THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: There is evidence in the record that innocent members of the population were killed in reprisal for attacks on troops and acts of sabotage committed by unknown persons by troops subordinate to the defendant von Leyser. That the defendant knew of many such killings, he admits. He denies that he ever issued an order to carry out any specific reprisal measure. He contends that this was the responsibility of divisional commanders in conjunction with Croatian government authorities. The record discloses, however, that on 10 August 1944, the defendant issued an order containing the following: "In case of repeated attacks in a certain road sector, communist hostages are to be taken from the villages of the immediate vicinity, who are to be sentenced in case of new attacks. A connection between these Communists and the bandits may be assumed to exist in every case." This order is, of course, not lawful. Reprisals taken against a certain race, class or group irrespective of the circumstances of each case, sounds more like vengeance than an attempt to deter further criminal acts by the population. An assumption of guilt on the part of a particular race, class or group of people in all cases also contravenes established rules. This is a matter which a judicial proceeding should determine from available evidence. We must assert again, in view of the defendant's statement that the responsibility for the taking of reprisal measures rested with the divisional commanders and the Croatian government, that a corps commander must be held responsible for the acts of his subordinate commanders in carrying out his orders and for acts which the corps commander knew or ought to have known about.
The evidence concerning the killing of hostages and reprisal prisoners within the corps area is so fragmentary that we cannot say that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the measures taken were unlawful. The killing of hostages and reprisal prisoners is entirely lawful under certain circumstances. The evidence does not satisfactorily show in what respect, if any, the law was violated.
This is a burden cast upon the prosecution which it has failed to sustain.
The more serious charge is that pertaining to the evacuation of large areas within the corps command for the purpose of conscripting the physically fit into the Croatian military units and of conscripting others for compulsory labor service.
On 8 March 1944, the XV Army Corps reported to the Second Panzer Army in part as follows: "Operation 'Bergwiese' terminated. Final report not yet available. Another 74 able bodied men taken into custody." On 9 March 1944, the same division reported 332 above bodied men in custody from the same operation. On 20 March 1944, the XV Army Corps reported in part as follows: "Operation 'Illusion' carried out after refusal by German Navy. No contact with enemy, 100 able bodied persons brought to Fiume." On 21 March 1944, the XV Army Corps reported as follows: "Intention: Harehunt code name 'Lagerleben' (Taking into custody of 200 compulsory recruits 6 kilometers east-southeast of Brinje)." This whole question can be disposed of by a consideration of the operation "Panther".
Shortly after taking command of the XV Corps, the defendant formulated a plan for the evacuation of the male population between the ages of 15 and 55 from the area between Una and Korana. This territory was supposed to contain about 7,000 to 8,000 men who were partly equipped with arms procured from the Italians. The area had been under the temporary control of the bands to such an extent that the Croat government had complained of its inability to conscript men for military service from the area. It was planned to crush the bands and evacuate the men and turn them over to the Croatian government for use as soldiers and compulsory labor. The operation was designated as Operation "Panther" and is so carried in the German Army reports. On 6 December 1943, the Second Panzer Army approved Operation "Panther". The order of approval provided that the estimated 6,000 persons fit for military service should be held in camps at Susak and Karlovac. The The evacuation of persons fit for military service was to be known by the code name "Silberstreifen" (silver stripes). On 2 December 1943, the Second Panzer Army ordered the operation to commence on 6 December 1943.
The last sentence of the order states: "Sending the evacuated population fit for military service to Germany for labor service is considered expedient."
The operation was carried out but only 96 men fit for military service were captured. It is evident that the inhabitants had been warned before the operation was commenced and had left to escape capture. The defendant attempts to justify his action by asserting that the primary purpose of the Operation "Panther" was the suppression of the bands, that the operation was purely a tactical one so far as he was concerned and that the disposition of the captured population fit for military service was for the decision of the Croatian government and not his concern.
We point out that the Croatian government was a satellite government and whatever was done by them was done for the Germans. The captured men fit for military service were turned over to the Croat administration and were undoubtedly conscripted into the Domobrans, the Waffen Ustasha, the Croat units of the Wehrmacht or shipped to Germany for compulsory labor just as the defendant well knew that they would be. The occupation forces have no authority to conscript military forces from the inhabitants of occupied territory. They cannot do it directly, nor can they do it indirectly. When the defendant as commanding general of the corps area participated in such an activity, he did so in violation of international law. The result is identical if these captured inhabitants, were sent to Germany for compulsory labor service. Such action is also plainly prohibited by international law as the evidence shows. See Articles 6, 23, 46, Hague Regulations. We find the defendant von Leyser guilty on this charge.
