THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Weisgerber.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q General, shortly before the recess, we talked about your assignment in the newly created German air force. This new German air force had, according to general opinion, been a part of the Wehrmacht which, according to Goering's wish, was to represent a means of National Socialist power. Is this opinion correct, and if it is, how did you in particular, taking into consideration your relationship to National Socialism, cope with this fact?
A What you say is correct. Goering wanted at the time to create quite clearly a National Socialistic air force. This danger was a very acute one. During the time when the air force was created it wouldn't have taken very much and it would have been a purely Party organization. That, however, was prevented.
Q And who was it who prevented it?
A I would like to say that it is a historical problem of some of the old general staff officers who had transferred to the air force, that they were responsible if somebody interfered with this fighting for power and with this idea of the armed forces. If somebody can really judge all these facts, I am bold enough to say that I was the man who could do this best as the organizer of the air force.
Q What was your general attitude in those years before the last war regarding the development of National Socialism in Germany?
A I had expected the so-called taking over of power - partly with great expectation and partly skeptically. My disappointment, however, and thus my inner opposition, grew from month to month because, as an officer as well as a man of cultural standing, I had to refute a state of affairs and a development which, in a few words I think I can signify. It was a meaninglessness of power and a powerlessness of sense.
Q And why didn't you draw the consequences then and leave the armed forces?
A I frequently faced this difficult decision, but there were higher problems involved then one of personal or egotistical solution. If we old officers were to leave, then the new ones would take over immediately and they were only waiting for that moment. In other words, the armed forces would have become a National Socialist Party organization. But it didn't become such a thing. Yo achieve this was our task, and we fulfilled our task.
BY DR. WEISGERBER: If is please the Tribunal, at this point I would like to offer a few documents in evidence from Document Book Speidel 1. The document Speidel #2 on page 6 of both the German and English text. Page 6. This will become Speidal Exhibit #1. This is an affidavit executed by Count von Luckner who has known General Speidel since 1935, and in subsequent years he had many occasions to meet him, I would like to draw attention to the last sentence in paragraph 2 where it says:
"As early as then he rejected the influence the NSDAP exerted on all organizations of the state and sharply criticized the basic principles of the Party."
JUDGE BURKE: We'll delay just a moment until the document book is available to the interpreter.
DR. WEISGERBER: I read the last sentence in paragraph 2 and I will repeat:
"As early as then he rejected the influence the NSDAP exerted on all organizations of the state and sharply criticized the basic principles of the Party."
The affiant goes on to say:
"At the end of 1343 and in the Spring of 1944 I was, as far as I can remember, twice the sole guest of the General in Athens. On one of these occasions we spoke very frankly about all the things that weighed on our minds, such as the totalitarianism of the Party, education of youth, battle against Christianity and about the constantly increasing suffusion of the army with National Socialistic tendencies."
The affiant goes on to say.
"I can assure you that I already had the conviction at that time that General Speidel was one of those officers who were not National Socialists."
The affidavit has been duly sworn to and properly certified.
The next document which I want to offer is Speidel Document #3, Docu Book Speidel 1, on page 8. This is an affidavit by Major General Herbert Rieckhoff, who makes the following statement:
"General (Air Force) Speidel was my immediate superior from December 1939 until August, 1940, as Chief of Staff of the Air Fleet 2."
The next but one sentence roads:
"However, I came to know him as a particular and correct officer with a very sensitive conception of honor who was skeptical toward the political and military leadership of Hitler and Goering."
This document will be offered under Exhibit #2.
The third exhibit in this connection will be Speidel Document #4 in Document Book 1 on page 9 of this document book. Page 9 of both the English and German text. This document will be offered under Exhibit Speidel #3. It is an affidavit executed by one Wilhelm Baessler, who is now a member of the Landtag for Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern and deputy chairman of the Christian Socialist Union. This affiant states at the end of his affidavit that General Speidel was known to him from 1916 and that he was at no time a Nazi general. The affiant states literally:
"In the numerous discussions about political and military problems he did not hide his critical attitude towards Germany's war leadership."
The affidavit is duly certified by a notary.
