General Felmy was always conscious of this seriousness in view of the reprisals to be taken. He always endeavoured to show his leniency wherever it was not contrary to "military necessities". His mildness was a basic feature of his nature, significant of him and confirmed by many. In Greece it earned him the appellation "too soft" on the part of many, On the other side he was obliged to make them prevail, if it was required in the interest of the preservation of the general military position as well as in the interest of his soldiers and the protection of the good elements of the Greek population cooperating with the Germans.
This question seems to be justified: Would a general of any other army in General Felmy's position have been able to take an attitude different from Felmy's towards these occurrences and would he have taken it? I believe I can answer this question only in the affirmative, in a way, negative from the point of view of the prosecution. It is not difficult to gather from decree No. 1 of the Military Government how the American occupation army in cases even by less complicated, occurring in occupied German territory, would have reacted. There a large number of acts are forbidden under the penalty of death.
Finally the extensive connections of the last war must not be overlooked as one theater of war can not be separated from the other, neither in a spiritual nor moral respect. To what however have we come in this last terrible struggle, if we take as a starting point the world of the Hague rules of land warfare which are supposed to be the basis of substantive law for these proceedings. For the purpose of illustration I want to mention one example only:
"The City of Wuerzburg having hardly any war important industry was destroyed by the R.A.F. for the most part on 16 March 1945, in a raid lasting 20 minutes, 2 weeks before American troops entered, i.e. at a time when the war had been decided. Of 120,000 Inhabitants only 6,000 could be housed in the city's ruins immediately after the attack and at that only provisionally often. Thousands of people, mostly women, aged men and children lost their lives besides very many wounded about 10,000 of which had been taken to about 25 hospitals in the city. Many monuments especially valuable from a point of view of the history of art were almost completely destroyed. On 44 churches, 36 were destroyed, the other 8 damaged. Only the few military installations escaped distruction, namely the barracks and a part of the air port.
"This, Your Honors, is the face of the last war which could not remain hidden from General Felmy far away, but it did not cause him to deviate the least from his fundamental attitude rooted in his old soldierly tradition. He continued to be guided by the "military necessities" of the Nague Rules of Land Warfare." And the attitude taken towards the Greek population by a man called "fit to lead foreign peoples" in an opinion submitted by the prosecution is best evidenced by his last activity when he, after all the numerous other offices had left, became "dictator". I will not go into details but will only refer to the testimony of the witness Berghofer who has described the surrender of huge quantities of supply goods of all kinds to the Greek and to the affidavit of the Swiss Legation Councillor Escher which are supplemented by the interrogation of the witness Freiherr von Varnbuehler also for the subsequent assignment of General Felmy's in Seyrimia General Felmy tried, as is shown in Escher's statements, with all means to ensure that the capital Athens should be taken over by the English as soon as possible after the German troops had marched off in order to prevent its falling into the hands of the bands, and declared it an "open town" in order to avoid destructions.
The defendant, who had always, and in several respects, been specially interested in the shrines of art of old Greece, refused in contrast to the English who entered soon after he had left, to have the town bombarded in the fight against the bands. in order not to harm innocent people and not to destroy the works of an old civilization. If one further considers that in disobedience to a clear order, he did not blow up the Marathon Dam, in order not to endanger the water supply of Athens which mostly depended on the stowed water of the lake, and to prevent pestilences with unforseeable consequences, it is easy to see what general Felmy did for Athens and its population and, with it, for Greece. His last symbolic act in the capital of the country before he marched of f, was to deposit a wreath on the grave of the Unknown Greek Soldier, This gesture symbolizes at the same time his human and soldierly way's.
"If you, Your Honors, in your deliberations, will take into account all the connections described by me only in short outline which alone render it possible to recognize the true facts, then this is my conviction - the judgment on General Felmy cannot bE doubtful."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, please:
Earlier this afternoon you made a request, an application to the Tribunal wherein you sought permission to confer with your client tomorrow, Sunday.
It is the judgment of the Tribunal that matters concerning these closing arguments and your reply to any statement made by the prosecution will necessarily have to be checked by you. It is a matter of argumentation rather than any assistance which your client could give you. We feel certain that you can handle the matter and if there is any help which your client needs to give you, he can give it to you by written memorandum.
