It permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; it allows the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger; but it does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces. It is lawful to destroy railways, lines of communication or any other property that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes and churches even may be destroyed if necessary for military operations. It does not admit of wanton devastation of a district or the wilful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants for the sake of suffering alone.
The issues in the present case raise grave questions of international law. Military men the world over debate both the law and the policy involved in the prosecution for war crimes of the high ranking commanders of defeated armies. This is partially brought about by the possibility of future wars and the further possibility that the victors of the present may be the vanquished of the future. This only serves to impress the Tribunal with the absolute necessity of affording the defendants a fair and impartial trial under the rules of international law as they were at the time the alleged offenses were committed. Unless this be done, the hand of injustice may fall upon those who so vindictively contend for more far-reaching pronouncements, sustained by precedents which we would hereby establish.
Strict discipline is necessary in the organization of an army and it becomes hard for many to believe that a violation of the orders of a superior may bring about criminal liability. Love of country and adherence to duty intervene to palliate unlawful conduct. The passage of time and the thankfulness for a return to peaceful pursuits tend to lessen the demand that war criminals answer for their crimes.
In addition thereto, there is a general feeling that excesses occur in all armies, no matter how well disciplined, and that military trials are held to convict war criminals of the vanquished while those of the victor are cleansed by victory. Unless civilization is to give way to barbarism in the conduct of war, crime must be punished.
If international law as it applies to a given case is hopelessly inadequate, such inadequacy should be pointed out. If customary international law has become outmoded, it should be so stated. If conventional international law sets forth an unjust rule, its enforcement will secure its correction. If all war criminals are not brought to the bar of justice under present procedures, such procedures should be made more inclusive and more effective. If the laws of war are to have any beneficient effect, they must be enforced.
The evidence in this case recites a record of killing and destruction seldom exceeded in modern history. Thousands of innocent inhabitants lost their lives by means of a firing squad or hangman's noose, - people who had the same inherent desire to live as do these defendants. Wherever the German Armed Forces were found, there also were the SS (Die Schutzstaffein Der Nationalsocialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei), The SD (Die Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuehrer), the Gestapo (Die Geheime Staatspolizei) the SA (Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei), the administrators of Goering's Four Year Plan and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, all participating in the administration of the occupied territories in varying degrees. Mass shootings of the innocent population, deportations for slave labor and the indiscriminate destruction of public and private property, not only in Yugoslavia and Greece but in many other countries as well, lend credit to the assertion that terrorism and intimidation was the accepted solution to any and all opposition to the German will. It is clear, also, that this had become a general practice and a major weapon of warfare by the German Wehrmacht. The German attitude seems to be reflected in the introduction to the German War Book, as translated by J. H. Morgan on Pages 53, 54 and 55 wherein it is stated: "If therefore, in the following work the expression 'the law of war' is used, it must be understood that by it is meant not a lex scripts introduced by international agreements; but only a reciprocity of mutual agreement; a limitation of arbitrary behavior, which custom and conventionality, human friendliness and a calculating egotism have erected, but for the observance of which there exists no express sanction, but only 'the fear of reprisals' decides.
*** Moreover the officer is a child of his time. He is subject to the intellectual tendencies which influence his own nation; the more educated he is the more will this be the case. The danger that, in this way, he will arrive at false views about the essential character of war must not be lost sight of. The danger can only be not by a thorough study of war itself. By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions, it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them. It will also teach him how the rules of belligerent intercourse in war have developed, how in the course of time they have solidified into general usages of war, and finally it will teach him whether the governing usages of war are justified or not, whether they are to be modified or whether they are to be observed."
It is apparent from the evidence of these defendants that they considered military necessity, a matter to be determined by them, a complete justification of their acts. We do not concur in the view that the rules of warfare are anything less than they purport to be. Military necessity or expediency do not justify a violation of positive rules. International law is prohibitive law. Articles 46, 47 and 50 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 make no such exceptions to its enforcement. The rights of the innocent population therein set forth must be respected even if military necessity or expediency decree otherwise. We have hereinbefore pointed out that it is the duty of the commanding general in occupied territory to maintain peace and order, punish crime and protect lives and property. This duty extends not only to the inhabitants of the occupied territory but to his own troops and auxiliaries as well. The commanding general of occupied territory having executive authority as well as military command, will not be heard to say that a unit taking unlawful orders from someone other than himself, was responsible for the crime and that he is thereby absolved from responsibility. It is here claimed, for example, that certain SS units under the direct command of Heinrich Himmler committed certain of the atrocities herein charged without the knowledge, consent or approval of these defendants.