The defendant is also charged with issuing the Commissar order of 6 June 1941 and causing the same to be carried out while he was in command of the 269th Infantry Division in Russia in 1941.
The record shows a report of the 269th Infantry Division under date of 28 September 1941 wherein it is stated: "Special occurrences: 1 female Commissar shot. One woman who was in contact with Partisans, likewise shot". Under date of 20 November 1941, this same division reports as follows: "2 Russian prisoners of the 1st Battery were shot upon the order of the battalion commander. These were 1 Commissar and 1 Russian high-ranking officer." On 9 July 1941, the 269th Infantry Division reported to the XXXXI Army Corps to which it was subordinated as follows: "34 Politruks (Commissars) liquidated."
This evidence clearly shows that the 269th Infantry Division, commanded by the defendant von Leyser killed Commissars pursuant to the Commissar Order. This was a criminal order and all killings committed pursuant to it were likewise criminal. We find the defendant guilty on this charge.
We find the defendant von leyser guilty on Counts Three and Four.
The defendant Felmy had two assignments in Greece. He was appointed Commander Southern Greece about the middle of June 1941 and continued in the position until August 1942. During this period he had only 3 battalions of security and police troops subordinate to him. On 10 May 1943 the defendant became commander of the LXVIII Corps and continued in that position until the corps withdrew from Greece, an operation which was completed on 22 October 1944. In addition thereto on 9 September 1943, he assumed command of Army Group Southern Greece. He had subordinate to him the 1st Panzer Division, 117th Rifle Division and a number of fortress battalions. Until the collapse of Italy, two Italian divisions were subordinate to him.
This defendant is charged with responsibility for the unlawful killing of innocent members of the population and the wanton destruction of villages and towns without military necessity existing therefore.
The defendant admits ordering reprisal measures but denies that they were unlawful.
A brief review of some of these acts for which the defendant is responsible is therefore necessary. To begin with the defendant admits receiving the basic order of 16 September 1941 relative to reprisal measures up to 100 to 1 which has been often referred to in this opinion. He also received the Keitel Order of 28 September 1941 relative to the taking of hostages from all sections of the population which has likewise been quoted herein. He also received and passed on the order of General Loehr, Commander-in-Chief Southeast, dated 10 August 1943, which states in part: "In territories infested by the bandits, in which surprise attacks have been carried out, the arrest of hostages from all strata of the population remains a successful means of intimidation. Furthermore, it may be necessary, to seize the entire male population, insofar as it does not have to be shot or hung on account of participation in or support of the bandits, and insofar as it is incapable of work, and bring it to the prisoner collecting points for further transport into the Reich. Surprise attacks on German soldiers, damage to German property must be retaliated in every case with shooting or hanging of hostages, destruction of the surrounding localities, etc. Only then will the population announce to the German offices the collections of the bandits, in order to remain protected from reprisal measures." Defendant also received and passed on the order regarding reprisal measures issued by General Loehr, deputizing for Field Marshal von Weichs as Commander-in-Chief Southeast, under date of 22 December 1943, an order which has been previously quoted in this opinion. It says in part: "Reprisal quotas are not fixed. The orders previously decreed concerning them are to be rescinded. The extent of the reprisal measures is to be established in advance in each individual case. * * * The procedure, of carrying out reprisal measures after a surprise attack or an act of sabotage at random on persons and dwellings, in the vicinity, close to the scene of the deed, shakes the confidence in the justice of the occupying power and also drives the loyal part of the population into the woods.
This form of execution of reprisal measures is accordingly forbidden. If, however, the investigation on the spot reveals concealed collaboration or a conscientiously passive attitude of certain persons concerning the perpetrators, then these persons above all are to be shot as bandit helpers and their dwellings destroyed * * * Such persons are co-responsible first of all who recognize Communism."
