To the best of my recollection they got this uniform from another district. I don't know whether it was from the district of somewhere near Fiume, that is possible. The double-eagle with a crown, which represented a sign of loyalty to royalty, that, of course, they could never wear as long as they fought amongst the ranks of the partisans. That would be the same as if we wore on our helmet the badge of the hammer and Sickel.
Q. As I understand you, what you said, is that the uniforms of the Erremic detachments were only established when this unit had already become part of the Croatian state unit?
A. That is correct.
Q. Now, let's turn back, witness, to the four villages in the area of Brezenica. I believe I understood you correctly, and it did snow it on the map, that the large village of Pisac was outside that area?
A. Yes, considerable so.
Q. Now, before we start discussing the documents which were submitted by the Prosecution concerning this area of Drezcnica, I would like to ask if there is anything you want to say on your own as to this count of the indictment, quite generally speaking?
A. Yes, in order to shed light on the actions of my division you might be interested in two personal experiences of mine. Both of these I had to the best of my recollection on 13 July 1944. During the recapture of the area of Drezcnica, from which in the preceding night our own occupation troops had been driven, and since no one officer had been in a position I myself went there by Volkswagon and started the ground attack when the ground attack was proceeding, and when we were under enemy machine gun fire, I shortly went back to see whether my Volkswagon was protected against enemy machine gun fire. At that moment, from a very near distance, a bullet passed my head at very close range. I turned around immediately and saw a civilian with his rifle disappearing behind the bushes. This man was obviously a partisan. I had no time or inclination to occupy myself with this individual murderer, as I might call him, and went back to the Front.
After the attack was well under way, we advanced along the road in a small armored truck. Suddenly, a vehicle immediately in front of the house struck a mine. That was one-and-a-half kilometers south of Drezcnica. We were all flung out of the car. The vehicle was severely damaged and immediately behind the house in a cellar hole, the whole partisan family was assembled. It could be quite obviously assumed that they knew all about these things because, with six or ten detonators which were dispersed all over the road, these mines had been equipped so that even the children of this house if they would leave the house would have brought these detonators to an explosion.
We did not take any measures against these people, although we knew that they were in immediate connection with the partisans. We continued to carry out our duties in defeating the enemy. I am only giving this example in order to illuminate how very difficult cur situation was at the time and how we had neither time nor inclination to take revenge against this, in the final analysis, helpless population; but they were entirely in the wrong, after all, but we were not. Therefore, I am shocked and disgusted that the Yugoslavs, after all this time, face us with an account such as is laid down in the indictment which, after all, is known all over the world. The thanks for our attitude down there today is that we are marked as murderers. I object and defend myself against this indictment and I am here above all to represent the honor of my division and the honor of my commanding general and defend it.
Q Herr Kobe, we now turn to the document which was submitted by the Prosecution in connection with the problem of Drezcnica. What we received in connection with this problem from the Prosecution is relatively little and it was quite difficult on the basis of the decument to get a, proper impression of the conditions, all the more so because only the name of Drezcnica is mentioned in the document, although four villages are mentioned but not by name.
I would like you, therefore, to tell the Tribunal on which oc casion your division entered this area for the first time and what the.
purpose of that operation was.
A. That was towards the end of January, 1944, when we fought for that whole area and freed it, which we had occupied before. We then sent a combat unit down there and our main line ran along the Gresse Capella where we encountered the 13th band Division and faced them in battle. Also we wanted to secure those arms and equipment of which we had gained knowledge in that area.
A Was that operation carried out only by a combat group of your division or were parts of any other division involved in this, Herr Kobe?
A. Yes, the 114th Rifle Division came from the South on the way through and sent us another task force via Drezcnica.
Q. If I understood you correctly, you said that this operation took place during the middle towards the end of January, 1944. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you please tell us whether this operation was carried out under a certain cover name?
A. Yes, really all these operations had cover names. It is possible that this operation, because it took place near Drezcnica, had the cover name Drezcnica.
Q Where this so-called operation Drezcnica is concerned, the Prosecution submitted a few documents which I would like to discuss with you in order to clarify the count of indictment concerned here against General von Leyser. I first of all have Document Book XXV of the Prosecution shown to you, and I would like you to look there at Document NOKW-1770; this is Prosecution Exhibit 566. The document which I mean is on page 47 of the English text, which is page 37 of your Document Book XXV. Have you got the document in front of you, Herr Kobe?
