were reported by the plenipotentiary commanding general in Serbia during the tenure of General Kuntze as having been carried out. I further brought evidence of the fact that reprisals reported during General Kuntze's tenure had not increased in number but on the contrary decreased and in the summer of 1942 reprisal measures were not carried out at all and did not have to be carried out because the populace remained generally quite. Nor were the sabotage acts of the bands retaliated for at that time.
Now a brief insertion in this connection. In this connection I would like to recall once again that the following incidents did not fall into the period of tenure of General Kuntze: One, the case of Kragujevac, two, the case of Kraljevo and three, the case of Valjevo and four, the incident of the army signal regiment 521, five, the reprisal measures according to Exhibit 108, Volume 3, pages 93 of the German text and 133 of the English text, six, the Belgrade incidents as shown in exhibit 124, document book IV, page 193 of the German and 153 of the English, seven, the reprisal measures of exhibit 146 document book VI, page 37 of the German and page 46 of the English.
This brings me to the conclusion of my statement, middle of page 4. For the rest I should like to point out that General Kuntze after in December 1941 he had gained knowledge of Boehme's order of 10 October 1941, which is Exhibit 88, Document book III, page 27 of the German, and 34- of the English text, as well as of its effects did try everything in order to achieve a mitigation of the measures ordered by the OKW. In this connection I refer to page 32 of my final plea. Above all I should like to point to his struggle with the OKW which had only disadvantages for him personally and above all I should like to add the fact that General Kuntze was not appointed commander in chief of the southeast because he was declared too mild for the Balkans but merely remained a deputy during all his service, and was not promoted during the whole war. This shows that he could not have committed crimes as the prosecution charged him with. This is all I have to say Court No. V, Case No. VII.
in connection with my client General Kuntze.
DR. VON JACKWITZ (For the defendant Rendulic): If it please the Tribunal, I have mentioned part of my reply already in my final plea in reply to various statements of the prosecution, only concerning two points I should like to supplement my replies. If the prosecution maintains on page 9472 that before the army order of the 15th of September 1943 was issued no reprisal measures had been carried out in the area of the 69th corps, this is misleading, inasmuch as this corps was only established a very short time before the 2nd Panzer Army arrived in the theater of war. The prosecution in its opening statement on page 59 has mentioned itself that even before the 2nd Panzer army took over the leadership in the area, reprisal measures had been carried out in the Croatian area in the same way as later. Supplementing these statements I should like to refer to prosecution's Exhibit 261, pages 2 and 12 to exhibit 266 pages 6 and 7 and to exhibit 292 the last page of that document all of which refer to the year 1943. If furthermore the prosecution maintains on page 9471 that the Golden Badge of Merit was purely a Party badge, this is not correct. The Golden Badge of Merit was as well as other orders granted for instance to numerous generals and other persons who moved in a sphere completely outside of the Party. I have shown that the fact that General Rendulic was given this medal was based purely on military expedience. This is shown on pages 5341 and page 5621 of the record.
Court No. V, Case No. VII
DR. GAWLIK: (Counsel for defendant Dehner): The Prosecution has asserted in its final plea that General Dehner had adhered to the letter of the summarizing order of the 15th of September 1943 and has not wasted any time in order to carry out handings and shootings.
I have already shown in my final plea in great detail that General Dehner had not ordered any shootings and hangings and that the troops subordinated to him have not carried out any such measures. But also the measures carried out by the German police and by the Croatian units, for which General Dehner is not responsible, as I have likewise shown, do by no means reach the quota mentioned in the order of 15 September 1943, that is, a quota of 50 to 1.
The Prosecution has said that it would be too monotonous to mention the dates and incidents in formal statistics. In this connection I can only say that is rather a strange presentation of evidence which I have not experienced before in my practice. It is not important whether presentation of evidence is monotonous or not. It is merely important whether it is material or not and it would have been material to show these dates and incidents by way of statistics in order to show that the measures carried out by Croats and by the German police did in actual fact reach the ratio of 50 to 1. The Prosecution has by no means not done this because it would have been too monotonous, as it has stated, but instead, because through statistics, its own assertion would have been refuted.
