COURT V, CASE VII
Since attacks, acts of sabotage, etc. had considerably increased in number and extent it can be assumed for certain that individual reprisal measures were not reported to him. This would also have had to be proved by the prosecution.
10. In the case Uzice it can be gathered from the reports to the Armed Forces Commander South East dated 19 September 1941 that "165 bandits" had been shot there. Thus it could not have been a reprisal measure. Should therefore Field Marshal List have gained knowledge of this report - a point to be proved by the prosecution - he had to assume and could assume that these people were shot either in combat or after court martial proceedings.
11. In the case Crabovac - Field Marshal List had on 9 October 1941 criticized the fact that a peasant who had made statements about the sawing off of telegraph poles had been dismissed too soon. The record of the interrogation which was submitted, shows inequivocally that the peasant in question was examined only in a superficial manner. Had the interrogation been more thorough, clues as to the perpetrators would probably have been found.
When at a later date General Boehme ordered that in reprisal for acts of sabotage every fifth house should be burned down, this order constituted an action which was not carried out. For the further reports from General Boehme dated 14 and 20 October 1941 prove that fighting developed around Grabovac and that the troops were fired at from that village. That alone is the reason why Grabovac was destroyed in the course of the fighting and why a number of inhabitants were shot. Besides, the report from General Boehme of 14 October 1941 would not longer have come to the knowledge of Field Marshal List since he had relinquished his position on 15 October 1941.
12. There are yet a few other incidents to be discussed which took place in Greece.
They concern the measures taken by the 164th Infantry Division. The prosecution documents show that in September and even more so in October 1941 Greek partisans had attacked various occupation troops with fire arms.
In the course of the German countermeasures fighting repeatedly took place with the insurgents.
In the course of the first fight, which took place on 12 September 1941, four Greeks were shot. They were, however, shot in combat; in the same sentence mention is made of "wounded" Greeks.
In the course of the second encounter, on 29 September 1941, 27 Greeks were shot "some of them while escaping, others while attempting to offer resistance". They too were killed in combat which obviates any adverse interpretation.
On 17, 20, and 23 October 1941 troops of the 164th Infantry Division burned down some villages. According to the reports the men were shot, the women and children were resettled at other localities. These villages had served the partisans as strong-points and German troops had been fired at from them. When the villages were burnt, "hidden ammunition" exploded, according to the reports, in every house.
There is nothing in the reports to indicate that these actions originated from orders of superior command agencies, much less from orders of the Armed Forces Commander South East. It is true that Field Marshal List's order of 5 September 1941 was sent also to the Commander Solonike - Aegean. But it is by no means certain that he passed it on to the 164th Infantry Division. Against that speaks the fact that the order of 5 September 1941, as can be seen from the preamble and from the entire balance of its contents, was issued for the Serbian area exclusively. Above all I should like to draw attention to Paragraph 1 section 2.
"The Commander Serbia and Corps 65 are therefore to make all preparations immediately..."
If, therefore, in all of these cases the troop commanders in Greece took stringent measures, it cannot be said that their actions originated in the order of Field Marshal List. That can also be seen from the activity report of the 164th Division in which the Division itself states that at its order more energetic measures are being taken against these villages.
Summary Court Martial proceedings did take place. Emphasis ought to be placed on the fact that the population which had thanked the German troops for freeing it from the robber bands, actively supported the fight against the partisans and cheered "shouting loudly and gesticulating" when the judgment of the Summary Court Martial was explained. Now I have yet to deal with the treatment of the Jews during the time that Field Marshal List was in the Balkans.
The prosecution claims that they were arbitrarily arrested and systematically murdered, and that Field Marshal List knew all that and approved it.
What had been proved?
A report dated 5 July 1941 which has been submitted states that among other things three Jews were shot in connection with explosives discovered. In a report from the Commander Serbia to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast dated 17 September 1941 it says that "parts of the male Jewish population of Belgrade were taken in the transit camp near Belgrade".