A. Yes.
Q May I ask you then to tell the Tribunal what kind of a document this is?
A. Now do you mean by this question-what kind of a document it is?
Q. what I mean is what does the document which you have in front of you represent?
A. It seems to be a report or rather a draft of a report from the corps to the army. It says here "Final report Drezcnica."
Q Will you tell us please, witness, what units are mentioned in this report?
A. The 392nd Division is mentioned here, which is my division, and the 114th Rifle Division.
Q. Then I would like you to give us your comments on the entry concerning the 392nd Division.
A. At that time, we had made thirty-four prisoners which might be important here and apart from that sixteen partisans deserted and came to us. Furthermore, we had captured quite some booty and we also suffered some losses.
Q. Since you know that area from your own observation, it might be important that you give us some comments to the entry which concerned the 114th Rifle Division.
A. The 114th Rifle division has destroyed twenty bandit quarters there. Those bandit quarters to the best of my knowledge were huts which the-enemy had constructed outside of Drezcnica because Drezcnica itself did no longer represent any accommodation. These men built huts or very small shelters for their own accommodation. These bandit quarters could not be constructed in Drezcnica itself because there was no room in that place but it had to be done outside of the valley which belonged to the community of Drezcnica. These quarters were apparently destroyed just in the same way as the enemy destroyed our own quarters, as for instance the one on the Capella Pass during attacks.
Q. In this document, as far as the 114th Rifle division is touched upon, it is mentioned the destruction of a military hospital in Moshune. It says here "In Moshune, a military hospital with fifty beds destroyed." do you know that locality from your own observation, Herr Kobe?
A I was in that area and I was about three kilometers away from Moshune along, the street but I know quite well how things looked there. Moshune was merely a spot on the map. In actual fact, it was just a wood clearing, and the enemy had there a telephone communication post and a small ammunition depot as we established later on from captured documents. This alleged hospital with fifty beds was nothing but an accommodation hut, and the enemy conducted his operations from there along the coastal road between Senj and Gobite where, for instance, he murdered our Croatian District Councillor while he passed along that highway. The destruction of that hut was a necessary measure in order to make it difficult for the enemy to gain foot in that area. The actual hospitals of the enemy were located considerably further to the north in Lorski--Kupa where there were hotels and hospitals and all these were not damaged in any way.
Furthermore, the 114th Rifle division did net arrive at Moshune during surprise action. Instead, the read which led there had constantly been blocked by tree blocks. The enemy did not use this highway at all; they used their own path. Therefore, one must by no means imagine that the 114th Rifle Division broke into a modern hospital and killed all patients there. Nobody was left when the division got there.
Q Perhaps it would be possible for you to clear up for us, Herr Kobo, why the troop particularly mentions here the destruction of a hospital if in actual fact, if I follow your testimony correctly, this was merely a band quarters?
A Of course I can't interpret under oath in detail what my colleagues with the 114th Rifle Division meant when they put down that a hospital was destroyed. They probably wanted to express that the division had encountered an enemy depot -- which was the actual fact. The munition dump was at that time not found by the 119th Rifle Division and we cleared it up at a later date.
Q I would now like you to turn up page 39 in your document book 5 which is page 30 in the English text. Here you will find Document NOKW1772 of the prosecution which has been submitted by the prosecution as Exhibit 570. On the first page of the document, you have a supplementary report to a daily report of the XV Mountain Corps dated the 9th of February, 1944. After the heading, it gives in this report the concluding report on the operation Drezenica. Can you compare the document which we have just discussed and this one here and tell us whether these are two different reports of facts or whether the same facts form the basis of both reports?
A No, the reports refer to the same facts. The second is a summary of the whole combat actions and it is a concluding report.
Q From this last document, Herr Kobe, on page 39 of the German and 50 of the English text, there is one point which might be of interest. In this report, there are mentioned quite a number of booty, military equipment, munition and arms. It is quite obvious that this is not property of the civilian population but it also mentioned sixty boxes of matches and 10 hundred weights of salt. Those things could be property of the civilian population of that area and possibly the prosecution wanted a document with this particular point that the troops there plundered the civilian population. Can you from your own knowledge give us your comments on this point?
A Yes. These things were kept together in depots, together with the munition by the bandits and hidden from the civilian population. The matches and the sulphur were property of the Creatian state. They were a state monopoly. The match factory in Vrbobsko and the Croatian Besac mine of Tar and the partisans had hidden these things there after they had robbed them from the Croatian states.