The records show the following actions by troops subordinate to this defendant: On 9 September 1943, during mopping up operations of Levadeia "as reprisal measures for 1 murdered German soldier 10 Greeks hanged." On 7 November 1943, the LXVIII Corps reports "18 Communists were shot in Tripolis as reprisal for railroad sabotage committed lately." On 29 November 1943, the LXVIII Corps reports: "As reprisal for band attack on Tripolis - Sparta road 100 hostages shot at the place of attack." On 5 December 1943, the LXVIII Corps reported "50 hostages were shot in Aighion for attacks committed lately" and on 6 December 1943, "for attack on railroad strong hold East of Tripolis 50 hostages were hanged." On 6 December 1943, operation "Kalavrita" was commenced. In reprisal for the killing of 78 German soldiers, the 117th Division under the command of General von Le Suire carried out this attack. More than 25 villages were destroyed and 696 Greeks are admitted to have been shot in reprisal. There is evidence of an eyewitness that approximately 1300 Greeks were killed in reprisal. The defendant admits that this reprisal measure was excessive and says that he orally reprimanded General von La Suire for the severity or this reprisal measure. No reprimand or complaint as to Le Suire's conduct appears in the documentary evidence before the tribunal.
The diary of the LXVIII Corps reports the following reprisal measures: On 17 January 1944, "In retaliation for an attack on one officer in the Rhizaes area 20 communists executed." On 22 April 1944, "In Tripolis 12 well-known communists were shot as a retaliation measure for the murder of a rural police officer." On 23 February 1944, "Shooting of 200 hostages from the Tripolis hostage camp at the place of attack." This reprisal was for two truck convoy attacks resulting in 33 German dead and 9 wounded. On 11 March 1944, for an attack on an armed German convoy, General Le Suire asked and was granted permission by this defendant to shoot "200 hostages (communists) to be taken out of all hostage camps." Defendant contends that only 141 hostages were actually shot.
The extent of the reprisals taken in the area of the LXVIII Corps is shown by the testimony of the defendant who says that between July and December, 1943, 91 acts of sabotage occurred and 60 reprisals taken, and from January to June 1944, there was a monthly average of 55 acts of sabotage and engagements with bands.
It hardly seems necessary for us to point out that many of these reprisal killings were excessive and many were unlawful because there was no connection between the inhabitants shot and the offense committed. Reprisals were taken against special groups, such as "communists" and "bandit suspects" without any relationship to the offense being established. The Kalavrita operation can only be described as plain murder and a wanton destruction of property. The assertion of the defendant that he orally reprimanded General von Le Suire for the severity of this operation does not appear too convincing in view of the recommendations later made by defendant for the advancement of Le Suire to a higher command. Reprisal measures were carried out in the corps area without rhyme or reason. They became a part of the tactical campaign for the suppression of the bands in the first instance rather than as a last resort. It is plane that deterring the local population at the scene of the offense was not the primary objective. Reprisal prisoners were taken from hostage camps generally and at points distant from the place where the offenses occurred. It was more the case of an eye for an eye than an honest attempt to restrain the population by a use of hostage and reprisal measures as a last resort.
On 5 April 1944, the notorious "blood bath" at Klissura occurred. The facts are: On the date in question, an engagement between bands and German troops occurred about 2 1/2 kilometers outside the village of Klissura. After the retreat of the bands, the troops moved into the village and began searching for evidence of band support. None was found. Later in the afternoon, units of the 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment entered the village and began almost immediately to kill the inhabitants.
At least 215 persons, and undoubtedly more, were killed. Among these killed were 9 children less than one year old, 6 between 1 and 2 years of age, 6 between 2 and 3 years, 11 between 3 and 4, and 4 between 4 and 5. There were 72 massacred who were less than 15 years of age and 7 people in excess of 80 years. No justification existed for this outrage. It was plain murder.
On 10 June 1944, troops of this same regiment carried out a reprisal measure against the inhabitants of the village of Distomon. It seems that bands were first engaged near Stiri, 5 kilometers southeast of Distomon. After the defeat of the bands, the troops returned to Distomon and shot approximately 300 of the population, including men, women and children. It also was plain, calculated murder.
