The fortifications also had to be adapted to the new tactical knowledge gained, and this new tactical knowledge was based on experience made when the Allies had landed in Italy, in Normandy later, gained from Commando operations in the Adriatic Sea. Therefore, I was very often on official trips. I felt and realized that that was my main task. I knew all bases in my area and I have selected a large part of these bases myself.
When the Italians left the Alliance, we had to do things all over again. The inspection of a regimental sector, for instance, on the Peloponnes, took easily five days. The reason for this was partly the bad communication situation, and because of the danger from the air it was only possible to fly at night time so that a round trip through all the islands Zante or Paros--Zante is spelled Z-a-n-t-e and Paros is spelled P-a-r-o-s. Zante - Paros. Melos (M-e-l-o-s) - A round trip through these islands also might take four to five days.
Q Did the Allies make their preparations together with the bands for the landing?
A That was quite obvious. In Cairo. The Allies entertained constant communication with the bands. Repeatedly we had found radio transmitters of British origin on the occasion of band operations. We knew that parachutists were frequently dropped in order to maintain contact with the bands. In the final analysis, that was the whole meaning of the inciting of the bands and the supporting of the bands; namely, that at that moment when the Allies landed somewhere, the bands started operations and attacked us from the rear.
After all, the British did not support the band to the extent they did for nothing.
Q What was the situation, Particularly in Attica?
A The distances in Attica were shorter, of course, but the inspection of fortifications also took up a certain amount of time, and new such field positions and fortifications were established when I came to Attica. Furthermore, the Army Group had subordinated to me a railroad security regiment which was to protect the railroad line from Athens via Lamia.
Lamia is spelled L-a-m-i-a. That was a task which should really have been part of the work of the Military Commander because in my opinion it was a territorial problem.
I don't know why the Army Group subordinated this railroad security regiment to me. It caused a lot of extra work for us since along that railroad there were quite a number of very valuable installations. That threw over the whole organization as it had been up to that point, it bared the plain land of troops and attached particular importance to the structures there. There was the Bralo Bridge, (B-r-a-l-o) Bridge, which was a viaduct of over 140 meters height which bridged the gulf and there was a similar bridge, the Asopotamos Bridge (A-s-o-p-o-t-a-m-o-s). Then there was the Gorgopotamos Bridge (G-o-r-g-o-p-o-t-a-m-o-s). Then there were a number of tunnels, particularly so near Lamia.
Q General, did you also have to deal with political problems?
A Yes, political questions also took up a considerable amount of my time, particularly after the collapse of the Italians, when it became obvious that the EAM had gained increased influence. We had quite good ideas about what was going on down there in their sphere of foreign politics, so that the written works which appeared now about the fightings in Greece do not surprise me in the least.
I have no intention of quoting them in order not to make Mr. Fenstermacher raise objections but there is nothing new in them, only confirmation of what we could prove at the time only in part, but where we knew quite well what was intended. These political questions, since the Corps Headquarters had the task of defending against possible enemy landing, had a great influence on the conduct of war. However, the whole situation was involved and complicated as very much is in the Eastern countries. There were the Greek inner political currents which existed. Then there was the constant change of influence which was exercised from the exile government of Mr. Papandreu in Cairo.
At that time even we knew of the conference in the Libanon where six communists had to be included in the Papandreu Government. In order to cover up for existing differences of opinion in the exile government; many politicians in Athens saw a mystery in this fact and they felt very uncomfortable about it because they didn't like that particular solution. We received information concerning mutiny which had occurred in the newly created Greek Army of Liberation.
In spring and summer, 1944, this mutiny occurred and in my opinion it can be traced back to the influence of communists. They wanted to prevent that certain circles loyal to the government would gain influence in Greece and possibly dominate the situation there if the exile government or parts of the exile government would be transferred to the Greek mainland. There were a large number of political questions which I only touched upon here and which influenced the whole situation.
Q Was taking care of the troops also part of your tasks, General?