But this cannot be a defense for the commanding general of occupied territory. The duty and responsibility for maintaining peace and order, and the prevention of crime rests upon the commanding general. He cannot ignore obvious facts and plead ignorance as a defense. The fact is that the reports of subordinate units almost without exception advised these defendants of the policy of terrorism and intimidation being carried out by units in the field. They requisitioned food supplies in excess of their local need and caused it to be shipped to Germany in direct violation of the laws of war. Innocent people were lodged in collection and concentration camps where they were mistreated to the everlasting shame of the German nation. Innocent inhabitants were forcibly taken to Germany and other points for use as slave labor. Jews, gypsies and other racial groups were the victims of systematised murder or deportation for slave labor for no other reason than their race or religion, which is in violation of the express conventional rules of the Hague Regulations of 1907. The German theory that fear of reprisal is the only deterrent in the enforcement of the laws of war cannot be accepted here. That reprisals may be indulged to compel an enemy nation to comply with the rules of war must be conceded.
It is not, however, an exclusive remedy. If it were, the persons responsible would seldom, if ever, be brought to account. The only punishment would fall upon the reprisal victims who are usually innocent of wrong-doing. The prohibitions of the Hague Regulations of 1907 comtemplate no such system of retribution. Those responsible for such crimes by ordering or authorizing their commission, or by a failure to take effective steps to prevent their execution or recurrence, must be held to account if international law is to be anything more than an ethical code, barren of any practical coercive deterrent.
That the acts charged as crimes in the indictment occurred is amply established by the evidence. In fact it is evident that they constitute only a portion of the large number of such acts which took place as a part of a general plan for subduing the countries of Yugoslavia and Greece.
The guilt of the German occupation forces is not only proven beyond a reasonable doubt but it casts a pall of shame upon a once highly respected nation and its people. The defendants themselves recognize this situation when they decry the policies of Hitler and assert that they continually protested against orders of superiors issued in comformity with the plan of terrorism and intimidation.
It is the determination of the connection of the defendants with the acts charged and the responsibility which attaches to them therefore, rather than the commission of the acts, that poses the chief issue to be here decided.
Objection has been made that the documents offered in evidence by the prosecution are not the original instruments but photostatic copies only. No objection of this character was made at the time the exhibits were offered and received in evidence. In view of the fact that this objection was not timely made, it cannot receive the consideration of the tribunal.
The record is replete with testimony and exhibits which have been offered and received in evidence without foundation as to their authenticity and, in many cases where it is secondary in character, without proof of the usual conditions precedent to the admission of such evidence. This is in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, Ordinance No. 7, Military Government, Germany, which provides: "The tribunals shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure, and shall admit any evidence which they deem to have probative value. Without limiting the foregoing general rules, the following shall be deemed admissible if they appear to the tribunal to contain information of probative value relating to the charges, affidavits, depositions, interrogations, and other statements, diaries, letters, the records, findings, statements and judgments of the military tribunals and the reviewing and confirming authorities of any of the United Nations, and copies of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents of any document, if the original is not readily available or cannot be produced without delay.
The tribunal shall afford the opposing party such opportunity to question the authenticity or probative value of such evidence as in the opinion of the tribunal the ends of justice require." This tribunal is of the opinion that this rule applies to the competency of evidence only and does not have the effect of giving weight and credibility to such evidence as a matter of law. It is still within the province of the tribunal to test it by the usual rules of law governing the evaluation of evidence. Any other interpretation would seriously affect the right of the defendants to a fair and impartial trial. The interpretation thus given and consistently announced throughout the trial by this tribunal is not an idle gesture to be announced as a theory and ignored in practice, - it is a substantive right composing one of the essential elements of a fair and impartial adjudication.
The trial was conducted in two languages, English and German, and consumed 117 trial days. The prosecution offered 678 exhibits and the defendants 1025 that were received in evidence. The transcript of the evidence taken consists of 9556 pages. A careful consideration of this mass of evidence and its subsequent reduction into concise conclusions of fact, is one of the major tasks of the tribunal.
The prosecution has produced oral and documentary evidence sustain the charges of the indictment. The documents consist mostly of orders, reports and war diaries which were captured by the Allied Armies at the time of the German collapse. Some of it is fragmentary and consequently not complete. Where excerpts of such documents were received in evidence, we have consistently required the production of the whole docent whenever the defense so demanded. The tribunal and its administrative officials have made every effort to secure all known and available evidence. The prosecution has repeatedly assured the tribunal that all available evidence, whether favorable or otherwise, has been produced pursuant to the tribunal's orders.
The reports offered consist generally of those made or received by the defendants and unit commanders in their chain of command.
By the general term "orders" is meant primarily the orders, directives and instructions received by them or sent by them by virtue of their position. By war diaries is meant the records of events of the various units which were commanded by these defendants, such war diaries being kept by the commanding officer or under his direction. This evidence, together with the oral testimony of witnesses appearing at the trial provides the basis of the prosecution's case.
The defense produced much oral testimony including that of the defendants themselves. Hundreds of affidavits were received under the rules of the tribunal. All affidavits were received subject to a motion to strike if the affiants were not produced for cross-examination an open court upon demand of the opposite party made in open court.
In weighing and evaluating this evidence, it was necessary to ascertain the nature of the chains of command and the general military structure in the involved territory. The correct subordination of military units as to time and place was sometimes important. Orders given and received had to be tested as to claimed literal or general meanings often made in accordance with the interest of the claimant. We have been confronted repeatedly with contentions that reports and orders sent to the defendants did not come to their attention. Responsibility for acts charged as crimes have been denied because of absence from headquarters at the time of their commission. These absences generally consisted of visitations to points within the command area, vacation leaves and leaves induced by illness. It is claimed also that many of the acts charged were committed by units not subordinated to them or by independent units subordinated to agencies other than the German Wehrmacht. It is contended generally by these defendants that they signed no orders for the performance of specific acts which are charged as war crimes, a fact which is undoubtedly due to their high rank and their indirect control only of troops in the field.
We desire to point out that the German Wehrmacht was a well equipped, well trained and well disciplined army.
Its efficiency was demonstrated on repeated occasions throughout the war.
There is some evidence that the troops in the Southeast were overage and not as well fitted for duty there as they might have been. The evidence shows, however, that they were led by competent commanders who had mail, telegraph, telephone, radio and courier service for the handling of communications. Reports were made daily, sometimes morning and evening. Ten day and monthly reports recapitulating past operations and stating future intentions were regularly made. They not only received their own information promptly but they appear to have secured that of the enemy as well. We are convinced that military information was received by these high-ranking officers promptly, a conclusion prompted by the known efficiency of the German Armed Forces.
An army commander will not ordinarily be permitted to deny knowledge of reports received at his headquarters, they being sent there for his special benefit. Neither will he ordinarily be permitted to deny knowledge of happenings within the area of his command while he is present therein. It would strain the credulity of the tribunal to believe that a high ranking military commander would permit himself to get out of touch with current happenings in the area of his command during war time. No doubt such occurrences result occasionally because of unexpected contingencies, but they are the unusual. With reference to statements that responsibility is lacking where temporary absence from headquarters for any cause is shown, the general rule to be applied is dual in character. As to events occurring in his absence resulting from orders, directions or a general prescribed policy formulated by him, a military commander will be held responsible in the absence of special circumstances. As to events, emergent in nature and presenting matters for original decision, such commander will not ordinarily be held responsible unless he approved of the action taken when it came to his knowledge.
The matter of subordination of units as a basis of fixing criminal responsibility becomes important in the case of a military commander having solely a tactical command.
But as to the commanding general of occupied territory who is charged with maintaining peace and order, punishing crime and protesting lives and property, subordinations are relatively unimportant. His responsibility is general and not limited to a control of units directly under his command. Subordinate commanders in occupied territory are similarly responsible to the extent that executive authority has been delegated to them.
Much has been said about the participation of these defendants in a preconceived plan to decimate and destroy the populations of Yugoslavia and Greece. The evidence will not sustain such a charge and we so find. The only plan demonstrated by the evidence is one to suppress the bands by the use of severe and harsh measures. While these measures progressively increased as the situation became more chaotic, and appeared to have taken a more or less common course, we cannot say that there is any convincing evidence that these defendants participated in such measures for the preconceived purpose of exterminating the population generally.
Neither will the evidence sustain a finding that these defendants participated in a preconceived plan to destroy the economy of the Balkans. Naturally there was a disruption of the economy of these countries but such only as could be expected by a military occupation. There were unlawful acts that had the effect of damaging the economy of Yugoslavia and Greece, possibly the result of a preconceived plan, but the evidence does not show the participation of these defendants therein.
There is evidence to the effect that certain reports and entries in the war diaries do not reflect the truth and were not intended to do so. The explanation is made that certain orders received from the High Command were so harsh and severe that resort was had to subterfuge to appease the insistent demands of superiors. It is asserted, for example that the number of reprisals taken against the population was increased above the actual number for this purpose and that the number of killings was inflated for the same reason.
In this connection we desire to point out that the records of the German Army are mute evidence of the events and occurrences which they themselves made. Statements contained therein which are adverse to the interests of the defendants approach the status of admission against interest. If the evidence and circumstances sustain such an assertion of falsity, we will of course give credence to it, but there are limitations beyond which the most credulous court cannot go.
In determining the guilt or innocence of these defendants, we shall require proof of a causative, overt act or omission from which a guilty intent can be inferred before a verdict of guilty will be pronounced. Unless this be true, a crime could not be said to have been committed unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly as charged in the indictment.
In making our findings of fact, we shall give effect to these general statements except where a contrary application is specifically pointed out. We shall impose upon the prosecution the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. We shall also adhere to the rule that the defendants will be presumed innocent until proven guilty by the required quantum of competent evidence. With these general statements in mind, we shall turn to a consideration of the charges against the individual defendants.
A brief historical background is helpful in dealing with issues here involved. The troubles of the German Wehrmacht in the Balkans began in October 1940 with the commencement of the war on Greece by Italy. Until that occurrence, Greece was a neutral nation and immune to invasion by the allied powers without the violation of fundamental concepts of the rights of neutrals. The attack on Greece by Italy, an ally of Germany, transformed that country into an active belligerent which welcomed the aid of the allied powers. The failure of the Italian forces to subjugate Greece opened the way to possible invasion of continental Europe by allied forces. To prevent such a contingency, Germany deemed it necessary to occupy Greece.
Arrangements were made for the passage of troops through Bulgaria for the attack on Greece and a treaty was made with the then existing government of Yugoslavia which insured non-action on its part. A few days after the making of the treaty with Yugoslavia, strong opposition developed in that country which resulted in the overthrow of the government and a disavowal of the treaty. The Germans, deeming it a military necessity to protect against the possibility of an attack from the rear and a disruption of its supply lines, determined to crush Yugoslavia as a part of the campaign against Greece. Once again international law gave way to military expediency on the part of the German Wehrmacht and neutral Yugoslavia was invaded. As we have heretofore shown, both countries were overrun and the German Wehrmacht became occupants within the meaning of international law.
The territory was particularly favorable to the guerrilla warfare which soon broke out. Local political, religious and racial conflicts had provided a training ground for this sort of fighting. The various conflicting elements of the population, over a period of time, were gradually welded into a common partisan front. The guerrilla methods of the partisans and the attempts of the Werhrmacht to eliminate them by a campaign of intimidation provides the basis for the prosecutions here brought.
A similar situation developed in Greece after the capitulation of the Greek armies. While it is true that the partisans of Greece were never able to organize a common front to the extent it was done in Yugoslavia, the methods of the various partisan organizations were very much the same. Guerrilla tactics were employed. German troops were ambushed; transportation and communication systems sabotaged. The capture of the perpetrators was next to impossible. Again draconic measures of terrorism and intimidation were indulged in an attempt to subjugate the country. It was with this situation that List, Kuntze, Loehr and von Weichs had to deal in their capacities as over-all commanders in the southeastern area.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the Courtroom please take their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke will continue reading the opinion.
The Defendant Wilhelm List was the fifth ranking Fieldmarshal in the German Army. He was a thoroughly trained and experienced military commander. He was the commander-in-chief of the Twelfth Army during the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece, and, in addition thereto, in June, 1941, became the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, a position he retained until illness compelled his temporary retirement from active service on 15 October 1941. From July to September, 1942, he was returned to active service as commander-in-chief of Army Group A, an army group operating on the Russian front. He stands charged on all four counts of the indictment.
On 9 June 1941, Hitler appointed the defendant List to be Wehrmacht Commander in the Southeast with headquarters in Salonika. His commission provided that the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast is the supreme representative of the Wehrmacht in the Balkans and exercises executive authority in the territory occupied by German troops. Directly subordinated to him were the "Commander Serbia", the "Commander Salonika-Aegea" and the "Commander of Southern Greece". Among the duties assigned was the safeguarding of the unified defense of those parts of Serbia and Greece, including the Greek Islands, which were occupied by German troops, against attacks and unrest. The defendant Foertsch, who had become Chief of Staff of the Twelfth Army on 10 May 1941, continued as Chief of Staff to the defendant List in his new capacity as Wehrmacht Commander Southeast.
The record shows that attacks on German troops and acts of sabotage against transportation and communication lines progressively increased throughout the summer of 1941. Even at this early date, the shooting of innocent members of the population was commenced as a means of suppressing resistance. Excerpts from the war diaries and orders of the participating units reveal, for example, that on 5 July 1941 thirteen communists and Jews were killed in reprisal in Belgrade; on 20 July 1941, fifty-two communists, Jews and members of families of band members were killed in reprisal for the attack on General Lontschar; on 25 July 1941, 100 Jews were killed in Belgrade because a sixteen year old Serbian girl threw a bottle of gasoline at a German motor vehicle at the alleged instigation of a Jew; on 29 July 1941, one hundred and twenty-two communists and Jews were killed in Belgrade in reprisal for acts of sabotage; and many other orders and reports showing the shooting of hundreds of the inhabitants in reprisal.
On 5 September 1941 the resistance movement had developed to such a point that the defendant List put out an order on the subject of its suppression. In this order, he said in part: "In regard to the above the following aspects are to be taken into consideration: * * * Ruthless and immediate measures against the insurgents, against their accomplices and their families.
(Hangings, burning down of villages involved, seizure of more hostages, deportation of relatives, etc., into concentration camps)."
On 16 September 1941, Hitler in a personally signed order, charged the defendant List with the task of suppressing the insurgent movement in the Southeast. This resulted in the commissioning of General Franz Boehme with the handling of military affairs in Serbia and in the transfer of the entire executive power in Serbia to him. This delegation of authority was done on the recommendation and request of the defendant List to whom Boehme remained subordinate.
On 16 September 1941, Fieldmarshal Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, issued a directive pertaining to the suppression of the insurgent movement in occupied territories. The pertinent parts of this order are: "Measures taken up to now to counteract this general communist insurgent movement have proven themselves to be inadequate. The Fuehrer now has ordered that severest means are to be employed in order to break down this movement in the shortest time possible. Only in this manner, which has always been applied successfully in the history of the extension of power of great peoples can quiet be restored.
"The following directives are to be applied here: (a) Each incident of insurrection against the German Wehrmacht, regardless of individual circumstances, must be assumed to be of communist origin. (b) In order to stop these intrigues at their inception, severest measures are to be applied immediately at the first appearance, in order to demonstrate the authority of the occupying power, and in order to prevent further progress. One must keep in mind that a human life frequently counts for naught in the affected countries and a deterring effect can only be achieved by unusual severity. In such a case the death penalty for 50 to 100 communists must in general be deemed appropriate as retaliation for the life of a German soldier. The manner of execution must increase the deterrent effect. The reverse procedure - to proceed at first with relatively easy punishment and to be satisfied with the threat of measures of increased severity as a deterrent does not correspond with these principles and is not to be applied."
This order was received by the defendant List and distributed to his subordinate units.
On 25 September 1941, General Boehme issued an order to his subordinate units in part as follows:
"After dissemination, destroy!