A complaint was voiced by the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office and an investigation demanded. The defendant Felmy was charged with the duty of having the investigation made. He denies that this regiment was subordinate to him or that he had any disciplinary control over it. For the purpose of this discussion, we will accept his statement as true even though the order to investigate and report through Wehrmacht channels indicates the contrary. The point that is material here is that the investigation was made, the battle report of the commanding officer was found to be false and the action of the regimental commander found to be in excess of existing orders. Upon the discovery of these facts, the defendant Felmy recommended that disciplinary action (the method of trying minor offenses) be taken against the officer in charge in consideration of the sacrifices of the regiment in the combat area at the time. The defendant testified that he never knew what punishment, if any, was assessed against this guilty officer. He seems to have had no interest in bringing the guilty officer to justice. Two of the most vicious massacres of helpless men, women and children appear to have met with complete indifference on his part. The falsification of the battle report by the regimental commander seems to have been deemed the major offense.
War at its best is a dirty business but under no circumstances can coldblooded, mass murder such as these two cases establish, be considered as related remotely even to the exigencies of war. The defendant's attitude toward the innocent population is reflected in his indifference to these unjustified and brutal murders which took place within the area of his command. It is a matter that goes to the question of the defendant's character, intent and purpose in carrying out the acts for which he is charged. The responsibility of the defendant for the killing of innocent members of the population by the exercise of unlawful hostage and reprisal practices is clearly established. We find the defendant Felmy guilty on Counts One and Two.
The defendant Lanz was appointed to command the XXII Mountain Corps on 25 August 1943 and actually assumed the position on 9 September 1943. The corps command was generally speaking the Epirus area of Greece. This consisted of the area between the Gulf of Corinth and Albania lying west of the Pindus Mountains. The Corps headquarters were in Joannina. The defendant is charged with the responsibility for killing hostages and reprisal prisoners in violation of international law and with the unlawful killing of Italian officers after the Italian capitulation.
A brief summarization of the evidence against the defendant is required. On 13 September 1943, General Stetner, Commander of the 1st Mountain Division, a unit subordinate to the defendant and whose headquarters was at the time also in Joannina, issued an order in part as follows: "In order to oppose energetically the continued raids on convoys and members of the Wehrmacht, it is ordered, that from 20 September (1943) onward, for every German soldier wounded or killed by insurgents or civilians, 10 Greeks from all classes of the population to be shot to death. This order must be carried out consistently in order to achieve a deterrent effect." On 29 September 1943, the XXII Corps reported: "Telephone sabotage in the area of Arta. Poles sawed off at two places.
30 male civilian suspects arrested and shot." On 3 October 1943, the defendant issued an order reading in part as follows: "On account of the repeated cable sabotage in the area of Arta: 30 distinguished citizens (Greeks) from Arta, 10 distinguished citizens (Greeks) from Filipias, are to be arrested and kept as hostages. The population is to be notified that for every further cable sabotage 10 of these 40 hostages will be shot to death." The defendant denies that any of these hostages were shot and there is no evidence in the record to the contrary. On 4 October 1943, the 1st Mountain Division reported to the XXII Corps as follows: "Mopping up operations Eisl continue beyond Alomotros. Villages destroyed as reprisal measure. All civilians shot to death." On 18 October 1943, the 1st Mountain Division reported to the XXII Corps as follows: "Shot to death: Paramythia: Reprisal measure for 6 murdered German soldiers 58. Thereakision: Reprisal measure for murder of Lt. Col. Salminger 14.
Arta, Klisura: Suspicious elements near the localities where attacks had occurred (about) 30. Jannina City: 4." On 25 October 1943, the 1st Mountain Division issued a special directive to its subordinate units which stated in part: "If a member of the German Wehrmacht is killed by either attack or murder in a territory considered pacified, 50 Greeks (male) are to be shot for 1 murdered German. * * * The decision regarding executions for losses in band combat is made by the competent troop commander. Here also the ratio is 1 to 50. The prerequisite for the order of execution is indubitable proof that the population of a village has participated in hostile action against the German Wehrmacht. In addition, the villages are to be destroyed." This order supersedes that of 13 September 1943. Numerous killings of hostages and reprisal prisoners, in addition to those enumerated, appear in the record. There are reports to the effect that "all the inhabitants" of named villages and "all men capable of bearing arms" were shot to death. Persons designated as "civilians" were shot on numerous occasions.