According to a third report dated 26 September 1941 Jews were arrested at and around Smederowo. These reports dating from the time of Field Marshal List's tenure constitute the basis for the assertion of the prosecution that the Armed Forces in the Southeast were active against the Jews and that Field Marshal List approved of and ordered these measures. If according to the report of 5 July 1941, a number of communists and Jews were shot "in connection" with explosives which had been found, it must be assumed that they had participated in the preparation of acts of sabotage. The fact that Jews actually participated in acts of sabotage or in some cases instigated them is proved by the report of 27 July 1941. Even the report of 17 September 1941 which has been quoted by the prosecution mentions only that parts of the male Jewish population of Belgrade had been taken to the transit camp near Belgrade.
Presumably those parts of the Jewish population were concerned which either had participated in hostile actions directed against the occupation power or were suspected to have participated in such. This is most plainly shown by the report of 26 September 1941. In this report it is expressly mentioned that Jews were arrested. In other words not all Jews but only those who had instigated the insurrection.
Field Marshal List could not have received the report of 27 July 1941 if for no other reason than because at that time he was on leave. Whether or not he was informed of the other reports regarding the treatment of Jews has not been proven. But even if this should be the case, it would not warrant the conclusion that the Armed Forces persecuted the Jews at the order or with the approval of Field Marshal List. The Jewish question in the light of a racial problem was of no interest whatsoever for the Armed Forces in the Balkans. The Jews, as can be seen from numerous affidavits, were during Field Marshal List's tenure free to move as they pleased. No restrictions were imposed on them. On the contrary, various members of the staff of Field Marshal List were living with Jewish families, and Jewish business men were considered when the Army placed contracts. If at that time Jews happened to be arrested or if any measures were taken against them, this was not done for racial reasons but exclusively because they had participated in the insurrection or were sufficiently suspected of such participation.
To persecute the Jews in any manner would have been contrary to the basic principles of Field Marshal List. Much proof has been brought to show this. Also the letter from Rosenberg to Bormann and the other documents about the activities of the Special Detachment Rosenberg show in no manner that Field Marshal List took part in any anti--Jewish activities or ordered such.
In the first place it is not even certain whether or not Rosenberg's letter was written and sent off at all. It is quite possible that all we have is a draft which was never sent off just because it contained certain erroneous statements.
In this alleged letter Rosenberg tried to justify himself against attacks by the SD and/or the Reich Security Main Office. In order to settle this conflict, Rosenberg approached Bormann, the strong man of the party, and, abusing the name of Field Marshal List, he made assertions which had nothing in common with reality. For, at the time when Rosenberg could have written this alleged letter Field Marshal List did not hold command authority in Belgrade.
Therefore Rosenberg's colleagues could not have been operating in Belgrade in agreement with Field Marshal List. Also the other assertion that Field Marshal List would establish accord with the SD has been made up. No such discussions or agreements in which Field Marshal List took part ever occurred.
All that Field Marshal List did was that at the beginning of the Balkan campaigns he once received Lieutenant von Ingram, the man in charge of Special Detachment Rosenberg, who had come to report to him. But the only reason that he received Ingram was that in the Western campaign he had been decorated with the Knight's Cross. On that occasion Field Marshal List expressly requested him to carry out his tasks in an honorable manner.
This Special Detachment Rosenberg was a small group of a few soldiers (approximately 5 to 10) and not, as the prosecution would have it, some kind of specialized unit. This detachment had the assignment to search State-owned libraries, archives of church authorities. Free Mason Lodges, and Jewish associations for subervise material. How limited their powers were becomes evident from the fact that they could not carry out even confiscations. If the Commander Saloniki-Aegean reported on 29 July 1941 that the Special Detachment Rosenberg had started on the "campaign against the Jews", this can only be understood to mean that it started on its activities amongst the archives; and the fact that the same detachment was detailed to the Commander Southern Greece on 2 October 1941 meant that the detachment had concluded its work amongst the archives of Saloniki and started to do the same things in Athens. Had it been an activity directed against the Jews themselves, a change in their situation would have occurred. That however, was not the case. The connection between the "Kommando Rosenberg" and Wehrmacht agencies was of a purely economic and disciplinary nature and existed only to the extent that members of this "Kommando" had been drafted for military service. Military commands had not authority whatever to issue orders or directives with respect to the execution of the "Kommando's" assignment.
