Such was the situation which the German commanders faced in Jugoslavia and Greece, but never has such a situation been faced by a commander of the opposing parties.
The German people did not obey the appeal of their government to form the "Werewolf", and nevertheless the fear that such illegal forces of resistance might become active was sufficient to evoke a threat that punishment should be meted out at a ratio of 1 to 200 and very minor reasons led to the killing of German hostages at a ratio of 1 to 4, as has been the case at Markdorf and Reutlingen. The fact that the American Army did not face a situation in which it would have had to carry out executions of hostages, since the German civilian population did not participate in the fighting, does not prove that such measures are inadmissible on principle. The threats which were issued in accordance with Article 358d of the American Military Manual prove the opposite. Nor can in this connection the general indignation evinced by the killing of two British soldiers by the Irgun followers be cited. This action occurred in retaliation for the execution of two Irgun followers who had been sentenced to death by a court, and therefore was undoubtedly not a permissible reprisal measure.
In my Opening Statement I stressed the somewhat unusual conditions in the Balkans which are the result of the geographical and ethnic situation there.
An Allied commander at no time had to face a situation such as the defendants had to cope with in Jugoslavia and in Greece, and at no time have soldiers of the Allied forces had to deal with enemy who fought so cunningly. Field Marshal List was asked on cross examination whether he believed that the people of the Balkans were in anyway different from those in the Western nations, whether for instance they were more cruel.
I should like to supplement the answer he gave then by quoting from the introduction to a book written by an expert on the Balkans, Miss Edith Durhan, an English woman. The book is called The Slav Danger, 20 Years of Balkan Memories, and, I quote:
"The reader enters an almost unknown new country, which often appears to us as a remainder of medieval days, inhabited by passionate and violent people . . . . . . conspiracies, fanatism, intrigues, lust for power, and above all, blood....."1) The population of the Balkans has achieved a way of living which is entirely different from that of the actual European cultural area; their passions are different, so are their impetuosity, their stubborness, and cruelty.
There have always been there, and there particularly, all sorts of illegal fighters, from the common robber to the vendettist son and grandson, from the religious fanatic to the band leader and all sorts of underground movement.
90 years ago the British report about the march of the Turks who had been atrociously mutilated by the Montenegrans after the battle of Grahevo and who were on their way home, near Korfu, startled all of Europe in stark horror.
35 years ago, yet another report was taken notice of everywhere. At that time, 1913, after the war in the Balkans, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sent a mixed commission for the investigation of war atrocities to the Balkans. The report of the commission shows through a glance at merely the table of contents such words as "Extermination.
................
The Massacre of Donate.......
The Massacre and Conflagration of Serres" On Page 79 and the following pages of this report we find pictures of destructions and massacres in Macedonia, Turks, Serbs, and Greeks had a share in them, partly also Bulgarians.
Pages 96 and 98 show Greek propaganda prints. In glaring colors one of these prints shows a Greek Evzone, a soldier of the guards.(*), who is about to overpower a Bulgarian and bite his face; the other print shows an Evzone, who in the middle of a battlefield, while the battle is raging, is putting out the eyes of a Bulgarian, with blood pouring down! The International Carnegie Commission put on record, amongst others, the following statements of Greek soldiers, showing the effect of such advocated cruelty:
"These soldiers all state that they everywhere burned the Bulgarian villages. Two boast of the massacre of prisoners of war. One remarks that all the girls they met with were violated. Most the letters dwell on the slaughter of noncombatants, including women and children."
"Here we are burning the villages and killing the Bulgarians, both women and children."
'We picked out their eyes (five Bulgarian prisoners) while they were still alive."
"The letters relieve us of the task of summing of the evidence. From Kukush to the Bulgarian frontier the Greek army devastated the villages, violated the women and slaughtered the noncombatant men."
In the cruel destructions of those days the hatred of all against all found an outlet.
The Serbs have at all, times been regarded as cruel and malicious fighters, regardless of what good characteristics they might otherwise possess. Of their five kings of the last 80 years, three were murdered.