Your application and request will be denied.
It should be kept in mind by all counsel that Monday the defense counsel will be given two hours, if they care to make use of that, time to reply to any matters which were brought up by the Prosecution and which they did not have an opportunity to comment upon in their own arguments.
We do not want a repetition of matters which were included in their own closing arguments and statements. The defense counsel -or the Prosecution -- will then have an hour and a half, if they care to make use of it, to reply. Following that, the defendants may address the Court and will be given ten minutes each, if they care to make use of the time.
Will counsel who are here advise the other defense counsel that the Monday session will commence at nine o'clock?
The Tribunal will now recess until Monday at nine o'clock.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 0900 Hours 9 February 1948.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants sitting at Nurnberg, Germany on 9 February 1948, 0900, Judge Carter presiding.
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain as to whether or not all defendants are present in the courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all defendants are present in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We will hear the defense at this time on any matters they have not had an opportunity present, due to the fact that they did not anticipate them at the time they made their prepared statements.
DR. LATERNSER: If it please the Tribunal, I am to talk openly considerably shocked by the low level in which the prosecution has summarized the results of this important trial. With all emphasis I would like to refute all the personal insults which have been raised against my client. I will not deal with them in detail because I do not intend to emulate the prosecution. I intend to be quite factual, which is also the desire of Field Marshal List. The evidence of the defense is refuted by the statement that 90% of it is not worthy of credence, however, that is where the matter rests. That the prosecution has not undertaken any other attempts at rebuttal proves, however, that it is not in a position to do so. If some witnesses in this trial had made their statements while using notes which seems quite comprehensible considering the abundance of material, this circumstances does not entitle the prosecution to maintain that all witnesses' testimony had no value, further it does not apply to the testimonies of Field Marshall List and his witnesses, quite apart from the fact that the prosecution should consider the pertinent circumstances before making such an assertion.
I should now like to deal with the individual points of the statement because I think it necessary to reply to them because of their factual incorrectness. One completely unfounded assertion is that Field Marshal von Weichs issued an order where one hundred civilians were to be executed in retaliation for German soldier. Such an order was not presented by the prosecution, merely an announcement to the population that a shooting had taken place. The prosecution never attempted to produce proof for the executions. The war diary of the 2nd Panzer Army also never reached Nurnberg. In it there were no entries which would show the existence of such an order, let alone its execution. Thus also further assertion of the prosecution that Field Marshal List got his reprisal quotas from this alleged but never proved order comes to naught. Field Marshall List never ordered , quote: The prosecution maintains that according to Fuehrer Directive 31 of May 1941, the Serbian area was under the direction of Field Marshal List. Through their own documents of the prosecution it becomes apparent that Serbia only belonged as of 23 June 1941 to the command area of Field-Marshall List.
The prosecution further maintains that Field Marshal List had decided to pass on the OKW order of 16 September instead of leaving it in the files, as he supposedly could have done. With all emphasis I should like to point out that the prosecution has never brought the slightest evidence of a passing on of this order. From a distribution of this order it becomes apparent that it was an order directly sent by OKW to the subordinate commander of Field Marshal List. Further, the prosecution says that Field Marshal List participated in so--called "lootings" of the Rosenberg agency. This is not so. The prosecution never proved that this detachment Rosenberg which was not subordinate to Field Marshal List took objects away from Greece or even looted.
Such assertions should be made in the final plea only if a proof is also adduced. The prosecution claims also during the reprisal measures in Topola only Jews were executed. That is not correct. The documents of the prosecution itself mention only inmates. I have already shown that Field Marshal List neither in the Balkans nor during his activities in Russia knew anything of the commissar order or its carrying it out. The prosecution attempted to impeach this testimony by quoting what General Leyser said, that the commissar order was known and much discussed. However the statement of General Leyser refers to the year 1941- whereas Field Marshal List only took over command in the second half of the year 1942. It is furthermore merely an assertion of the prosecution and has remained so, that reports of subordinate units were sent to Field Marshal List from which he would have learned of it. From the documents submitted it becomes very clear that the reports did not reach the agency of Field Marshal List. The prosecution wanted to prove with the staff order signed by Field Marshal List on 30 October 1941 that Field Marshal List carried on official business after the 15th of October. I am grateful for the help of the Tribunal and it is based on this help that the missing part of document 664 was presented which the prosecution had taken the page and had attempted to prove. The opposite of what became apparent from the whole document. According to that also Field Marshal List on the 13th of October was in the hospital because of a serious illness and subsequent operation and the official business had been transferred prior to that date for his successor.