The "Sonderkommando (Special Kommando) Rosenberg" did not, accordingly, have the slightest connection with the persecutions of the Jews. Hence, all the adverse conclusions drawn by the prosecution with respect to Field Marshal List in this connection are incorrect.
This concludes my recital of the facts relating to Field Marshal List's activity on the Balkan peninsula inasfar as they have been at issue in this trial.
Your Honors!
I have already submitted to you that, on 15 Oct. Field Marshal List, having fallen seriously ill, finished his duties on the Balkan peninsula, was operated on 17 Oct. and had to undergo medical treatment for several months thereafter.
When, in the early months of 1942, he had fully recuperated, he did not return to the Southeastern Theater.
Whereas the fact that Field Marshal List received no decoration at the conclusion of the Balkan campaign and that, throughout his illness, Hitler never once inquired after his health, did indicate the existence of tensions, the fact that field Marshal List was not reassigned as Armed Forces Commander Southeast is the most telling evidence that Hitler was dissatisfied with his conduct of affairs. Field Marshal List's repeated objections to the measures demanded of him had caused Hitler not to give him any other assignment.
If Keitel on 24 April 1942 wrote in his appraisal of Field Marshal List that the latter had distinguished himself as Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army and Armed Forces Commander Southeast and enjoyed the unbounded confidence of the Fuehrer, it must be understood that Keitel's judgment was intended to persuade Hitler in favor of Field Marshal List. This is also evident from a remark made by Keitel to Field Marshal List that he, Keitel, had to straighten out List's case just as he had to straighten out Hoeppner's case. General Hoeppner had fallen into disgrace with Hitler on account of his resistance and had been demoted from the rank of General to that of an enlisted man.
To carry out an offensive operation, a new army group command had to be established in the southern sector of the Eastern Front in the middle of 1942. General Halder, then Chief of the Army General Staff, suggested Field Marshal List as Commander-in-Chief of this army group. It was only after General Halder had repeatedly urged the appointment that Hitler decided to assign Field Marshal List to command this army group. He did so, as General Halder has stated, "reluctantly" and only because he needed Field Marshal List, an expert in mountain warfare, for this particularly difficult assignment.
On 7 July 1942, Field Marshal List took over elements of the von Bock Army Group as a new Army Group "A" in the southern sector of the Eastern front. His assignment was purely operational.
Just as Field Marshal List could have had no knowledge of the Commisar order during his Balkan assignment --
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The copy I have here seems to be incomplete. That is as far as it goes. Very well, I have a copy now.
DR. LATERNSER: I shall start on page 186 at the top.
Just as Field Marshal List could have had no knowledge of the Commisar order during his Balkan assignment this order had not come to the Southeast - he did not learn about this order while on the Eastern Front. The Commissar order was issued more than a year prior to his appointment. As List's assumption of office as Chief Commander took place in the middle of an operation and the von Bock Army Group had only handed over the most urgent papers and only such files as pertained to the operations in hand, the new Army Group "A" had no records whatever to show that the commissar order had been transmitted to subordinate commands. Neither, did incoming reports received by Army Group "A" supply any indication that any importance whatsoever was attached to the commissar order. Hence Field Marshal List at that time had no occasion to institute any investigations. There was all the less reason for that since the Commander-in-Chief had to deal exclusively with operational matters in immensely vast areas and was not concerned with territorial tasks in the areas occupied by the armies.
The commanders of the rear army areas did not report to the Army Group on any incidents of this kind within their areas. Thus, Field Marshal List could not have obtained knowledge of the prosecution document on the shooting of Politruk Kalaba and Commissar Mahala. Hence no responsibility attaches to him for the enforcement of the commissar order in the east.
