Schaeffer) Court No. V, Case No. VII.
because in the Mladenovac event the perpetrator of the attempt was found and apprehended but she later on shot herself. However, the letters which were found on her person revealed that the co-perpetrators in her village were Communists. These Communists had incited the perpetrator to carry out the attempt. The actual Communists involved could not be found. However, they remained unknown and, therefore, in this particular instance reprisal measures of the kind mentioned were ordered.
Furthermore, in this case also the reprisal order did not originate with Geitner but with his commander in chief. Geitner, as chief of staff, didn't order it, and is, therefore, not responsible for it.
Following up the Mladenovac incident, the Prosecution in its closing statement has maintained that this reprisal order and other similar orders had sprung from a wish to decimate the Serbian population and exterminate it. This assertion does in no way conform with the facts. The actual attitude and conduct shown by General von Geitner and his two commanders in chief was, on the contrary, directed towards helping the Serbian population as much as possible. In this connection I refer to pages 3 through 12 of the survey submitted by me concerning the defense material submitted for Geitner which has any number of individual instances, to show the real attitude shown by General von Geitner towards the Serbian population. Documents and testimony are used in this connection.
The Prosecution further has asserted that Geitner had himself admitted the main purpose of the executions was vengeance and extermination of the Serbian population. This is also incorrect. At no time and at no place has Geitner made such a ridiculous assertion. The Prosecution further has maintained that the Chief of Staff of a corps had disciplinary authorities in his relation to a regimental commander. In other words, he had the authority to punish a regimental commander. No such a thing is mentioned in the Army Regulations, although the Prosecution has referred to this service regulation and presented the matter as though it was provided in this regulation, that the Chief of Staff of a corps has disciplinary authority over a regimental commander. If any such thing is being asserted that is pure invention on the part of the person who asserts it. He who wants the truth can quite obviously glean from the Army Regulations that it merely states in Paragraph 5, that the Chief of Staff of a corps has the disciplinary authority of a regimental commander and also that the disciplinary authority is vested in him only in relation to the members of his own staff. He has no disciplinary authority over any other soldier of the armed forces, and least of all towards a regimental commander.
In the same way, of course, it is wrong if the Prosecution presents the matter, as though the Chief of Staff, so to speak, was to deputize for his commander in Chief, when the latter was absent. That was never the case in the German Army. From Paragraph 4 of the Army Regulations it becomes evident that only under rather limited conditions is the Chief of Staff authorized to deputize for his Commander in Chief, and only then, and I quote, "In operational and tactical matters," because only in such matters does Paragraph 4 regulate the limited authority to deputize of a Chief of Staff. All of this has emphatically been made clear by numerous documents and witnesses and by the Chief of Staff of the German Army Holder It has long been proved that the Commander in his judicial authority, that is where reprisal measures are concerned, can at no time be replaced by his Chief.
Completely incomprehensible to me is also how it can be asserted with reference to von Geitner that the Chiefs of Staff frequently issued orders on their own initiative without the Commanders knowing it. Not one single such case has been proved or even asserted in Von Geitner's case. The Prosecution has in this connection only presented one case in which the Chief of Staff of General Dehner is supposed to have committed such an independent act, but if this Chief of staff of General Dehner did exceed his authority and as the Prosecution asserts, independently issued a basic order of general importance, this still does not entitle the Prosecution to incriminate the defendant von Geitner with that, or even to merely assume that he who was a conscientious and correct Chief of Staff may have committed a similar act of independence.