The Prosecution in this connection has further stated that the total amount of persons killed has reached 450. However, the Prosecution has not dared to assert that this figure has actually been proved but very cautiously the Prosecution has added that this is an estimate.
This also contradicts all usual principles of a proper procedure. A defendant cannot be sentenced on the basis of an estimate. A defendant can only be sentenced if the facts have been proved beyond any reasonable doubt. Further, I see no cause why this figure should Court No. V, Case No. VII.
have to be guessed at. The Prosecution would have only had to add up the numbers on the basis of documents submitted by it. I will inform the Prosecution of the number which becomes apparent from the documents submitted by which I don't in any way want to recognize the probative value of this documentary evidence, which I have already challenged in my final plea. That figure in actual fact reaches 371 persons.
The Prosecution further has very cautiously forgotten to add the number of persons which had been killed by the bands; that is, the number of killings which have presented the cause for the counter measures, carried out by the Croatian authorities and by the police. This number also becomes very clearly apparent from the evidence submitted by the Prosecution and when one adds these numbers we reach a number of 1,157 persons.
And now your Honors will understand why the Prosecution has withheld these figures -- because these figures refute quite clearly the assertions of the Prosecution that in the area of the 69th Reserve Corps during the time when General Dehner was in command of that corps the quota of 50 to 1 was reached. There cannot be any mention that a ratio of 1 to 1 was ever reached, that is, as I have already stated in my final plea, merely the ratio of 1 to 0.3 was reached.
The Prosecution in this connection has particularly referred to a report of the 187th Reserve Division dated 20 September 1943. I regret to have, in this instance, to reply to the Prosecution that in choosing this report it was not very fortunate because this report shows that this reprisal measure was carried out by the Croatian Panzer Regiment 202 because of a surprise attack against a Croatian truck. Croatian Panzer Regiment 202 was at no time subordinate to the 69th Reserve Corps nor has it at anytime been asserted by the Prosecution. In order to connect this reprisal measure which was carried out by the Croatian Panzer Regiment 202 with General Dehner, the Prosecution has further asserted that this report was contained in a war diary. That also is incorrect. In the war diary this report is not entered at all Court No. V, Case No. VII.
as can quite obviously be gleaned from the document. This is a further proof of the fact that the 69th Reserve Corps had nothing whatsoever to do with this reprisal measure. This example again shows on what weak foundations the Prosecution based their charges.
The same applies for the balance of the reports which the Prosecution has mentioned in its final statement and to which I cannot reply owing to lack of time. In summary I can only say that the statements of the Prosecution, as far as they are supposed to show an incrimination of General Dehner, are in contradiction with the documents presented by the Prosecution itself. This particularly is incorrect as Prosecution has asserted in its final plea that on the so-called necrologue there are General Dehner's initials.
Why doesn't the Prosecution name these documents? It doesn't do that because it can't do it, because such documents have not been submitted by the Prosecution.
I continue. The Prosecution further has criticized in its final statement that the witness Zorn made statements on the basis of notes which he has seen on the desk of General Dehner. The Prosecution could only congratulate itself if it had proved that the documentary material submitted by the Prosecution itself had in actual fact been seen on General Dehner's desk because in that case the Prosecution would have proved something which up to now it hasn't proved -- namely, that General Dehner did in actual fact gain knowledge of the documents submitted by the Prosecution and this evidence would have been material because, according to General rules of procedure, a document can only be used against a defendant if it has in actual fact been proved that the defendant had knowledge of the contents of such a document.
In this connection I refer to Wharton's statements which is contained in his well known work, "Evidence in Criminal Cases." Unfortunately, I cannot give you the volume and page because I couldn't get the book over Saturday and Sunday.
The evidence for the fact that General Dehner had knowledge of Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the documents submitted by the Prosecution has in actual fact never been produced by the Prosecution. In particular this applies to the document dated 6 November 1943 mentioned by the Prosecution in its closing statement.