The fourth and last exhibit in this connection will be Document Speidel #29, contained in Document Book Speidel 2 on page 54 and 55. This is an affidavit of one Truman Smith which will be offered under Exhibit #4. It is contained on pages 54 and 55 in Speidel Document Book 2. I shall offer it as Exhibit Speidel 4. This is an affidavit executed by Truman Smith who was Military Attache of the United States in Berlin and maintained this position for four years. The affiant relates how, during this time w ho was in Gerlin, he had repeated contacts with my client. I am reading here paragraph 3 of his affidavit:
"During my tour of duty in Berlin, Germany, as American Military a* Air At ache from 1935 to 1939, I saw General (then Major and Colonel) Speidel rather frequently."
I am continuing with the next paragraph:
"There was no doubt in my mind at this time that Speidel was definit to be included in the large group of officers who were anti-National Socialists. As a former Reichswehr officer this political attitude of his w not unusual. I have examined my diaries of the years 1936 and 1937, and fine two notations to the effect that I considered Speidel anti-Nazi in his view points.
"Speidel showed himself at all times as Pro-American. He was obviously appreciative of the treatment he had received in Texas and desired to assist me in my capacity as an Air Attache as far as his duty permitted.
"I considered Speidel a high-minded, honorable officer and gentleman."
Q. General, as chief of staff for Air Fleet 1, you participated in the war against Polands. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. What assignments did you have subsequent to that time?
A. After I had participated in the war against Poland as chief of staff of Air Fleet I became, on the basis of my experience in active air war, transferred to the West. There I was appointed as chief of staff of Air Fleet 2, and I participated in the operational air war against the Western states of Europe and later against England. I prepared this air war and I participated in it.
Q. How long did you remain in that assignment?
A. I remained as chief of general staff of Air Fleet 2 until the 1 of October, 1940. At the beginning of October I was appointed German comma* for the German Air Mission in Roumania and I was thus transferred to Roumani Shortly before that, there had been a change of government in Roumania and Marshall Antonescu had taken over the government, had joined the Axis powers and thus I landed as one of the first German soldiers in Bucharest.
Q. What were your tasks as chief of the Air Force Mission in Roum*
A. I can summarize that very briefly:
(1) The creation and maintenance of military political relations between both air forces;
(2) The reorganization and training of Roumanian air force candida* (3) The organization, training and leadership of the Roumanian air defense, mainly in protection of the vital and decisive oil fields which werin the interests of German forces;Finally, the fourth task, was organization and maintenance of the Roumanian Air Force ground forces.
I had for this task German fighter planes, German antiaircraft artillery, special formations altogether of a strength of approximately 50,000 men.
Q. And what was the reason for the conclusion of this assignment?
A. The reason for the end of this command was that in May, 1942, I became very ill of malaria which proved almost fatal and I had to stay in hospitals in Germany for several months.
Q. In October, 1942, you were then assigned as military commander Southern Greece. Was this assignment a logical and consequential continuanc of your career, which had been a striking one, up to what time?
A. No, on the contrary, it was an unusual demotion and I found myself put on ice.
Q. And what were the reasons, in your opinion, for this fact that you were put on ice?
A. I was never given any reasons. However, I thought I was in a position to explain to myself the facts. During the air war against the Wes* and, above all, against England, I had fundamental differences of opinion wi the chief of the general staff of the air force and with Goering. As a consequence, I was very suddenly replaced in my position as the chief, in October, 1940, and I was, for the first time, transferred to Roumania. In actual fact, it just meant that I was shelved. Goering felt antagonistic a* mistrusted the old general staff officers. He used those people for the ac hard work, but he still mistrusted them. I myself didn't find him personalantagonistic, but I was often treated in such a degrading and offending man* that I knew quite well where I stood.
Q Was there any connection between this treatment and the fact that you were one of the few leading generals of the air force who did not receive the Knights Cross?
A I had been decorated for my commitment in the war against Poland, against France and against England and because of my many missions on which I flew, I was suggested twice as a recipient of the Knight's Cross. The first time Goering rejected this proposal and the second time Hitler personally rejected it.
Q Now let us talk about your assignment in Southern Greece did you receive for your task in Greece any particular instructions?