In the course of the operations, grave differences arose between Field Marshal List and Hitler. Hitler had ordered Field Marshal List to lead an attack with some of his forces across the Caucasus making for the Black Sea. As this attack would not have had the success desired by Hitler, but, on the other hand, would have been certain sure to have jeopardized the German attackers in the most irresponsible fashion. Field Marshal List opposed the execution of this order. Because of the latter's objections voiced orally, by telephone, and through the personal agency of General Jodl, Hitler finally dropped his original plan. On the following day, however, Field Marshal Keitel arrived and told List that he, List, no longer enjoyed Hitler's confidence. He was to resign his command of Army Group "A".
On 9 September 1942 Field Marshal List resigned the Command- inChief of Army Group "A" and on the following day returned by plane to Germany.
If the prosecution blames Field Marshal List for not having resigned as early as September 1941 after his remonstration against the OKW directives, dated 16 Sept. 41, had failed, the following ought to be said:
Conditions in the fall of 1942 were very different from those in September 1941. In 1942 the point at issue was an operational order on which Field Marshal List, being Commander-in-Chief of an Army Group was in a position to and even bound to comment. In this case he was able to put forward weighty military reasons against Hitler's order.
Apart from that, there is a fundamental difference, owing to the fact that, in the fall of 1942, Hitler requested Field Marshal List to relinquish his command. A resignation against Hitler's will would have been impossible for Field Marshal List even in the Fall of 1942 because of the ban on resignations.
After only 2 months in office, Field Marshal List relinquished the command over Army Group "A" in September 1942. Thus his military activity was finally terminated.
Although it was painful for him no longer to be able to serve his country, to which he had devoted his life's work, in the most difficult of all struggles, yet his inner antagonism to Hitler and National Socialism, which became more and more apparent, greatly helped in relieving his anguish.
From that time on, every contact with Hitler ceased. Field Marshal List never requested to be reassigned, nor did he address a message of devotion to Hitler on the occasion of the plot on the latter's life on 20 July 1944.
V.
Your Honors:
When, in your appraisal of the established facts of this case, you seek to determine the extent to which the prosecution's assertions have been substantiated, I would ask you always to bear in mind the fact that Field Marshal List was the predominantly operational leader of an entire theater of war comprising several countries.
Field Marshal List's position on the Balkan peninsula is comparable to that of a Head of State, and it would not occur to anybody to hold a Head of State criminally responsible for all the acts of his subjects. The position of the American General Clay affords another point of comparison. Let us for the sake of completeness assume that the Commander General of the American Zone in Austria were subordinate to General Clay and we have, approximately, the same relationship as that existing between Field Marshal List and the Commanding General for Serbia. You can see from these comparisons how untenable the position taken by the prosecution really is.
In drawing such comparisons, you will also gain the correct criteria as to the knowledge that Field Marshal List may be presumed to have had of all the events on the Balkan peninsula. As for all the reports and statements not directed to his command, he could not have had knowledge of them, and of the reports that were sent to his command he could only know such as were reported or submitted to him, because you cannot, prima facie assume that the Supreme Commander of a theater of war takes personal cognizance of all incoming reports. The corollary implied by these considerations is, I submit, that the burden of proof for an asserted knowledge rests on the prosecution. You can hold a Commander-in-Chief responsible for acts and actions occuring in such a vast area only inasmuch as and insofar as he either ordered their commission or conived at them.
Only by applying these principles, will you arrive at a conclusion that will do justice to the position held by Field Marshal List at the time.
1.
Court I of the Indictment charges Field Marshal List with participation in war crimes and crimes against humanity, which are alleged to have consisted in the murder of large parts of the civilian population in the Balkan peninsula, a plan for terrorizing them, executions of hostages and alleged executions of a 100 Serbs and 20 Communists.
Against these charges I state:
a) Field Marshal List never issued orders for the killing of parts of the civilian population or of individuals. Inasfar as civilians were killed, it was a matter of executing rebels. Although they could have been summarily dealt with, as Prof. Taylor explicitly remarks, the German Wehrmacht had orders that they were only to be executed after they had been found guilty by a court martial or summary court martial. I have supplied ample evidence on this point.