May it please the tribunal, this is what I call the climax of distortion of this trial, if the prosecution after all this evidence which has been presented to the effect that Field Marshal List fell ill on the 15th of October want to use this document and want to call this sickness a legend and want to prove by it that Field Marshal List's statements are not correct?
Unequivocal proof has been produced that Field Marshal List as of the 15th of October concluded his service in the Balkans.
May it please the tribunal, I have concluded my statements. I now have to put the fate of Field Marshal List into your hands.
DR. MENZEL (for General Kuntze): May it please the tribunal, as defense counsel for the defendant General Kuntze I would like to deal briefly with the following points which appeared in the final statement of the prosecution. This will take only a very short time. One: The prosecution has in order to prove its assertions against General Kuntze mentioned shootings on the 22nd, 30th, and 31st of October and 19th of November 1941, however without any reference to the documents which are being used for this purpose. I assume that the prosecution is referring to exhibit 135 document book 6 pages 8-11 in the German text and 11-14. in the English means the shootings ordered by the plenipotentiary commanding general in Serbia and therefore I would like to make the following comments to this document. The contents of this document has in part been wrongly reproduced, by the prosecution thus the order of the plenipotentiary commanding general in Serbia dated 30 October refers to the execution of a shooting of two hundred hostages and not as the prosecution assorted of eight hundred. A report of the 19th of November about a shooting which had been carried out dealing with two hundred fifty hostages is not contained in this document nor in any other documents of the prosecution. These orders of the plenipotentiary commanding general did as the document itself proved and as becomes apparent in Kuntze's Exhibit 65 document book III - page 38 -- not reach the Armed Forces Commander Southeast and therefore could not become known to General Kuntze. These were measures Court No. V, Case No. VII.
which-although they were ordered by the plenipotentiary commanding general of Serbia-wer not proved by any of the documents to have been carried out. If these orders had been carried out, their execution would have appeared in reports from the Plenipotentiary Commanding General to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast which however is not the case. The prosecution has maintained merely on the basis of the testimony of Lattmann that the words "standrechtlich erschlossen" mean that shootings were carried out without a courts-martial procedure. The prosecution believes with this testimony to have refuted the unanimous statements of the defendants and of the numerous witnesses of the defense. But a close examination of the testimony of the witness Lattmann shows that it is not a refutation but a confirmation of the testimony of the defendants and their witnesses. The witness Lattmann has on the 19 of January 1948 testified the following (this is contained in page 9048 of the German and 9233/34 of the English record. In the OKH he had one day been submitted a decree which had already been signed by the commander in chief of the army, Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch. In this decree the words "standrechtlich erschossen" were used. From the balance of the contents of the decree it had become apparent that courts-martial proceedings were to be carried out. As legal advisor of the OKH he thought it more expedient to substitute for "standrechtlich" "standgerichtlich". This very clearly shows that a certain expression did not have to be used and even with the OKH the word "standrechtlich" was used for "standgerichtlich". If that was the case for the OKH then it is even more comprehensible that "standrechtlich erschossen" was used by the troops for "shot after court-martial." The witness states on page 9053 of the German record and page 9238 of the English record that he did not know whether a difference between "standrechtlich" and "standgerichtlich" was even known to the troops. From the documents the inter-changable use of these expressions was proved sufficiently and it also becomes apparent from the document that the expressions "examination" or "interrogation" meant in the reports the carrying out of summary Court No. V, Case No. VII.
courts-martial proceedings. Compare this with the reports of 18th or 20th of July 1942 in exhibit 208, document book 8, on pages 43 of the German and 50-52 of the English, also the prosecution witness BachO Zelewski has confirmed that these expressions were used inter-changeably by the troops for the carrying out of courts-martial. That becomes apparent from page 8128 of the German and 9004. of the English record.