AAt the beginning of September, 1942 I learned that I was to be transferred to Southern Greece. I was ordered to report to the O.K.W. and there I received approximately the following instructions for my tank. Athens is threatened by a revolution, the situation is one of great unrest, there are many strikes, there are many demonstrations, surprise attacks, etc., go to Athens as quickly as possible and take measures as stringent as possible to restore law and order, defeat the strikes ruthlessly, fly to Athens tomorrow. In spite of the fact that I stated that I only led civilian clothes with me the order was maintained. However, I did not go to Athens immediately. Of course I traveled by Bucharest and I had not handed over my affairs yet to my successor. In Bucharest I became sick again and bad to spend three weeks in the hospital. Thus it happened that only in the beginning of October, either the 9th or 12th of October, 1942, I arrived in Athens.
Q And what was the actual situation in Athens when you arrived there, General?
A The situation in Athens was considerably more quiet than it had been described to me in the excited times in the O.K.W. There were of course small scale sabotage acts and surprise attacks from time to time, there were some strikes, but those had since been pacified again and there were small scale shootings from time to time, but one could nowhere recognize a plan in all these activities.
Thus I kept observing and waiting.
Q And how did the situation develop in Athens until the end of 1942?
A The situation did not change basically compared with the description which I rendered just now, it was comparatively quiet, unrest flared up from time to time, but I want to stress that toward the end of the year sabotage activities increased strongly and considerably.
Q And you had your official office in Athens proper?
A Yes.
Q This brings me to the organization and channels of command in Southern Greece. Who had Southern Greece occupied at the time?
A By the Italians.
Q General, I think it would be expedient that you show us on the map the area which was under your competency. Will you please do this in such a manner that it can be of value for the record?
A I believe I can be very brief there. This area has already been pointed out during General Felmy's examination and it did not change since. It was part of the harbor of Pyraeus, with an adjacent coastal strip, the Islands Salamis and Aegina in the Salonis gulf and a very small area northeast of Athens with a few localities.
Q And to whom was the rest of the area subordinate and Athens itself?
A To the Italians.
Q What was the official relationship between you and the Italians?
A There was a coordination at least there was no relation of subordination, there was a loose cooperation commanded by the local conditions.
Q General, I would now like to discuss with you briefly, in order to make clear your position as military commander Southern Greece, the organization of the channels of command in the area of Southern Greece.
If it please the Tribunal in order to make this clear, I have included into a document, Speidel 2, a document which is document Speidel No. 14 on page 1 in this document book in the German and English document books, a sketch, which will facilitate this discussion. I shall offer this document under exhibit Speidel No. 5. I hope that this sketch is contained in the document books of the Tribunal. May I inquire of the Tribunal whether they have this sketch?
JUDGE BURKE: Yes.
DR. WEISGERBER: The sketch is entitled "Commander Southern Greece."
JUDGE BURKE: On pages 1 and 2?
DR. WEISGERBER: Yes, your Honor.
JUDGE BURKE: Judge Carter does not appear to have a copy. He has now been supplied. You may proceed.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q General, will you please look at this sketch. Tell us very briefly the channels of command in the area for Southern Greece?
A The highest command agency in Southern Greece, was Army Group E, in Salonika, which is on the top of the sketch. Subordinate to this army group in all aspects was the Military Commander Southern Greece, which is reproduced in the middle of the sketch and which was my agency. Below are those units which were at that time subordinate to the military commander Southern Greece. I shall start on the right on the bottom of the page. Three reserve rifle battalions and one replacement unit, those were units which served the purpose of guarding and work. Then on the left of this sketch are other units and administrative units in Pyraeus. In the middle below is the command flag of the 11th Airforce Field Division with those units subordinate to them. This division came at the end of December, 1943 or the beginning of January, 1943 to Southern Greece, but it was only subordinate to me for purposes of an administrative nature and for training purposes. The operational subordination remained in the hoods of the Army Group E.
Q What other German command agencies were in Athens besides?