Field Marshal List could act on this basis.
b) No plan existed to terrorize or deter the population. The terror order of 23 July was no applicable to the Balkans; it was valid only for the east, as its contents show very clearly.
c) The shooting of hostages was not based on orders by Field Marshal List, but instead on the OKW order of 16 September and the order by General Boehme of 10 October 1941. I have previously stated that the OKW order is a direct order to subordinate agencies which Field Marshal List did not pass on, since it was sent through direct channels, but which he did mitigate within the scope of his possibilities, whereas he was no longer in a position to learn of Boehme's order.
d) The alleged shooting of 100 Serbs was in actual fact never carried out, the announcement was made merely as a deterrent. (This concerns Par. 5a. No evidence has been submitted for the alleged carrying out of the shootings. Apart from this, the 2nd Army was not under the command of Field Marshal List.
e) I have previously commented on the case of Rtany.
This case was never known to Field Marshal List.
f) The ten-day report (par. 5c) covering the period from 20 - 30 October 1941 could not longer reach Field Marshal List's knowledge due to his leaving prior to that date.1) The balance of the statements contained in Count 1 of the Indictment do not concern Field Marshal List in view of the time factor involved.
2.
According to Count II of the Indictment, Field Marshal List is to have participated in the war crimes of plundering and looting, the despoiling and retarding of the economic and industrial potential, and in the destruction of towns and villages, particularly in the plains of Drina, in the bend of the Sava river, and in the Valjevo district.
By way of contradiction I maintain:
a) The Prosecution has not submitted adequate evidence for the existence of the alleged crimes of plunder, looting, and weakening of the economic potentional. The Rosenberg detachment, which was active in the Balkans, did not have the task of plundering and looting, but merely to secure documents and material which was damaging to the State, as the prosecution documents show. The Wehrmacht could not possibly have been interested in weakening the economic potential, but on the contrary, merely in strengthening it.
b) In his order of 5 September 19413), Field Marshal List merely indicated the possibility of burning down villages which had participated in certain actions. I have previously shown that this act was one admissable under international law. In no case has the prosecution offered evidence for the wanton destruction of villages, which alone is punishable according to Control Counsel Law No. 10.
c) In no case did Field Marshal List order or consent to punitive expeditions.
3.
In Count III of the Indictment Field Marshal List is charged with having passed on the order of the 2 Army of 28 April 1941, the commissar order, the terror order, as well as with having had a consenting part in the alleged shooting of 2100 Jugoslav Prisoners of war (par 12d), in the order of General Boehme not to grant a pardon (par 12e), and in the arrest of relatives of members of the Jugoslav National Army.
In view of these charges I contend:
a) Field Marshal List can not be charged with the order of the 2 Army of 28 April 1941, since this Army was not under his Command.
b) Field Marshal List at no time received or passed on the Commissar order; the prosecution has not produced any evidence to substantiate this charge.
c) The terror order was not sent to the Balkan Theater of war; it applied to the East only; this fact becomes apparent from the contents of the order.
d) 449 arrestees, not 2100 Jugoslav prisoners of war, were shot by way of reprisal as a consequence of the Topola incident. The partisans were those who shot German prisoners and wounded near Topola. The reprisal measures were based on an express order of the OKW, of which Field Marshal List might have possibly learned. The prosecution has not proved, however, that he did. Field Marshal List does not recall it, and there are not indications concerning this order in his daily notes.
e) The prosecution has not submitted an order by General Boehme to the effect that members of the National Jugoslav Army were not to be pardoned; therefore, this order has not been proved to exist. The order of General Boehme concerning negotiations with the insurgents dated 8 October 1941 only mentions insurgents and franctireurs. It was not sent to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Therefore, Field Marshal List would only have been in a position to observe the effects of this order from reports which were available to him.
Those consequences, however, could not be ascertained from an order of 8 October 1941 until 15 October 1941 - the day when Field Marshal List left the service, so that this order can not be charged against Field Marshal List.
f) Field Marshal List could also not have had knowledge of the order by General Boehme of 14 October to arrest relatives of the partisans the prosecution calls them: members of the Jugoslav Army of Liberation. This order was not sent to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast for information purposes. But even if this would have been the case, Field Marshal List could not have gained knowledge because of his leaving the service.