Miss Durhan describes in her Balkan memories events of 1912:
"From the occupied territory pitiful reports arrived about the atrocious cruelties committed by the Serbs as well as by Montenegrans against the Albanian populations, and the conquerers boasted of their brave deeds, instead of trying to withhold them. A Serbian officer almost choked with laughter over his glass of beer, when he related how his people in Ljuma bayonetted women and children."
The persecution's assertion concerning the extensive evidence of the defense about the Jugoslav and Greek atrocities, namely that this evidence does not become any more credible through constant repetition, can hardly be applied to the aforementioned reports.
The Balkans have been, unlike any other part of Europe, a source of explosive action, of latent unrest, of partisan fights. Jugoslavia and Greece threatened to degenerate into complete chaos when the explosive passion of the population was incited to fight against the German Occupation army.
The defendants as German Military Commanders had a twofold task in that particular situation: to protect their troops and to hold the Balkans, which the prosecution itself has called the Achilles' heel of the German front. For three years they carried out this task. They, however, had to use harsh means in order to counter all attempts at insurrection.
I have only very little to say now concerning the reprisal and hostage problem. Apart from the demand for ratios, which I have discussed previously, other rules have been laid in order to restrict the latitude of those parties which take reprisal measures. The American Professor Foulke calls all of them "merely an expression of opinion and of little practical value.
Restrictions for the carrying out of reprisal measures can only exist in accordance with their nature as coercive means in connection with the principle of military necessity.
Why should it be necessary under conditions prevailing in Jugoslavia and in Greece to inform the partisans of the names, addresses, etc., of those persons kept as security hostages, when the forces of resistance were informed by announcements and posters concerning the fact that hostages or so-called "reprisal prisoners" would be used as live pawns?
Paragraph 358d of the American Field Manual merely demands a statement that security hostages, where and when necessary, would be used in reprisal. The Manual which was available to the German Military Commanders for informational purposes, the semi-official commentary by Waltzog Rules of Land Warfare (1942) gave somewhat more detailed instructions in this particular:
"The hostages are detained in a sort of security custody. They guarantee with their lives the lawful conduct of the opponent. When taking hostages, it has to be announced, according to unwritten international law (common law), that hostages were arrested and for what purpose. Above all, the taking of hostages and the threat to kill them has to reach the knowledge of those parties, against the lawful conduct of which the hostages are a guarantee.
"If the very act occurs, for the prevention of which hostages were taken, and if the opponent continues his conduct in violation of international law, the hostages may be killed. The taking of hostages is therefore more than an action depriving a group of people of their liberty. It is beyond that a break with the principle of the respect for the life of the citizen, laid down in Article 46."
These demands have been complied with by the orders in question. I refer particularly to the order of Field Marshal List dated 4 October 1941 which orders the announcement of the fact, to all persons concerned, that the hostages' lives are at stake.
At times, a territorial connection between the hostages and the preceding action was demanded. However, no reasons can be given for such a demand, not even with Article 50 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare, -as is being attempted occasionally -- because Article 50 does not refer to reprisal measures. From the nature of reprisal measures as coercive measures, a general principle results, which Professor Bonfils has formulated in the following way:
"Reprisals have to be such as not to fail to impress those who are the authors and instigators of the excess in question."
Territorial connection between hostages and perpetrators might have played a part in earlier days when acts of resistance and sabotage against the occupation forces mostly emanated from a limited circle of persons. However, it was of no importance, whatsoever, in Jugoslavia and Greece where the resistance activity emanated from forces which reached beyond all local frontiers. In such a situation only the spiritual connection between hostages and perpetrators could be taken into account, such as it becomes apparent from the membership in or support of the illegal resistance forces, or merely from the fact of a common national basis.
With reference to the authority for the ordering of reprisal measures, the following should be stated:
There existed a regulation in the German army to the effect that only a senior commander waste decide the fate of hostages -- as a rule a division commander. There is, however, no rule in the laws of war to this effect. This is expressly stated in the British Military Manual.