A Certainly it was. Of course, I had to look after my soldiers and had to see that they were well off. That became quite a difficult problem because of the inflation. It was a problem which occupied a great deal of our time because we did not dispose about the necessary means. In some way, we had to find a way out of this situation and to better the position of the troops. However, not only the material part of the was importance but also the spiritual welfare of the troops was quite a difficult problem. One has to know these isolated strong points on the Peloponnes or on the Greek islands where our men suffered under the climate. Also we didn't have enough radio sets in order to put them in contact with the rest of the world. As I said, the spiritual welfare also was a difficult problem for us.
Q General, the documents submitted by the prosecution seem to show a one-sided and therefore a wrong picture of your official activity.
A They are one-sided because they are taken out of the context and because they only deal with reprisal cases. Everything connected with the combatting of bands was not in the foreground of my activity.
It did not take up the most part of my time. The provisions and directives for the combatting of bands had been issued and fixed by the OKW. This, as far as the execution was concerned, was a task of the divisional commanders. As I said, the execution of reprisal measures had been made the task of the divisional commander and therefore I could restrict my attention to what was necessary and material.
Q Did you have the chance of examining the expediency of reprisal measures ordered by subordinate units on the spot?
A No, the vastness of the area and the very nature of band fighting made that quite impossible. Any band operation would occur surprisingly. It was not announced beforehand. Not even the divisional commanders could in every case be at the right time on the spot and make their decisions on the basis of their own observations. They also had to rely on reports from their troops unless they themselves were in charge of one particular operation, which, however, only happened in the case of large-scale operations. An additional factor is the frequency with which surprise attacks, sabotage, etc. occurred.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: At this point, if it please the Tribunal, - I would like to submit a document which reports the situation in the spring of 1944, and in particular about the band situation. This is Document 104, contained in Felmy Document Book V, page 61, and this document will be offered under Exhibit 39. This is the War Diary of Army Group E. Unfortunately it is not quite complete. The first few pages are missing, also in the photostat.
In the first paragraph on page 61 there is some report about the 28th and 29th of April, but according to the whole contents of the report only the year 1944 can be meant. I would first of all like to read from page 61 where it says, "Enemy Reports", toward the middle of the page:
Political situation: In addition to the economic crisis, the widely circulated rumors which again and again appear in a new version of an early withdrawal of the German Wehrmacht and an imminent landing by the Allies, are strong determining factors in regard to the morale in the capital and the entire country.
They result in various considerations and generally in a play for time.
The Communist party is setting up a strong organization for the coming crisis in the outspoken workers district of the capital.
The active communist propaganda does not result in such membership gains which one could have expected as a result of a continuous economic disintegration. The Greek national circles are fully aware of the seriousness of the coming struggle with the Communists; the fight for Athens is also prepared in their camp. One is of the opinion that the Greek security battalions, joined by the national partisan groups, will be in a position to break the communist terror. There are signs for the establishment of a national defense front. It is said that rumors, resulting from the situation on the eastern front, of a withdrawal of the German troops, have caused the Government to get in touch with EDES in Athens. Previously existing differences seem to have been bridged. By a close association with the Zervas organization one intends to have a strong government on a broad basis ready to take over in case the German troops are withdrawn.
Partisan situation: Stepped up sabotage activities, increased Communist attacks on Greek volunteer units and self-protection organizations, active measures of recruitment and organization by the Communist and national bands as well as growing Allied influence continued to be the characteristics of the band situation in the Greek territory.
Conduct of the bands: In Northern Greece repeated surprise attacks, especially from the Paikon - and Vermion mountains, were carried out on anti-Communist bases and on our own supply lines.