Q How do you mean for these purposes?
A I mean for the purposes of the partisans.
Q One further point is mentioned in this document which might apply to civilian property. There is a report hero about tho destruction of a printing press. One might think hero that this is purely civilian property which was destroyed. Could you possibly toll us something from your own knowledge about this destruction too?
A Yes. There were no other printing shops in this district but the enemy had a few printing machines which could be packed in boxes and he had them hidden there and thus he could produce leaflets in order to incite the population to fight against us and he did that constantly. We realized the importance of those printing shops very soon and we endeavored energetically to, as soon as possible, get these transportable printing presses into our own hands in order to avoid that the enemy could again and again incite the population to fight against us. Eventually, we achieved our aim and we seized all tho printing shops worked by the enemy in that district and thus we achieved that; quite soon in that area there was comparative peace and order.
Q You have mentioned quite a lot of booty on tho occasion of this operation. Herr Kobe can you now toll us where these stocks came from -- mainly tho stocks of arms and munition which are mentioned here?
A That was only a small part of the total booty which was available in that whole area. It was all Italian army property which, when the Italians capitulated, fell into the hands of the bands.
Q This operation Drezcnicz which you have mentioned we might leave now, Herr Kobe and I would like to ask you to turn to another document. I will have Document Book XVI of the prosecution shown to you and I would like to ask you to turn up page 124 in your document book which is page 82 in the English document book. Here you will find a daily report of the XV Mountain Corps dated the 22nd of April, 1944. This is prosecution Exhibit 389, Document N0KW-1416. Under your division, there is an operation "Koulenschlag" mentioned in this report which apparently also took place around the area of Drozonica. Can you remember this operation Koulenschlag?
A I remember this operation quite well because it was one of our most successful operations of all. During the first operation Dreznica which we just discussed, we had established that the total area around Dreznica of which Tusevic and Voivoda were parts -- these are the two other villages mentioned in the indictment ---- and all these places represented one big arms and ammunition depot. The enemy -- by this I mean the sc-called 13th Band Division -- used this area as a stronghold for their attacks and surprise attacks along our supply road which ran further South. We then decided to liberate that area, fight till it was free, and to hold it in order to achieve peace and order along our supply lines and thus drive the enemy off. When we came into the area South of Brenj, which is near this area, we found out that the population by way of slave labour had to bring up enormous amounts of arms and ammunition to these mountainous villages and there the partisans took these arms and equipment away from the population and hid them. Of course, rumors had started circulating which by far exaggerated these factual reports. They said that steel shelters had been built there and the enemy allegedly received constant reinforcements through parachutes from the British and according to one message even a golden treasure was supposed to have been hidden there, of Tito's.
When we started this operation and in severe battle defeated the 13th Band Division, we found out that in every single one of those villages almost in every single house, there was a large or small ammunition depot of infantry ammunition, of machine guns and machine pistols. In the small mills which were there, they had hidden the ammunition between and under the millstones; even in a cemetery they had dug a fresh grave and when we found out that nobody had died there and investigated the grave, we found a largo depot of ammunition and motor vehicle spare parts of Italian trucks. Behind this area, there were the largo woods of the Miscovica. The enemy had hidden that type of ammunition there, which was not as sensitive and also guns, motor vehicles as far as they worked, etc. and they there hid these instruments from the civilian population and camouflaged them in a masterly manner. Also, the enemy built there, to a considerable extent, small accommodation huts, It is quite clear from the report that these huts were just in the process of being built because it said in the report that we captured sixty loads of timber. The population of this district had hidden in the woods but after they found out that we were quite harmless people, they came back on the very same day and moved back into their own houses. I would like to make it clear again that we could have simply regarded those villages and houses or at the least those where ammunition was stored as ammunition depots and exploded them, but we did not do that.
Q One additional question to this report about the operation Keculenschlag. Here again under the booty you find a hundred bags of salt, several cases of cigarettes, and cigars, matches. How about this booty. HerrKobe? Was that something which the troops had taken away from the civilian population or if not where did these stocks come from?
A No, that was exactly the same, and where the cigarettes and cigars are concerned I would like to say that the Croatian monopoly factory for tobacco, cigarettes, and cigars was located in Senj. That's where those cigarettes, cigars, and tobacdo came from. And then this, as well as everything else, had been really hidden from the civilian population.