The orders for the taking of reprisal measures were clearly unlawful. An order to shoot 50 Greeks for each German killed regardless of circumstances meets the legal objections heretofore stated in this opinion. Instead of reprisals against innocent inhabitants being taken as a last resort, they were more often taken in the first instance. Reprisal killings were often carried out against the inmates of hostage camps and not against the population having some relationship with the crime committed. Attacks by armed bands having no connection with the local population were avenged by killing innocent inhabitants who had no possible association with the guilty. Many villages were destroyed and the civilian inhabitants shot without any logical reason at all except to wreak vengeance upon the population generally. According to the reports in evidence, court martial proceedings were not held. The killings were had on the order of the competent field commander, the evidence showing that battalion commanders sometimes gave such orders.
This defendant says that as a tactical commander he was too busy to give attention to the matter of reprisals. This is a very lame excuse. The unlawful killing of innocent people is a matter that demands prompt and efficient handling by the highest officer of any army. This defendant, with full knowledge of what was going on, did absolutely nothing about it. Nowhere does an order appear which has for its purpose the bringing of the hostage and reprisal practice within the rules of war. The defendant does not even contend that he did. As commander of the XXII Corps, it was his duty to act and when he failed to so do and permitted these inhumane and unlawful killings to continue, he is criminally responsible.
The defendant Lanz is also charged as commander of the XXII Mountain Corps with having ordered or permitted the unlawful execution of Italian officers and soldiers of the surrendered Italian army. He is also specifically charged with ordering troops under his command to execute the captured Italian General Gandin and all officers of his staff. The general situation regarding the collapse of Italy and the surrender of its armies has been set forth in the portion of the opinion dealing with the defendant Rendulic and it will not be repeated here except as necessity requires.
The record discloses that the defendant Lanz knew when he assumed command of the XXII Mountain Corps that Field Marshal Badoglio had succeeded Mussolini as head of the Italian government and Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army. On 8 September 1943, he heard of the armistice which the Italians had signed with the allies. On the same day, due to the absence of senior officers from Athens, General. Alexander Loehr, Commander in Chief of Army Group E, commissioned the defendant Lanz to negotiate with General Vecchiarelli, the Commander-in-Chief of the XIth Italian Army. After much negotiating, General Vecchiarelli surrendered the XIth Army to the Germans on 9 September 1943. The surrender terms were carried out during the following 14 days, without difficulty insofar as troops stationed on the Greek mainland were concerned. On the islands of Corfu and Cepha lonia, however, difficulties arose.
These two islands were occupied by one Italian Division under the command of General Gandin. The defendant Lanz as commanding general of the XXII Corps, demanded that General Gandin surrender his troops and the demand was refused even though General Vecchiarelli had directed him to do so. General Gandin vacillated, contending that his orders were not clear and that he had no right to surrender the division. The situation resulted in fighting between the German and Italian troops on the island of Cephalonia and the eventual surrender of the Italian forces, including General Gandin and his staff, on 21 September 1943.
During this stage of the proceedings, a Fuehrer order arrived directing that the 6,000 or 7,000 italians of General Gandin's division were to be shot for mutiny. The defendant Lanw refused to carry out this order for the reason that it was neither feasible nor lawful to do so. The fuehrer order was then modified providing only that the officers were to be shot for mutiny. The defendant objected to the shooting of all officers and advocated that the order apply only to the guilty. The evidence indicates that the defendant Lanz ordered the German commandant of the islands to determine the guilty officers by court martial proceedings. This was done and on 24 September 1943, General Gandin and his staff officers were shot.
A similar situation developed on the island of Corfu. Fighting ensued, the Italians surrendered and the officers shot after a summary court martial. The record shows that a large number of Italian officers were shot in this manner. One instance shows that on 5 October 1943, 58 Italian officers were shot by troops subordinate to the XXII Corps.
********killing of these Italian officers was clearly unlawful. The evi************defendant shows that he believed that their killing was unla************ protests to Army Group E, based on the illegality of the Fu**********were successful in reducing the number of Italians to be subjected to the unlawful order, the fact remains that the killing of the reduced number was just as much a criminal act.
That he gave the order to the commandant of Cepholonia to execute the guilty officers only, he readily admits. The Italian soldiers were not franc-tireurs. They were still allies of Germany, insofar as their commanding officers then knew, although they had notice that an armistice had been signed with the Allied Powers. If they were prisoners of war by virtue of the surrender of the XIth Italian Army by General Vecchiarelli, it is clear that they were entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention, 1929, regulating the treatment to be afforded prisoners of war. This was not done in any material respect. The reasoning set forth on the same subject in this opinion as it pertains to the defendant Rendulic applies here and is adopted by reference to the present situation. We are obliged to hold that the killing of the Italian officers was a war crime for which the defendant is responsible.
