This document contains a number of daily reports by the Commander in Chief Southeast from the period of time between 1 September and 15 September 1944, I don't know, General, why this particular document should incriminate you.
A Well, nor do I. There is one passage "Raids in the Big Cities," then it says "Disengaging movements in the Peloponnese go according to plan. Attacks by strong bands on construction trains. Losses of our own," and that is the only reference I can discover in Exhibit 497. I really can't see anything incriminating here.
Q The next document incriminating you is NOKW 964, which is Exhibit 498 on page 139 of the English and page 112 of the German. This report contains an incident in the area of Stip and Skeplje in the course of which four villages were burned down and 160 suspects were shot. General, please give us your comments about this?
A In Exhibit 498 I cannot find any connection with my corps. On the 16 October we were on our retreat, on the 12th and 13th Athens having been evacuated we were north of Lamia, and probably had reached Lurissa with the Operational Staff, and therefore we were not concerned with engagements in Northern Macedonia or even Bulgaria. I know that Salviati was with the 22nd Division, which had come up from Crete, but that is all I can say about this.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal, please, at this time I should like to offer a few defense documents. They are documents which have been submitted previously by the Prosecution, but they had been incomplete and therefore were in need of supplementation, because only if you have the addition one can see the connection quite clearly. The first document in this series is contained in Volume V for Felmy. It is document 106 on page 74 of that document book. It is offered as Exhibit 52. This document is an extract from Document NOKW 755 contained in Document Book 19. It says there under "Greece:"
"Band attacks on Italian escort and motorized column turned back at Levadia. Attack by strong bands on Italian, garrison at Almiros (25 SW of Volos) repulsed after a battle lasting several hours. 16 Italian dead, 66 wounded, 35 enemy dead......"
It goes on in the photostat copy: "2 villages occupied by the bands bands bombed by the Luftwaffe."
The part I read just now is not included in the document book.
Q General, I would like to ask you now, do you know anything of the bombing by the Luftwaffe of these two villages occupied by the bands. Excuse me -- did you have anything to do with the committment of the Luftwaffe?
A What was the date, please?
Q The report comes from the Commander-in-Chief Southeast to the OKW, and is dated 15 August 1943.
A On the 15th of August 1943 I and my headquarters were in the Peloponnese. Incidents occurring in the area of Volos or southeast of Volos, were none of my concern. I had nothing to say there. Therefore committing the Luftwaffe was none of my concern. I was in command of Army units, not Luftwaffe units, although I wore a Luftwaffe uniform, but that had its special reasons.
Q Was at that time Levadia part of your Corps area?
A I said just now we were situated in the Peloponnes, that is to say Levadia was not part of the area of the 68th Corps.
Q Where is Levadia situated?
A Levadia is situated in Boeotia.
Q Would you please show it on the map?
A Here is Athens. This is the road to Lamia, and Levadia is about half way.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The next document in Volume Felmy No. 5 is document 107 on page 75. It is offered as Exhibit 53. This is a daily report by the High Command Army Corps East, addressed to the Commander in Chief Southeast, of the 5th October 1943. In the document of the Prosecution, which is contained in Document Book 19 there are missing the words "Under 68th Army Corps: 22nd Mountain Army Corps." There it says "As reprisal for the murdered regiment commander, " and, then it says "Village of Akmetopos completely destroyed. All inhabitants shot."
This incident, in other words, does not concern the 68th Army Corps, but the 22nd Mountain Army Corps. This incident has been discussed when General Lanz was examined.
The next document offered from Document Book Felmy V is Document 109, which is to be found on page 78 and it is offered as Exhibit 54. May I just read this one paragraph, which has again been emitted in the document book of the Prosecution. The document is also contained in Volume 19 of the Prosecution. It is a Daily report by the High Command Army Group E, addressed to the Commander in Chief Southeast, of the 21st December. It says there under 68th Corps:
"68th Corps :On Sparta-Tripolis road a band attack on our truck column. Our losses: 7 dead, 11 wounded. The area along the read is being combed out. State of emergency proclaimed in Sparta. Telephone connections Sparta - Tripolis, Sparta. - Cythion - Molaki and Molaki - Monemwasia interrupted. Attack on Greek volunteers south of Sparta repulsed in bloody fight. Renewed sabotage on telephone line connections near Lamia."