Now I would like to make a brief insertion. The prosecution on page 9439 maintains again that the decrease of the reprisal quota of 1:50 or 1:25 respectively was not ordered by General Bader owing to General Kuntze's intervention or rather that General Kuntze's intervention was by no means proved. This assertion of the prosecution is incorrect and in this connection I should like to refer to our proof shown in the Kuntze plea on page 32 -- furthermore, I continue with my insertion--the prosecution has made the completely new assertion that captured partisans were shot as a matter of principle . The contrary is shown by the large number of captured partisans according to the documents which appear on page 65 of final plea Kuntze.
I continue on page 3 middle of the page and I shall very shortly have concluded my statement. The following point is of decisive importance for the evaluation of General Kuntze's responsibility, therefore I shall be very grateful to the tribunal if it would give particular consideration to the following statements when evaluating the evidence and deciding upon the judgment. The prosecution has said in its final statement that is in the last sentence of the final statement about General Kuntze -- that from a statistical point of view most of the reprisal measures were carried out during the tenure of General Kuntze. That statement which was not proved by any statistics is quite decisively an error and not justified. I have already in my final plea on pages 53-57 shown on the basis of the reports to Armed Forces Commander Southeast and the reports of that agency to the OKH which adequately cover General Kuntze's tenure how many reprisal measures Court No. V, base No. VII.
were reported by the plenipotentiary commanding general in Serbia during the tenure of General Kuntze as having been carried out. I further brought evidence of the fact that reprisals reported during General Kuntze's tenure had not increased in number but on the contrary decreased and in the summer of 1942 reprisal measures were not carried out at all and did not have to be carried out because the populace remained generally quite. Nor were the sabotage acts of the bands retaliated for at that time.
Now a brief insertion in this connection. In this connection I would like to recall once again that the following incidents did not fall into the period of tenure of General Kuntze: One, the case of Kragujevac, two, the case of Kraljevo and three, the case of Valjevo and four, the incident of the army signal regiment 521, five, the reprisal measures according to Exhibit 108, Volume 3, pages 93 of the German text and 133 of the English text, six, the Belgrade incidents as shown in exhibit 124, document book IV, page 193 of the German and 153 of the English, seven, the reprisal measures of exhibit 146 document book VI, page 37 of the German and page 46 of the English.
This brings me to the conclusion of my statement, middle of page 4. For the rest I should like to point out that General Kuntze after in December 1941 he had gained knowledge of Boehme's order of 10 October 1941, which is Exhibit 88, Document book III, page 27 of the German, and 34- of the English text, as well as of its effects did try everything in order to achieve a mitigation of the measures ordered by the OKW. In this connection I refer to page 32 of my final plea. Above all I should like to point to his struggle with the OKW which had only disadvantages for him personally and above all I should like to add the fact that General Kuntze was not appointed commander in chief of the southeast because he was declared too mild for the Balkans but merely remained a deputy during all his service, and was not promoted during the whole war. This shows that he could not have committed crimes as the prosecution charged him with. This is all I have to say Court No. V, Case No. VII.
in connection with my client General Kuntze.
DR. VON JACKWITZ (For the defendant Rendulic): If it please the Tribunal, I have mentioned part of my reply already in my final plea in reply to various statements of the prosecution, only concerning two points I should like to supplement my replies. If the prosecution maintains on page 9472 that before the army order of the 15th of September 1943 was issued no reprisal measures had been carried out in the area of the 69th corps, this is misleading, inasmuch as this corps was only established a very short time before the 2nd Panzer Army arrived in the theater of war. The prosecution in its opening statement on page 59 has mentioned itself that even before the 2nd Panzer army took over the leadership in the area, reprisal measures had been carried out in the Croatian area in the same way as later. Supplementing these statements I should like to refer to prosecution's Exhibit 261, pages 2 and 12 to exhibit 266 pages 6 and 7 and to exhibit 292 the last page of that document all of which refer to the year 1943. If furthermore the prosecution maintains on page 9471 that the Golden Badge of Merit was purely a Party badge, this is not correct. The Golden Badge of Merit was as well as other orders granted for instance to numerous generals and other persons who moved in a sphere completely outside of the Party. I have shown that the fact that General Rendulic was given this medal was based purely on military expedience. This is shown on pages 5341 and page 5621 of the record.