We find the defendant Lanz guilty on Counts One and Three.
The defendant Speidel assumed the position of Military Commander Southern Greece in early October 1942, and remained in the position until September 1943. From September 1943 until May 1944, he occupied the position of Military Commander Greece. His first assignment extended to a portion of the harbor Pyraeus and the adjoining coastal strip, a small section northeast of Athens and the Islands Salamis and Aegina. The balance of the area, including Athens, was controlled by the Italians. Under the second assignment, his authority extended over the whole of Greece although such authority was limited to certain functions. He had no tactical or operational tasks in this position, they being in the hands of Army Group E.
As Military Commander Southern Greece, his chief tasks were the maintenance of public peace and order within the area occupied by German forces, the security of German troops and installations, and jurisdiction over crimes committed against the Germans by the population. As Military Commander Greece, his principal tasks were the maintenance of peace and order, the administration of the judicial authority over the population as to crimes and offenses committed against the Germans and their military installations and the handling of negotiations with the Greek government, As in the case of his previous assignment, all tactical and operational matters were in the hands of Army Group E in Salonika.
Subordinated to the defendant were 7 Sub-Area Headquarters units. On and after 22 December 1943, reprisal measures could be ordered only by divisional commanders after agreement with the competent Sub-Area Headquarters. This order, promulgated by General Loehr as Acting Commander-inChief Southeast, provided in part: "The revenge for attacks, which are directed against the unit and its installation may be ordered only by a German commander with the disciplinary authority to punish of at least a division commander, in accord with the competent administrative sub-area Hqs. If an agreement is not reached, the competent territorial commander is to decide. Reprisal measures for losses in the air corps, navy, police and the OT are to be ordered principally by the territorial commanders."
That the Military Commander Greece could control the reprisal and hostage practice through the various sub-area headquarters which were subordinate to him cannot be questioned. This conclusion is borne out by the testimony of the defendant and charts prepared by him. It is plainly established that all administrative Sub-area Headquarters and Local Headquarters of his area of command were subordinated to the Military Commander Greece by the Keitel order of 21 December 1943.
The defendant contends that many of the acts changed against him were committed by or under the direction of the Higher SS and Police Leader, General Shimana. Whether General Shimana was subordinate to the Military Commander Greece insofar as the ordering of reprisal and hostage measures was concerned, is directly disputed. We are convinced that the record shows that he was. In this respect, the record quite conclusively shows that General Shimana was directly subordinate to Himmler as to matters of discipline, promotions and matters of similar import.
Ordinarily, Himmler insisted that all SS units remain wholly subordinate to him, a matter of which he was very jealous. But in the present instance, the matter is controlled by regulations issued by Fuehrer headquarters under date of 17 September 1943 which in part says: "By agreement with the Chief of OKW, the Reich Fuehrer SS, and Chief of the German Police appoints a Senior SS and Police Leader for the area of Military Commander Greece. The Senior SS and Police Leader is an office of the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, which is subordinate to Military Commander Greece for the period of its employment in Greece. * * * The Military Commander is authorized to issue directives to the Senior SS and Police Leader which are necessary to avoid interference with Wehrmacht operations and duties. They take precedence over any other directives. The Senior SS and Police Leader will receive policies and directives for the execution of these duties from the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police. He will carry them out independently, currently and opportunely, informing the Military Commander Greece in as far as he does not receive any restrictive directives from the latter." The defendant admits that General Schimana considered himself subordinate to the Military Commander Greece as to the ordering and carrying out of hostages and reprisal killings. That the Senior SS and Police Leader was a member of the Staff of Military Commander Greece is shown by the Keitel order of 21 December 1943. The evidence is clear that the defendant is responsible for the execution of these measures except when they were taken during tactical operations on which occasions, of course, the responsibility rests with the tactical superior.
A review of some of the hostage and reprisal measures taken within area of the defendant's command and for which responsibility attaches, will be necessary. On 3 December 1943, the following report was made: "Nineteen Communist reprisal prisoners shot as revenge for the murder and wounding of Greek police, by the Senior SS and Police Fuehrer in Athens."