Q General, will you very briefly give us your comments on this?
A This is one of the surprise attacks along the Sparta-Tripolis road. This I alluded to yesterday when I said that down there a total of four attacks had taken place. That this entailed the destruction of telephone lines, more or less, at the same time had become a daily occurrence.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The next document from Felmy Document Book V is Document 110 on page 79, offered as Exhibit No. 55. This is an extract from Document NOKW 1012 contained in Prosecution Document Book 20. It is a "Ic Activity Report" with enclosures for the War Diary of the Headquarters of 1st Panzer Division from 1 June 1943 to 16 October 1943. The particular passage I read this morning when we discussed the document.
The next document will be Felmy No. 112, in the same Document Book, to be found on page 82, offered as Exhibit 56.
Here we are concerned with an extract from Document NOKW 1363 in Document Book 20 of the Prosecution. I shall read from the Daily report of the "Ic" Daily Report of 20 September.
"Night of 17/18. Plundering of a Camp of the Liaison Staff for road construction in Kalanos (8 Km. SE Chalandritsa) Explosions on the road Patras-Chalandritsa-Kalavrita; bridge near Chalandritsa (still passable), at 2 points near Lopesi, explosions occurred; explosions occurred at 5 points between Polosi and Kalanos (part of the road not passable, explosions E Kalanos, Band Group engaged on the outskirts of Pyrgos, 1 man shot.
In Metsena (12 Km S Patras) 6 Italian officers (among them three staff officers of the Piedmont Division) and 300 soldiers in a band group (statement of an Italian soldier)."
The next document follows on this document immediately. It is Document 113, page 83, offered as Exhibit 57. This document is an extract from Document NOKW 1557, and is contained in Document Book XXI.
"Information as regards the situation.
...............
III.) Balkans, Position 21.7 22.00 o'clock
I). Army Group E:
LXVIII Army Corps: N. Pilos an own motor vehicle convoy attacked by superior bands and destroyed. 78 of our soldiers dead, 6 missing, motor vehicles burned out. Enemy losses up to the present in the pursuit party operation N. Pirgos, 288 dead."
..............
Reprisal measures were not ordered.
The next document will be Felmy 114 on page 84 of Document Book V.
JUDGE BURKE: Just a moment. What was the last sentence you read of Exhibit 57, please?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The last words were "288 dead," and the last think I said was my own addition, which is not contained in the document.
Felmy Document No. 114, on page 84 is an extract from Document NOWK 1641, contained in Prosecution Document Book 21. It is on page 34 in my document book. It is offered as Exhibit 58. This is a Daily Report by the Commander-in-Chief Southeast addressed to the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The date being 15 August 1944. The words "68th Army Corps" are contained in the Prosecution Document Book in the report concerning the instance in Crete, according to which 50 suspects were shot, and the impression was thereby created as though the 68th Army Corps was responsible for the shooting of the 50 suspects there.
And the last document of this type which I would like to offer is Document Felmy 117, contained on page 87. It is offered as Exhibit 59. This is an extract from Document NOKW 1667 contained in Prosecu tion Document Book 25.
In the report concerning Attica it says:
"Attica: Reinforced Company Light Infantry Regiment 22 (L) 11 mutilated corpses north of Mirini (see Daily Report dated 7 Feb.) and one seriously wounded Greek (presumably a bandit) recovered...." This is a short report by the 68th Army Corps. The paragraph read by me is again not contained in the Prosecution Document Book.
May it please the Tribunal, I would like briefly to refer to Document Book 24 of the Prosecution. In that Volume III, Document NOKW 1783, Exhibit 547, which we should discuss -- it may be found on page 246 of the English and page 180 of the German. This is a document which has been used to incriminate General Felmy. It contains a list of names of persons named for execution. This list has been submitted by the Iraklien district headquarters on 5 July 1943. It has been sent on to the Commander of the 22nd Infantry Division. Iraklien is situated on Crete. General, please give us your comments on this?