It is a strange procedure of presenting evidence which the Prosecution in this connection has presented, that from the fact that I did not ask General Dehner during his examination whether he in actual fact knew of this document of 6 November they conclude from this a knowledge on the part of General Dehner of the document. I have never before experienced such a kind of presenting evidence. Perhaps I didn't put these questions because, to use the words of the Prosecution, "it seemed too monotonous" to me to repeat these questions. In that case it would have been the duty of the Prosecution if they attached such great importance to these facts to ask General Dehner this question during cross examination and in this way to prove, if it can be proved, that General Dehner did know about this document. It is not my task to prove that General Dehner did not know about the document. It is moreover the task of the Prosecution to prove that he knew about it.
The Prosecution, when I had concluded my evidence, was apparently under the impression that the evidence against General Dehner was weak and unfounded. It, therefore, called Bach-Zelewski to the witness stand during rebuttal after no witnesses against General Dehner had been called during the direct case.
The Prosecution has attacked the probative value of the witnesses called by the Prosecution in the introduction of its closing statement. On the basis of these statements I do not believe that the Prosecution wants to seriously assert that this witness is a classical witness. It is incomprehensible to me, therefore, how the Prosecution can refer to this witness for evidence for the charges brought against General Dehner.
There is a proverb which says: "Tell me who your friends are and I will tell you who you are." This witness, Bach-Zelewski, was Court No. V, Case No. VII the closest confidant of Hitler's. He was the man who enjoyed Himmler's full confidence.
This man, Bach-Zelewski, was chief of the anti-partisan units and he is the main responsible man for all measures of the band combatting efforts. This witness, Bach-Zelewski, was, after Himmler, one of the most powerful and also one of the men who were most greatly feared. These two men, Himmler and Bach-Zelewski, by their measures have spilled innumerable tears.
Every party is under obligation to present the best evidence available to it and there is a legal assumption to the fact that every party is presenting its best evidence, and this, then, is the best evidence which the Prosecution is in a position to produce against General Dehner. That is a man who is prepared to make any statement whatsoever, even to perjure himself, if he can remain in Nurnberg and thus escape being extradited to Poland! Bach-Zelewski himself has admitted that he drew up the regulations for the combatting of the bands. BachZelewski is responsible for all orders which were issued by Himmler and Hitler concerning the combatting of the bands. He is also responsible for those orders which General Dehner did not carry out.
Can the evidence presented by the Prosecution be refuted in a more striking manner? General Dehner stands with clean hands at the end of this trial. There can be only one decision concerning this general and that is acquittal.
Court No. V, Case No.VII.
DR. WEISSGERBER (Counsel for defendant Speidel): May it please the Tribunal, the closing statements of the Prosecution causes me to make only a very few brief comments in General Speidel's case. Concerning the sabotage against the ship Citta di Savoia; it was not the loss of 69 horses which caused General Speidel to order reprisal measures. This arbitrary assertion of the Prosecution proves that the testimony of my client who very decidedly refuted this point of view, is being ignored completely.
The sabotage act resulted in the loss of the transport space of this ship which was direly needed for the troops in the Mediterranean and this was a very serious loss which had been suffered by the German Armed Forces through this sabotage act. That this sabotage against shipping space was an act not admissible under International Law and that the military necessity justified the reprisal measure cannot be doubted.
General Speidel has ordered the shooting of 10 persons during this last reprisal measure he ordered. This cannot be regarded as an exaggerated or unproportional ratio. The acts quoted by the Prosecution according to which General Speidel in connection with the strike had taken certain measures which had the effect of seizing every tenth worker and threatening them with execution has not been proved throughout the entire presentation of the Prosecution.
Concerning the complete independence in the police sphere in which the Higher SS and Police Leader was not subordinate to the military commander for Greece but exclusively to the Reichsfuehrer SS, this has already been dealt with in my final plea. Thus, there is no foundation for my client being incriminated or charged with reprisal measures which the Higher SS and Police Leader took after losses of the German and Greek police forces.
The Prosecution has quoted four reprisal measures which allegedly were carried out by Administrative Sub--Area Headquarters and General Speidel is being charged with these incidents. The report of the Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Tripolis, dated 25 February 1944, is a Ic report and as such is completely unsuitable to be the foundation for a responsibility on the part of General Speidel. It does not give the slightest indication for the fact that the military commander in Greece had anything at all to do with this incident because the Peloponnesus was in the area of jurisdiction of the 117th Light Infantry Division.
