To put down the Greek resistance the Germans tried the same old methods. Terror and intimidation, hostages and reprisal measures, hangings and burnings, had failed to pacify Serbia and Coratia. But the Germans, never humane and seldom smart, knew no other course.
Greece during 1943 and 1944 was, like Yugoslavia, divided theoretically into both operational areas and so-called administrative areas, each with its own separate jurisdiction, organization and personnel. For the efficient execution of their respective missions of pacification and security, it was, of course, quite necessary that the regular tactical troops of Felmy and Lanz should cooperate closely with the district and sub-area police troops under Speidel's jurisdiction. This was achieved both by personal contact of the major personalities involved and by the regular interchange of information, daily and weekly situation reports, and the like. Generally speaking, the tacticaL troops confined their activities to regular military engagements against the organized partisan bands. Speidel's police troops, on the other hand, were concerned for the most part with the civilian population--seizing workers for forced labor in the Reich, deporting Jews from Crete, Corfu, Rhodes and the other islands putting down strikes, executing hostages in retaliation for acts of sabotage and the clandestine killings of German police and quisling Greek mayors.
The orders of Flemy, Lanz and Speidel in Greece were similar to these issued by Rendulic, Dehner and Leyser in Croatia and by Felber and Geitner in Serbia. When attacks on troops, installations and supply lines continued, notwithstanding a previous 10:1 "hostage" quota, the Germans, with their customarily inflated notions of their own worth, promptly raised the quota to 50:1. But even the execution of 50 civilians in retribution for attacks by unknown persons did not completely satisfy General Lanz.
On the 25th of October 1943, his 1st Mountain Division ordered that the 50:1 arithmetical key be applied even to German losses suffered in regular military combat with the legitimately organized and uniformed guerrillas. After October 1943 the out--moded 10:1 ratio was to be effective only for the less serious deaths of such racial inferiors as a "pro-German Greek or a Greek working for the Germans."
By mid--1943, the "Andartes", as the Greek partisans were called, were an enemy to be seriously reckoned with. The Germans, however, refused to grant full belligerent status to the Greek resistance forces. Instead they waged war against the Greeks in 1941-42--by pressing the native population into service on the side of the terror that was oppressing them. They intimidated the inhabitants of peaceful villages into giving information concerning the size and location of partisan troops. They executed civilians in reprisal for the bombing of bridges and tunnels, and for sabotage of communication lines. They labeled men "Bandits", "communists", bandit suspects" and "bandat helpers" and killed them without benefit of investigation, trial or even summary court martial. In short, they resorted to every trick and device that a tyrant, blinded by the fury of his own insanity, might resort to. The reports to von Weichs and Foertsch tell the story of the harvest of the German policy in Greece:
29 November 1943: "In reprisal for band attack on the road Tripolis-Sparta, 100 hostages shot at the scene of the attack."
1 December 1943: "In reprisal for the killing of one German soldier in Tripolis, 30 'communists' were shot."
2 December 1943: "For attack on railroad bridge southeast of Tripolis 50 hostages hanged."
3 December 1943: "19 communist reprisal prisoners shot in revenge for the murder and wounding of Greek police."
6 December 1943: "As reprisal for band attack southeast of of Gythion 25 hostages shot."
621 December 1943: "In the area of Volos 25 bandits shot to death in reprisal for an attack on motor vehicles."
25 February 1944: "50 hostages from the hostage camp at Tripolis shot to death on 23 February in reprisal for the murder of an interpreter."
9 March 1944: "In reprisal for strike agitation by communists 50 communists shot to death."
25 March 1944: "45 hostages shot in Corinth, 52 in Tripolis, 44 in Sparta."
1 April 1944: "Special train Athens-Salonika hit mines. One dead, 14 wounded. Tracks blocked only short while. The execution of 70 Greeks at the site of the incident ordered."