Q It seems of importance in this report that a command and medical but is reported as having been destroyed. When we discussed the report of the 114th Rile Division you said that the destroyed hospital in Moshune was merely a hut. Here you have a report of your own division, Herr Kobe. Can you, from your own knowledge of the district and of the locality, tell us something about the destruction of the command hut and the medical hut?
A Yes, it so happens that I remember this report very well. One or two days after the report had come in I myself got up there to that district where our battle was being waged in order to convince myself of the extent of the booty and in order to check on the transport of the booty. The troop leader there, who accompanied me, and I went into the woods and found out the code, according to which the enemy designated these camps, and then we found some of the camps, I saw some wooden huts, such as our foresters use in winter time when they want to war themselves, and I asked the officer who accompanied me whether the cabins which he had reported were of the same type, and he confirmed this. This man was inclined to exaggerate his reports in such cases in order to illuminate favorably the deeds and accomplishments of his troops, I reproached him for this, but I don't even want to attempt here to prove that this medical hut did not, at sometime, serve for the accommodation of wounded persons, but instead I would like to emphasize two points: One -- all these huts were only in the process of being built. They were not inhabited by anybody, which can be seen from our report. It says hero, "When further mopping up the area west of Drezenica, at present inconsiderable resistance by minor bands."
In other words the real battle had taken place on the preceding days. The enemy knew quite well what we were driving at, and the enemy had withdrawn, with the exception of dispersed parts of his troops. He had also taken his wounded along, and I do not want to make a derogatory remark about our very brave opponent and say that he withdrew and left his wounded behind. This was what we called, at that time, "purely looking for Easter eggs." Two, the second point is that we now had this particular area tightly in our own hands. That made the command hut and the medical hut impossible for the enemy to use in the future. Just these two huts were three to four Km. west of Drezenica. I could easily show you that exactly on the map. This was an area which was daily checked up on by reconnaissance squads from our troops in Drezenica. These huts could, therefore, no longer serve the enemy for hospital purposes. In my opinion it would be asking too much if we would have brought these cabins to an area where they could have been of use to him -- 20 to 30 Km. further north of the area. After a defensive battle these huts could no longer be used since, on principle, we pursued the enemy 10 to 20 Km. further. I believe that in saying this I have sufficiently clarified this point.
Q I believe the same, Herr Kobo, and I believe that we do not have to spend any more time with this point. One other question which is concerned with another document, which is also connected with this problem. This morning you told us something about the organization of the indigenous units. Above all, you told the Tribunal that these indigenous units carried out operations on their own initiative. And now you told us something about the destruction of band hospitals, as the huts are called, according to this report. Amongst the Prosecution material we have one document which, in my opinion, belongs to this set of questions which we have now discussed and which, up to this point, has not been clarified sufficiently. This document is also contained in Document Book XVI, which I believe you still have in front of you. It is on Page 139 of the German text, which is Page 93 of the English text.
Here you have a Daily Report of the XVth Corps, of the 5th of June 1944. This is Prosecution Document N0KW-1428, which is Prosecution Exhibit No. 393. In order to make my question clear I would like to quote the entry about which I want to ask you. It is the entry of the 373rd Division, and it reads: "Croatian combat unit groups have destroyed a bandit hospital southeast of Udbina, thereby 20 enemy dead, including 2 physicians. In addition 93 wounded and sick massacred." I may presuppose, witness, that the incident which is described here by the 373rd Division was not known to you at that time.
A No, we had no direct contact with that division.
Q But perhaps, on the basis of your general knowledge of the combat conditions in that area, seen on a large scale, you can tell us something in order to make this incident a little more clear.
A Yes, the corps which is concerned here expresses that the Croatian combat groups have fought hero and that enemy dead were made on that occasion. Then, the corps reports that apart from that the Croatian combat groups massacred 93 wounded and sick. Let us assume I was a member of the Army Staff and read this report. Then, I would know that the Corps in this way of reporting complains bitterly about the Croatian combat groups. But there's no time to go into details about this because it's only a very short teletype, but by clearly separating the combat action, on the one hand, and the massacring on the other hand, everybody would realize that tho corps clearly dissociates itself from this incident. it would have mentioned all dead and Otherwise, simply enemy together would not have particularly mentioned this separation. In other words, tho corps reports one incident which took place in its area, and, at the same time, expresses in this report that it dissociates it with this action and complains about it. it would be the task of tho higher Now, agencies to discuss the incident with the corresponding Croatian agencies. Furthermore, I would like to say one more thing based on my experiences. I am sure that these wounded and sick here were members of another ethnic group because we had the experience that the Croatians never -- I wouldn't say never, but generally speaking -- did not treat Croatian partisans in this way, but only Serbians.