Furthermore, General Speidel was on the 25th of February 1944 in Germany on recuperation leave. The two reports of the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Larissa, dated 4 April and 4 May 1944, deal with sabotage against railroad lines. For the protection of railroad lines a proper railroad security service had been established which was immediately subordinate to Army Group E. I refer to this connection to Speidel Exhibit 55. This railroad security service was not subordinate to the military commander for Greece and, therefore, he cannot be found guilty of any responsibility. In both cases Ic reports are concerned and the same applies to them as did in the first case.
The report of the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Corinth is also a Ic report. Patras, furthermore, was in the area of the jurisdiction of the 117th Light Infantry Division. Further, the entry mentioned by the Prosecution which is to be found in the war diary of the military commander for Greece also deals with an act of sabotage against railroad lines and this shows that the railroad security service was competent and responsible in this case. This incident also falls into the period of absence of General Speidel.
It is completely incorrect that General Speidel has tried to push off the responsibility for reprisal measures which were reported by his Administrative Sub-area Headquarters on to the shoulders of the troops and the SS units. He is right to deny responsibility for measures taken by commanders and units which were not subordinate to him.
On several occasions the attempt has been made here to make General Speidel generally responsible as territorial commander for all Court No. V, Case No. VII.
reprisal measures taken. In this connection I refer to Paragraph 1 of the Prosecution Exhibit 306, Document Book XII, page 94 of the German and 112 of the English text. This particular section in the document seems to make quite clear the inexpediency of the attempt to make General Speidel responsible for all reprisal measures and charge him in this manner.
The Prosecution has deemed it correct to present suspicions of the most varied type against my client which partly have exceeded the purely factual aspects. Even in the last stage of this trial I do not intend to leave the sphere of complete factuality which my client and I myself have maintained throughout the whole of this trial, I can do this so much more as the Prosecution, in the one-day cross examination which was held with my client, has not been in a position to shake his testimony in the very least. Therefore, I am firmly convinced that the Tribunal will not have the slightest doubt of the full credibility of my client.
DR. SAUTER (Counsel for defendants Lanz and von Geitner): May it please the Tribunal, concerning the rebuttal documents with reference to the cases of Lanz and von Geitner, I have commented on these in a supplement to my final plea dated 4 February. I refer to this supplement and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the contents of my supplement dated 4 February.
At this point I should only like to comment on a number of asserions and statements contained in the closing statement of the Prosecution. First of all, I should like to deal with the case of von Geitner. In this connection, I shall limit myself to merely correcting a number of the most important points.
The Prosecution has maintained that reprisal measures were carried out in Serbia and ordered even at such times when the perpetrators of terror acts were known. The Prosecution in this connection has quoted the Mladenovac incident in which incident a young woman carried out a surprise attack on two German officers. That is incorrect Q Feb 48-M-MB-4-4-Primeau (Int.
Schaeffer) Court No. V, Case No. VII.
because in the Mladenovac event the perpetrator of the attempt was found and apprehended but she later on shot herself. However, the letters which were found on her person revealed that the co-perpetrators in her village were Communists. These Communists had incited the perpetrator to carry out the attempt. The actual Communists involved could not be found. However, they remained unknown and, therefore, in this particular instance reprisal measures of the kind mentioned were ordered.
Furthermore, in this case also the reprisal order did not originate with Geitner but with his commander in chief. Geitner, as chief of staff, didn't order it, and is, therefore, not responsible for it.
Following up the Mladenovac incident, the Prosecution in its closing statement has maintained that this reprisal order and other similar orders had sprung from a wish to decimate the Serbian population and exterminate it. This assertion does in no way conform with the facts. The actual attitude and conduct shown by General von Geitner and his two commanders in chief was, on the contrary, directed towards helping the Serbian population as much as possible. In this connection I refer to pages 3 through 12 of the survey submitted by me concerning the defense material submitted for Geitner which has any number of individual instances, to show the real attitude shown by General von Geitner towards the Serbian population. Documents and testimony are used in this connection.