Lidice, the small Czech village which the Germans leveled to the ground in 1942, stands today as a symbol of German savagery. In Greece there are a thousand Lidices--their names unknown and their inhabitants forgotten by a world too busy and too cynical to remember. Greece has many small primitive villages with 500 to 1,000 inhabitants who live in mud houses with thatched roofs that have been lived in for centuries. There are, for example, the villages of the Peloponnes peninsula which were leveled to the ground in December 1943 during the notorious "Operation Kalavritha." Touched off by a report that "bandits" in the vicinity had killed 78 German prisoners, troops subordinate to General Felmy embarked upon a reprisal expedition that lasted for eight days before their senseless bestiality had been satiated. Fourteen villages were completely destroyed and their male inhabitants shot. 511 persons from Kalvritha alone were executed. Whether the Partisans had killed captured German soldiers or not, there was no legal excuse, and there can be no moral mitigation, for seeking wholesale and indiscriminate revenge on the innocent.
Then there were the parallel tragedies of Klissura and Distomen. On an April morning in 1944 partisan troops appeared on the outskirts of Klissura and forbade the inhabitants to leave the village. On the afternoon of the same day, about two miles away, one German motorcycle was attacked and two German soldiers killed.
German reprisal methods being well known by now, all the male population of the village fled in fear to hide in the hills.
Only ole men, women and young children remained behind. About 4 p.m. that afternoon the 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and Bulgarian Occupational Militia subordinate to its command, both under Felmy's tactical jurisdiction, threw a cordon around the village, searched the houses unseccessfully for weapons and ammunition, and called all the people together in the public square. Then the killing and burning began. When it stopped, there were 223 victims lying in the square -- fifty of them children under ten years, 128 women and the rest old men -- Klissura was a mass of smouldering rubble.
The "blood bath of Klissura", as the Germans so appropriately entitled their own report on the affair, was too much for Minister Neubacher to stomach. Not because it was inhumane but because it would have serious political repercussions, Neubacher immediately protested to Weishs. He said:
"It is sheer insanity to shoot babies, children, women and old people because heavily armed Reds had been quartered for one night in their houses and had shot two German soldiers in the neighborhood. The political consequences of such deeds may be very serious. It is obviously easier to kill quite harmless women, children and old men than to hunt down an armed band. I demand a thorough investigation of the matter."
The investigation was ordered. The military whitewash of an SS unit by a Wehrmacht Field Marshal came two months later when Weiehs wrote to Neubacher:
"The Greek witnesses cannot be believed. The village was taken by storm, the inhabitants killed by artillery fire. There was no retaliation action."
Just two months after Klissura, in June 1944, troops of the same 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment were involved in a similar massacre at Distomon.
From the Germans' own lengthy report of the incident the following facts appear. As a German company approached the village, 18 Greek civilians were seen. Although they did not fire on the Germans, six of the 18 "were shot while trying to escape". The remaining 12 civilians were arrested and taken along with the company, which continued on to Distomon, remained there for several hours undisturbed, and then set out on the road from Distomon to Stiri. About two kilometers from Distomon, 30-35 partisans, well-entrenched in ridges overlooking the read and armed with an 8 cm. trench mortar that covered the entire area, lay in ambush. Before the surprised Company could disperse and reorganize to return the sudden Partisan fire, the enemy had gone.
In defiance of orders restricting the initiation of reprisal measures to commanders of at least division commander level, the company commander returned his troops to Distomon to retaliate the villagers because they had not previously disclosed the presence and position of the "bandits". A report of a German Secret Field Police member, who was in Distomon at the time, relates what happened after the troops returned: "After the troops returned to Distomon, the 12 prisoners who were taken back were shot dead in the market place as a reprisal measure.....
Subsequent to that, all people present in Distomon were shot dead wherever they happened to be. At that time, I was at the market place and was looking after our wounded interpreter. As far as I observed events, 60 to 70 persons -- men, women and children -- were killed in the vicinity of the market place. As far as I could see it, all were shot dead. I did not see inhabitants being killed in any other way, i.e. beaten to death by rifle butt, or by pouring gasoline over them and setting them on fire."
Why were the 12 arrested Greek civilians killed? What had they to do with the subsequent action by the "Andartes"? Why were 270 inhabi tants of Distomon killed?
What was their crime? Why did the Secret Field Police member feel obliged to say that he had not seen any inhabitants "killed in any other way, i.e. beaten to death by rifle butt, or by pouring gasoline over them and setting them on fire"? Was that the usual method of executing retaliation victims?