A. I see no connection between the Island of Crete and the area of the XVIII Corps. On 5 July 1943 the General Headquarters was situated in Peloponnes and had nothing to do with Crete.
Q. This is the only document in Book XXIV which we need discuss. and I shall now come to the last document book of the Prosecution, which is Document Book XXV. The first document, General, which has been used to incriminate you in this document book is NOKW 1667, which was Exhibit 571. It may be found on page 76 of the English and page 59 of the German. It is a report by the XVIII Corps, the date being 20 March 1944. There mention is made of a band attack on a group of the North Caucasian First Battalion on Kymi in Euboea. In that operation, according to the report, two Greek policemen were killed. As a reprisal measure the destruction of houses of well-known Communists was ordered in several villages in the neighborhood of Kymi. General, can you recall this incident?
A. No, I could not give you any details here. All I know is that in the neighborhood of Kymi we had frequent clashes with the bands, because they were attacking the coal mines in that neighborhood.
We have mentioned these coal mines before today on several occasions which supplied the electricity work in Athens.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I shall now turn to page 84 of the English, which is page 66 of the German text. Under 18 May 1944, the Ia of the XVIII Army Corps reports a reprisal measure for repeated acts of sabotage on telephone lines. That 17 well-known Communists were hanged on telephone poles along the Road Chamari-Erveni northwest of Xylecastren. The same incident also occurred in NOKW 1804, which was Exhibit 579, and is contained in the Daily Report by the Ic of the Corps of the 17th of May 1944. This may be found on page 124 of the English and page 94 of the German. General, what about this incident, did you know it at the time?
A I do not recollect it. Whether it was reported at the time I cannot state from my memory.
Q The next document used to incriminate you is NOKW-1803, Exhibit No. 578, on Page 115 of the English and Page 87 of the German Document Book. There we are concerned, first, with a letter by the Commandant of the Sea Defense of Attica, dated 31 May 1944, and addressed to the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division. In that letter a proposal is made by the Commandant of the Sea Defense of Attica to the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division that, in view of the band situation such as it is in the area of Marathon, certain precautionary and reprisal measures should be taken. General, do you remember whether the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division, to which this letter was addressed, followed this proposal by the Commandant of the Sea Defense of Attica and took any steps?
A I am afraid I could not say any more. All I remember is that around that period of time there was, in the neighborhood of Raphina, which is on the eastern side of Attica--roughly in the neighborhood of Marathon, which is mentioned here, there was an incident in which two officers had been murdered because officers were reported as having been lost. That is what I remember. I believe they were members of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division stationed in one of the harbor towns, namely Raphina, I believe with a company. That is all I can say about this document.
Q This brings me to Page 116 of the English Document Book and Page 88 of the German Document Book. There we have a report by the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division where we are concerned with what was known as Operation "Falke." That report has its climax in the proposition to have the prisoners and people who were found to be definite criminal types arrested during the operation, and all who had propagated Communist tendencies to be used as hostages. This report was signed by the Commanding Officer of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division, General Kohler. Was this proposal by the Divisional Commander complied with, and did the Corps reach a decision?
A Well, you couldn't see that in the document. I see on top, under Chief, the initial "G." This might be Colonel Goerhardt, who was my Chief of Staff and who later lost his life in an airplane crash. And then we have the initials "K.G.," illegible. My "F" is usually quite distinct when I initial something, and I always put the date next to it. I cannot say, therefore, whether this was submitted to me, nor do I remember what happened afterwards. Operation "Falke" was one of the many operations against the hands which was touched upon before today, some of which took place on Euboea, and some of which took place on Boeatia. This is all I am able to tell you about this document.
Q This brings me to Page 118 of the English and Page 89 of the German Document Book. There we have combat reports by the Combat Group Froech, concerning the Operation "Falke." There are two reports of the 6th and 17th of June 1944, and mention is made of the shooting of four bandits by Greek police and of three armed women shot by members of the Citizens' Guard. Were you connected with these incidents in any way?