4.
According to Count IV of the Indictment Field Marshal List is said to have participated in war crimes consisting of: internment of inhabitants in concentration camps, in particular the male inhabitants of Sabac and the entire population of the districts south of Mitrovica and Ravnje in the concentration camp Zasaviza, the shooting to death of 2200 Jews in the concentration camp Belgrade, and in compulsory labor employment. Against this I maintain:
a) The internment of members of the population regarded as suspects is admissable under international law -- and this is also general practice. If documents of that time mention concentration camps, then this refers to collecting or internment camps by the troops in the sense of the internment camps which even nowadays exist. The remark by Field Marshal List in his order of 5 September refers only to such collecting camps. The concentration camps in the notorious sense did not yet exist at that time. By a letter dated 22 June 1941 the Serbian Minister of the Interior was directed by Turner to set up a so-called concentration camp. The establishment of this first camp, therefore, was ordered at a time when Serbia did not yet belong to the area of command of Field Marshal List.
b) The Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, Boehme, ordered on 23 September, on the occasion of the evacuation of Sabac, the establishment of a concentration camp into which the arrestees from the prisoner collecting camps were to be transferred.
This order went by teletype to the 342nd Division which was in charge of the evacuation of Sabac, but only for information purposes; that is by letter to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. The evacuation was scheduled by an order dated 23 September suddenly for 24 September; any interference by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, therefore, was impossible because the evacuation had already been completed before the Armed Forces Commander even heard about this incident. However, he intervened with an order of 4 October which directed a far reaching mitigation. By his order the arrested persons were released after their interrogation.
c) With the order of 22 September the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, Boehme, ordered the mopping-up of the Save bend and the transfer of the arrested persons to prisoner collecting points and later to concentration camps. The further order by General Boehme for the evacuation of the Save bend dated 25 September which ordered the forcing of the population to the south into the Cer mountains, was submitted to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast for information. That was the first thing Field Marshal List learned of the intended evacuation of the Save bend. He immediately intervened against forcing of the population into the Cer mountains.
The camp Jarak, too, originated from an order by the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. This order never reached the Armed Forces Commander Southeast and so he could not have had any knowledge of this matter. The camp was turned over to the police by order of 27 September.
d) The camp Zasaviza was to be set up according to an order by General Boehme. From par. 2 of this order it becomes quite clear that this was not to be a concentration camp but a camp which was to be made adjacent to the locality of Zasaviza. As to the report by the Chief of the Security Police and the SD of 9 October, this again concerns this very camp, which, according to the report, was to be considerably extended. The establishment of the camp, however, did not take place because its rebuilding was stopped by an order dated 28 October of the Commanding General in Serbia in view of the fact that the terrain was swampy.
e) The alleged shooting to death of 2200 Jews in the Belgrade concentration camp was not carried out. This incident is identical with the retaliation measures caused by the attack near Topola, which were not based on an order by Field Marshal List and which had been carried out before he could have gained knowledge about them.
f) Field Marshal List did not issue any orders for compulsory labor employment; neither did the Prosecution furnish any proof in this respect.
With that, I have discussed all the Counts in the Indictment under which Field Marshal List has been charged, on the basis of the evidence. May it please the Tribunal!
This exposition has shown that the charges of the prosecution against Field Marshal List lack all foundation; how senseless however, these accusations really are becomes particularly clear after a brief consideration of his personality.
As early as the first World War Field Marshal List held various positions in the General Staff owing to his abilities in military matters and by virtue of his human qualities. During the time of the Weimar Republic, his superior knowledge enabled him to continue with his military career. After serving with the troops and with various staffs Lieutenant Colonel List, as he was then, was appointed to the Ministry of Defense where he was put in charge of the Department for Army Training. In 1930, Grosner, who was then Defense Minister, appointed him commander of the one and only Infantry School, at Dresden, that is, to a position which was entrusted only to men of particularly strong character and of superior personality. In that connection, he was given the special job of counteracting the spread of National Socialist idealogy among the young ensigns.