The Prosecution further has asserted in connection with von Geitner's case, and I quote, "The crimes were carried out on the basis of his orders without his superior officers even knowing about it." This also is a reversion of the facts which have been proved. The Prosecution should present one single case in which von Geitner without previous knowledge and order of his Commander in Chief or of the letters' deputy had independently issued an order. The Prosecution is in no position to do this, because such things never occurred, - never - and I mean never without any exception. Furthermore, it is a wrong presentation of the facts for the Prosecution to assert that von Geitner had put a more refined emphasis on the whole issue and talked about a Chief of Administration who was not subordinate to him. That was something completely know, it has been said. However, he who has followed this trial with some attention knows that in the service regulation for the armed forces commander Southeast there is a clear distinction made between the operational staff, the head of which was von Geitner, and the administrative staff, the head of which had nothing to do with him. We know that this service regulation for the Military Commander Southeast is contained in Document Book 5, Document 124, Exhibit 105. This document has been submitted and has been presented in the course of these proceedings. The Prosecution, therefore, knows this regulation.
The tasks of the Administrative Staff and the Operational Staff have been made clear in documents submitted and the testimony of the witnesses.
Everyone who has listened in and followed this trial must realize that. It is therefore impossible to know how the Prosecution could maintain that 1st Lieutenant Bode, frequently mentioned by von Geitner was, as the Prosecution puts it, a creature invented by von Geitner and only used as a pretext, -- that this was a Lieutenant not known to anybody. In this connection I would like to recall that the name of 1st Lieutenant Bode again and again appeared as that of the expert for retaliation matters in the documents submitted. That the 1st Lieutenant Dr. Bode was O-I-Ist ADC, and that he was mentioned in various entries of the War Diary in connection with conferences with the Commander concerning retaliation matters he was repeatedly mentioned and that above all witnesses General Felber and Prinz v. Holstein have confirmed here that the reprisal measures were dealt with by this administrative jurist, who reported about them directly, that is without von Geitner's interference, to the Military Commander.
Furthermore, it stands to reason, that the two Military Commanders, Bader and Felbcr would rather be advised by a jurist in these difficult matters than by their Chief of Staff, who was an expert chemist and factory owner, and who knew nothing or rather not very much of legal matters. The Prosecution further maintained that Geitner had not been in a position to cite single case concerning the so-called mock executions. That is not correct. It is merely correct that he himself has not ordered any mock shootings, as the whole matter of ordering retaliation was reserved to the Commander in Chief. von Geitner did, however, know about mock shootings, which were discussed between von Geitner and Schaefer of the SD. Geitner was very happy about it that in this manner a means was found in order to restrict reprisal measures to a minimum. Apart from this, as already has been proved, mock shootings are not an invention of our days as the Prosecution contends, - but it is a fortunate coincidence that two documents of the War Diary were received which show that at that time such mock shootings were expressly mentioned. I have compiled these cases in sub-section 9, page 5 of the survey submitted by no concerning the defense material submitted for von Geitner, and particularly refer to Document Book von Geitner 4, page 27, Document 93, Exhibit 78.
The Prosecution has now quoted the witness Fischer, because this man did not know anything about mock shootings. That, however, does not prove anything. The witness Fischer could not be in a position to know anything about it, because Fischer had never worked in Belgrade, but in a branch agency and the matter of the mock shootings was dealt with in Belgrade, and of course remained a secret between the SD chief Schaefer on the one hand and Bader and Felber and the Chief of Staff on the other hand.
If the Prosecution objects to the fact that these shootings were not mentioned in the reports which were sent to higher levels, this also is a erroneous conclusion. That could not have been in these reports, because otherwise the superior agencies and also the OKW would have learned that the reprisal measures ordered were in reality not carried out.
Then in a von Geitner document book I have further presented a survey about sabotage acts, on the one hand and the much smaller number of reprisals on the other hand. This was done in Document Book IV, Document 81, page 1, and the Prosecution, and I quote, talked there about a web of fantasy, and of people who loved juggling with figures. In this connection I can only say that such personal attacks against a defense counsel and his actions in which he is duty bound, leave the level to which we are used to in a proper procedure. I have to reject such a criticism on my survey. The Prosecution knows the following: "This survey has been made under my own personal surveillance and with the help of my reliable collaborators with great conscientousness and after weeks of hard work." The documents on which this survey is based are documents sent from Washington, and they were available to the Prosecution in the same way as they were available to the defense.