Again Neubacher was dismayed by the political, not the moral, insanity of such actions. And again he protested -- not to Himmler, although SS troops were once more involved, but to Weichs, the omnipotent master of the Southeast, the Commander of Wehrmacht and SS troops alike. This time the investigation was more lively, for it revealed that the regiment to which the company involved was subordinate had knowingly issued a false official combat report of its action against Distomon. According to the regimental report the 16 Greek civilians opened fire upon the company as it was approaching Distomon and were "shot while trying to escape", while Distomon itself was taken only after a hard battle followed by a mopping-up operation.
From a sheer internal military standpoint, the SS company commander had not only violated orders regarding the initiation of reprisal measures. He had also deliberately issued a false official report. But convinced that the "competent authorities would also subsequently have ordered reprisal measures against Distomon which would have necessitated sending at a later time a strong mission with corresponding high fuel consumption" and believing that the company commander's procedure was "merely a transgression against formality and corresponded to a natural soldierly feeling", the regiment requested permission to handle the matter "by disciplinary proceedings only". General Felmy, the corps commander involved, consented to the regimental request , and Field Marshal Weichs agreed. Neubacher was informed. The case was closed.
The events of Distomon merit this somewhat detailed account because in this single tragedy there is presented in microcosm the evil of the German Army in Greece and in the whole Southeast during four years of ruthless occupation.
It gives good insight, for example, into the mental processes of a young German officer of company grade, completely devoid of any notions of decency and honor, thoroughly corrupted by the regulations, directives and orders handed down by his superiors. It reveals precisely how war in the Southeast was fought, how the peaceful population was drawn into the struggle, what a reprisal action specifically entailed. It indicates how little the top military authorities did to humanize the already existing techniques and methods of anti-partisan warfare, how lax they were in disciplining their own troops, how they shielded the guilty. Finally, it gives the lie to one of the most important single myths that the Wehrmacht seeks desperately to perpetuate -- that the terrible crimes of troops in the field were committed by SS units over whom the Wehrmacht had no power or control, and that Wehrmacht commanders constantly and vigorously protested to higher authorities against the undisciplined excesses of the SS troops. Weichs knew the inhabitants of Klissure had been killed in a reprisal, not a combat, action by the same SS unit which later was involved at Distomon. He not only did not remove the commanders responsible for that atrocity before they could repeat the same criminal performance at Distomon, but he lied to Neubacher in order to shield it from criticism.
During the spring and summer of 1944 both the tactical commons of Felmy and Lanz and the administrative organization of General Speidel worked feverishly and desperately to postpone the bitter end. The order of 14 August 1944 of General Friedrich Wilhelm Mueller, Commanding General on the island of Crete, is representative of the attitude that prevailed:
"Numerous attacks on German vehicles require vigorous counter measures to demonstrate to the Greek people that we are masters on the island. Consideration for innocent people cannot be shown any more."
Although they knew the war was irretrievably lost, the Southeast Command continued to hang and burn and deport, and as always the Germans' own reports tell the story:
6 April 1944: "In reprisal for an attack by bandits during battalion roll call, killing 4 and wounding 11, 150 persons suspected of belonging to bands were shot in Verria."
23 April 1944: "In Tripolis 12 communists shot in reprisal for a murdered Gendarme."
30 April 1944: "60 communists shot in Athens as further reprisal measures for attack on police officer."
30 April 1944: "200 Greeks will be shot to death as a reprisal measure for the killing of Gen. Krech and his escort detachment." 1 May 1944: "In reprisal for attack on the truck convoy of the 41st Fortress Div. in the southeast Peloponnesus area, 335 communists and band suspects shot to death.
10 May 1944: "In the Boestia area, in reprisal for an attack on vehicles on 26 April 1944, an additional 100 hostages are being shot in Athens."
In May and June 1944: "1600 Jews deported from Corfu and 350 Jews from Crete."
From 1 May to 1 June 1944: "1747 laborers sent to the Reich in three transports. Compulsory deportation to the Reich, particularly from the Peloponnesus, will take place soon."
From 16 June to 15 July 1944: "600 men ready for shipment from the Peloponnesus for employment in the Reich. Transport will take place in a few days for 'Reichswerke Hermann Goering' iron ore mines."
13 July 1944: "50 communists hanged in retaliation for attack on two German officers."
31 July 1944: "Line repair detachment attacked by band west of Agrinion, 8 dead, 14 wounded, Reprisal measures -- 71 communists shot."