When Hitler took over the government in 1933, Field Marshal List, setting aside all misgivings, decided not to leave his responsible post as Commander of the Infantry School in order to be able, in this important position, to exert his influence against all National Socialists political excesses and attempts to overstep authority.
It was not personal ambition of National Socialist leanings which prompted Field Marshal List in his further actions; rather it was the consciousness that in this way he could best serve his Fatherland.
That his attitude towards National Socialism did not change was shown clearly in July 1934. After the Boehm putsch, Field Marshal List sharply objected to the excesses of the SS. Although at that time the anticlerical tendencies of the party became more and more apparent. Field Marshal List true to his conviction openly declared himself then and later a devout Christian and convinced follower of the church. In spite of the difficulties already existing at that time, he also tried to organize spiritual care within the Army and until his resignation he tried to promote it in every possible manner.
Neither officially nor in his social life did he allow himself to be influenced in any manner in his attitude towards the Jewish problem. When, in November 1938, excesses were committed against the Jews, Field Marshal List, in his capacity as Commander of Army Group Headquarters V in Vienna immediately raised sharp objections with the political authorities there and made the dissenting attitude of the Armed Forces abundantly clear.
Also during the Polish campaign he took drastic steps whenever incidents became known to him in which the police and the political agencies had committed excesses. Every time that members of the Armed Forces committed offenses against Jews or other inhabitants of the occupied areas in Poland and France, Field Marshal List punished the guilty men, thus showing where he stood.
A highly developed sense of justice and great awareness of duty caused him in such cases to protect the population rather than to shield his own soldiers. Thus it can be explained that nothing Field Marshal List did while he was active in Poland and France has been raised against him.
It was owing to the humane principles of Field Marshal List that the campaign against Jugoslavia and Greece was carried on in a chivalrous manner and that nothing was destroyed unless absolutely necessary.
Could any Army commander have acted in a more magnanimous manner than Field Marshal List who is a special Army Order particularly mentioned the bravery of his enemies and dismissed all prisoners of war immediately after the cessation of hostilities? Field Marshal List also did everything in his power for the civilian population of Greece in order to find a solution for the food problem and to give assistance in every other respect.
All these examples show unequivocably that some of the most prominent characteristics of Field Marshal List were the way in which he cared for people, his benevolence, and kindness of heart, coupled with a sense of responsibility.
In view of all this evidence, does it not appear positively absurd that a man like Field Marshal List should have pursued a plan to terrorize and decimate the population of the Balkans? How could one explain such a sudden change in his entire attitude and ideology?
I believe that this exposition will be sufficient to show what to think of the allegations of the prosecution. Not Field Marshal List and not the German troops were responsible for the drastic measures but the politically incited partisans which started fighting the occupation power in the most insidious manner. All measures against them therefore bear the stamp of unavoidable military necessity.
May it please the Tribunal I now come to the final evaluation of the case:
Through the development of the situation in the Balkans after the beginning of the Russian campaign, Field Marshal List was faced with a number of legal questions, scarcely any of which could be given an unequivocal answer. Here, the sins of the past became evident, in that no clear and exhaustive legal rules were created for martial occupation. The League of Nations is just as responsible for this sin of neglect as was the Hague Peace Conference before it. It should have been one of the most urgent tasks of the associations of international law to create clarity in this important sphere of law, but it was neglected, as were so many other things. Nothing shows more clearly the incomplete and defective regulation of this matter than the situation concerning international law which has developed since the end of the second world war on the territory of the former German Reich! Because how would it be possible for each of the occupation powers to administrate its zone on different principles, if the law of martial occupation were governed by clear, positive principles?
Events since 1945 have brought home to every intelligent man in the world the truth of the fact that scarcely one single sphere of international law is so defective as this one. Those men from the great Western nations with a sense of responsibility have drawn therefrom the only possible conclusion, namely that to remedy this condition an occupation statute must be created. It is in the nature of things for the corresponding conclusions also to be drawn from the case in question, and for it to be recognized that Field Marshal List, as all the other German commanders assigned to a German occupied country was faced with a sphere of law full of deficiencies and obscurities.