The Prosecution further has asserted that Geitner had himself admitted the main purpose of the executions was vengeance and extermination of the Serbian population. This is also incorrect. At no time and at no place has Geitner made such a ridiculous assertion. The Prosecution further has maintained that the Chief of Staff of a corps had disciplinary authorities in his relation to a regimental commander. In other words, he had the authority to punish a regimental commander. No such a thing is mentioned in the Army Regulations, although the Prosecution has referred to this service regulation and presented the matter as though it was provided in this regulation, that the Chief of Staff of a corps has disciplinary authority over a regimental commander. If any such thing is being asserted that is pure invention on the part of the person who asserts it. He who wants the truth can quite obviously glean from the Army Regulations that it merely states in Paragraph 5, that the Chief of Staff of a corps has the disciplinary authority of a regimental commander and also that the disciplinary authority is vested in him only in relation to the members of his own staff. He has no disciplinary authority over any other soldier of the armed forces, and least of all towards a regimental commander.
In the same way, of course, it is wrong if the Prosecution presents the matter, as though the Chief of Staff, so to speak, was to deputize for his commander in Chief, when the latter was absent. That was never the case in the German Army. From Paragraph 4 of the Army Regulations it becomes evident that only under rather limited conditions is the Chief of Staff authorized to deputize for his Commander in Chief, and only then, and I quote, "In operational and tactical matters," because only in such matters does Paragraph 4 regulate the limited authority to deputize of a Chief of Staff. All of this has emphatically been made clear by numerous documents and witnesses and by the Chief of Staff of the German Army Holder It has long been proved that the Commander in his judicial authority, that is where reprisal measures are concerned, can at no time be replaced by his Chief.
Completely incomprehensible to me is also how it can be asserted with reference to von Geitner that the Chiefs of Staff frequently issued orders on their own initiative without the Commanders knowing it. Not one single such case has been proved or even asserted in Von Geitner's case. The Prosecution has in this connection only presented one case in which the Chief of Staff of General Dehner is supposed to have committed such an independent act, but if this Chief of staff of General Dehner did exceed his authority and as the Prosecution asserts, independently issued a basic order of general importance, this still does not entitle the Prosecution to incriminate the defendant von Geitner with that, or even to merely assume that he who was a conscientious and correct Chief of Staff may have committed a similar act of independence.
The Prosecution further has asserted in connection with von Geitner's case, and I quote, "The crimes were carried out on the basis of his orders without his superior officers even knowing about it." This also is a reversion of the facts which have been proved. The Prosecution should present one single case in which von Geitner without previous knowledge and order of his Commander in Chief or of the letters' deputy had independently issued an order. The Prosecution is in no position to do this, because such things never occurred, - never - and I mean never without any exception. Furthermore, it is a wrong presentation of the facts for the Prosecution to assert that von Geitner had put a more refined emphasis on the whole issue and talked about a Chief of Administration who was not subordinate to him. That was something completely know, it has been said. However, he who has followed this trial with some attention knows that in the service regulation for the armed forces commander Southeast there is a clear distinction made between the operational staff, the head of which was von Geitner, and the administrative staff, the head of which had nothing to do with him. We know that this service regulation for the Military Commander Southeast is contained in Document Book 5, Document 124, Exhibit 105. This document has been submitted and has been presented in the course of these proceedings. The Prosecution, therefore, knows this regulation.
The tasks of the Administrative Staff and the Operational Staff have been made clear in documents submitted and the testimony of the witnesses.
Everyone who has listened in and followed this trial must realize that. It is therefore impossible to know how the Prosecution could maintain that 1st Lieutenant Bode, frequently mentioned by von Geitner was, as the Prosecution puts it, a creature invented by von Geitner and only used as a pretext, -- that this was a Lieutenant not known to anybody. In this connection I would like to recall that the name of 1st Lieutenant Bode again and again appeared as that of the expert for retaliation matters in the documents submitted. That the 1st Lieutenant Dr. Bode was O-I-Ist ADC, and that he was mentioned in various entries of the War Diary in connection with conferences with the Commander concerning retaliation matters he was repeatedly mentioned and that above all witnesses General Felber and Prinz v. Holstein have confirmed here that the reprisal measures were dealt with by this administrative jurist, who reported about them directly, that is without von Geitner's interference, to the Military Commander.