Further focal points of band activities were south of Florina and southeast of Kastoria. In the course of a major operation of our own we inflicted heavy casualties on the bands in the Vermion mountains and destroyed their bases. In the West Olympus area strong groups of bands resisted our own assaults and those carried out against them by anti Communist units. In the Pelion mountains the bulk of the bands succeeded in evading a major operation by retreating to the north and west. The situation in Northern Greece is unchanged. In Western Greece the existing armistice between the EDES and ELAs organizations did not result in a lessening of their differences. Zervas, in remaining neutral towards the German troops, succeeded in shifting the northern part of the Arachtos front to the East and in strengthening the central part of this front.
The Allied Military Mission: It is above the task of the Allied Military Mission in Greece to organize the bands for the fight against the occupation power. British liaison staffs with wireless equipment are not established in every ELAS division and Zervas units. The strength of the Allied Military Mission can be estimated at 300 to 400 men who presumably have been reinforced during the past few weeks. In general the influence of the.... liaison officers seems to diminish to the advantage of...... For the first time reliable reports about the appearance of individual ..... officers have been received.
Now, following there is a paragraph missing. This is a Washington document which was only received here recently. It is one of the original documents which was sent over separately, and in the photostat paper is stuck over these parts.
"In general the influence of the .... liaison officers seems to diminish to the advantage of ...... For the first time reliable reports about the appearance of individual ..... officers have been received."
Supply: The supply of the bands through dropping from the air by the Allied Air Force and through submarine landings is increasing, however, it does not yet cover the demand. To give an opinion about the actual number of sorties flown for the purpose of bringing supplies to the bands in Greece is not possible due to the incomplete reports of the air information center.
Armament: The increasing enemy supply flights and the frequent landings improve the band's armament and ammunition situation to a great extent. According to reports from a reliable source Zervas has received five light mountain guns (5,6 cm) and six anti-tank guns (2,5 cm) and consequently has greatly strengthened its fighting power.
Strength: Zervas, according to reliable reports has considerably strengthened his forces. It is said that the number of 7000 active men under arms, as agreed with the British, has been reached and that therewith the rearmament of the EDES has been concluded. The "Times" stated at the end of March that the strength of the Greek ELAS bands amounted to 30,000 men. This statement corresponds substantially with the records here at hand. See enclosure for information about distribution of the forces.
Opinion of the situation: In anticipation of coming events the Communist as well as the national forces are concentrating and preparing, Zervas, evidently through a neutral attitude towards the German Wehrmacht, endeavours at present to maintain the connection with England as a result of the war material deliveries.
Pretending to fight against the traitors of the Greek nation the Communists already attempt, through surprise attacks on Greek security forces, to weaken their internal political opponents of tomorrow.
In case of an Allied landing the "Major Greek Revolt" can be expected in the course of which, however, every party will attempt to make their own interests prevail. According to a report from a reliable source Zervas does not intend to fight the German occupation power but he evidently will attempt to secure himself a loading position in the new Greece with the help of the national circles over the then tied down Communist enemy.
On page 64 it says in the teletype to the Commanderin-Chief Southeast, towards the middle of the page:
The band situation at the Peloponessus has become so critical that merely a few, constantly occupied coastal sections including ports and towns located in these sections, as well as the cities of Tripolis and Spartha and their immediate surroundings, are still under the control of the troops. The major operations resulted in only small success as the excellent not of communications of the bands excludes any surprise. The not of communication is provided by the civilian population who therefore share the guilt for the German casualties. The indulgent treatment of the civilian population, so far practiced by the military administration, had no effect of any kind. If the day comes when the 117th Light Infantry Division will be withdrawn the Peloponnessus could be given up at lost due to the present band situation. After the present pacification policy has resulted in failure and in consideration of the military situation, it is now imperative to take into account the state of war which is actually prevailing at the Peloponnessus and to make use of all military and political means of power under a unified command in order to restore order and tranquility."
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess at this time.