The German regulation was valid only for such length of time as the opponent adhered to it also. Since according to the American Rules of Land Warfare, a subordinate commander can order on his own responsibility proper reprisal measures, in urgent cases of military necessity, no conclusions can be drawn from the fact that German troop commanders have supposedly acted in the same way.
Two further forms of reprisal measures are at issue in this trial: the use of so-called preventative or security hostages, particularly for the protection of railway traffic, and the destruction of houses and localities as a means of reprisal.
The use of railway hostages was discussed at great length when the Germans in 1870/71 in France and the British during the South African war made use of this means. It is the achievement of Professor Hyde to have analyzed the principles of the problem in an objective manner, after Professor Oppenheim had stated that the use of railway hostages is permissible. The legality of the measures depends entirely on the status of the persons against whom they are directed. Professor Speight states:
"If, therefore, one confines one's remarks to a district in which there is no possibility of damage done to the line having been effected by the enemy's, raiding parties or in which such raiding parties could not achieve their purpose without the inhabitants assistance or connivance.......I held that no objection arises under the laws and customs of war to the carrying of hostages on trains."
Since in Jugoslavia and Greece -- as I have developed -- legal combatants of the enemy did not exist at all after the capitulation and every possibility of legal resistance was eliminated, the use of security hostages was a measure permissible under international law.
The considerations raised in Article 463 of the British Military Manual against their use, could not be of any practical significance under the conditions prevailing in Jugoslavia and Greece.
Where the destruction of enemy property, houses and localities is concerned, a difference will have to be made between measures which are necessary in connection with military operations and measures carried out from a reprisal aspect. The laws of war permit them in both instances.
In general, the Laws of War do permit the destruction of enemy property if warranted by Military necessity.
The history of war provides numerous instances in support of the thesis that viewed under this aspect, in guerilla fighting and in the event of insurrections, the systematic destruction of towns and villages is sanctioned as a legitimate resort calculated to deprive the resistance forces of their means of subsistence.
Professor Oppenheim states:
"But the fact that a general devastation can be lawful in case of a leve en masse on already occupied territory, when selfpreservation obliges a belligerent to resort to the most severe measures, must be admitted. It is also lawful, when after the defeat of his main forces and occupation of his territory, an enemy disperses his remaining forces into small bands which carry on guerilla tactics and receive food and information, so that there is not hope of ending the war except by general devastation which cuts off supplies of every kind from the guerilla bands."
During the Boer War, the British very largely availed themselves of such measures. The country was laid waste and wide as a means of cutting off the supplies of the Guerilla forces. At the same time the civilian population was interned in "'concentration camps' with the result of serious loss of life."
In this connection Professor Spaight states that Lord Kitchoner carried out this policy of devastation with a systematic thoroughness that seemed liked barbarity to some, but was amply warranted by the peculiar nature of the war.
The American scholar, Professor Hershey, also things that devastation and destruction, even of a town are permissible in the face of a threatened insurrection of its inhabitants, or if directed against guerilla forces in order to cut off their supplies.
Destructions are permissible as reprisals against unlawful acts of the population or against unlawful combatants, nor need a direct connection with military operations be established in such cases. When one of Sheridan's officers was murdered in October 1874. General Sheridan had all the houses within a radius of 5 miles burnt down.
Professor Fenwick states:
"The burning of towns and villages has been a common form of retaliation."
Professor Cobbet also classes the destruction of localities or houses as among the permissible reprisals against crimes committed there or in their proximity.
In the same way, Professor Holland states that such measures are not uncommon.
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht comments:
"Art. 50 does not prevent the burning by way of reprisals of villages or even towns for a treacherous attack committed there on enemy's soldiers by unknown individuals."
In accordance with the general practice of belligerents and authorative opinion on international law, the U.S. Rules of Land Warfare also describe reprisals consisting in the burning down of houses and villages as permissible measures.
That such measures had also to be resorted to in Jugoslavia and Greece is only natural, considering the extent of unlawful partisan activity in these countries and the methods of warfare practiced by the partisans.