If the Prosecution finds in my affidavit of 21 October 1947 contained in Geitner Document Book IV, Document 81, pages 1 to 5, or in the survey on which it is based, something which can be factually criticized it would have been its right to do so; but it would also have been the duty of the Prosecution to examine these documents before doing so, and to examine them as to whether or not the compilations submitted by me were correct or incorrect. The Prosecution did not make any such examination. Instead they found it sufficient to ridicule these surveys. Such a treatment of a factual matter condemns itself, particularly so since the Prosecution knew from my survey that these figures were calculated exactly from the situation reports of the War Diaries, that is from documents which were beyond any doubt, as can be seen from Von Geitner Document Book VI, Documents 189 to 195, Exhibits 61 to 67, pages 72 to 95. In this connection I should ask you to compare these with the Document Book of the Prosecution No. 24, NOKW 1757, Exhibit 549, page 143. Von Geitner is not even to be reproached with his interest in the concentration camp of Semlin, and I quote, "Judging from his interest in the way concentration camp Semlin was run."
Your Honors, please, that is correct, von Geitner was interested when he heard about the bad conditions in the camps. As a matter of fact, he reported to his commanders about this camp, and it took much effort for him to get permission for a medical officer to enter the Semlin camp to check up on the conditions prevailing there, and to help. But, Your Honor, please, since when is it a crime if an officer interests himself in a humane way, for the benefit of the inmates of a camp, in the matters at hand? I am of the opinion on the contrary that von Geitner's in erest in this camp should be highly recognized since he was not at all responsible for this camp. On the contrary this fact shows how he had interested himself in the camp and how much he was interested in the welfare of the Serbian population, also of the communists and partisand and, how he wanted to help them and how he wanted to make sure of humane treatment for them, that is also beyond the sphere of his own competency.
In that connection of the Prosecution finally has asserted that there were no objects against the activities of the police. This assertion is also incomprehensible to me. The documents show again and again and explicitly that for weeks and weeks the military agencies in Belgrade objected against excesses of police, and again and again made objections to the high SS Police Leader Meyszner, and asked for superior agencies to help and make changes in the matter. A few examples, Geitner Book V, Document 46, Page No. 133, Exhibit 110, and in Document Book VI, Pages 24-29, Documents 165, 166, and 168, Exhibit numbers 139 up to and including 141. Further, I would like to refer to my survey of defense material submitted for von Geitner, page 9, paragraph 5.
Now, I would like to refer to General Lanz, concerning the Sorando incident of 28 Italian officers shot. General Lanz and myself have repeatedly explained that this is an independent order of the Divisional Commander, General von Stettner, and on his own initiative, and that this divisional commander had issued orders for the shooting in contradiction of the orders of General Lanz, who wanted them to be treated as prisoners of war, that is that they should be sent to the prisoner of war camps, -although, as a matter of fact, there were no prisoner of war camps.
The Prosecution has again charged General Lanz of the fact that he did not do anything about this disobedience of General von Stettner. This is also incorrect, and the Prosecution knows it from the examination of General Lanz. Lanz, at the time he heard of the shooting of the Italian officers, called von Stettner to his office and asked him to explain the facts to him. Stettner reported that the 74 Italian officers had been shot because during the investigation of the case it had become apparent that for 8 days, together with the bands, they had fought against the German troops. Von Stettner also said he ordered the shootings in absolute agreement with the very clear Fuehrer Order issued by Hitler. This responsibility of von Stettner is undoubtedly correct. General von Stettner was actually covered by the Hitler Fuehrer order. Lanz had to let matters rest there whether he wanted to or not. Of course Lanz, under these circumstances, could not undertake anything against von Stettner. Had he wanted to do so he would have had to report the incident to Hitler, that is he would have had to suggest to Hitler that Hitler have von Stettner punished because von Stettner had adhered to a Fuehrer order. That was of course completely impossible. Lanz would have only made himself ridiculous doing what the Prosecution says he should have done.
