Although the presiding judge had, on general principles, immediately given his verbal approval for this trip, the approval of the Military Government in Berlin was refused by telephone, since no German is, at the present time, permitted to travel to Greece. On the same day, however, the Press reported that German exporters were again permitted to take trips to all foreign countries with the exception of Japan and Spain, thus including Greece.
"If one must check the conditions in a foreign country during a past period, one must also be in the position to gather the necessary information in the locality concerned. Only in this way can the High Tribunal obtain a correct picture of the conditions and circumstances in this country. If this trial must take place in Germany, the defense must at least have the opportunity to obtain all the facts which concern the matter under discussion. That is a quite natural legal prerogative which is applicable in all cultural States. It must be applicable to an even greater extent since the prosecution has had the right and possibility to present a number of Greek witnesses to the High Tribunal. I am convinced that if the prosecution would have desired and had seen a promise of success in doing so, they would, without technical difficulties, have been able to send representatives to Greece, to obtain facts there so that, if necessary, any number of witnesses would have been brought from Greece to Germany by them in order to be questioned in this trial.
"In accordance with Article IV e of Decree No. 7 of the Military Government in Germany, every defendant has the right to submit to the court through his defense counsel evidence in his defense. This common right has been denied me by refusing me the permission to go to Greece. The trial shows, therefore, a considerable formal default, which does not allow an objective decision, if the evidence submitted by the prosecution is considered to be important. Your Honors, if I now approach the material part of my statements and the discussion of the counts of the indictment, I will attempt, first of all, to draw a general picture of the situation concerning the partisans in the Balkans and particularly in Southern Greece. The arguments of the prosecution are obviously incoherent, that is, the effects described are independent of their fundamental cause. If one speaks about reprisal measures in the Balkans, one should not forget the incidents which caused these measures; because no one is going to maintain that these reprisal measures were ordered without any foundation. Only the prosecution authorities could speak of an extermination plan by the defendant without consideration of any partisan activities. The situation concerning the partisans can only be understood if one takes the Balkan history and its particularities into consideration.
"It does not appear necessary to prove in detail that the Balkans, as far as the appearance of partisans is concerned, were always outside of the European community. Since there is a Greek history, there are partisans in Greece, who, of course, not always have committed excesses with the same strength and intensity. The century old literature of the Balkan peoples had again dealt with activities of partisans in various forms. I only "have to point out the fact, which is well known throughout the world and which is constantly being published in press and radio here and abroad, namely that the activities of the partisans did not stop with the departure of the Germans from Greece in 1944, but rather that they increased since that time.
The most recent incidents show best of all that this situation seems to be a physical necessity, caused by geographical, geological and anthropological reasons. In order to justify this statement, I would like to point out that in the entire German history similar incidents have never occurred.
"When General Felmy as Commander of Southern Greece entered this territory for the first time in June 1941, there was no antipathy on the part of the Greek people against the German soldiers, who had fought recently and courageously. On the contrary, a well founded and hearty understanding quickly developed between the population and the occupation forces. The population only showed opposition towards the members of the Italian occupation army which was caused by an antipathy developed during the course of history, the unsuccessful conduct of the war by the Italians, and their unfriendly attitude towards the Greek people. At late as August 1943 partisans sent German prisoners back with a letter of apology, stating that they had been mistaken for Italians. The decisive change in the attitude of the partisans did not develop until the Fall of 1943, that is, 1½ years after the Greek army capitulated. Up to this time, surprise attacks on Germans in Southern Greece had occurred to a very small extent only. The change of the situation was obviously due to several reasons.
"First, it was the capitulation of the Italian "army which would have resulted in idleness for the partisans if they would not have selected new objects for their attacks, in view of the fact that they now were sold considerable quantities of weapons and ammunition by the Italians.
No particular mention has to be made of the fact that the members of the EAM-ELAS - and only these outfits appeared in Southern Greece during the entire period of occupation - consisted to a large extent of elements which were economically unreliable, criminals, or open followers of communism.
"That even nationalistic Greeks joined the ranks of the EAM in addition to those who were forced to join up can be explained by the fact that at the beginning, the EAM threw a nationalistic robe around its shoulders while its actual attitude could not be recognized. Only in the course of time did the Greek population realize more and more that the EAM had nothing in common with national aims but worked undoubtedly for Bolshevism in Greece. The incidents after the evacuation of Greece by the Germans finally opened the eyes of all nationalistic Greeks."
Winston Churchill, in his article "If I were an American", which appeared in the magazine "Life" of 12 May 1944, writes:
"In forty days of street fighting we fought for the life and the soul of Athens, sector for sector, district for district, the Communistic invaders were driven back, house for house, and finally routed with severe losses. During their retreat, they murdered at least 20,000 men, women and children whom they did not like or who crossed their path."
If I may add that the present Greek Government has very recently outlawed not only the Communist Party but also the EAM, I believe the circle, is closed.
Further causes for the actual beginning of partisans activities against the Germans in the fall of 1943 can be found in the development of the foreign political situation.
From Communistic circles of other countries - may I point out the treaty of the Communist parties of Greece and Bulgaria of 12 July 1943 showing the cooperation with the Greek Communists - the partisans were supplied with men and material. On the other hand, the supply by air of the bandits with weapons, ammunition and money by the Allies was considerably increased. The word "money" should be changed to "gold". The bandits were interested in the bolshevistic course in Greece, the Allies wanted to create unrest, and cause as much damage as possible to the German occupational authorities. In how far the interests of these two circles, which at that time worked in the same direction, were actually different in the end, has been shown by the development of the situation in Greece during the German occupation, particularly, however, by the increase in gravity in the political situation after the German evacuation.