10 August 1944: "F.K. 817 reports 50 communists shot at scene of incident at Manara in reprisal for band attack on Athens-Thebes road."
5 August 1944: "Railroad sabotage on train CorinthTripolis. Seven cars derailed. No losses of our own. In reprisal 18 hostages who had been taken along were shot."
26 August 1944: "18 communists shot in Athens in reprisal for German soldier shot from ambush."
23 August 1944: "During mopping-up operations near east Messara, Crete, 191 persons suspected of being bandits shotk 1 village destroyed, 1500 civilians being resettled."
5 September 1944: "In retaliation for raid on truck convoy, 186 suspects shot to death."
In August and September 1944: "13 villages destroyed in retaliation for the kidnapping of Lt. Gen. Kreipe."
Finally, in October 1944, the end came. Threatened from the Nest by combined Anglo-American forces and from the East by the Soviet armies, German troops were withdrawn from the southeast to defend a crumbling Reich. British units landed on the mainland; Elas and Edes troops came down out of the hills. After four long and difficult years under the Nazi yoke, Greece was starving and destitute. But proud and courageous as always, Greece was at last free to resume her own national destiny.
The generals of the Southeast Command went home, were reassigned, surrendered. Twice in 25 years mere readiness for war had been insufficient. As had happened once before, the Balkans had proved to be an Achilles heel to German aggression. The generals were never able to understand why - but strong, independent peoples accustomed to hardship, innured to suffering, and born to freedom can "no more be broken by tyranny than a diamond scratched by a sword."
GENERAL TAYLOR: Your Honor, I desire to turn next to the charges concerning devastation and deportation in Northern Norway. These are the charges embodied in the first specification of Count Two of the indictment, and to examine them we must turn our attention from the Balkans to the northernmost part of the European mainland - the province of Finnmark in northern Norway.
These charges concern only the defendant Rendulic.
Even since the initial attack against Russia, the German 20th Mountain Army had been situated in the northern part of Finland, holding Petsamo and threatening Murmansk and the railroad line from Murmansk south to Leningrad, one of the two main avenues for the weapons and supplies which America and Britain were sending to the Soviet Union. This army had been commanded, since January 1942, by Generaloberst Edward Deitl, who met his death in an airplane crash in June, 1944. Rendulic was chosen to succeed him, and arrived in Finland in August. The order of battle of the 20th Mountain Army, predominantly comprised of mountain troops, is shown in chart "G" of the prosecution's pamphlet.
Rendulic's arrival in Croatia in August, 1943, had been followed almost immediately by the collapse of Germany's Italian ally, now he was to encounter a parallel situation in Finland. On the fourth of September, 1944, the Finns capitulated to the Soviet forces, and demanded that the Germans promptly withdraw their troops from Finland. Rendulic decided to fall back across the northwestern Finnish frontier into northern Norway.
The region in which this retreat took place is shown in map "E" of the prosecution's pamphlet. The northernmost province of Norway is known as Finnmark, and the province just to the south as Troms. Including a nomad population of Laplanders, the population of this area numbers approximately 62,000, most of whom live in small ports and villages along the heavily indented coastline, and make their living as fishermen. It is a very wintry and isolated region; there are no railroads, and the only communication with southern Norway is by sea or by the single road along the coast know as Route 50.
Rendulic began his retreat in September, 1944. The two northernmost corps of his army were the XIX Mountain Corps under General Ferdinand Jodl (brother of the Jodl who was a defendant in the International trial) and this corps was in the extreme north near Petsamo; the other was the XXXVI Mountain Corps, about 100 kilometers to the south of Jodl's unit. It was the troops of these two corps that were chiefly concerned in the activities which form the basis of the charges in the indictment. By the latter part of October, part of these troops had been withdrawn westward from Petsamo through Kirkenes and were resting around the village of Tana, and others to the south were making their way out of Finland by the more southerly route shown on the map which joins Route 50 near Porsanger-Halvoya. The darkness of the northern winter was rapidly settling in, it was very cold, and there was more than enough snow. The advancing Soviet troops had kept contact with the Germans as far as Tana. In order to make the Russian advance as difficult as possible, the German troops had been systematically destroying barracks and buildings and port facilities, and endeavoring to persuade the Norwegian population to evacuate, in the area between Kirkenes and Tana.