Concerning the Cephalonia and Corfu incident the Prosecution contends that Lanz had known that Badoglio had given an order to General Gandin to resist the German troops. This is completely untrue, and unfounded. Lanz had no idea of such an alleged order and never knew anything about it, and above all General Gandin himself never referred to such an order of Badoglio.
The Prosecution contends now that the conditions of the ItalianAllied Armistice were made known to the German Government by Badoglio himself, and on the 12 September 1943 had appeared in all German newspapers.
Of all of this, however, Lanz did not know anything in September 1943, and even today he knows nothing about it, and is not offhand in a position to recognize the assertions of the Prosecution to this effect as correct, for we have had very unfortunate experiences here in this case, and proof has not been rendered thereto by the prosecution during this trial. Of these conditions of the Armistice apparently the Commander in Chief Vecchiarelli, and the Italian Commander at Joannina did not know anything. How then should Lanz have gained any knowledge of it. For months and months the Prosecution has submitted evidence here which in many instances was superfluous, but concerning this particularly important point in the Lanz case, no evidence has been submitted.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Dr. Sauter?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Before we take our morning recess, I would like to call your attention to the fact that thirty minutes remain for this phase of the argument by the defense. The Tribunal has made no attempt to allot the time between defense counsel and we trust that you have taken into consideration that others may want to speak.
DR. SAUTER: May I ask how much time we have got left, your Honor?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: A total of thirty minutes left -that is for the whole group.
DR. SAUTER: No, I don't believe there will be any other defense counsel who wants to speak and I shan't use all that time.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Just so you have your understanding with other counsel.
The Tribunal will take its recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the Courtroom will please be seated.
The Court is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
DR. SAUTER: I stopped considering the question whether General Lanz had known about the armistice conditions between the Allies and Italy and I am now concluding.
Any proof concerning the statements of the prosecution has not been brought and has not been submitted. The conditions of armistice treaty were obviously not known to the Italian Commander-in-Chief Vecchiarelli and the Italian Corps Commander Joannina. Now how was General Lanz to have known about them?
The Prosecution apparently concludes incorrectly in Rendulic Doc. Book III, Document 52, page 2. This document which was taken from the War Diary of the XXXI Armored Command -- that is not the 22nd Corps of Lanz -- says that apparently Rendulic during the night of the 8th to the 9th September 1943 had informed by teletype the subordinate administrative sub-area Headquarters command of the following and I quote:
"according to the statement of Marshall Badoglio, Italian troops on the Balkans are subordinated to the American General Wilson. Therefore we have to count on armed resistance by the Italians."
To this document Rendulic I should like to comment on Lanz's behalf. He found out about the teletype of General Rendulic to whom Lanz was never subordinate, only here in the course of this trial.
At the time in September 1943, he did not know anything about a statement by Marshall Badoglio, nor did he know anything about any news via radio of Cairo. I should like to point out, however, that in the teletype of General Rendulic from 9th September 1943 it is added explicitly, -- and I quote:
"The Italian 11th Army has surrendered its heavy arms and has assured that it would not fight against Germans".
It is just this 11th Italian Army to which General Gandin belonged. It was just the Commander-in-Chief of this army who had ordered refusal to surrender arms, also for the area of General Gandin. Furthermore, I have to emphasize that neither Vecchiarelli nor Gandin nor any other Italian ever referred to an order to the contrary issued by Marshall Badoglio. They all certainly would have done so if such an order had been received by them. Moreover, the fundamental question must be raised here.
Is a German general who is in the front lines concerned with a treaty concluded between two enemy nations, and in which Germany is not a participant? We have already seen a precedent case which might make the answer to this question easier.
In the spring of 1941, Serbia swerved into the German camps. That, too, was reported by the newspapers. This, too, was reported over the radio. Several Allied Generals certainly would have read about that. I should like to ask now, does one really believe that only one Allied General respected this treaty between Germany and Serbia and believed that it was legally binding for him, and did any one of the Allied Generals actually act in accordance with that? No!