Court No. V, Case No. VII
DR. GAWLIK: (Counsel for defendant Dehner): The Prosecution has asserted in its final plea that General Dehner had adhered to the letter of the summarizing order of the 15th of September 1943 and has not wasted any time in order to carry out handings and shootings.
I have already shown in my final plea in great detail that General Dehner had not ordered any shootings and hangings and that the troops subordinated to him have not carried out any such measures. But also the measures carried out by the German police and by the Croatian units, for which General Dehner is not responsible, as I have likewise shown, do by no means reach the quota mentioned in the order of 15 September 1943, that is, a quota of 50 to 1.
The Prosecution has said that it would be too monotonous to mention the dates and incidents in formal statistics. In this connection I can only say that is rather a strange presentation of evidence which I have not experienced before in my practice. It is not important whether presentation of evidence is monotonous or not. It is merely important whether it is material or not and it would have been material to show these dates and incidents by way of statistics in order to show that the measures carried out by Croats and by the German police did in actual fact reach the ratio of 50 to 1. The Prosecution has by no means not done this because it would have been too monotonous, as it has stated, but instead, because through statistics, its own assertion would have been refuted.
The Prosecution in this connection has further stated that the total amount of persons killed has reached 450. However, the Prosecution has not dared to assert that this figure has actually been proved but very cautiously the Prosecution has added that this is an estimate.
This also contradicts all usual principles of a proper procedure. A defendant cannot be sentenced on the basis of an estimate. A defendant can only be sentenced if the facts have been proved beyond any reasonable doubt. Further, I see no cause why this figure should Court No. V, Case No. VII.
have to be guessed at. The Prosecution would have only had to add up the numbers on the basis of documents submitted by it. I will inform the Prosecution of the number which becomes apparent from the documents submitted by which I don't in any way want to recognize the probative value of this documentary evidence, which I have already challenged in my final plea. That figure in actual fact reaches 371 persons.
The Prosecution further has very cautiously forgotten to add the number of persons which had been killed by the bands; that is, the number of killings which have presented the cause for the counter measures, carried out by the Croatian authorities and by the police. This number also becomes very clearly apparent from the evidence submitted by the Prosecution and when one adds these numbers we reach a number of 1,157 persons.
And now your Honors will understand why the Prosecution has withheld these figures -- because these figures refute quite clearly the assertions of the Prosecution that in the area of the 69th Reserve Corps during the time when General Dehner was in command of that corps the quota of 50 to 1 was reached. There cannot be any mention that a ratio of 1 to 1 was ever reached, that is, as I have already stated in my final plea, merely the ratio of 1 to 0.3 was reached.
The Prosecution in this connection has particularly referred to a report of the 187th Reserve Division dated 20 September 1943. I regret to have, in this instance, to reply to the Prosecution that in choosing this report it was not very fortunate because this report shows that this reprisal measure was carried out by the Croatian Panzer Regiment 202 because of a surprise attack against a Croatian truck. Croatian Panzer Regiment 202 was at no time subordinate to the 69th Reserve Corps nor has it at anytime been asserted by the Prosecution. In order to connect this reprisal measure which was carried out by the Croatian Panzer Regiment 202 with General Dehner, the Prosecution has further asserted that this report was contained in a war diary. That also is incorrect. In the war diary this report is not entered at all Court No. V, Case No. VII.
as can quite obviously be gleaned from the document. This is a further proof of the fact that the 69th Reserve Corps had nothing whatsoever to do with this reprisal measure. This example again shows on what weak foundations the Prosecution based their charges.
The same applies for the balance of the reports which the Prosecution has mentioned in its final statement and to which I cannot reply owing to lack of time. In summary I can only say that the statements of the Prosecution, as far as they are supposed to show an incrimination of General Dehner, are in contradiction with the documents presented by the Prosecution itself. This particularly is incorrect as Prosecution has asserted in its final plea that on the so-called necrologue there are General Dehner's initials.
Why doesn't the Prosecution name these documents? It doesn't do that because it can't do it, because such documents have not been submitted by the Prosecution.