On the other hand, the Serbians would never treat their Serbian partisans in this way only the Croatian partisans. We have here in the middle of our own fighting a fight for ethnic reasons.
Q Herr Kobo, you, as Ia, were, for a long time, a member of the XVth Crops, and as such under the command of General von Leyser. Can you tell us about how the XV Corps as General von Leyser, in particular, we acted in general if such a thing happened?
A Yes. We received the monthly reports, and, on other occasions if the overburdened teletype communications allowed, the information about those things which the corps reported, if only to be informed about the ideas by the corps. I know, therefore, quite well that General von Leyser always complained bitterly about such incidents and always took the severest steps which he could take within the scope of his own authority. We were always glad that we did not make too much trouble for him in this direction, within our divisional area.
Q. Did the Corps on its own have any opportunity to take steps against such actions as have been mentioned here and to call the perpetrators to account?
A. No, not that I know of. To the best of my recollection the relationship between the corps and the Croatians were on exactly the same basis as they were with us with the divisional Croatians.
Q. After this interpolation, let us return to your own division, fitness, after the last incident concerning the 373rd Division, before I turn to discussing further documents with you, one additional question; how did your division wage the battle against the minor bands as they are called here, by these I mean those partisans who carried out the surprise attacks and the sabotage acts?
A. We first of all tried through smaller or larger operations to get hold of the perpetrators. With these operations we connected our own propaganda in order to deter the population from the senseless and unlawful interference with our own fighting. Through this means, as I repeatedly said, our area became increasingly quiet and the attacks became more scarce. That, of course, also had to do with the fact that our Coratian soldiers were able to talk to the population and above all, we had to be thankful for the reasonable attitude of the population and that very little happened in our area.
Q. Do you mean to say, Herr Kobe, that no further sabotage acts and surprise attacks occurred in your area at all?
A. No, I don't mean to say that, but while at the beginning of our commitment, the sabotage acts and surprise attacks were very frequent and were carried out by the population because they were incited against us, but they became scarcer as time went on so at the end we hardly had to take measures or steps of any kind. The population in the final analysis saw in us the successors of a very happy time for them, which was the Austrian Hungarian occupation and they had no further desires.
Q. You said, witness, you did not have to take any further measures and steps against sabotage acts or surprise attacks?
A. Hardly any.
Q. Do you mean reprisal measures or any steps?
A. Yes.
Q. In this connection, I would like to ask you, witness, what fundamental orders about reprisal measures were known to you during your commitment in the Croatian area?
A. I only know one order, which we received at the very beginning of our commitment and which I could not even recall any longer, but saw here again.
Q. I would then like to ask you to take document book 16 to hand and please turn up page 98 of your test. This is page 37 in the English document book. Here you find prosecution document exhibit 379 which is NOKW 172. There you find the order of Army Group F, dated 22 December, 1943 and this order was signed by General Leehr. May I ask you, Herr Kobe, whether this is the order, which you mentioned just now?
A. Yes, this is the one I mean.
Q. You said first, Herr Kobe, that reprisal measures harkly played any part with your division. In connection with this statement I would like to discuss one incident with you, which was reported from the 392nd division, according to a document. Maybe I might add here that according to the prosecution documents that it is the only incident of a reprisal measure which occurred with your division.
The incident, which I mean, is contained in document 23 of the prosecution. You have document book 16, Mr. Kobe, I will have document book 23 shown to you and will you please turn up German page 41, which is page 32 in the English text?
Here you see prosecution exhibit 670, which is prosecution document NOKW - 1772. On the page indicated you have a daily report of Courts 5, Case 7 XV the corps, dated 8 February, 1944.
Under the 382nd division you have the report of an intention and here it reads:
"It is intended to have retaliation measures for an attack on a battery chief northwest of Pattovic."
On page 53 of the English text you have the daily report of the Corps, dated from the following day. Here your division reported:
"As a retaliation measure for stabbing of an officer, the western sector of Podom, 3.5 kilometers northeast of Ottoshac was taken in spite of resistance and burned down."
Can you from your own experience remember this incident, Herr Kobe?
A. Yes, I remember this incident quite well, because it was the first attempt of murder which had occurred in our division and at that time it caused great excitement among us.