On the contrary, the Allies at that time justifiedly did everything in order to destroy this new constitution, but the German General Lanz is expected to disregard the orders of his superiors and his head of state and that he supposed to act according to the treaties which the enemy nations have concluded among themselves.
The prosecution in spite of everything does not wish to understand why General Lanz fought against the Italians at all. The Italians, the prosecution says, intended only, and I quote, -- for this is too interesting --"to remain on the Greek Islands more or less for a vacation for the rest of the war."
This argument, of course, is entirely nonsensical and I would like to ask you: would the American Occupation Force in Germany permit a German division to remain under arms and permit them to live more or less on vacation in Germany until the end of the war just because this division does not want to recognize Germany's surrender?
I should like to know, your Honors, if a German division would do that, just what would the very same gentlemen of the prosecution say to that, for to pose this question at all means to answer it in the negative.
Greece with Kephalonia and Korfu -- which of course belong to Greece -- was German zone of occupation. The people that inhabited this area during the occupation were subordinate to the jurisdiction of the occupational powers. Whether or not they were soldiers or civilians. Besides, you will find in my plea a legal reason for the fact that the captured Italians were not prisoners-of-war within the meaning of the Geneva Convention, and therefore could not claim to be subject to its provisions; but I must say that following also.
The Italians who were not prisoners-of-war are expected according to the Prosecution to have remained under the protection of the Geneva Convention. However, the German generals, who without doubt were prisoners-of-war are denied by the same prosecution the protection of this very same Geneva Convention.
It has also been said that Lanz behaved incorrectly towards General Gandin; In a leaflet which the prosecution mentions with the inclosing statement, he is supposed to have misled the Italians by mentioning the transport of the Italians to Italy. This can actually be read in this leaflet but Lanz made this statement in good faith for this order of the OKW in which the treatment of Italians was fundamentally regulated was not in his hands at that time.
On the contrary, at that time, he assumed that the Italians actually would be transported to Italy after their surrender of arms. Therefore, we cannot speak of any misleading of the Italians on the part of Lanz. Furthermore, Lanz also did not know anything about the teletype of the OKW from 11 September 1943 which was cited once again by the prosecution, and which says that the employment of captured Italians in war industry is ordered.
After the finishing of the Italian matter, this teletype to the Epirus weeks later. In connection with the case of Kephalonia and Korfu, the prosecution thought that would always be one of the most and humiliating chapters in the long history of national soldierdom. If that were the actual opinion of the prosecution, then I would have to ask again and again why then did the Prosecution not submit one single order which Badoglio at that time was supposed to have issued to General Gandin, and furthermore I ask why is it that the prosecution did not bring into the witness stand a single one of those Etalians who thank their lives to this General Lanz?
The reason, of course, is clear to me. General Gandin did not receive orders to the contrary by General Badoglio which could justify his mutiny. And all statements to the contrary are, if I may quote the prosecution more or less -- webs of fantasy" and every Italian who would have been put into the witness stand here would have become a strong defense witness for General Lanz, for his chivalry which he transformed into action at that time.
Apart from the case of Kephalonia and Korfu, General Lanz was charged that he had registered the population in Saranda for forced labor. This is also incorrect. An agency which was subordinate to General Lanz has ordered such forced labor in one case only. That is correct. This order of his subordinate agency was not known to Lanz before. He only found out about that in Nurnberg.
But this order did not command forced labor which was against international law for Saranda at that time belonged to the State of Albania which at that time was independent and unfriendly terms with Germany and did not belong to Greece, and the inhabitants of this state in Albania who were conscripted for forced labor only worked for the defense of their own country and were not working for German military purposes. That was permitted.