(Thereupon a recess was taken until 1330)
AFTERNOON SESSION THE MARSHAL:
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal, please, may I continue reading from Felmy Document 104 in Felmy Volume V, page 64, I shall start again at the bottom of the page, with the last but one sentence:
"After the present pacification policy has resulted in failure and in consideration of the military situation, it is now imperative to take into account the state of war which is actually prevailing at the Pelopponnessus and to make use of all military and political means of power, under a unified command, in order to restore order and tranquility."
To this purpose the High Command of the Army Group E, after all essential preparations have been concluded, plans to declare the Peloponnessus a "zone of combat" until the pacification has been accomplished. Basic accord is requested from the High Command Southeast in order to bring an immediate start of the preparations. The pacification under the command of the 117th Light Infantry Division is to be carried out in such a manner that through appropriate cordoning off measures, the communications between the civilian population and the bands will be ruthlessly eliminated. Following that the active fight is to be carried out. The International Red Cross maintains the closest contact with the bands and also supplies them with food.
To continue on page 66 I shall read the paragraph headed "Combat Reports," at the middle of that page:
"A tendency to exaggerations in reports could be observed. Enemy strength and enemy losses are, as a rule, given as improbably high. The troop and intermediary offices must again be taught the soberness and honesty so well practised in the German army. A sharp line of distinction must be drawn between the official reports and the releases of propaganda and defensive spirit agencies, which stand on a different level. By order of OKW, combat reports, and reports about special events, are in future to be signed, from the company upwards, by an officer, held responsible.
Indication of the official post only as the dispatcher is forbidden."
And then I would like to continue on page 67, at the bottom:
Situation with regard to band fighting: The situation with regard to bands in the Greek territory is characterized by a steadily increasing threat to our supply roads and the systematic organization of the band communication net. Raids by Communist bands against our weaker outposts still occur, while the bands avoid major conflict with the occupation force.
And then on page 67-A, it says:
In Western Greece, Zervas kept to his neutral attitude towards the German Forces. He continued to march his newly organized bands into position on the Arachtos front. The declaration of the Peloponnesus as combat region by reason of increased band activity considerably influenced the conduct of the bands in that region. The number of acts of sabotage and raids diminished conspicuously since then.
THE INTERPRETER: There is no page 67-A in the interpreter's book.
THE PRESIDENT: The book the Tribunal has, at least the one I have no page 67-A.
DR. MUELLER-TORTOW: I am sorry, Your Honor, this is outside my control.
THE INTERPRETER: I have just found the page Dr. Mueller Torgow is reading from, so you may continue.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: It is the bottom of page 67.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you may continue.
DR. MEULLER-TORGOW: I shall then continue on page 68, the second half:
"Critical judgment of the situation: The above-mentioned movements of forces from Egypt to Palestine and further into Syria may mean a broadening of the spring-board Egypt, with the aim of a larger-scale attack against the main-land of Greece, as well as Crete and Rhodes. On the other hand, there is the possibility that a shift of the center of gravity into the Levant and especially Syria takes place, aiming at a shorter way of attack (eventually via Turkey) for an offensive against the Dodecanesus, thereby broadening the former commando operations."
On Page 68-A, it says at the bottom under "Greece".
"The Allied invasion in Northern France has not yet produced a clear political reaction. The general jubilation gave way to an attitude of expectation, due to the news coming in about the course the invasion is taking. If the invasion in Franco fails, the ground will become more favorable for the German policy.
With regard to the band situation one can expect that the shock effect, produced by the declaration of the "Peloponnesus a combat region, will persist. The impression upon the population, which is to a great part opposed to the bands, is of a positive nature. By the isolation of the Peloponnesus from the main-land and by the sealing-off of the bandinfested regions, the prerequisites for more intensive fight against the bands are given."
Corps Gen Staff (Gen. Kdo.) XXII reports time and assignment of the forces, time table and geographical plan for the concentration, and fuel requirements.