I propose to conclude my legal arguments on the problem of reprisals by once again pointing out the most significant fact in this case:
Neither in Jugoslavia nor in Greece were there any longer any lawful resistance forces after the conclusion of the campaign and the surrender of the Jugoslav government and the Jugoslav and Greek armies, there were only unlawful combatants, war rebels. The more fact of organizing these resistance forces and the establishment of partisan formations constituted war rebellion. This alone entitled the German commanders to resort to acts of suppression and reprisals independent of any individual crimes committed by the resistance forces against German troops. The extent of and danger inherent in, the resistance forces very largely determined the scale of the reprisal measures. The latter, though usually provoked by individual acts of resistance, were naturally directed against the illegal resistance as a whole of which individual acts were merely tokens.
1. Within the realm of international law, the plea of superior orders - with respect to war crimes - has always received a different treatment from that accorded to it within the sphere of domestic criminal law.
2. In accordance with a recognized rule of the customs of war, the plea of superior orders, at any rate at the time at which the events at issue in this case occurred, was regarded as a full justification in relation to war crimes.
Professor Lauterpacht has expressed his as follows:
"It is an interesting gloss on the complexity of the problem that in the United States the plea of superior orders is, on the whole, without decisive effect in internal criminal or constitutional law, although it is apparently treated as a full justification in relation to war crimes." (Underlining added.)
It is certain, moreover, that both the well-known comment of Professor Oppenheim -, and that of the American author Manner - as well as the provisions of the Military Manuals of the United States and Great Britain, in the version which was valid until 1944, treated the plea of superior orders in its full scope as a justification, a justification, that is, on all levels of the military hierarchy and not merely applicable to the common soldier or enlisted man.
Even Professor Glueck, in his treaties on the ambiguity of the wording in paragraph 347, US Rules of Land Warfare, does not seriously dispute it. Neither was this wide scope of the plea of superior orders ever impugned in the discussions of the Interallied Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes at the end of the first World War or in the discussions on Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles.
The subsequent amendment of paragraph 347 of the US Rules of Land Warfare and of paragraph 443 of the British Manual, calculated to render possible the punishment of members of the German Armed Forces who had acted on orders of their government or their superiors, is a manifest violation of the universally recognized axion that no punishment must be based on ex-post - facto laws. Besides the restatement of the provisions in the US Rules of Land Warfare and the British Manual, being acts of domestic legislation, could not amend a recognized rule of international law.
In examining the grounds adduced in support of the amendment, mainly those advanced by Professor Glueck and Professor Lauterpacht to whose initiative the new version of the two regulations is to be attributed, one will find that they are dictated by mere expediency.
The events in Germany after 1933 showed very clearly where the casting oberboard of fundamental principles of law has got us to. No legal system can survive such treatment; neither can international law.
Professor Hyde's comment proves that, even today, eminent foreign lawyers, including American jurists, regard the plea of superior orders as a justification.
Professor Hyde's reference to reprisal measures, quoted below, groves that he views the subject with the same realism he had displayed throughout:
"In land warfare the opportunity for a commanding officer to exorcise discretion in resorting to retaliation is narrow, because such procedure is commonly determined by the highest authorities of the State, and when decided upon, leaves the commander in the field no alternative."
May it Please the Tribunal I attach decisive importance to the statements of Charles Cheney Hyde, Professor at Columbia University and former advisor to the State Department of the United States of America, contained in the 1945 edition of International Law; I submit that these statements are of decisive importance to the case at issue before this Tribunal and, if it please the Tribunal, I commend them to the special attention of the Tribunal.
IV.
Now we turn to the events which are the subject of this trial.
1.
At the conclusion of the campaigns against Poland (September 1939), Denmark-Norway (1940), and France (1940) the following military situation aroses toward the end of 1940.
The bulk of the German army was in France; smaller parts were in the East. As is historically known, in the autumn of 1940 Italy attacked Greece without previous understanding with Germany, and against Hitler's wishes. This campaign took an unfavorable course for Italy. Further serious danger threatened the Italian army with the landing of British forces and the establishment of British air bases on Crete and the Greek mainland. Negotiations concerning this had been taking place for some years between England, France, and Greece.