I continue. The Prosecution further has criticized in its final statement that the witness Zorn made statements on the basis of notes which he has seen on the desk of General Dehner. The Prosecution could only congratulate itself if it had proved that the documentary material submitted by the Prosecution itself had in actual fact been seen on General Dehner's desk because in that case the Prosecution would have proved something which up to now it hasn't proved -- namely, that General Dehner did in actual fact gain knowledge of the documents submitted by the Prosecution and this evidence would have been material because, according to General rules of procedure, a document can only be used against a defendant if it has in actual fact been proved that the defendant had knowledge of the contents of such a document.
In this connection I refer to Wharton's statements which is contained in his well known work, "Evidence in Criminal Cases." Unfortunately, I cannot give you the volume and page because I couldn't get the book over Saturday and Sunday.
The evidence for the fact that General Dehner had knowledge of Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the documents submitted by the Prosecution has in actual fact never been produced by the Prosecution. In particular this applies to the document dated 6 November 1943 mentioned by the Prosecution in its closing statement.
It is a strange procedure of presenting evidence which the Prosecution in this connection has presented, that from the fact that I did not ask General Dehner during his examination whether he in actual fact knew of this document of 6 November they conclude from this a knowledge on the part of General Dehner of the document. I have never before experienced such a kind of presenting evidence. Perhaps I didn't put these questions because, to use the words of the Prosecution, "it seemed too monotonous" to me to repeat these questions. In that case it would have been the duty of the Prosecution if they attached such great importance to these facts to ask General Dehner this question during cross examination and in this way to prove, if it can be proved, that General Dehner did know about this document. It is not my task to prove that General Dehner did not know about the document. It is moreover the task of the Prosecution to prove that he knew about it.
The Prosecution, when I had concluded my evidence, was apparently under the impression that the evidence against General Dehner was weak and unfounded. It, therefore, called Bach-Zelewski to the witness stand during rebuttal after no witnesses against General Dehner had been called during the direct case.
The Prosecution has attacked the probative value of the witnesses called by the Prosecution in the introduction of its closing statement. On the basis of these statements I do not believe that the Prosecution wants to seriously assert that this witness is a classical witness. It is incomprehensible to me, therefore, how the Prosecution can refer to this witness for evidence for the charges brought against General Dehner.
There is a proverb which says: "Tell me who your friends are and I will tell you who you are." This witness, Bach-Zelewski, was Court No. V, Case No. VII the closest confidant of Hitler's. He was the man who enjoyed Himmler's full confidence.
This man, Bach-Zelewski, was chief of the anti-partisan units and he is the main responsible man for all measures of the band combatting efforts. This witness, Bach-Zelewski, was, after Himmler, one of the most powerful and also one of the men who were most greatly feared. These two men, Himmler and Bach-Zelewski, by their measures have spilled innumerable tears.
Every party is under obligation to present the best evidence available to it and there is a legal assumption to the fact that every party is presenting its best evidence, and this, then, is the best evidence which the Prosecution is in a position to produce against General Dehner. That is a man who is prepared to make any statement whatsoever, even to perjure himself, if he can remain in Nurnberg and thus escape being extradited to Poland! Bach-Zelewski himself has admitted that he drew up the regulations for the combatting of the bands. BachZelewski is responsible for all orders which were issued by Himmler and Hitler concerning the combatting of the bands. He is also responsible for those orders which General Dehner did not carry out.
Can the evidence presented by the Prosecution be refuted in a more striking manner? General Dehner stands with clean hands at the end of this trial. There can be only one decision concerning this general and that is acquittal.
Court No. V, Case No.VII.
DR. WEISSGERBER (Counsel for defendant Speidel): May it please the Tribunal, the closing statements of the Prosecution causes me to make only a very few brief comments in General Speidel's case. Concerning the sabotage against the ship Citta di Savoia; it was not the loss of 69 horses which caused General Speidel to order reprisal measures. This arbitrary assertion of the Prosecution proves that the testimony of my client who very decidedly refuted this point of view, is being ignored completely.