I shall continue on page 70:
"Situation with regard to the bands. The situation in the Greek area with regard to the bands is characterized by the increasing threat to our own communications and by the systematic organization of the net of communications of the bands. Apart from that, attacks by Commun. bands against rather weak bases of our own forces and motorized convoys still occur, while the bands are ddging major conflicts with the occupation forces. Terrorizing the population by EAM and ELAS still continues. Operations of our own brought about some relaxation of the tension."
On page 70-A, roughly in the middle:
"The declaration of the Peloponnesus as a zone of combat on account of the increasing activity of the bands had a vital influence upon the conduct of the bands in that region. Resistance of the bands against detachments of Greek volunteers persists, and of the bands against detachments of Greek volunteers persists, and numerous reprisals against members of their families are committed by them. As before, they withdraw before major operations of our forces, or try to camouflage as harmless inhabitants.
On page 71, the second phrase "Allied Military Mission:
According to reports, confirmed repeatedly, the Allied Military Mission is supposed to be composed of about 190 Englishmen and 30 Americans. They are said to have even received some re-inforcements recently. No active influence on the military direction was noticeable so far.
In some Elas-bands districts the Allied officers appear to gain increasing influence upon the direction of the groups of Partisans, in excess of their former scope of tasks, Possibly, the progress made by the bands as to leadership and fighting methods are results of the instruction received by Allied training officers. No clear picture results of the relation between the bands and Allied officers. Tensions, as reported occasionally, are very likely to be of a local character only.
Communications: The organization of the bands' communications has made considerable progress in the course of the past months as a result of continuing assistance by the Allies. In particular wireless communication has gained importance for the transmission of communications.
Supply: Supplying of Zervas bands is done, just as before by the Allied Air Force and through landings in the area.
In the area of Paria.
"The supply position is said to be assured. On the other hand, the Elas bands are suffering from difficulties of supply of material and food: it is not possible to see clearly to what extent they are sharing in the dropping of supplies and landings of the Allies.
Armament. The Allied supply aeroplanes and landings, particularly on the coast of North-Western Greece, brought arms mainly to the Servas bands, amongst them some 1, mountain guns, ammunition and equipment. The equipment of the Elas bands was considerably improved thereby.
The Elas bands were also supplied with 1. artillery to a lesser extent, above all those in the area of Macedonia. Some divisions are said to have complete batteries, at 5 guns each, at their disposal.
Supply of ammunition is still causing difficulties to the bands.
Morale: The morale of the bands is generally bad, according to depositions made by prisoners. The formation of the self-defense units in the various districts has its effect in this connection, as it is endangering the system of requisitioning which as yet used to work so smoothly. Complaints are being made about the bad food supply. The population shows, in the areas controlled by the bands an increasingly negative attitude towards the Elas units, in as far as Zervas allows, seeing in them rightly the cause for their economic distress and for their exclusion from the relief measures of the International Red Cross.
Still, this fall off in the morale must not lead to the quite wrong conclusion that the partisan units which are becoming stronger in armament and international organization, are losing in importance and menace to us. Hardest possible fight against the partisans in any form remains the law of the hour, before it comes to combat operations for the coast.
May it please the Tribunal, it was just pointed out to me here is a correction in the photostatic copy. The document book included the sentence, "The population shows, in the area controlled by the bands, an increasingly negative attitude towards the Elas units, inasfar as Zervas allows," should read "the terror" instead of "Zervas." I should be grateful if this would be corrected.
May it please the Tribunal, I would now like to submit a rather voluminous document. This is the whole of document book 4. It contains the War Diary of the LXVIII Army Corps for the period of time between 1 January and 30 June, 1944. It is document No 87 and it is offered as exhibit No. 40.
The War Diary of the LXVIII Corps with which we are concerned here has been used by the Prosecution as exhibit No. 20 with relatively few extracts. This is document NOKW-1065, Prosecution Exhibit 480 on page 137 of the English, 99 of the German, volume 20. The extracts, which the prosecution has used in the aforementioned document, give only a very incomplete picture of the situation of the day, because it omits all the things which cause reprisal measures, mainly the constant attack by bands. I have therefore decided to submit the War Diary we have received from Washington without any abbreviations in the same form as it was received by the Corps from the archives of the Army. It is not my intention to submit the details and I shall not read any parts of it. But I recommend it to the Tribunal for study. He who will read that diary will know what went on in southern Greece at that time. I should like to confine myself to a very brief summerization.