A These command agencies are in the middle of the left half of the sketch. There was the Admiral Aegean the commander of the naval forces, then the commanding general of the air force, who was the commander of the German air force units in Southern Greece, then the head district command which dealt with the ground organizations of the airforce and looked after them. These two airforce agencies were for that part subordinate to Field Marshal Kesselring in Italy and finally if we go further down to the left, there was the defensive economic staff and a number of other agencies of the O.K.W., O.K.H., etc. The agencies just described, or rather the troops under them, were territorially subordinated to the military commander Southern Greece whenever they were stationed in his area.
Q The meaning of the words territorial subordination will not be discussed at this point. I shall deal with this later. There is one question though in this connection, what other official agencies were there in Athens with which you had to cooperate?
A There were quite a number of those. On this sketch on the right at the top I have only mentioned the three most important agencies of this kind with which I worked together, there was the German Legation, then the Greek government and finally the Italian 11th Army.
Q To make it quite clear, I would like to briefly mention those units which were subordinate to you. There was one replacement battalion, three local defense battalions who served for security purposes, other supply units and for training purposes the 11th Airforce field division; is that correct?
A Yes, it is.
Q Now I would like to discuss with you briefly your tasks as commander Southern Greece. If it please the Tribunal, to simplify the oral examination I have included in document Speidel No. 15 on page 2 and the following pages of document book 2 a summarizing description. I am offering this document as Speidel exhibit No. 6. This is in document book 2 for Speidel on page 2 and the following pages.
It will be offered as exhibit No. 6. I thought this was an expedient procedure in order to abbreviate as much as possible the oral examination. General, I would like to ask the following question, did you compile this summary and is it in all instances correct?
A To both questions, it is yes.
Q Will you now briefly name a few of the most important tasks which you had as commander Southern Greece?
A I will summarize these tasks in three large catagories, first tasks concerned with the troops, then territorial tasks and then the task of executive powers. Troop tasks were the following, again briefly summarizing, training of units subordinate to me including the 11th Airforce Field division, second organization and planning of the coastal defense in the German coastal sectors and third and that was the most extensive task, the direction of all supplies to Africa, Crete and the other islands, The second category contains all those tasks which one can summarize under territorial tasks, the representing of the interests of the German armed forces toward the individual parts of the Wehrmacht, toward the German Legation, the political representatives and toward the Italians and also toward the Greek government. The third category is those tasks pertaining to executive power, the maintenance of law and order and judicial jurisdiction over the population.
Q By which organizational order had your tasks been established?
A That was the frequently previously mentioned directive, the Fuehrer directive 47.
Q That is a document of the prosecution contained in document book 9, which was offered under exhibit 242 and is contained on page 171 in the English text and page 168 of the German text. It is prosecution exhibit 242.
A Yes, I found it. Thank you. Nothing special is to be added to this Fuehrer Instruction 47. I can only stress that which has been established in this Fuehrer directive, which I pointed out on the map just before, that of the borders of the area under the command of the Commander Southern Greece. It has also been established that the military commander Southern Greece is not competent for Crete, hut in every aspect the commander of the fortress Crete. With regard to the authority of the territorial commander the last page of this O.K.W. directive states very clearly that the commander in chief southeast has the authority of a territorial commander in Greece and that in the operational area, which included all Greece, he had executive powers through the military commanders and was subordinate to them.
That seems to me the pertinent parts of the Fuehrer instruction No. 47.
Q That is all then about the channels of command and area of authority in Southern Greece. General, when looking through the documents of the prosecution pertaining to the year 1942, I cannot find you charged with any incident in that year, however, in prosecution exhibit 261 in document book 10 of the prosecution, page 76 of the English text and page 53 of the German text, I find a report of the commander in chief southeast addressed to the O.K.H., dated 7 January, 1943. This would be document book 10 of the prosecution, page 76 in the English text. In this report, under the heading "Greece" it is reported that eighteen hostages were shot. If it please the Tribunal, I would like to add here that 1 had informed the Secretary General in writing of the document books needed, during the examination of General Speidel, in accordance with the suggestion made by the Tribunal some time ago.
JUDGE BURKE: They will he here shortly.
BE DR. WEISGERBER:
Q Under the heading, "Greece" it is here reported that eighteen hostages were short. What does that report mean, General?
A This report of the commander in chief south east, dated 7 January 1945 addressed to the O.K.W. is undoubtedly addressed comes from the Commander Southern Greece. The report contains retaliation measures, however, it does not show up the connections and the causes for the events since the report is given in a very concentrated form and the original report we do not have available.