The sabotage act resulted in the loss of the transport space of this ship which was direly needed for the troops in the Mediterranean and this was a very serious loss which had been suffered by the German Armed Forces through this sabotage act. That this sabotage against shipping space was an act not admissible under International Law and that the military necessity justified the reprisal measure cannot be doubted.
General Speidel has ordered the shooting of 10 persons during this last reprisal measure he ordered. This cannot be regarded as an exaggerated or unproportional ratio. The acts quoted by the Prosecution according to which General Speidel in connection with the strike had taken certain measures which had the effect of seizing every tenth worker and threatening them with execution has not been proved throughout the entire presentation of the Prosecution.
Concerning the complete independence in the police sphere in which the Higher SS and Police Leader was not subordinate to the military commander for Greece but exclusively to the Reichsfuehrer SS, this has already been dealt with in my final plea. Thus, there is no foundation for my client being incriminated or charged with reprisal measures which the Higher SS and Police Leader took after losses of the German and Greek police forces.
The Prosecution has quoted four reprisal measures which allegedly were carried out by Administrative Sub--Area Headquarters and General Speidel is being charged with these incidents. The report of the Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Tripolis, dated 25 February 1944, is a Ic report and as such is completely unsuitable to be the foundation for a responsibility on the part of General Speidel. It does not give the slightest indication for the fact that the military commander in Greece had anything at all to do with this incident because the Peloponnesus was in the area of jurisdiction of the 117th Light Infantry Division.
Furthermore, General Speidel was on the 25th of February 1944 in Germany on recuperation leave. The two reports of the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Larissa, dated 4 April and 4 May 1944, deal with sabotage against railroad lines. For the protection of railroad lines a proper railroad security service had been established which was immediately subordinate to Army Group E. I refer to this connection to Speidel Exhibit 55. This railroad security service was not subordinate to the military commander for Greece and, therefore, he cannot be found guilty of any responsibility. In both cases Ic reports are concerned and the same applies to them as did in the first case.
The report of the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Corinth is also a Ic report. Patras, furthermore, was in the area of the jurisdiction of the 117th Light Infantry Division. Further, the entry mentioned by the Prosecution which is to be found in the war diary of the military commander for Greece also deals with an act of sabotage against railroad lines and this shows that the railroad security service was competent and responsible in this case. This incident also falls into the period of absence of General Speidel.
It is completely incorrect that General Speidel has tried to push off the responsibility for reprisal measures which were reported by his Administrative Sub-area Headquarters on to the shoulders of the troops and the SS units. He is right to deny responsibility for measures taken by commanders and units which were not subordinate to him.
On several occasions the attempt has been made here to make General Speidel generally responsible as territorial commander for all Court No. V, Case No. VII.
reprisal measures taken. In this connection I refer to Paragraph 1 of the Prosecution Exhibit 306, Document Book XII, page 94 of the German and 112 of the English text. This particular section in the document seems to make quite clear the inexpediency of the attempt to make General Speidel responsible for all reprisal measures and charge him in this manner.
The Prosecution has deemed it correct to present suspicions of the most varied type against my client which partly have exceeded the purely factual aspects. Even in the last stage of this trial I do not intend to leave the sphere of complete factuality which my client and I myself have maintained throughout the whole of this trial, I can do this so much more as the Prosecution, in the one-day cross examination which was held with my client, has not been in a position to shake his testimony in the very least. Therefore, I am firmly convinced that the Tribunal will not have the slightest doubt of the full credibility of my client.
DR. SAUTER (Counsel for defendants Lanz and von Geitner): May it please the Tribunal, concerning the rebuttal documents with reference to the cases of Lanz and von Geitner, I have commented on these in a supplement to my final plea dated 4 February. I refer to this supplement and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the contents of my supplement dated 4 February.
At this point I should only like to comment on a number of asserions and statements contained in the closing statement of the Prosecution. First of all, I should like to deal with the case of von Geitner. In this connection, I shall limit myself to merely correcting a number of the most important points.
The Prosecution has maintained that reprisal measures were carried out in Serbia and ordered even at such times when the perpetrators of terror acts were known. The Prosecution in this connection has quoted the Mladenovac incident in which incident a young woman carried out a surprise attack on two German officers. That is incorrect Q Feb 48-M-MB-4-4-Primeau (Int.