During the time concerned, that is the first six months of 1944 157 acts of sabotage, blowing up of railroad lines, destruction of telephone lines, blowing up of bridges, surprise attacks, etc. had occurred. In the case of operations and against the bands, the enemy was contacted 175 times, only those cases were taken into consideration where the enemy was actually engaged, that means between January and June of 1944 there were in each month 55 of the incidents just described, that is to say almost two on each day of the six months. The incidents in Athens are not included in this, because there the Higher SS and Police Leader was the competent officer, nor are the losses due to attacks on Greek volunteer units on the Pelophnnes included, but only those incidents which refer to the LXVIII Army Corps.
I should now like to continue in my examination of this witness.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, did you ever observe that the units committed excessed of which you did not approve?
A. Yes, on two occasions. These were the cases of Kalavrita and Pristelmont.
Q. Those two cases I shall come back to later on in detail. You said it was not really possible to apprehend the bands themselves by following up the excesses committed. Now apart from reprisal measures, were there any tactical measures carried out against bands so that the affair could be stamped on, root and branch, so that the bands could be exterminated?
A. Yes, several operations of that type were carried out and thereby it always became clear that roops stationed in the Pelopponessus were not sufficient to really hunt the partisans down. The battle of annihilation, in other words, militarily speaking was not feasible, that is to encircle them from all sides so nobody could escape, so that they could be put out of action in that manner. Therefore, we had to confine ourselves to attack the centers of the bands themselves.
Q. Were these operations successful?
A. For the reasons, which I have just mentioned, they were not decisively successful. It was not possible for a long period of time to denude the defensive sectors of the troops, because nobody could judge whether or not the Allies would not land tomorrow thus a large scale hunting down, such as I would like to have seen, did not occur.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: May I interpolate here? My attention has been drawn to the fact that the term "Kesseltreiben" was translated as "hunting down." I am not sure that this "hunting down" is as strong as "Kesseltreiben" in the German?
THE INTERPRETER: May I say something about this, Your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, indeed.
THE INTERPRETER: Well, in my idea, the term "Kesseltreiben" is a shooting term in German and "hunting down" means a relatively thorough type of hunting an animal.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, the prosecution has frequently expressed the view that they did not regard the occupation of Greece by German troops as effective and that the Greek population therefore were not under any obligation to observe the Hague convention toward the German occupation force. At this point I do not wish to discuss the question whether or not the effectiveness of the occupation can be judged at the moment of the cessation of fighting or whether it should not be judged under the conditions of internal difficulty under which the Greek Government of today labors, I only want to ask you now whether the effectiveness of the occupation existed as long as the troop units under your command were present in Greece?
A The occupation of southern Greece was effective at all times. The bigger cities, which formed certain centers of power, were always occupied by German troops. We had the two high ways firmly in our hands and we were in a position to go anywhere we wanted to get if it became necessary. The many acts of sabotage did not alter anything in these matters. The bands always took evasive action when we wanted to engage them in their hiding places in these difficult mountain areas and we chased them away from there too. We did not allow them to rest.
From the war diary, which you have just submitted under document book 4, I have seen that throughout those six months, as an average, there were major or minor operations against the bands on 29 days of each month, operations to say where we engaged the enemy and exchanged bullets. Into this a stipulation must be placed, that successful operations had been fulfilled. It must be described as a "Fairy Tale" really for the prosecution to say that the Edes bands or Elas bands had chased the German troops out of Greece. That really means putting things up-side down. We evacuated the country when we had orders to do so. We could have demanded the Luftwaffe to help us in order to fight the center of the bands, but we did not do so.