A Major Froech, who took part in the "Falke" Operation, as I said this morning--I remember the name and this is why I deduce it must have been an operation by the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division--the Greek Policemen and the Citizen Guard on Euboea had nothing to do with us. They attached themselves to our operations on some occasions. All I know is that EDES units had been formed at the beginning of 1944 in Euboea by the Higher SS and Police Leader. A certain dualism appeared in the band system. The Greek witness, for instance, condemned the EDES people who worked with us. He called them Quislings. The people must have had their reasons because had they remained alone they would not have been safe of their lifes because of ELAS; therefore, they preferred to contact us rather than be killed by ELAS. I believe, if the War Reporter of General Zervas, whom we saw here, had been on Euboea he might have formed a little different picture of the situation from what he told us here, and thus the leading man of the EDES people in Athens--I do not wish to intentionally give his name because at the moment he is one of the ministers in office; I do not want to incriminate him politically--and thereupon the EDES formations were formed in Euboea, and that is the reason who they participated in this operation.
As far as events in the incident which are reported here are concerned they had that connection.
Q This brings me to the last document contained in Volume XXV, which has been used to incriminate you, and thereby I go to the last document of the Prosecution which I should discuss. This is document NOKW-1804, which was Exhibit No. 579. It may be found on Page 119 in the English Document Book and Page 90 in the German. This is a Daily Report by Ic of the LXVIIIth Corps; on Page 121 of the English and Page 92 of the German we find in the Daily Report of 23 April 1944 that 12 Communists are reported to have been shot to death in Tripolis as a retaliation measure for a surprise attack on a lieutenant of the Police. General, who ordered that retaliation measure?
A I'm afraid I can't tell you, nor does the report make that clear. Moreover, it's completely unclear as to what unit this lieutenant of the Police belonged. General Headquarters had no police units under it. They had a police platoon it's true, under an officer, but it was not that officer because that platoon was stationed in Athens in the Headquarters of the Corps. I could not say, therefore, who ordered the retaliation for the surprise attack on the lieutenant of the Police.
Q This brings me to Page 123 of the English and Page 93 of the German. There in the Daily Report of 8 May 1944 is a reprisal measure for surprise attacks on Euboea--the shooting of a total of 48 hostages, as reported from three villages. Do you remember that incident?
A Reference is made here to the Daily Reports of the 11th and 26th of April, but as those Daily Reports are not available, no real connection can be reconstructed; so I cannot make any statements again.
Q On Page 124 of the English and Page 94 of the German there were, according to the Report of the 19th of May 1944, 10 hostages shot to death for a surprise attack in Megalopefko.
Do you know that incident?
A No, nor can I remember ever having heard of it.
Q On Page 124 of the English and Page 95 of the German there is a Daily Report of the 26th of May, and as a reprisal measure for the attempted blasting of a bridge, which was preceded by a surprise attack on the bridge south of Kymi, the shooting of 26 hostages is reported, as is the destruction of 45 houses in a village near Kymi. Do you remember that incident, General?
A No, I do not. We have attempted to obtain information about members of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division, who might have been participating in this, because the replacement battalion of that Division was situated in Chalkis, but the people concerned could not recollect any such thing, nor am I in a position to make any statements about it.
THE PRESIDENT: At this point we win discontinue until 0930 tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned at 1630 to resume session at 0930 5 December 1947)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 December 1947, 0930, Justice Wennerstrum presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain if the defendants are all present in the Courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom with the exception of the Defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Mueller-Torgow.
HELMUTH FELMY - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q If the Tribunal please, yesterday I stopped discussing the last Prosecution document in Volume XXV. May I continue on Page 125 of the English Document Book and Page 95 of the German Document Book?
General, in the report of the Ic of 14th June we find that the destruction of a monastery and a nursing home near Furka, in the neighborhood of Lamia, is reported, because they had been identified beyond any doubt as band shelters, that is, the monastery and the nursing home served as quarters for bands.
Will you give us your comments about that please?
A I can only say quite generally that it happened not infrequently that monasteries which were situated on mountain tops were used as strongpoints for the bands. They were perched up on these mountains like castles. I do not remember the special case which is mentioned here.
Q Then, there is the Ic report of the 17th of June 1944. In that report we find that as a retaliation measure for a surprise attack on a major in Kalamata that 27 Communists were shot to death in the locality of the incident, and for the attack on Valtetsi 10 Communists were shot to death. Can you give us your comment about that please?