The British forces in Greece constituted at the same time a threat to the Rumanian oilfields which were vital for Germany, and also a threat to the Reich's communication with the entire Southeast. This danger had to be removed, from the military standpoint, as well. But this was only possible if the British were prevented from remaining in Greece.
And so in November-December 1940 German forces assembled in Rumania. After March 1941 - as the 12th Army - they were transferred to Bulgaria.
Jugoslavia was not threatened by those events. At the end of March 1941 a pact was concluded between Germany and Italy, according to which her neutrality was to be observed to the fullest extent. However, the Jugoslav coup d'etat of 27 March 1941 changed this situation entirely. Through this the very government was removed which had concluded the pact with Germany and Italy a few days previously. During a state celebration organized by the revolutionary government, the German ambassador in Belgrade was publicly jeered at - while the police looked on - the Jugoslav army was openly mobilised and deployed. There was no doubt that the revolution was an act directed against Germany and Italy.
The Commander in Chief of the 13th Army deployed against Greece, Field Marshal Wilhelm List, was surprised by this turn of affairs in Jugoslavia. No provisions at all had been made for such a situation.
When, therefore, the order arrived from the Commander in Chief of the Army to the effect that because of the changed situation Hitler had ordered a simultaneous attack against Greece and Jugoslavia, the previously planned operation against Greece had to be altered, a completely new and formerly unconsidered plan of attack against Jugoslavia had to be drown up, and the deployment for it carried out.
Therefore, the military operation against Jugoslavia was an absolute improvisation.
In this situation a operation directed exclusively against Greece could not be undertaken from a military point of view. Because the long west flank of the 12th Army pushing towards Greece - and its one and only supply road running parallel and close to the boundary of the BulgarianJugoslavian frontier mountains in the Struma Valley - as well as the northern flank of the Italians fighting in Albania against Greeks, would have been exposed to the greatest danger from the unrestrained Jugoslav army. The Jugoslav army would have been able to attack the flank of field Marshal List's 12th Army as well as that of the Italian army in Albania in order to deal the death-blow.
Therefore, as things had developed, the military leaders could neither regard the campaign against Greece nor the campaign against Yugoslavia as an aggressive war.
The very war against Jugoslavia, repeatedly described by the prosecution as "illegal", is from the point of view of a military observer - and this alone is what matters here, because the defendants are, after all, soldiers - a test-case of an unavoidable preventive war, which had become militarily necessary because of political and military events brought about without the slightest participation in the matter by Field Marshal List.
Consequently the Greek army ceased to exist.
The fighting which followed then was only against British forces mainly around the Pass of Thermopylae and the Isthmus of Corinth. The remnants of the British forces, about 10,000 men who could no longer escape by sea, were captured on the southcoast of the Peloponnesus. With this, the whole of Greece was occupied by German troops.
Simultaneously, with the further advance from Salonica, the islands of Lemnos, Mytilene, Chios, and Skiros were occupied.
Crete was taken in May 1941 after heavy fighting. With the occupation of Crete the last possibility for a Greek government and parts of the Creek army to remain on Greek soil was removed.
In the meantime the entire Jugoslav army capitulated on 17 April. An armistice with the Commander in Chief of the 2nd Army, General Field Marshal Freiherr von Weichs was concluded on behalf of the government by Markovic, who traced his authority back to Simonic - who later became chief of the Government in Exile in London.
Both countries were occupied immediately after the campaign, as far as this had not already taken place during the military operations.
I submitted a sketch man to the Tribunal to illustrate the occupation forces at approximately the beginning of June 1941. If forces were withdrawn at the conclusion of the fighting, at the end of April 1941, then this was only done if the remaining troops or the troops brought in to substitute them were sufficient to maintain the occupation. Field Marshal List, it is worth noting, made no protest at the time against the withdrawal of troops, because the situation was such as to allow this.
It was not possible for the defense to give a complete enumeration of all the existing forces in June 1941, since the actual documents for this are missing; a thorough examination of all the files and maps belonging to this theater of war would also have been necessary, even of material not concerned with the subject of this trial. Both time and material however, were lacking for this purpose.
