the fulfilling of these tasks?
A The main prerequisite for the fulfillment of these tasks was peace and quiet in the interior of this area.
Q And how did one attempt to achieve that?
A Through most extensive consideration of the interests and needs of the population, certainly not, as I occasionally heard, through hatred or vengeance.
Q What difficulties did the government face in their endeavor for peace and quiet?
A The difficulties were mainly during tho first time established in two things. Firstly, in my opinion, unfortunate policy regarding the Southeast and secondly, in tho flare-up and increasing of the insurgent movements in the individual districts.
Q What especially provoked these insurgent movements?
A For this fact there were several reasons in existence. There was the already previously mentioned rather unfortunate policy, then the contrast, in the ethnic groups in this area, and finally the help and support from the outside which incited those movements.
Q And what did you regard as the unfortunate policy in that area?
A I can only state here my own personal attitude which I had at that time. I considered tho dividing up of Yugoslavia immediately after the campaign an unfortunate solution, and even if one undertook such a subdivision, I considered the frontier between Croatia and Serbia, a specially poor solution. Besides it seemed to me that the political supremacy which one had attributed to Italy made the general conditions even more difficult. And, finally according to my personal opinion the filling of the posts of delegates and envoys in that area was not particularly well chosen, with one exception, and that is Envoy Altenburg in Athens which I consider proper and adequate.
Q The help and support of the bands from the outside could that be felt from the very beginning?
A Yes. In any case very clearly when the Russian campaign had started.
Q And as a consequence was it mainly and essentially a Communist influence?
A Essentially yes but there were additional motives - the already mentioned contrast of the ethnic group in this area and also purely Nationalistic motives. There were also the unavoidable economic difficulties which were the result of the war.
Q Witness, the witnesses whose affidavits I have presented here and also the Prosecution consider you in a certain respect as an expert, on the Balkans. How long were you in the Balkans?
A From 6 April 1941, that is as Chief of Staff as of 10 May, until the 4 March 1944.
Q In connection with this I would like to ask you to give us quite briefly just as an overall picture the development of these insurgent movements during these three years, just an outline of the main points.
A I can, of course, just do it in large outlines because I have no documentary information available now. I would like to point out expressly that it is quite possible that I make errors especially concerning chronological sequence. But if I picture to myself today the course of events in the various districts, I have the following picture. In Serbia the illegal warfare against the German Armed Forces started with individual sabotage actions, small band operations, with participation of large circles of the population. At that time the Communist and the Nationalist elements were inferior over. In the further course of events, especially in Serbia, the Nationalistic movement, characterized by Mihajlovic, more or less absorbed the Communistic movement. Partly through active fighting, on the part of Mihajlovic and his people, and partly because, according to my experience, the Serbian peasant does not feel inclined off hand toward Communism. Therefore, Tito never played a particularly important part in Serbia. The fighting of the Mihajlovic movement and the always next to it existing band leaders show no uniform increasing lino but rather moves in the form of waves.