A It is difficult to recall this. The major, for instance, is not identified by his unit. It says "a major in Kalamata." I would not think that he was a member of the LXVIIIth Corps because his unit or at least his name would have been reported. Who this major was I don't know. Perhaps He was a Greek. I really don't know; nor do I know what I could say about the attack on Valtetsi. I cannot even think what Valtetsi is. Probably it was a strongpoint of the volunteer formations and an attack was made on it, which happened quite frequently, particularly when the unit as such had left the village, which the bands found out soon by means of their first-class intelligence system. We experienced such incidents quite frequently. That is all I can give by way of explanation about this report.
Q And then finally we have the report of the 30th of June which is a collective report for June, 1944. There the individual reports are obviously contained in it. Is that right?
A Yes, that is correct. Usually at the end of the month you would give a concise review of the week, concerning incidents, operations, etc., and in June and July a number of operations against the bands took place in an increasing extent in the Peloponnes because it had been declared a combat zone and also on Euboea and Boeotia. On Euboea and Boeotia the operations lasted until August. Later on the troops withdrew.
Q This brings me to the end of a discussion of all the documents which have been used by the Prosecution to incriminate General Felmy.
General, I would now like, once again, to discuss the declaration of the Peloponnes as a combat zone in May, 1944. Did that measure, namely that the Peloponnes was declared a combat zone, relieve the band situation in the Peloponnes in your opinion and in your experience?
A Yes, without any doubt. I said before, I believe on one occasion, that I regret that we did not take that measure earlier because the surprise attacks and acts of sabotage decreased very visibly. The intimate contact between the civilian population and the bands, as far as the passing of intelligence was concerned, had become so intense that only by striking measures could the situation be believed. The many attacks on vehicle columns, which any way moved about only in convoys, prove unequivocally that the bands which had their helpers and assistants in every German garrison know every occasion when these convoys would be put together and set on route.
Q You mean to say, General, that the success by the bands frequently were based on collaboration with the population?
A There cannot be any doubt about that. To convey information they preferred to use women or adolescent boys because they would appear to be least suspected. By their contact men they know in good time when we made preparations for band operations -- concentration troops, for instance. In the open country the shepherds were the most important ones because there were so many herds of sheet about. On their flutes they passed on certain signals. They understood each other more or less as the Negroes do in the jungles with their tom toms. The telling of church bells had special significance, as well as other methods of this type. Primitive though they were they were effective, quite apart from modern equipment, such as radio transmitters, which the bands also had at their disposal in some cases, and of which we captured quite a few.
Q Now, this brings me to the last chapter, General. We should now discuss conditions in Athens during the last three months of the German occupation. Let us follow up the discussion which we had a few days ago concerning conditions in the Greek capital. How was it in Athens that conditions developed in the last stages of the German occupation?
A Well, in Athens there glimmered a fire under the surface; the influence of the EAM or ELAS grew. Shootings at night increased in frequency. On a number of occasions of German troops, such as Naval, Artillery, and Anti-aircraft Artillery, which were stationed in the immediate vicinity of Athens on the fringes of the city were attacked.
On the sacred road which leads from Athens to Eleusis, very near Athens, the Commanding Officer of the Corps Reconnaissance Detachment, Lt. Col. von Monsdorf, was killed, when we wanted to help, on the spur of the moment, to disentangle a confusion which had been caused by a surprise attack on a few vehicles. Therefore, by the end of September I felt compelled to issue a special warning to the City of Athens. I dropped leaflets and stipulated in them that those elements of the population which still had their common sense should exercise influence against the disintegrating elements. I was aware of the fact that I was fighting windmills, but I did not want to leave a stone unturned; therefore, I explored every avenue. I know that the present Prime Minister, Sophoulis, wrote in the Greek underground press to the same effect, and he exhorted his follow citizens not to make these pointless attacks on German troops because the end could not be good if they continued.
Q Did Prime Minister Sophoulis, at that time, hold an official position in the Greek Government?
A No, all he was was a leader of the Liberal Democratic Party. The center in Greece consists of a great many political parties.