Furthermore, it stands to reason, that the two Military Commanders, Bader and Felbcr would rather be advised by a jurist in these difficult matters than by their Chief of Staff, who was an expert chemist and factory owner, and who knew nothing or rather not very much of legal matters. The Prosecution further maintained that Geitner had not been in a position to cite single case concerning the so-called mock executions. That is not correct. It is merely correct that he himself has not ordered any mock shootings, as the whole matter of ordering retaliation was reserved to the Commander in Chief. von Geitner did, however, know about mock shootings, which were discussed between von Geitner and Schaefer of the SD. Geitner was very happy about it that in this manner a means was found in order to restrict reprisal measures to a minimum. Apart from this, as already has been proved, mock shootings are not an invention of our days as the Prosecution contends, - but it is a fortunate coincidence that two documents of the War Diary were received which show that at that time such mock shootings were expressly mentioned. I have compiled these cases in sub-section 9, page 5 of the survey submitted by no concerning the defense material submitted for von Geitner, and particularly refer to Document Book von Geitner 4, page 27, Document 93, Exhibit 78.
The Prosecution has now quoted the witness Fischer, because this man did not know anything about mock shootings. That, however, does not prove anything. The witness Fischer could not be in a position to know anything about it, because Fischer had never worked in Belgrade, but in a branch agency and the matter of the mock shootings was dealt with in Belgrade, and of course remained a secret between the SD chief Schaefer on the one hand and Bader and Felber and the Chief of Staff on the other hand.
If the Prosecution objects to the fact that these shootings were not mentioned in the reports which were sent to higher levels, this also is a erroneous conclusion. That could not have been in these reports, because otherwise the superior agencies and also the OKW would have learned that the reprisal measures ordered were in reality not carried out.
Then in a von Geitner document book I have further presented a survey about sabotage acts, on the one hand and the much smaller number of reprisals on the other hand. This was done in Document Book IV, Document 81, page 1, and the Prosecution, and I quote, talked there about a web of fantasy, and of people who loved juggling with figures. In this connection I can only say that such personal attacks against a defense counsel and his actions in which he is duty bound, leave the level to which we are used to in a proper procedure. I have to reject such a criticism on my survey. The Prosecution knows the following: "This survey has been made under my own personal surveillance and with the help of my reliable collaborators with great conscientousness and after weeks of hard work." The documents on which this survey is based are documents sent from Washington, and they were available to the Prosecution in the same way as they were available to the defense.
If the Prosecution finds in my affidavit of 21 October 1947 contained in Geitner Document Book IV, Document 81, pages 1 to 5, or in the survey on which it is based, something which can be factually criticized it would have been its right to do so; but it would also have been the duty of the Prosecution to examine these documents before doing so, and to examine them as to whether or not the compilations submitted by me were correct or incorrect. The Prosecution did not make any such examination. Instead they found it sufficient to ridicule these surveys. Such a treatment of a factual matter condemns itself, particularly so since the Prosecution knew from my survey that these figures were calculated exactly from the situation reports of the War Diaries, that is from documents which were beyond any doubt, as can be seen from Von Geitner Document Book VI, Documents 189 to 195, Exhibits 61 to 67, pages 72 to 95. In this connection I should ask you to compare these with the Document Book of the Prosecution No. 24, NOKW 1757, Exhibit 549, page 143. Von Geitner is not even to be reproached with his interest in the concentration camp of Semlin, and I quote, "Judging from his interest in the way concentration camp Semlin was run."
Your Honors, please, that is correct, von Geitner was interested when he heard about the bad conditions in the camps. As a matter of fact, he reported to his commanders about this camp, and it took much effort for him to get permission for a medical officer to enter the Semlin camp to check up on the conditions prevailing there, and to help. But, Your Honor, please, since when is it a crime if an officer interests himself in a humane way, for the benefit of the inmates of a camp, in the matters at hand? I am of the opinion on the contrary that von Geitner's in erest in this camp should be highly recognized since he was not at all responsible for this camp. On the contrary this fact shows how he had interested himself in the camp and how much he was interested in the welfare of the Serbian population, also of the communists and partisand and, how he wanted to help them and how he wanted to make sure of humane treatment for them, that is also beyond the sphere of his own competency.