Q. Herr Kobe, I have had these two reports shown to you which arc the reports of the 8th of February, which gave the intention of the reprisal and the report of the 9th of February, which gave the execution of the reprisal measure, Will you please tell us whether both these reports clear up the whole of the incident or whether at that time your division made any further reports to the corps about this incident?
A. One might assume it for certain that we reported this incident the day before or two days before to the corns as a very special incident, which had occurred in our divisional area. In actual fact, it was a very special incident, and in the intention to carry out reprisal measures for an attack on the battalion chief, it is assumed as known that the attack had occurred.
Q. If I understand you correctly, Herr Kobe, what you intend to say is that these two reports do not clear up the report with sufficient clarity?
A. No, for someone who is not familiar with the facts, it does not.
Q. From your own memory, are you in a position to give this historical incident in the same manner in which it occurred at the time?
A. Yes, I remember it very well. We had taken the town of Ortoshac and had been welcomed by the population as liberators, because they had suffered terribly under the terror of the occupation by the partisans. We still fought against the partisans in a terrain of mountains and woods about five to six-kilometers northeast of Ortoshac. This particular battalion was with its gun positions on the outskirts of Ortoshac and its observation post was stationed on the foot of the mountain of Um. At the foot of the mountain of Um, there was the village Podom, which is concerned here. The infantry fought about two kilometers north of that point and the battalion chief had gone to the observation point by bicycle from his station. When he reached the road fork, some civilians equipped with knives came out of the surrounding houses and butchered him to death. That was the incident and how it had occurred.
Q. How, Herr Kobe, do you know the incident so well?
A. We all concerned ourselves very much with this incident and the occurrence itself was observed by some soldiers from the top of the mountain. Apart from that, we were given exact information from the Croatian inhabitants, who also observed it and immediately reported what had happened.
Q. Did the troops take any measures on the spot to catch the perpetrators?
A. The soldiers of the battalion of course immediately searched the district and vicinity, but of course could not find anybody.
Q. There is something, which is not quite clear to me Mr. Kobe, and maybe you can help me. In the second report, it says the western sector of Podom was taken against enemy resistance and you just told me that the district was already occupied?
A. Well the one unit that fought there was not very strong and in the evening we had to withdraw it to the outskirts of Ortoscac.
We fought until one or two days later the district was freed. In the meantime, my divisional, commander discussed with State Secretary Markovic the reprisal measures which were to be carried out. Markovic, to the best of my knowledge, came from Ortoshac and it was decided that the houses from which the murderous attack had taken place were to be burned down. On the day, which is also reported by date in the report, our own troops attacked again and they had the order to burn down these houses. They throw back the enemy and in combat action burned the houses mentioned and at a later time I saw frequently the remains of these houses. They were the very houses, which were situated around the road fork where the attack had occurred.
Q. Can you tell us how many houses there were?
A. There may have been five or six houses in all.
Q. You toll us the houses concerned were around the road fork; what do you mean by that?
A. I mean they were the houses from which the partisans came in order to carry out the murderous attack. I mean that I would not like to dispute two or three houses here, after one of our officers, who was quite helpless, had been ruthlessly butchered.
Q. Now, one more general question about these reprisal measures, Herr Kobe; do you know whether on principle, the population had been warned not to take part in such sabatage and surprise attacks? Do you know how these warnings were carried out?
A. Yes. We ourselves produced posters which contained a warning to this effect and we had those posters given to the Croatian State Secretary so that he could exhibit them in public places. I myself saw such posters.
Q. One other question concerning the reprisal measure in Ortoshac: was the execution of this reprisal measure and the reason for it made known to the population at any time?
A. Yes, to the best of my recollection, a poster to that effect was exhibited in Ortoshac. We had there a large board where we exhibited our announcements.
Q. This brings us to the conclusion of this particular incident. Is there anything that you would like to say in a general way and which would perhaps clarify even further this incident?
A. Yes, I would like to stress the discipline of the troops because the men did not take reprisal measures on their own initiative which would nave been understandable from a humane point of view. Instead they waited for an order coming from the division and, furthermore, I would like to stress the fact that this particular district was the home of those men who later on, together with Erremic, came to us because they were convinced of the cause. Had they not been under the impression that we would take just measures and that we showed a corresponding attitude, I am sure they would not have come to join us.
Q. My last question concerning these facts goes to the following: was this reprisal measure seen to be a success at a later time?