Q Before he wrote this article in the press which you mentioned just now, had he been in the Chaidari Concentration Camp?
A I think he must have been because I went with Legation Councillor von Graevenitz, the so-called branch office of Neubacher as we called it, which was the remanant, as it were, of the former German Legation, or it was Archbishop Damaskinos who asked me or gave me a message to the effect that I should use my influence to have him released from the concentration camp.
With him the name of the new Prime Minister Gonatas was mentioned and a man called Kaffandaris, who was entirely unknown to me. The name of Sophoulis, of course, was known to me. That is how I and the man in charge of the SD, Standartenfuehrer Blume, had a conversation, and, in my opinion, the release was due to this intervention, and perhaps Neubacher exercised a certain amount of pressure. I don't know all the details. Well, any way, they were, I think, released from Chaidari. Blume was a little obtuse but not very fanatical because otherwise I would not have achieved anything if he had not complied. I could not force him, of course. I could only persuade him.
Q General, was the city area of Athens made subordinate to you?
A Yes, in the last third of September; so this is how I remember it. I was at last solely in command. The Higher SS and Police Leader had disappeared. The SD had vanished. The Military Commander, General Scheurlen at the time was fighting somewhere along the Bulgarian Front, because we had now reached the end of September with the result that I had no other agencies with whom I had to negotiate and to whom I could not issue orders.
Q. Now, that you had become competent for Athens,
THE COURT INTERPRETER: The sound system has suddenly become very bad. I believe the system is all right now, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you should repeat the last question.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. After you had become competent for athens did you take action against the Communist quarters of the city, where the ELAS bands had established their rule by military means?
A. We thought a lot about that very seriously, but ultimately I did not take that extreme measure. Fighting in a city -- a big city -- is a highly delicate affair. One cannot see what the enemy is doing. Both sides will suffer heavy losses, and from the word "go" one has to use the most crude means. One must either bomb them from the air or he must shell them with artillery and trench mortars where block after block has to be smashed, so that the troops can move in. I admit quite frankly that I was afraid of losses on our side and also that I took into consideration that the population would suffer in that type of fighting inevitably, because I know what direction I am to take and what I am to shell, whereas the population, since they are quite helpless, cannot do anything, Also, I wanted, if at all possible, to avoid the shelling of Athens.
Q. General, did you, at that time, hold conversations with Archbishop Damaskinos?
A. Yes, at least two, as far as I remember. In our first conversation I told him to use his influence on the radical elements. The metropolite of Pireus in the Peloponnes had joined the band, and I used that opportunity to draw the Archbishop's attention to the fact that Communist elements were greatly strengthened by an action of that sort, and that would have its effect on conditions in Athens.
I was afraid at that time that something similar might happen, such as the Warsaw uprising. The signal for the attack by ELAS could occur any day. We knew about their ammunition and their depots of weapons, that is, the reserves which they had built up. The situation was highly uncomfortable, even more uncomfortable than in any big battle at the front, as we were hedged in in a big city and had the responsibility for the population. Therefore, I asked the archbishop to use his influence to avoid an explosion because I could not answer for the consequences, I told him. He declared that he was prepared to do that, and I think, without any doubt, that he did so. I think, on that occasion, he expressed the request that we should not, under any circumstances, blow up the dam near Marathon. It is a sort of lake which has a dam at one shore. The Marathon Lake was very important for the water supply of Athens. It had been built in the 30's by an American firm, and it was the first modern water supply for Athens. The few fountains which still worked in the city did not, of course, suffice in any sense of the word. Even the quantity of water in that lake depended on rain and it was not too rich for the population. The population in Athens had increased during the war. Preparations for the blowing up of the dam must have been known to the Archbishop.
Q. What did you do after he expressed that request?
A. I realized that had we blown up the dam chaos would have broken out in the city because even during that part of the year, the end of September and the beginning of October -
because our departure had not been timed yet -- it was still very hot down there. I knew that the Marathon dam was on the list of things to be blown up. As I could find out thereupon, it was supposed to have been effected by a special detachment of the Reich Main Security Office, under Himmler, a detachment which was competent for special sabotage activities.