In that connection of the Prosecution finally has asserted that there were no objects against the activities of the police. This assertion is also incomprehensible to me. The documents show again and again and explicitly that for weeks and weeks the military agencies in Belgrade objected against excesses of police, and again and again made objections to the high SS Police Leader Meyszner, and asked for superior agencies to help and make changes in the matter. A few examples, Geitner Book V, Document 46, Page No. 133, Exhibit 110, and in Document Book VI, Pages 24-29, Documents 165, 166, and 168, Exhibit numbers 139 up to and including 141. Further, I would like to refer to my survey of defense material submitted for von Geitner, page 9, paragraph 5.
Now, I would like to refer to General Lanz, concerning the Sorando incident of 28 Italian officers shot. General Lanz and myself have repeatedly explained that this is an independent order of the Divisional Commander, General von Stettner, and on his own initiative, and that this divisional commander had issued orders for the shooting in contradiction of the orders of General Lanz, who wanted them to be treated as prisoners of war, that is that they should be sent to the prisoner of war camps, -although, as a matter of fact, there were no prisoner of war camps.
The Prosecution has again charged General Lanz of the fact that he did not do anything about this disobedience of General von Stettner. This is also incorrect, and the Prosecution knows it from the examination of General Lanz. Lanz, at the time he heard of the shooting of the Italian officers, called von Stettner to his office and asked him to explain the facts to him. Stettner reported that the 74 Italian officers had been shot because during the investigation of the case it had become apparent that for 8 days, together with the bands, they had fought against the German troops. Von Stettner also said he ordered the shootings in absolute agreement with the very clear Fuehrer Order issued by Hitler. This responsibility of von Stettner is undoubtedly correct. General von Stettner was actually covered by the Hitler Fuehrer order. Lanz had to let matters rest there whether he wanted to or not. Of course Lanz, under these circumstances, could not undertake anything against von Stettner. Had he wanted to do so he would have had to report the incident to Hitler, that is he would have had to suggest to Hitler that Hitler have von Stettner punished because von Stettner had adhered to a Fuehrer order. That was of course completely impossible. Lanz would have only made himself ridiculous doing what the Prosecution says he should have done.
Concerning the Cephalonia and Corfu incident the Prosecution contends that Lanz had known that Badoglio had given an order to General Gandin to resist the German troops. This is completely untrue, and unfounded. Lanz had no idea of such an alleged order and never knew anything about it, and above all General Gandin himself never referred to such an order of Badoglio.
The Prosecution contends now that the conditions of the ItalianAllied Armistice were made known to the German Government by Badoglio himself, and on the 12 September 1943 had appeared in all German newspapers.
Of all of this, however, Lanz did not know anything in September 1943, and even today he knows nothing about it, and is not offhand in a position to recognize the assertions of the Prosecution to this effect as correct, for we have had very unfortunate experiences here in this case, and proof has not been rendered thereto by the prosecution during this trial. Of these conditions of the Armistice apparently the Commander in Chief Vecchiarelli, and the Italian Commander at Joannina did not know anything. How then should Lanz have gained any knowledge of it. For months and months the Prosecution has submitted evidence here which in many instances was superfluous, but concerning this particularly important point in the Lanz case, no evidence has been submitted.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Dr. Sauter?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Before we take our morning recess, I would like to call your attention to the fact that thirty minutes remain for this phase of the argument by the defense. The Tribunal has made no attempt to allot the time between defense counsel and we trust that you have taken into consideration that others may want to speak.
DR. SAUTER: May I ask how much time we have got left, your Honor?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: A total of thirty minutes left -that is for the whole group.
DR. SAUTER: No, I don't believe there will be any other defense counsel who wants to speak and I shan't use all that time.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Just so you have your understanding with other counsel.
The Tribunal will take its recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)