General Lanz was further cited in the closing argument of the prosecution in relation to a file note of the 18th of October 1943 according to which 160 persons on the order of the 1st Mountain Division were to be deported into the Reich proper. In this connection I wish to state that of this order of the 1st Mountain Division Lanz found out at the time but only through the subsequent report of the division, that is to say through the oral report of his staff officer Henke, who was 1c in his staff. Lanz at that time prohibited that any of these people should be deported into the Reich, for he said he needed those people to keep up the various communications and did not want them deported and that was conclusively established on cross examination. I am now coming to a further point: in one single case in which Lanz was charged with an operation against the Jews, namely with the Jewish deportation from Corfu. They say he permitted the forced evacuation of 1800 Jews from Corfu by an SS unit. This is the expression of the prosecution. Lanz never gave such an order nor does the prosecution contend he did so, rather he rejected any participation in this operation, and informed the army group of this. This operation at that time had been ordered by the SS and was to be carried out by the SS. Lanz criticized this operation and stated expressly that he could not give up any shipping space or escort for such an operation. The operation was carried out by order of the Reich Fuehrer and SS and police. The necessary shipping space was made available by the Navy commander in Patras who was not subordinated to General Lanz. The assertion that General Lanz was supposed to have helped the SS in the carrying out of this operation was not proven in any way. It was not correct. General Lanz then did neither order this operation against the Jews or Corfu nor did he participate in it. He had nothing to do with it, nor does he know even today whether the army group made available barracks for the temporary housing of the Jews as the prosecution charges. He was never chief of the army group and had nothing to do with things of that sort, however, from the long long time that Lanz was active this is the only case in which he was brought into contact in any way with the Jewish question.
Not even the prosecution can level any more charges in this direction against him. A further point: I am surprised that in spite of our evidence the question of the commissar order has been again made an object of a charge against Lanz. He has stated at the time that he had received the commissar order at the time in Russia, and that he had given explicit orders to the commanders under his command that even commissars were permitted to be shot only in combat. That has been proved by seven or eight affidavits. Lanz had clearly stated to the troops that were under his orders that the very same thing was true in the case of commissars as in the case of any other enemy, even a commissar according to severe and strict orders of Lanz, a commissar too could only be shot in combat. If the commissar surrendered or was taken prisoner in any other way even the commissar, according to the clear orders of General Lanz, was privileged to be under the protection of the Geneva Convention in the same way as any other prisoner of war, nor was it said, let alone proven, that the troops of General Lanz shot a commissar in a manner contravening International Law. One report of a war correspondent has been submitted, from which is to follow that among eighteen thousand Russian prisoners only one commissar was found and that this commissar after an interrogation that lasted three hours was shot by the German troops. Whether or not this report of the war correspondent is in conforming with the actual facts, General Lanz does not know. He believes he is very skeptical concerning such situation reports by newspaper reporters, for in such cases facts are frequently mixed up with imaginary incidents. In any case, Lanz did not order the shooting of this one and only commissar he knew nothing about it and only found out about it here in Nurnberg. But if you wish to be objective, then in order to evaluate such a case it must be said that in this report of the newspaper reporter something else was mentioned too-that was that the commissar in question was supposed to have shot at his own people from the back and was therefore reported to the German troops by his own men.
If in such a case, gentlemen, the indignant troops shoot down such a dog, we certainly are not surprised about it.