On 31 December 1943, the defendant reported: "In December on the Peloponnesus 758 people were shot to death, including reprisal operation 'Kalavrita'. In the remaining areas hostages were seized and to a small extent executions have taken place." On 9 January 1944, it was reported: "By (order of) Senior SS and Police Fuehrer 30 Communists were shot to death in reprisal for the murder of Greek policeman and for 36 attacks." On 10 January 1944, the Military Commander Greece reported: "50 Communists shot as reprisal measure for murdering 2 German police." On 13 March 1944, it was reported:
On the highway Sparta-Tripolis, truck convoy attacked. 18 Wehrmacht members dead, 25 heavily wounded, 19 slightly wounded and 6 Greeks wounded. As reprisal, state of emergency for Southern-Peloponnesus. Shooting of 200 Communist hostages." On 18 March 1944, the defendant reported in part as follows; "tendency to strikes and partial strikes at the railroad and several plants at the beginning of March were suppressed by energetic military measures: 50 communists were shot immediately, while others who were arrested are awaiting their sentence." While defendant was absent from his command for almost two months prior to 17 March 1944, he appears to have known of and approved the action taken by his deputy as shown by the foregoing report. On 22 March, 1944, the Military Commander Greece reported: "On the Peloponnesus, 5 Greeks hanged in reprisal for attack on railroad." On 22 March 1944, the defendant reported: "Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Korinth Report: 52 hostages in Tripoli and 44 hostages in Sparta were shot as reprisal measure on 21.3." On 1 April 1944, defendant reported: "Up to now: Wehrmacht 1 dead, 14 wounded. Tracks blocked only for a short while. The execution of 70 Greeks at the locality of the incident has been ordered." On 2 April 1944, defendant reported: "65 communists in reprisal for railroad sabotage 10 South La Rissa shot to death at the scene of the incident." On 6 April 1944, defendant reports: "In Verria (60 Southeast West Soloniki). Fire attack by bandits during roll call of the battalion. Losses of our own: 4 dead, 11 wounded of which 8 are heavily wounded. 150 people suspected of belonging to bands shot in Verria as reprisal measures." On 8 April 1944, the defendant reported "50 communists shot to death for attack on German soldiers (3 dead) North Athens." On 25 April 1944, the defendant reported: "In Tripoli 12 known Communists shot in reprisal for a murdered Gendarmerie Officer." On 26 April 1944, the defendant reported: "Officers of the commander of the Ordnungs Police attacked by about 70 bandits while on duty trip on the road Arachowa-Amfissa (15 West Lewadia). Major Schulz and Major Krueger dead, Captain Unger and 4 men missing. Two passenger automobiles and two motorcycles were burned out. Three men found their way to Lewadia.
50 Communists from Lewadia were shot as reprisal measures. Additional reprisal measures are intended."
That the foregoing killings were excessive in most instances is readily apparent. That no connection existed between the population and the offense committed in many cases is shown. That the reprisal and hostage practice here employed was not one of last resort but one of the first instance in most cases can be seen. The incidents cited show cases where the hostages were taken and killed at a distance from the place of the offense. Court martial proceedings are not mentioned. That the incidents recited, indicating the practice followed, were not in accord with international law is beyond question. The responsibility of the defendant therefore has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
We find the defendant Speidel guilty on Count One of the indictment.
Evidence has been produced in an attempt to show that the allied armies or units thereof, engaged in the practice of taking and killing hostages, and reprisal prisoners. There is but one instance cited that even resembles a case of shooting in reprisal. As to this, the evidence shows that four persons were shot by allied forces in Reutlingen, Germany, during the invasion. The official announcement proclaimed however, that those responsible for the killing of a French soldier had been apprehended and shot There is no convincing evidence that it was a hostage or reprisal shooting. It is not shown that a single hostage or reprisal prisoner had been killed by allied forces throughout the course of the late war. It also has been stated in the evidence and argued to the tribunal that the rules of war have changed and that war has assumed a totalitarian aspect. It is argued that the atom bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan and the aerial raids upon Dresden, Germamy, in the final stages of the conflict afford a pattern for the conduct of modern war and a possible justification for the criminal acts of these defendants. We do not think the argument is sound. The unfortunate pattern adopted in the second World War was set by Germany and its allies when hostilities were commenced. The methods of warfare employed at Rotterdam, Warsaw, Belgrade, Coventry and Pearl Harbor can aptly be said to provide the sources of the alleged modern theory of total war.