Late in October 1944, the German High Command decided that this program of devastation and deportation should be much more extensive and regorous. As a result, on 28 October 1944, the OKW, over Alfred Jodl's signature, issued the following order to Rendulic as Commander of the 20th Mountain Army:
Because of the unwillingness of the north Norwegian population to voluntarily evacuate, the Fuehrer has agreed to the proposals of the commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories and has ordered that the entire Norwegian population east of the fjord of Lyngen be evacuated by force in the interest of their own security and that all homes are to be burned down or destroyed.
The supreme commader, Northern Finland, is responsible that the Fuehrer's order is carried out without consideration. Only by this method can it be prevented that the Russians with strong forces, and aided by these homes and the people familiar with the terrain, follow our withdrawal operations during this winter and shortly appear in front of our position in Lyngen. This is not the place for sympathy for the civilian population.
* * * * * * * * * * * It must be made clear to the troops engaged in this action that the Norwegians will be thankful in a few months that they were saved from Bolshevism, and that the barbarian methods of the air war against our German country and her cultural shrines have brought a thousand times more misery to our people if compared with the humane evacuation and destruction of homes in northern Norway, which is necessary for our war effort, and which, if it is not done, must be paid with the blood of German soldiers.
The population, whose livelihood is fishing, in northern Norway, furthermore has enough shipping space at its disposal to be able to get out of the way en masse across the water. A large part of the small Norwegian ships which are kept hidden at present can be used for this, and can later also be used for our own transportation needs.
The danger of the formation of guerrilla bands on the part of the Norwegians appears to be negligible since they can no longer use the houses during the winter.
It was claimed, in defense of Alfred Jodl, during the international trial that this order was unnecessarily far-reaching, and that Alfred Jodl, by various subtle means endeavored to conveyy to Rendulic that it should not be complied with to the fullest degree.1 If this be true, there is little evidence that Rendulic undertook to soften its effect in any material respect. The order which Rendulic issued to his subordinate commands the following day follows very closely the language of the OKW order and includes the following:
1. Because of the lack of willingness of the north Norwegian population to evacuate the country voluntarily, the Fuehrer has ordered the compulsory evacuation of the population east of the Lungenfjords in the interest of the security of the population, which is to be 1. Alfred Jodl's contention in this regard is referred to in the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Vol I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 324.
preserved from Bolshevism, and that all houses be burned down or be destroyed. It is the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of Northern Finland that this order be carried out ruthlessly so that the Soviets supported by dwelling places and a population which knows the country will be prevented from following our withdrawal with strong forces. Pity for the civilian population is out of place.
* * * * * * * * * * 5. The following directions were given for the Execution of the Evacuation:
a) The entire evacuation area is to be emptied of people.
b) Evacuated settlements are to be destroyed unless they are to he used thereafter by troops marching through (that is, at the latest by the rear guards) .
c) The operation must be a sudden one and the officers of the Reichs Commissar of Norway must participate, and Norwegian authorities must be harnessed for it; the latter, however, only from the beginning of the operation.
d) The seized population is to be led to the nearest ports under military guard (also small ports with docks suitable for cutters) .
e) Local and district commanders are to erect reception camps in or near these ports.
f) Men capable of working and marching, and in the western districts women capable of marching also, are to be coupled to the marching units furtherest in front and to be taken along.
g) Insofar as the population still has small ships available, they are to be used for the deportation of the evacuees under military cover!
h) All ships used by the Wehrmacht (freighters and Army transports) are to be loaded additionally with as many evacuees as possible.
i) Columns on Route 50 to be formed only to an unavoidable degree; invalids, women and children to be assisted by loading them on trucks. Only men really capable of marching to join the march columns!
* * * * * * * * * * * * Finally I request all offices concerned to carry out this evacuation in the sense of a relief action for the Norwegian population.
Though it will be necessary here and there to be severe, all of us must attempt to save the Norwegians from Bolshevism and to keep them alive.
On November first, the Germans made known to the population what was in store for them. Rendulic's proclamation stated in part:
TO THE POPULATION:
The evacuation of a part of northern Norway has been rendered a military necessity as a result of the treachery of a Finnish Government clique.