The Tribunal will further see from a large number of reports and orders and the distribution lists contained therein that both countries were overrun with a network of military agencies, whose task was to deal with the business of an occupying power, which task was actually fulfilled.
With this, the occupation of both countries was effective.
If the prosecution disputes this fact -- that the Allies would then have supported a legal insurrection movement and not an illegal one -
then I want to reply to this now, quite briefly, and would like to refer to the question in more detail later on.
I say -- and I don't think this can be refuted:
If the German military forces were sufficient to conquet the armies of Jugoslavia and Greece in a few days, then they were also sufficiently strong to occupy these countries effectively, after the armed forces of the latter were removed.
I think that further explanation here on this subject would be superfluous.
One other thing must be mentioned here to which I would like to draw the particular attention of the Tribunal:
The prosecution has brought no charges of any kind against the method of warfare during the campaign directed by Field Marshal List.
If it had been in a position to do this, I do not doubt that these charges would have been brought.
The campaign was directed chivalrously and according to the old traditional fashion; proof of this was produced in several documents.
ow strange, then, is this fact if, as the prosecution asserts, the purpose of the alleged plan - previously drawn up - was to decimate and terrorise the Balkan peoples and to commit war crimes as if on a conveyor belt!
When was there a better opportunity to carry out such a plan than during the fighting?
When was there a better opportunity to decimate the population by bombing and killing than during the fighting?
And when, finally, was there a better opportunity to lay waste the towns and villages?
The explanation of this apparently remarkable fact is simple:
This alleged plan never existed; it is perhaps a discovery of the prosecution.
COURT NO. V, CASE NO. VII.
Where is there a shadow of a proof of such a montrous plan?
Where is there a document which proves this plan?
Where is the witness who confirms that such a plan existed?
Where is the slighest proof that a man of the background and condition of Field Marshal List ever participated in such a plan.
The answers to all these questions are self-evident for anybody engaged in these proceedings.
Field Marshal List's own activities in the Balkans were, as Your Honors know, of short duration only (6 months). They commenced on 6 April with the opening of the offensive and ended as early as 15 October owing to a severe illness.
After the conclusion of the campaign and after the occupation of Greece, Field Marshal List transferred his headquarters as Commander of the Twelfth Army to Kyphissia, a suburb of Athens. Right away he tried to normalize life in Greech as fast as possible. He desired fruitful collaboration with the Greek people, towards whom his inclinations were friendly.
This attitude of Field Marshal List towards the population found its expression also in a visible manner: On the castle of Athens, which was the seat of the new Greek Government, the Greek flag was hoisted with his permission. As guard of honor there stood in front of the the tomb of the unknown soldier - right in the center of Athens - a Greek soldier beside the German soldier. And the Greek flag flew also on the Acropolis, the landmark of Athens.
When, late in summer 1941 due to the blocking of the sealanes and owing to the frequent blowing up of the one and only railroad, the first food difficulties were felt in Greece, particularly in Athens, Army stores were used at the instigation of Field Marshal List in order to help out.
Stops were undertaken to help the Greek population by importing food stuffs-- even if transports which were of importance for the Army were delayed in consequence. In Athens children were fed from German Army stores. In the field of hygiene and in cultural life everything was done in order to make it easy for the Greek population to forget the consequences of the war as soon as possible.
All these welfare measures which in the first place were for the benefit of the population of Athens were instigated by Field Marshal List although as early as the beginning of May, Southern Greece had been occupied by the Italians in accordance with Fuehrer Directive No. 29, which meant that the Italians had to deal with the administration of the country. He helped, although it had been strictly forbidden, according to the regulations, to employ German agencies there. In spite of the fact that it had also been forbidden to act as mediator, Field Marshal List kept receiving members of the Greek population who could submit their desires and requests to him openly. Everything possible was done for them.
Owing to his attitude and his welfare activities Field Marshal List was very popular with the Greek population. He could cross the country in his car without any military protection.
Apart from very occasional acts of sabotage of an insignificant nature Greece - and Athens in particular was at that time a peaceful country in which no insurrection movements could be observed.