May it please the Tribunal, I would like to conclude my comments on rebuttal, without expressing my great surprise about the whole tenor of this statement. Already on Friday last I objected to the prosecution here charging these defendants with not having acted like men. The prosecution now thought it was right to say especially about the defendant General von Geitner that he had compared his position as chief of Staff of a corps with a crossing of a Secretary and an office clerk, or perhaps a postman, mailman, or a messenger boy whose task it was to correct typographical errors, to dust the desks, to sharpen pencils and lick the banks of postage stamps. These are expressions which can also be found in the written statement of the prosecution even though one cannot think such a thing possible. Your Honors, with making a man like von Geitner contemptible to such a degree, truth and justice have not gained anything. Every one of the defendants here and Geitner too has achieved a great deal during their lifetimes and have faithfully and honorably served their Fatherland for decades. Every one of these men has made efforts to fulfill their duties as citizens and soldiers in an exemplary manner. I believe it does not correspond to the significance or customs of this court nor to the historical tasks of this trial if a German general, just because he claims not to have had the executive powers, is compared to an office boy and made ridiculous, or if his functions are mad contemptive. The situation here is much too serious. The defense has endeavored to keep up a level of objectivity and chivalry which corresponded to its task during this trial and I am sorry that the prosecution has lowered this level to a way of expression which in the framework of the Nurnberg trials I have not experienced heretofore and I would not have thought possible. But there is something else, I would like to mention in conclusion, your Honors. My clients during the seven months during which the trial has lasted have won the impression that you gentlemen will not become tools of vengeance and hatred.
For whoever sows the seeds of hatred will reap storm.
You as the judges will not see in these defendants criminals, only because they are designated as such by the Prosecution, but you, the judges, with your conscientiousness will investigate and establish the real deeds and the motives of these Generals. Furthermore, Your Honors, you will evaluate the actions of these Generals from the conditions prevailing at the time, and you will think yourself into the very difficult position in which the Generals on the Balkans were at the time. You, the judges, finally will compare the charges levelled against these Generals with all the other events in the world during the last years and with events that are transpiring even today. The more you will be successful in this, your task, Your Honors, the more certain your decision will be, a just and wise decision, recognized by history as such.
Thank you.
JUDGE CARTER: The Defense having used their allotted time, we will now hear the rebuttal statement of the Prosecution. This phase has been limited to one hour and thirty minutes.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, before beginning the Prosecution's rebuttal statement, I should like to distribute two additional lists just to bring the files and records up to date. The first is a list of Prosecution exhibits which were introduced during the rebuttal and during the cross examination of the Defense affiants. This may be marked for identification purposes as Exhibit 677.
Your Honors will note on the fourth page of the document that we have stated as the date on which this particular exhibit was admitted the date, 7 February 1948. That, of course, should be changed to read 10 February 1948.
Now as Prosecution Exhibit 678 we offer a list of the rebuttal witnesses and Defense affiants indexed to the English transcript of the record, and then if Your Honors would please note at the very bottom of Exhibit 677, the Exhibit 678, the date 10 February 1948 and the fact that this is a diary of rebuttal witnesses and Defense affiants indexed to the English transcript.
I beg your pardon, Your Honors. I am told this is 9 February rather than 10 February 1948.
We have followed the arguments made last week by counsel for the defendants, and have read and reread these arguments over the week-end. While a great many words have been spoken, so far as we can see they encompass relatively few thoughts and, with only one or two exceptions at most, no new thoughts at all. In reply, therefore, the prosecution will be extremely brief. This trial has already lasted far longer than anyone expected it would when it started, and we have no desire to protract it on this, its last day, by belaboring the obvious or burdening the court with a detailed refutation of many arguments based on patent misconceptions and distortions. We will content ourselves with but one glaring example. Counsel for the defendant Speidel claims that the prosecution said the Hague rules would not be involved in this proceeding, and in support quotes as follows from the prosecution's opening statement:
"We have not sought and will not seek in this case to make murderers out of soldiers for the violation of rules framed in 1907."
DR. WEISSGERGER, in this little maneuver, had adopted the delightfully simple expedient of dropping off the last part of the sentence which read:
"if those rules today are outmoded and generally disregarded." This particular item is somewhat more amusing but no more absurd than many other which could be cited.
In general, it may be said that the one important point which has emerged from all the arguments that have been made on behalf of all the defendants is that it has now become quite clear, if it was not already so, that the real defense here is a denial of the validity of international law itself. Defense counsel have laid hold of every possible device in order to induce and delude this Tribunal to render a decision which would nullify the laws of war and international law.