The evacuation necessitates the removal of the civilian population, as the enemy has proved that, in those territories occupied by him, he ruthlessly and brutally forces the civilian population to give him active assistance in achieving his aims.
This means that he shelter or means of existence of any kind can be left to the Bolshevik enemy in the fighting zone. All such installations as housing accommodations transport facilities and food stocks must be destroyed or removed.
THE POPULATION IN THESE DISTRICTS WILL THEREFORE BE DEPRIVED OF THE BASIS FOR THEIR EXISTENCE, SO THAT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO SURVIVE, THEY MUST EVACUATE TO THOSE NORWEGIAN TERRITORIES WHICH ARE STILL PROTECTED BY THE GERMAN WEHRMACHT.
* * * * * * * * * *
HE WHO DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THESE UNEQUIVOCAL INSTRUCTIONS EXPOSES HIMSELF AND HIS FAMILY TO POSSIBLE DEATH IN THE ARCTIC WINTER WITHOUT HOUSE OR FOOD."
(signed) by TERBOVEN, (signed) by RENDULIC, Reichskommissar for the Generaloberst, Occupied Norwegian Territories.
Commander-in-Chief 20th Army.
This ruthless and in large part unnecessary decision was carried out by Rendulic's forces according to plan. Northern Norway, from Kirkenes nearly to Tromso, was turned into an Arctic desert. Over 43,000 men, women, and children over two thirds of the entire population of an area about the size of Scotland - were herded down Route 50 or crowded into small boats. We may be sure that the official German report to Rendulic of the manner in which the evacuation was carried out is not overstated. I quote :
Some untoward events, such as .... the separation of men from their families to be deported ..... the burning down of houses in the presence of inhabitants even where an immediate destruction was not necessary, and shelling of the locality Kjallefjord by units of the German Navy, hindered the readiness of the popurlation to follow the officially prescribed way.
The prosecution will submit evidence to show that the devastation and evacuation, at least in large part, were wholly unjustified from a military standpoint, and that, under the spur of Rendulic's admonition that his order was to be "carried out ruthlessly" and that "pity for the civilian population is out of place", the destruction and evacuation were carried out with unnecessary brutality, resulting in the impoverishment of the entire population, in the death of some, and the suffering of many thousands.
We will turn to the final portions of the indictment - those relating to THE MURDER OF CAPTURED "COMMANDOS" AND "COMMISSARS" Two of the specifications in Count Three of the Indictment differ from the others in that their scope is not restricted geographically to southeastern Europe.
These are sub--paragraphs "b" and "h" of paragraph 12 of the indictment. Both of these specifications refer to orders of general application, issued by OKW and OKH and distributed generally through the field commands of the Wehrmacht, which denied the protection of the laws of war to two special categories of enemy troops, and directed that they be executed if captured. These two categories were the commando troops, which the British and later the Americans made such effective use of, particularly prior to the invasion of France, and the so-called "political commissars", who were regularly attached to units of the Soviet forces and fought with them in regular Soviet uniforms.
Firstly as to the commandos.
The order for the murder of captured commandos was issued by Hitler through the OKW in October, 1942.1 It directed that enemy commandos were to be slaughtered to the last man; that even if they surrended, nonetheless they were to be shot immediately, unless interrogations were necessary, in which case they were to be shot thereafter. The order was not a purposeless piece of criminality; Allied commando operations were proving alarmingly effective, and Hitler apparently thought that this order would act as a deterrent.
The order was distributed to all three branches of the Wehrmacht, and there is ample evidence that it was widely distributed and wellknown throughout the German army. In all probability, all of the defendants (except List, who had retired just prior to its issuance) distributed or enforced the order at one time or another.
In July, 1944, the commando order was given a new and special application in southeastern Europe. A new order from OKW directed that it should be applied to the members of foreign "military missions" who might be captured with the partisan forces in the Balkans. This new order, dated 30 July 1944, stated:
In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest, members of foreign so-called "Military Missions" (AngloAmerican as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as specified in the special orders regarding the treatment of captured partisans. Therefore, they are not to be treated as prisoners-of-war, but in conformity with the Fuehrer's order for the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942.
We must not forget that to kill a defenseless prisoner-of-war is not only a violation of the rules of war. It is murder. The commando order required the commission of murder, and every German officer who handled it know that perfectly well. The signs of a guilty conscience are only too clear in another paragraph of the order which I have just read, which required that the distribution copies of it should be de 1 The circumstances pertaining to the commando order are summarized in the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal.
Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 328.
stroyed after reading.
There is ample evidence showing general compliance with this order, as was found by the International Military Tribunal which stated in its judgment:
Under the provisions of this order, Allied commando troops, and other military units operating independently, lost their lives in Norway, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. Many of them were killed on the spot, and in no case were those who were executed later in camps ever given a trial of any kind. For example, an American Military mission Which landed behind the German front in the Balkans in January 1945, numbering about twelve to fifteen men and wearing uniform, were taken to Mauthausen under the authority of this order, and according to tho affidavit of Adolf Zutte, the adjutant of the Mauthausen concentration camp, all of them were shot.
Secondly, Commissars:
Whereas the commando order Was especially designed for and executed in western, and later in southeastern, Europe, the commissar order was of principal importance on the Russian front. Unlike the commando order, it was not the result of, or issued in reply to, enemy action. On the contrary, it was issued and distributed nearly three weeks prior to the initial attack on the Soviet Union. Its words reflect, not the hurried decisions of men beleaguered, but the considered opinion of men who had pondered the conclusion sot forth.
The order was issued on 8 July 1941 by von Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-chief of the Army. That the authors were aware of the criminal character of its contents, is apparent from the restricted distribution instructions which it bore. It was "For General officers only. To be delivered through officers only.....You are requested to limit the distribution to Commanders-in-Chief of Armies or Air Forces, respectively, and to inform junior commanders by word of mouth". It provided, in part:
When fighting Bolshevism, one cannot count on the enemy acting in accordance with the principles of humanity or international law. In particular, it must be expected that tho treatment of cur prisoners by the political commissars of all types who are the true pillars of resistance, will be cruel, inhuman and dictated by hate.
The German troops must realize:
1. That in this fight, it is wrong to treat such elements with clemency and consideration in accordance with international law. They are a menace to our own safety and to the rapid pacification of the Conquered territories.
2. That the originators of the Asiatic barbaric methods of fighting are the political commissars. They must be dealt with promptly and with the utmost severity.
Therefore , if taken while fighting, they are offering resistance and they must, on principle, be shot immediately.....
....These commissars will not be recognized as soldiers; protection granted to prisoners--of-war in accordance with international law will not apply to them. After having been segregated, they are to be dealt with.
When the defendant Weichs received this order as Commander-inChief of the Second Army, he was not in combat but in the quiet of a then secure Germany. His army had just been withdrawn from the southeast, and he had returned to Germany; his army was in reserve and was not committed in actual combat until July on the eastern front. Weichs distributed the order to the subordinate commanders in his Army, and they in turn passed it down to the troops. The prosecution will introduce evidence showing that others among the defendants also distributed and executed this order.
The Second Army had been in the front line in Russia but a few days when reports began to come in to Weichs' headquarters, showing that the order had been carried out. Indeed, Weichs' headquarters appeared to have been especially interested in the effect which this order was having in actual combat; on 9 September 1941, his Chief of Staff advised the next higher headquarters (Army Group Center) that the commissars were fighting tenaciously and setting a courageous example for the Soviet troops. He further stated, that there was no evidence that the Soviet forces were taking any measures by way of reprisal.
Typical, reports from the corps commanders in the Second Army to Weichs Headquarters read as follows:
Up to 25 July, 3 commissars eliminated by the 293rd Division.
From 25 to 27 July, 4 commissars eliminated.
This order, like the commando order, called for the deliberate murder of prisoners-of-war. One's private feelings about political commissars, favorable or unfavorable, have absolutely nothing to do with the case. They were regularly attached to Soviet units, they fought in full Soviet uniform, and, as the documents show, they fought with great courage.
Your Honor, would this be a convenient time for a break? The prosecution has perhaps another hour and ten minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: I guess we'd better proceed for about a half hour.
GENERAL TAYLOR: Before concluding. Your Honor, I made the suggestion to inquire whether the translators still have enough German pages left to continue.
************ Mr. Frank advised me they have only five pages they have translated, and with a break of ten minutes we probably would be able to get the rest of the German up here so that we will be able to go through without a break.
THE PRESIDENT: The court will recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken)