The so-called "Commando Order" and the supplementary order, were issued between General Felmy's two assignments in Greece. At that time - the orders are dated 18 October 1941 - he was in the Kalmucksteppes where it was not delivered to him either; this order was not known to have been distributed there. The defendant, therefore, cannot have "issued" nor have "passed it on". He, later on, received knowledge of it through a conversation but never carried it out, dealing with this question here at once. The report of the Army Group E of 18 July 1944 on the English Commando Action against the Isle of Calino submitted in rebuttal is no proof to the contrary. This island is not situated in the area of the LXVIIIth Corps. The words in the report that sergeant Dryden was flown over to Athens and is being transferred to the SD do not prove that this was actually done and above all do not prove that General Felmy had anything to do with this affair. The fact that his Corps Staff was located near Athens will not be seriously considered by the Prosecution to constitute a sufficient indication for it.
An interpolation here:
The Prosecution in its statement has for the first time, and without any substantiation, asserted that after General Speidel was transferred General Felmy had taken over all agencies stationed in Athens.
Examinations of the defendants Felmy and Speidel, as well as Speidel Document Book III, page 24, Exhibit 23 and his signature under the Situation Report under the Military Commander for Greece, 13 July 1944, Prosecution Exhibit 468, show that General Speidel was relieved by General Scheuerlein.
I continue:
Franz Borstorff, who was English Interpreter in General Felmy's staff at the time, has confirmed the statement of the defendant in his affidavit to the effect that the Commando Order was in no case carried out by the 68th Corps."
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. We will take our afternoon recess. (A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I shall continue on page 25, last paragraph:
The actual treatment of Commando members is clearly shown in the affidavits of the former English commando officers McGregor and John Lodwick who were at that time brought before the office of the General Felmy. They were not, as the order ran, handed over to the SD, but the superior officers were deceived and they were taken to prisoner-of-war camps. Although these officers had inflicted great losses in material to the German Wehrmacht, General Felmy considered them merely as his adversaries, like any other members of an enemy power, as they had been wearing uniforms and had done nothing criminal in the execution of their sabotage orders.
I would like to deal in the following with General Felmy's second assignment in Greece.
I shall interpolate. First of all, I should like to determine that General Felmy never commanded the 15th Mountain Corps, as the prosecution claimed in its final plea. It is incomprehensible.
The Special Staff F (Sonderstab F) had been transformed into General Command LXVIIIth A.C. before he left Greece for his first time. General Felmy returned to Greece with it in June 1943 from his Eastern assignment in the Kalmucksteppes. The task of the Corps, to which some German and at first also Italian divisions were attached, was to protect the Peloponnesus against a landing of the Allies from the air and from the sea. All other additional tasks ranked far below this task in importance. No thought at all had been given at the beginning to the appearance of bands because there had hardly been any partisan raids on Germans during the first Greek assignment. The troops who had been used to have in front of them an openly fighting adversary, were at first in no way prepared for band warfare.
I have already tried in my opening statement to clarify somewhat the position of the Commanding General (Kommandierendor General) in the German army. The division was an integrated and independent military organism for tactical as well as for supply purposes. This is clearly shown from the wartime structure of the 117th chasseur-division. This independence also extended to the judicial system. In legal matters it was not the Commanding General but only the Supreme Commander of the Army who could, as the higher instance, take necessary decisions.
Likewise, the divisions were completely independent as regards the ever-increasing band activities: in fighting the bands, which constituted a purely tactical matter, as well as in the execution of reprisals. At the beginning a regimental or independent battallion commander was entitled to order such reprisals, later only a division commander himself. Quite apart from the fact that General Felmy was up to his neck in the preparations for the defense against an Allied landing, he was not, in view of the size of his Corps area which after the capitulation of the Italians in the autumn of 1943 had practically increased to the size of an army zone and in which official travels on account of the inaccessible terrain often took up a number of days, in a position at all himself to examine on the spot the situation that had arisen through raids of bands and acts of sabotage.
In order to serve as a basis for a decision in accordance with the actual facts, this examination had to be done, as far as the time factor was concerned, at once, as far as the locality was concerned, on the spot, as far as the matter itself was concerned, through the senior officer who had witnessed the incident directly. The type and size of any reprisals could only be decided upon by the competent commander on the strength of these reports. General Felmy, however, got to know what happened in this respect at best through the Ia or Icreports of the divisions. The greatest part of all these reports, he has, as he has stated himself never set eyes on, of course, for that not technically possible.
His instructions to the divisions, in his supervisory capacity, could only be on a general plane. On this plane were his conferences. To give written instructions which were not in full accordance with the orders from above was too dangerous. He was -and that was the other aspect of his peculiar position as Commanding General -- formally bound to the very strict orders on reprisals given by the supreme Wehrmacht authorities. Thus, he did not even in matters of principle, in which, as I have tried to show, he alone could make his authority felt, have the independence which one might have ascribed to him at first flush. The fact that he was bound to the orders given him is not nullified by the provision in article 47 of the German military penal code: for it is, of course, the tacit assumption of every order given by the leaders of a totalitarian state that the prerequisite of article 47 which was written for the safeguarding of the internal order do not exist. The answer to the question, however, whether an order violated the law of nations had to be left to the authorities which had issued the order. It was a prime necessity that all requirements of a formal and material nature had been reliably examined from a legal point of view. Where would there be any legal security in the military sphere -- and on top of it in war -- if every soldier had the right to investigate whether an order was in accordance with international law and if he were entitled to refuse to carry it out if he considered it to constitute a breach of the law of nations! In the military sector orders are given in order to be carried out. That goes for all armies of the world in totalitarian states exactly in the same way as in the armies of democracies. If, therefore, article II-4 b of the Control Council Law No. 10 considers the carryingout of orders which allegedly violate international law only as a mitigating circumstance but not as freeing from responsibility, it is in contradiction to the commonly accepted axiom "Nulla poena sine lege", as before the issuance of the Control Council Law such a legal axiom had never been in force.
Nor is this a case in which a generally accepted customary international law had been hardened into codified law. On the contrary, completely new law has been created. Even if one were of divergent opinion the legal defense of the duress, which also has its place in international law is not ruled out by this. This has also been clearly expressed in the Judgment of the Military Tribunal No. VI in the case against Flick at all. It should not be doubted that -quite particularly in war -- in the execution of military orders, every soldier up to the highest officers of the German Wehrmacht acted under duress. Every soldier, in case he clearly refused to obey orders, had to reckon not only with being released but also with being most severely punished. If, therefore, an order was given which appeared to him who had received the order as being in contradiction to international law or as being incapable of being executed, what he could do was to try and mitigate it as far as possible without higher authority ever getting to know anything of it. This applies to all orders emanating from Hitler and the OKW, especially, of course, also for all measures taken in the reprisal sector, thus also to the so-called "reprisal-quota-order", which was abolished only after it had been in force for a considerable time, through the so-called "Loehr-order" of 23 December 1943. Thus, General Felmy was placed between the devil of orders from above and the deep blue sea of the events which happened far below his own level and could, for the measures to be taken, only be examined on the spot.
The connection with all the incidents which happened in the area of the defendant was extremely loose. No clearer evidence of it can be found than in the indictment in which for instance the formula "Troops under the command and the jurisdiction of the LXVIIIth A.C." are alleged to have committed any act in violation of international law, is repeated again and again. The fact that this act was committed by were supplemented by numerous other statements introduced by the defense.
As for the rest, Doc. Book Felmy IV containing the war diary of the LXVIIIth A.C. covering the first half of 1944 is the best object lesson on the situation then prevailing. I refer in this connection to the short characterization of the diary given by me when I introduced it. Only he who has ever been in band infested areas knows how to judge the danger and also understands the psychological reaction caused by the band plague in the minds of the soldiers of the German occupation forces. This applies, of course, to an increased extent to our case, it being generally known how perfidiously the raids of the bands were executed and how cruelly and inhumanely the partisans treated the prisoners and wounded of their enemies. General Felmy, and for sure all of the other members of his Army Corps, would have liked much better to meet the bands in open combat. Then reprisal measures would at least not have been necessary to the extent they were resorted to.
And the result of the combat would, undoubtedly, have had a lasting effect on the partisans. But these were very elusive. The most rugged terrain in Southern Greece -- above all in the Peloponnesus where the danger from the bands was greatest -- greatly benefitted the partisans. They knew how to take advantage of the favorable situation by using unscrupulous methods. Thus the German soldiers, as well as the decent elements of the Greek population who did not make common cause with the bands, were in constant danger. The Greek Ministry of the Interior at that time published lists containing the names of members of security troops assigned to enforce law and order besides the German soldiers, who had been murdered by EAM. The size of these lists speaks for itself. The official Greek Government Authorities -- starting from the Prime Minister -- as well as the high church dignitaries tried again and again to make the recalcitrant parts of the population see reason. But I am sorry to say it was all in vain.
Confronted with this situation, General Felmy's possibilities were doubly limited as I have shown in a former context. How was this development to be met? General Felmy had often and with a thoroughness characterizing him pondered this question. He was not in sympathy with the reprisal measures, he, the soldier grown up in the good old tradition who had never had to do any such things in former times, though, on the other hand, he was well aware, and could be well aware, of the fact that reprisal measures were permitted under international law. There is no provision in the positive law forbidding them, nor has an international customary law banning them developed at any time. The sole basis of a general nature is to be found in the legal institution of the so-called "military necessities" contained in the Hague Conventions; they set the limits for what is permissible even if the wish to mitigate the sufferings caused by the war cannot be fulfilled. In the last analysis, General Felmy plainly aimed, when he took the measures which military necessity seemed to require, at mitigating as much as he could the sufferings caused by the war, for his soldiers as well as for the Greek population.
He first tried all manner of peaceful means. He had thought he might influence the recalcitrant elements of the population by propaganda of various types. Reprisals were, at the beginning, totally refrained from. The turning-point was reached when the Luftwaffe Field Company was attacked near Inoi on the Eleusis-Thebes road. Two thirds of this company were ambushed and killed; the last third, which was captured, was brutally slaughtered. I would have liked to have presented, for interrogation, to the Tribunal the sole survivor by the name of Doerner, who managed to escape, though wounded. But apparently he is in Jugoslav captivity, like a great part of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division in General. General Felmy, in spite of this incident could not make up his mind yet to recommend to the divisional commander, General Drum, who describes in his affidavit the event in its details, the carrying out of reprisal measures.
And then there was a decisive turn in the mind of General Felmy. The clemency shown by him in the Case Inoi, which is, emphasized by Gemmrig's affidavit, narrating a similar incident, and which he tried to justify before himself by the propaganda measures mentioned earlier, did not have the slightest effect. The bands did not have any understanding neither for the clemency nor for the propaganda. The situation did not improve but became increasingly worse -- particularly on the roads where the raid at Inoi had occurred.
From this moment on General Felmy was genuinely convinced that reprisal measures were indispensable. He considered them as ultima ratio for the maintenance of order. If he had failed to have reprisal measures carried out in the future, the discipline of the troops would have been undermined as they would have lost their confidence in the leadership and would have taken independent measures according to their Court 5, Case 7 (Int.
Lea) emotions.
This had to be prevented at all cost in view of the steadily increasing danger of an Allied landing. Moreover in accordance with Article 43 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare the German occupation force had the obligation of maintaining public order in the country in the interest of the population. Also in the interest of the latter, being menaced by partisans as well to an ever-increasing decree, General Felmy felt obliged to take steps against these occurrences. He thus contributed his share towards the prevention of the Bolshevisation of the country which, according to the statement of the witness Prof. Dr. Stadtmueller, would have turned Greece into a Soviet country at this time already, if reprisal measures had not been used.
Here an interpolation. In contrast to the prosecution statement it can be established that the witness Dr. Altenburg did not mention one word that he had asked for his relief because he considered reprisal measures criminal, on the contrary, the question in cross examination as to whether he considered orders for the execution of hostages criminal was not admitted, because the tribunal objected. It is hardly to be assumed that the prosecution did not remember this. I continue.
General Felmy and the troops subordinate to him were supported by the nationalistic part of the Greek population. They were joined by the volunteer units of Colonel Papadongonas, who also carried out reprisal measures, being convinced of their necessity. By the way partisans were by far more afraid of their own compatriots than of the Germans, as the former had naturally been quicker in recognizing the requirements of the situation.
Thus there was only the question as to the choice of kind and extent of the reprisal measures, in order to make them as effective as required. General Felmy was convinced that the reprisal quota order of the OKW was too rigid, not pliable enough and generally too severe. In his opinion reprisals had to be fashioned according to the individual case.
I have previously pointed out that the circumstances of the case could only be established on the spot.
A wide span of possibilities of reacting had to be taken into consideration thereby. In spite of the situation as a whole it was certainly unnecessary sometimes to order reprisal measures at all, as the result intended could be achieved by other means. According to the war diary No. 3 of the LXVIII Army KORPS, for the second half of the year 1943 reprisal measures were only taken at this time in 2/3 of the cases of raids by bands and acts of sabotage. General Felmy further, emphasized that only persons connected in some way with bands and horrors committed by them should be subject to reprisal measures. It has been corroborated by Scheure's diary that he, as a matter of principle, refused to request airplanes from higher authorities to be used against partisan villages, as innocent persons might have had to suffer thereby. In view of the practice of the enemy, also in Greece, as nonsensically as this may sound, General Felmy would in all probability not be sitting in this dock at all, if he had taken these far more radical measures. The reprisal prisoners, however, were not victimized indiscriminately as it would have been the case in air attacks, but, as already pointed out, selected carefully. On the Peloponnesus this was done by the staff of Colonel Papadongonas, whose volunteers came from the Peloponnesus themselves and thus offered a guarantee that only guilty persons would be called to account. The reprisal quota of 1: 100 established by the OKW order in force for a long time was, in no case, even remotely filled by troops subordinate to General Felmy. Mostly the quota, actually applied, was far below. This was known to General Felmy and in his verbal directives he has never given orders for the taking of stricter measures, but, in the contrary, always advised moderation and clemency, as is shown by a number of affidavits submitted by me.
General Felmy has never ordered reprisals on his own initiative.
In conclusion I want to say with regard to the reprisals that they actually achieved the result expected from them. General Felmy was firmly convinced of this too. In connection with discussing the raid made by bands South of Tripolis on 11 March 1944, I shall illuminate this fact again especially.
William Hardy McNaill, assistant of the American Military Attached in Athens from 1944 to 1946 has in his book "The Greek Delemma" published in 1947 expressly corroberated the fact that the reprisals taken at that time had been effective.
This concludes my general statements concerning the bandits and reprisals.
Within the scope of these arguments I cannot discuss once more all the separate incidents with the ensuing reprisals, which appeared in the reports. General Felmy is unable to testify concerning several incidents, partly because he cannot remember any longer the details of the events, or because he was never informed of them. The remarks I have just made apply to them all. In the following I shall concern myself merely with some of the more important cases which were the subject of charges against General Felmy, particularly those in which the defendant took a personal part and which the indictment has specially mentioned. I shall again discuss them according to their chronological occurrence.
I shall now turn to the case "K a l a w r i t a".
The town of Kalawrita and vicinity were for a long time a center of bandits in the Peleponnesus. The 117th Jaeger Division undertook already in August 1943 a cleaning-up operation which, however, had to be stopped short, because at that time one could not lay hands on the bandits. That it was necessary to clean up this area of bandits, in order to be able to supply troop units deployed there from the East in the event of an Allied landing on the West coast of the Peleponnesus, is illustrated by an affidavit of the former General Winter who was then Chief of Staff of Army Group E. In the second half of October 1943, while again on a reconnaissance mission in the area of Kalawrita, a company of the 117th Jaeger Division was captured. Negotiations carried on by the regiment through intermediaries with the bandits for the exchange of prisoners were unsuccessful. At the beginning of December an attempt was made to liberate the prisoners by means of a commando operation. At the same time it became known from two wounded soldiers, who had escaped, that the largest part of their company which comprised 78 men, had been murdered in a bestial manner.
Concerning the details I refer to the affidavit of one Bernhard Gruber, who himself was an eye-witness; and to the affidavit of one von Scheure, a former court martial judge of the 117th Jaeger Division. Thus may be explained that there followed immediately after the tactical commando operation, upon orders from the Division, the punitive expedition - which is now the subject of the indictment.
General Felmy ordered neither the tactical nor the reprisal operation. It is impossible to find where the Prosecution in its plea finds reason to conclude that General Felmy had given the orders to LeSuire to carry out the reprisal measures. Moreover, during this time he was absent from the Corps Staff, representing the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E in Salonika, where, however, he did not actually stay during the days in question since he was on an official trip of several days duration. The actual time at which General Felmy received knowledge of the punitive expedition cannot be precisely ascertained now because he very soon left for a Xmas furlough at home after he had deputized for the Commander-inChief. In any case it is manifest that the Division Commander, General von Le Suire, only reported to him orally after the operation had been carried out. General Felmy declared himself not in agreement with the reprisals taken by the Division, but considered them for several reasons as obviously excessive. That reprisals had to be undertaken at all is shown clearly by the underlying facts of the case and the events leading up to them. In view of the bestiality of the crimes committed by the bands, a general and understandable excitement got hold of the troops, especially in this case which followed very soon upon the formerly discussed raid near Inci, which still remained unpunished, and surely none of the men could have been kept in check from wreaking reprisals on his own account. Furthermore, the troops would have lost confidence in their superiors if they had done nothing. For this reason alone some form of counter-action was imperative. In addition, there was here a clear case of military necessity to deter the bandits in the future.
Of course, the reprisals should have been carried out according to the spirit of General Felmy's intentions, and his formerly discussed principles, in order to result in the success desired.
General von Le Suire was commonly recognized as an excellent soldier. However, he obviously lacked the vision for other, particularly political matters which went beyond the purely military sphere. Until the "Operation Kalawrita" nothing similar had occurred which could have caused the displeasure of General-Felmy. What should he have done now after this happening? At his interrogation he unequivocally and creditably set forth that it would have been unwise to summon General Le Suire before the Supreme Military Court or to request his relieve. General Felmy knew sufficiently well the attitude of Hitler and the OKW concerning reprisals. Its nature was made amply explicit by the reprisal-quota-order. The result would have been General Felmy's immediate relieve, and most probably his dismissal from active service. This the more so, as by reason of the events which led in 1940 to his dismissal, he was everything but in the good graces of the Leadership. On the other hand, Le Suire had very good connections higher up, as is shown, amongst other matters, in an affidavit by Dyckhoff, which mentions his visit to the Fuehrer Headquarters. General Felmy surely was not glued to his position for which he never could get enthusiastic. When deciding not to take any steps against Le Suire he thought not of himself but only of the cause. He wanted to prevent his replacement by a man - and that would have been the only possible result - who would have new acted according to the spirit of the highest Leadership. This way, however, he could himself act in a moderating and smoothing manner, and thus could the reprisal-quota-order be softened down in its effects to the very limits of military necessity. General Felmy, therefore, ordered that Le Suire would have to get permission from the Corps for all larger reprisal measures intended by him in the future. In this way he was surely able to still obtain the possible best from the situation conjured up at "Kalawrita".
Consequently, there is not much more to say concerning the document (Exh. 628) which the prosecution showed to General Felmy during his cross-examination, and which contains two of the defendant's reports on General von Le Suire. If in the second report of 16 July 1944, mention is made of "Leader of a "Mountain Corps" then this does not mean a proposal for promotion, but merely the expression of the opinion that General von Le Suire was militarily suitable to lead a Mountain Corps. Of this the defendant was certainly convinced. For the sake of completeness let it be noted that Le Suire was, without any action on the part of General Felmy, already transferred to the Fuehrer-Reserve at the time this report was made, and any person familiar with military procedure therefore knew that he would soon be assigned to command a corps. The two letters "NS", which mean "National Socialist" appear to the Prosecution to be of special characteristic significance concerning General Felmy's political views. They are, however, entirely harmless to anyone who is familiar with conditions in Hitler-Germany, since they were a required component of all reports on both civilian and military functionaries. They were merely designed to have it made known that the person reported on hold positive political views, a fact which he had in any event affirmed already by his oath. That it was prescribed for the immediate superiors to include in their reports - it was net required from the next higher ones - statements concerning political views - has been proved by the Prosecution itself through presenting in rebuttal a report by Army Group E on General Felmy; consequently, according to the questionnaire, the "short report " was to give an opinion also, amongst other matters, about the "National Socialistic attitude". If, according to orders, the report about General Felmy happens to state: "National Socialistic Leadership Personality" then a meaningless adjective was merely added to a military noun. This remark in the report is therefore in no ways connected with the fact that General Felmy, after his dismissal in 1940, was for a few months a member of the National Socialistic German Labor Party. Some persons might find it difficult not to see from this a connection with his work in private economy which followed his dismissal.
However, it was not General Felmy's intention to gain, by joining the party, any kind of professional advantages in his new position, nor did he wish to obtain thereby his reinstatement into the Wehrmacht as some future date.
By this gesture he merely wanted to make it known at that time that, in spite of the unjust treatment accorded to him by the highest office, he would place himself during the war, without considering personal feelings, as a member of the community behind the state leadership.
I take it for granted that, on the basis of my arguments, it has been made sufficiently clear that General Felmy did not wish to cover up General von Le Suire - in spite of "Kalawrita" - because he perhaps thought him a specially zealous National Socialist, for this would have presumed that he was one himself.
With this I conclude my arguments concerning the "Operation Kalawrita."
As already mentioned by me before, General Felmy never took any reprisal measures on his own initiative. What he did do, merely was that he once gave his consent for the execution of major reprisals, in connection with the order to the 117th Jaeger Division, issued after the Kalawrita incident, which provided that proposals for major reprisals should be submitted for prior decision by the Corps. These facts are shown from the Prosecution document NOKW-670 (Exh. 437) in Doc. Book XVIII, in particular from the Ic morning report of 15 March 1944, on page 50 in the German, and page 44 of the English, as well as from a number of other documents mentioned in the direct interrogation of the defendant. Concerned is a surprise attack on a truck convoy south of Tripolis on 11 March 1944, when 21 German soldiers were killed and 42 wounded. For revenge, it was ordered to shoot 200 reprisal-hostages and the burning down of ten towns. The hostages, being co-responsible according to the order, were to be taken from the vicinity of where the attack occurred. As in all the other cases, which not like in the "Operation Kalawrita." did also for this reason involve an excess, the reprisal prisoners were selected from the staff of Colonal Papadongonas. Of the 200 reprisal prisoners selected at first, 59 were sifted out again and released at this examination because they were in no manner connected with the bands. The reprisal ratio, therefore, amounted to prac tically only a little more than one or two.
Following action by General Felmy, the towns which the Division had proposed for destruction were also examined by the same staff, whether they qualified as nests of bandits, and only after they were established as such beyond any reasonable doubtand after the population had evacuated them for a long time - were they approved for destruction. General Felmy went right down to the very limits of his military responsibility; after he had recognized that in this case one could not get along without reprisal measures. Otherwise he would have endangered the lives of many German soldiers, inasmuch as this road was frequently travelled on by German, troops, and since already before this attack three others had taken place, to wit, those on 23 and 25 November, and 20 December 1943. After all the previous surprise attacks no reprisals were taken. If reprisals had been taken sconer, then the attack on the 11th of March 1944 would perhaps not have happened; for it is remarkable that after the reprisals approved by General Felmy had been carried out, especially after the elimination of the hide outs of the bands, no further attacks at all occurred on that road. This is the best proof that measures of reprisal actually do bring results and hence were a military necessity in order to maintain some degree of order.
- The Prosecution has claimed in its plea that the 141 reprisal hostages had been shot by Greek volunteers under German supervision, and has drawn a general conclusion accordingly. From the entry into the War Diary of the 68th Army Corps, Document Felmy 4, of 11 March 1944, is however merely a proposal by the divisional commander. As General Felmy has testified the 141 hostages were not shot by Greek volunteers at all but, by the 117th Infantry Division.
JUDGE BURKE: A few moments ago the statement was made: Operation Kalawrita did also for this reason involve an excess, the reprisal prisoners were selected from the staff of Colonel Papadongonas. Page 46: The reprisal prisoners were selected from the staff of Colonel Papadongonas. The ninth line on the page.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Yes, I have got it, Your Honor. It is correct. This is not a contradiction; they were selected by Greek volunteers, but they were not shot by the Greek volunteers under German supervision, but the Greek volunteer units under colonel Papadongonas were completely indepedent in the ordering and execution of reprisal measures on the one hand; on the other hand, they selected for the German agencies the reprisal hostages in order to have the guarantee that only those people were shot who actually collaborated with the bandits.
JUDGE BURKE: I don't think you understand my question. The language of this statement would appear that the prisoners themselves were members of the staff of Colonel Papadongonas. Did you wish to be understood that way?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I said the reprisal prisoners were selected by the staff of Colonel Papadongonas -
JUDGE BURKE: You repeated the same error.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Selected by the staff of Colonel Papadongonas.
JUDGE BURKE: It makes some difference.
Although the Prosecution has brought no charges against General Felmy in this matter, I want to speak briefly about the surprise attack upon General Krech. It took place on 27 April 1944, on the Molai-Monomwassia road in the southeastern Peloponnes. The commander of the 41 Fortress Division, General Krech and 3 accompanying men were killed, 5 seriously wounded. At that time General Felmy was relieving Generaloberst Loehr in Soloniki and hence already for this reason could not give orders for reprisals. However the leader of the Greek volunteer-units, Colonel Papadongonas of his own accord had 100 hostages shot. He was in no way subordinate to General Felmy - that is the reason for my speaking of the case - especially not with regard to the carrying out of reprisals. He was absolutely independent as far as this is concerned and had ordered these executions of his own accord, without consulting any German authority and had the execution car ried out on 30 April 1944.
That the 200 Greeks in Athens also could not have been shot by members of the LXVIII Armee-Corps I mention only for completeness sake.
In the indictment already the Prosecution held General Felmy responsible for the so-called "massacre of Klissura". This had taken place at the beginning of April 1944, as may be seen from several documents. General Felmy had nothing to do with this matter. Klissura was not in the district of the LXVIII. Corps, it was in Northern Greece in the Salonika area. The SS Armored Infantry Regiment 7 which was involved in the respective occurrences, belonged to the 4th SS-Armored Police Infantry Division and this again was not subordinate to General Felmy but came under the Corps Group Saloniki as is shown in its report of 12 June 1944 to the Army Group E, which tells of the investigations that were made. General Felmy was relieving Generaloberst Loehr during the time in question, but he did not learn of the actual incidents in Klissura at the time because contrary to the real facts of the case, in the regimental reports this had been described merely as an operation. Not until after the period for relieving was over were the true circumstances brought to light-evidently through the office of the Special Commissioner Southeast. Only here in Nuernberg did General Felmy learn of the excess from the records. He therefore can in no wise be held responsible for it.
Likewise General Felmy was not in any way connected with the later incidents in Distomen where the same Regiment was involved. The regiment was tactically subordinated to him for about 8 weeks - it was in June and July 1944 - when the Police-Regiment 18 which was under the authority of the Higher SS - and Police Leader, but was stationed in the district of the LXVIII.Corps without being subordinate to it, was temporarily transferred to the Peloponnes to fight Guerrilla-bands. At that time General Felmy - as has already been stated - had not yet learned of the incidents in Klissura and during the short time that the regiment was subordinate to him, he had no close contact with it. Of the Distomon incidents, which had happened at the beginning of the subordination, he learned only afterwards.