Q Do you recall those events, General?
A Yes. I do completely, namely because this was my first reprisal measure, which moved me at the time very deeply. To the best of my recollection, those were two different complexes of problems, which were somehow connected.
There were sabotage acts and the surprise attack on the Island Salamis and then there was serious sabotage on ships in the harbor of Pyreaus.
Q Did you find any details about this case in the documents of the prosecution?
A No, in the documents of the prosecution there are no indications about this case, however, in the documents sent from Washington I found an Ic report of the commander southern Greece, which explains the circumstances which led to the measure and thus I remembered all the facts.
Q If it please the Tribunal this Ic report has been included in document book Speidel 3. I know that this document book 3 is not yet in the hands of the Tribunal. To the best of my information this document will be in the hands of the Tribunal by tomorrow. I shall offer this Ic report in evidence at a later point, however, in this connection I would like to discuss the Ic report in question.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Doctor, do you wish at this time to offer it subject to its later production? You may do that if you desire.
DR. WEISGERBER: If the Tribunal agrees to this, I shall be glad to do it.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I assume there is no objection on your part, Mr. Fenstermacher.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: No, if your Honors please.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well. You may make your designation.
DR. WEISGERBER: This is Document Speidel No, 54 in Document Book Speidel III on page 58 of the German text. I am afraid I can't for the moment state the Page in the English document book because I don't have the translation yet. I am offering this document as Speidel Exhibit No. 7.
Q General, can you, on the basis of this document explain to us which sabotage acts took place at the time?
A Since Christmas 1942 there were surprise acts, sabotage acts; raids had increased very suddenly and kept increasing continuously. I am going to subdivide these incidents into three groups.
Group 1 was concentrated on the island of Salamis. This island had been built up to be a naval fortress. Around the end of 1942, beginning of 1943, there were every night raids on sentries and on defense installations, instruments, et cetera. The report which is under discussion here mentions in five consecutive nights such raids on the island of Salamis. There were dead and wounded as a consequence of such raids.
Group 2 was directed against the place opposite the island of Salamis on the mainland in and near Pyraeus. There were further five sabotage acts of a smaller scale.
And finally Group 3 consisted of two serious sabotage acts on ships on the 3rd and 4th of January 1943 during the night in one case a mine would be removed from a transport vessel which was cone and another ship had been heavily damaged by this mine and the ship had to be stranded.
Those were 12 cases of sabotage within nine days and we did not succeed in a single one of these cases to get hold of the perpetrators.
Q Were these sabotage acts of a very serious nature, General?
A The sabotage acts which I described just now and which had started very suddenly were mainly directed against installations of the navy, one against the only submarine base, of the single German base in the eastern Mediterranean and against the wharves connected with this submarine base; and then the attacks were directed against the shipping transport area. Obviously, all these acts were based on one unified plan.
Q Was this unified plan of a very dangerous nature?
A Yes, it was and for reasons these planned sabotage acts could serve to be a preparation for a large scale action from the sea against the only naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean. They could also aim at the elimination of this base with other means. Too, the obviously desired damaging and decimating of German shipping space indicated the same direction. This tendency also could only be understood within the scope of the whole of the war situation of that time in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean.
The supply of Southern Greece depended to a large extent on the sea communications, mainly on the functioning of the sea route TriestePyraeus, but not only the supply and the defense of Southern Greece but above all Rommel's war and conduct of war in Africa depended on this supply.
Furthermore, of course, the defense of Crete and the other islands depended on this.
Q General, to what extend did the conduct of war in Africa affect your tasks in Greece or vice versa?
AAs Military Commander for Southern Greece I had, as I indicated initially, the task to supply the army of Rommel in Africa, his equipment and manpower; I had to organize and to direct this supply. The fighting force and life of Rommel's Army depended on the functioning of this supply route.
Q Were the naval installations within your area which also include shipping space of particular importance for your task?
A. That is correct. Athens-Pyraeus, which is one conception, presented the key for the supply of all fighting units in the Eastern Mediterranean area, Africa, Crete and the Islands. The maintenance of the supply means by which I means shipping space in particular and the possibility of repairing ships were of an operational importance for the total warfare within this area. Therefore, I had to see seemingly small occurrences involving a few persons within the framework of the whole war situation.
Q. There was then, according to your conviction, a connection between the sabotage acts in Pyraeus and on Salamis and the war events in Africa.
A. There can be no doubt about that. I had to see a connection here if I thought a little further than the area which presented my own area. The suddenly and starting sabotage acts against the means of warfare against the navy had an effect of reciprocal action on Rommel's conduct of war and it was a natural consequence that they also affected the then starting counter measures of the british.
Q Were these sabotage acts a serious danger and damage to the whole of the warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean area?
A. Yes, every ton of shipping space was precious -- precious because it was irreplaceable, It was irreplaceable because the means of repair were very poor. These possibilities for repair became increasingly restricted because the supply position became increasingly worse through every loss of shipping space. It was just a vicious circle and losses of shipping space occurred constantly by British submarine attacks on shinning bases. It was, therefore, quite obvious that the small available shinning space was not only threatened by enemy action but also by sabotage acts. However, shipping space at that particular point was of decisive importance because at the same time the land routes were endangered through intentional blowing up of railway lines, and thus they functioned less and less. I am only reminded of the blowing up of the Gorgopotamus Bridge.
Here, too, was a fact of cause and effect between shipping routes and the functioning of land routes. I have seen from this point of view it was a military necessity to take stringent measures in these incidents, because I had to prevent the further occurrence of sabotage acts on shipping space. There were no other means.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: At this point, Dr. Weisgerber, we will continue with the case tomorrow morning at nine-thirty.
THE MARSHAL: The court will he in recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 11 December 1947, at 0900 hours.)
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF MILITARY TRIBUNAL V, CASE VII IN THE MATTER OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AGAINST WILHELM LIST, ET AL, DEFENDANTS, SITTING AT NURNBERG, GERMANY, ON DECEMBER 11, 1947, 0930, JUSTICE BURKE PRESIDING.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America, and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all of the defendants are present in the Courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all of the defendants are present in the Courtroom, except the defendant von Weichs, who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION continued WILHELM SPEIDEL BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. General Speidel, yesterday shortly before the recess, we had discussed the conditions in Athens, Pyracus and Salamis, around the turn of the year 1942 to 1945. On the basis of the 1-C report of your agency, dated 10 January 1945, you discussed sabotage cases and surprise attacks which occurred and gave details. Will you now please, very briefly, give us the reasons why you saw in these sabotage acts a serious danger for the total conduct of war in the Eastern Mediterranean?
A. I tried yesterday to explain why in this accumulation of sabotage acts within a small area, and through the sabotage acts on similar objectives, I had to see a unified plan; a plan, furthermore, which could decisively influence our conduct of war in the Southeast area.
It was intolerable from an operational point of view, because the existing small amount of shipping space being further reduced, not only by air attacks, submarines, etc., but even by the sabotage action mentioned yesterday. Shipping space at the time was particularly decisive for yet another reason, and that is because simultaneously and systematically the only weak land-route connecting Greece and Europe was disrupted by serious blowing-up of railroad lines.
I further said that between the disruption of the naval installations and shipping space, and the destruction of the railroad lines there was undoubtedly some connection. I would like to recall in this connection the blowing up of the Gorgopotamus bridge in Southern Greece, which has been discussed in earlier sessions here, and which considerably endangered our supply.
Based on all these perplexities, I saw that in this situation it was extremely necessary under all circumstances to take stringent measures.
Q. What were the reprisal measures you ordered?
A. One, I authorized the commander of the Fortress Salamis to carry out three reprisal measures. Two, I myself ordered 15 reprisal measures to be carried out in Pyracus, and, third, as a deterent and as a warning, I had 40 hostages arrested who were later on released.
Q. Were these reprisal measures successful?
A. Undoubtedly, they were extremely successful, because in Salamis the continued series of sabotage actions stopped very suddenly, and there was no sabotage on skipping space for months to come.
DR. WEISGRUBER: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like further to offer in evidence from Speidel Document Book 3, the following documents.