"In March of this year, Serbia shamefully broke the friendship treaty with Germany, in order to strike the German units marching against Greece in the back.
"German revenge stromed across the country.
"We must turn to new, greater goals with all our forces at hand. For Serbia, this was the sign for a new uprising, to which hundreds of German soldiers have already fallen in sacrifice. If we do not proceed here with all means and the greatest ruthlessness, our losses will climb to unmeasurable heights.
"Your mission lies in carrying out recommaissance of the country in which German blood flowed in 1914 through the treachery of the Serbs, men and women.
"You are avengers of these dead. An intimidating example must he created for the whole of Serbia, which must hit the whole population most severely.
"Everyone who wishes to rule charitably sins against the lives of his comrades. He will be called to account without regard for his person and placed before a court martial."
On 28 September 1941, Fieldmarshal Keitel directed the following order to the defendant List:
"Because of the attacks on members of the Wehmacht which have taken place lately in the occupied territories it is pointed out that it is opportune for the military commanders to have always at their disposal a number of hostages of the different political persuasions, - i.e. (1) Nationalists (2) Democratic Middle-Class, and (3) Communists.
"It is of importance that among these are leading personalities or members of their families. Their names are to be published.
"In case of an attack hostages of the group corresponding to that to which the culpril belongs are to be shot.
"It is requested that commanders be informed in this sense."
On 4 October 1941, the defendant List directed the following order to General Bader, the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia:
"The male population of the territories to be mopped up of bandits, is to be handled according to the following points of view:
"Men who take part in combat are to be judged by court martial.
"Men in the insurgent territories who were not encountered in battle, are to be examined and --
"If a former participation in combat can be proven of them to be judged by court martial.
"If they are only suspected of having taken part in combat, of having offered the bandits support of any sort, or of having acted against the Wehrmacht in any way, to be held in a special collecting camp. They are to serve as hostages in the event that bandits appear, or anything against the Wehrmacht is undertaken in the territory mopped up or in their home localities, and in such cases they are to be shot."
On 10 October 1941, General Boehme issued an order to military units under his command relative to the crushing of the insurgent movement, the applicable parts of which are:
"In all commands in Serbia all Communists, male residents suspicious as such, all Jews, a certain number of nationalistic and democratically inclined residents are to be arrested as hostages, by means of sudden actions. It is to be explained to these hostages and to the population that the hostages will be shot in case of attacks on Germans or Volksdeutsche. * * * * "If losses of German soldiers or Volksdeutsche occur, the territorial competent commanders up to the regiment commanders are to decree the shooting of arrestees according to the following quotas:
(a) For each killed or murdered German soldier or Volksdeutsche (men, women or children) one hundred prisoners or hostages. (b) For each wounded German soldier or Volksdeutsche 50 prisoners or hostages.
"The shootings are to be carried out by the troops.
"If possible, the execution is to be made in the daily reports, whether and to what extent the reprisal measure is carried out or when this will be finished.
"In the burying of those shot, care is to be taken that no Serbian memorials arise. Placing of crosses on the graves, decoration, etc, is to be prevented. Burials are accordingly to be carried out best in distant localities.
"The Communists captured by the troops in combat actions are to be hanged or shot as a matter of principle at the location in question as a frightening measure. Localities which have to be taken in combat are to be burned down, as well as farms from which troops were shot at."
After the issuance of the foregoing orders, the shooting of innocent members of the population was stepped up. Acts of sabotage increased and attacks on German military personnel continued unabated. The evidence is conclusive that a large number of reprisals against the population were carried out on the basis of the 100 to 1 order. Space will not permit a detailed account of each of these actions. We shall content ourselves with a recitation of the facts of one incident that bears similarity to many other shown by the record.
On 2 October 1941, at a small village near Topola, a troop unit of the 521 Army Signal Regiment consisting of two officers and 45 men was ambushed from the cornfields along the road on which they were traveling. A few dead and wounded were found at the scene of the attack. In a small valley near by, other dead soldiers were found. A survivor who escaped being killed by feigning death, gave information that these men had been lined up and killed by the partisans by machine gun fire. The total casualties consisted of 22 dead, 3 wounded and 15 or 16 missing.