Such was the situation in Greece when, in accordance with Fuehrer Directive No. 31, Field Marshal List was appointed Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
Thus he became the highest officer of the Army in the Balkans and was directly subordinated to Hitler and or the OKW. He received executive power for the German occupied territories of Greece and Serbia. To help him in its application that the Commander Serbia, the Commander Saloniki - Aegaean, the Commander Southern Greece, and the Commander of the Island Crete, were subordinated to him.
The tasks of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast consisted in defending in a uniform manner those parts of Serbia and Greece, including the islands before the coast, which were occupied by German troops, against attacks and insurrections. With the exception of operational air warfare, the Armed Forces Commander Southeast had to deal with all problems which arose from the occupation, the establishment of security and supplies as well as from the systems of transportation and communication. Furthermore, he was charged with the supervision of the military administration which was applied by various commanders.
That brought about a decisive change in the position of Field Marshal List. Whereas his activities as Commander of the Twelfth Army had been exclusively of an operation nature and had finally been limited to Greece, he was now charged not only with executive power but also with the supervision of the territorial commanders in Greece and Serbia.
These far reaching powers did not however -- especially as regarded Serbia -- become fully effective. The reason for that was that the Commander Serbia had been granted considerable independence by Fuehrer Directive No. 29 which was issued already on 17 of May. The Commander Serbia stuck to that even after his subordination had been changed.
This is proved inter alia, plainly by the fact that he did not even inform Armed Forces Commander Southeast of the formation of the new Government Nedic nor did he inform him of the arming of the Serbian Gendarmerie.
These efforts to maintain independence were promoted further by the fact that the Commander Serbia who, up till now, had been responsible only to the OKH, continued even after he had been subordinated to the Armed Forces Southeast to receive direct instructions from the OKH, particularly in the field of administration. Also the great distances and the insufficient signal and traffic communications played an important part in this respect. Owing to these conditions it frequently occurred that the Commander Serbia who was stationed in Belgrade received orders from the OKW before his superior, the Armed Forces Commander, had received them, thus making it impossible for him to intervene.
All these circumstances caused Field Marshal List to point out repeatedly in teletypes, which were sent to the OKW about the middle of September, that a uniform command in the southeast was necessary. These requests, which were justified, were recognized in new Fuehrer directives regarding authorities of command in which General Boehme was appointed Commanding General and soon after, in addition, Commander Serbia.
These facts show plainly that until Field Marshal List fell ill, the Commander Serbia went his own way in spite of all orders and did not give up his independence. The same went, in particular, for State Councillor Dr. Turner, the Chief of the Military Administration with Commander Serbia. In his capacity as highest police official in Serbia he was in the closest contact with Himmler from whom he received direct instructions.
In his capacity as State Councillor he had the very best connections with Goering and with the agencies of the four-year plan which also had the right to issue direct instructions in their sphere. Also the Foreign Office, which according to Fuehrer Directive No. 31 had an independent plenipotentiary after the political interests of the Reich, employed Dr. Turner for its purposes. Thus he was, owing to the political power which he enjoyed, in a position to evade to a large extent the influence and control of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast who was far away in Athens. In consequence, all attempts of Field Marshal List, in writing, as well as by word of mouth, to cause Dr. Turner to keep to the official channels were bound to be unsuccessful. These vague relations of authority and the existence of many political agencies, which were not subordinated to the Armed Forces, greatly impeded the efforts of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. The dictatorial anarchy, which at the time prevailed in Germany, the consequences of which are very hard to understand for anybody who has not himself experienced these conditions, was bound to have a yet greater effect on the administration of the occupied Southeastern areas which were far distant from Germany. Under these difficult conditions, which became increasingly more obvious during the summer and autumn of 1941. Field Marshal List, when he returned from an official journey to Berlin, on 23 June 1941, took over command as Armed Forces Commander Southeast and thus the command authority for the Serbian area as well.
At the same time Field Marshal List took over command authority as Armed Forces Commander Southeast, he was confronted with an entirely changed situation in Serbia.