If Churchill at the end of the above mentioned article comments on the routing of the partisans from Athens by the English, as follows: .... based upon this work the United States can occupy its positions today..., he forgets, that at the time when he supplied these same partisans from the air when he later fought against with all measures of modern warfare, and therewith supported their expansion, it was the German occupation force which prevented Greece from becoming bolshevistic at that time already.
For practical reasons and in this connection I now want to discuss in detail the evidence presented by the prosecution, and would like to consider first the assignment of General Felmy in Greece, insofar as it is concerned by the indictment.
General Felmy was transferred to Greece in June 1941 as Commander for Southern Greece and as Commander of the Special Staff F. Only his activities in connection with the first named position is of importance at this point. I believe that the minor importance of his assignment as Commander for Southern Greece has been sufficiently shown by the evidence. The special explanation of this fact is obviously found in the events connected with the person of General Felmy, which in the year 1940 led to his discharge and which made it appear inadvisable to the highest authorities to reinstate him in his former position in the Luftwaffe, in which he had held an important position.
The new field of activities which one believed could be entrusted to him, corresponded in its meaning with the distrust which one continued to have against him. At that time, Southern Greece was under Italian command. The Germans had practically nothing to say there. Merely the areas around the airports Tatoi, Eleusis and Kalamaki, the Southern part of the harbor Piraeus, several islands, some of which were not even occupied by German troops, the district Laurion and the island of Crete were under the control of General Felmy's office. The territorial subordination of Crete, which was confirmed by General Foertsch in his interrogation was even eliminated at a later date, as shown by Prosecution Exhibit No. 211. The personnel subordinate to the Commander of Southern Greece consisted of three Landesschuetzen Battalions, which were employed as guards.
The only duty of any practical significance was the supply of the island of Crete, for which purpose a special staff comprised of representatives of all three branches of the Wehrmacht was formed and placed under the command of General Felmy.
The situation, as far as partisans were concerned, was at that time completely quiet as I have already stated. The first and only attacks during this period occurred, as can be seen from the Activities Report of the Armed Forces Commander South-east for the month of June 1942 (Book VIII, Exh. 211, page 69 of the English, page 58 of the German text), in Athens against Wehrmacht vehicles as well as upon rail road tracks north of Athens. General Felmy was on lease during this period as is shown by his interrogation (German record page 6776, English record page 6929) and by the statement of Dr. Altenburgs, so that he could not have been connected with the reprisal measures which were ordered.
I shall insert now.
The same applies to the hostage shootings which took place in the Mossara Area which, apart from the surprise attack on the railroad line Liossia-Athens are charged to General Felmy in the plea of the Prosecution. This incident also occurred during the time when the defendant was deputized for by General Andre. Apart from this, the Messara Plain is located on Crete. That is outside of General Felmy's area of jurisdiction.
During the first assignment of General Felmy in Greece, the so-called "reprisal ratio-order" of 16 September 1941 was issued in which the High Command of the Wehrmacht ordered the well known ratio of 1:50 or 1: 100. At the time when this order was probably received by his office, General Felmy was not in Greece. If the order reached his office at that time, he himself could not have passed it on to the Landesschuetzen Battalions.
However, the assumption that this order was passed on by other members of his staff also appears misleading, since at that time there was no reason whatsoever to apply reprisal measures.
General Felmy learned of the reprisal quota order only at some time after his return to Greece In accordance with Prosecution Exhibit 68 the so-called "Kommando Rosenberg" was temporarily economically and disciplinary subordinated to the Commander of Southern Greece by a letter of the Military Commander Southeast.
This detachment consisted of a few soldiers who were given order to search Greek archives for certain material. General Felmy had actually nothing to do with this order and had no right to issue any orders whatsoever to that detachment. The fact that they were economically subordinated only meant that the members of the Kommando were mainly fed, clad and paid by the office of the Commander of Southern Greece.
Disciplinary subordination meant that these soldiers, in case of conduct unbecoming to a soldier when off duty, could be held responsible by the defendant.
Finally a word in reference to Prosecution Exhibit 69. Concerned is the order from the High Command of the Wehrmacht, dated 28 September 1941, to hold at all times a number of hostages of the different political factions, and a corresponding decree by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. General Felmy does not remember this order. He also does not know whether it had been carried out at that time. This, however, is not likely since at that time no partisan problem was evident and the Italians were carrier of the territorial sovereignty in Southern Greece.
I have now discussed all documents which the Prosecution has used to incriminate General Felmy in connection with his first assignment in Greece, and which appeared to be in need of discussion.
The Prosecution has not charged General Felmy with incidents which occurred during the period from 23 July until 23 August 1941 in Serbia, during which time he took the place of Field Marshal List in his capacity as Armed Forces Commander Southeast. For the same of completeness, however, I will discuss this deputy mission in short and general terms.
It was a pure formality. Somebody had to be there to represent the territorial commander - and only this deputy ship is concerned here to the outside world and who, in cases which could not be postponed, could make a decision.
During this time also, General Felmy's official residence was continually in Athens and no deputy was appointed for him in his capacity as Commander for Southern Greece. General Foertsch came to Athens several times during the week to make his reports. As General Felmy has stated as a witness he did not issue any directives of basic importance. In cases of such brief representations which only served the purpose of a temporary bridge-over this was not customary in the Wehrmacht. Particularly, General Felmy did not order any reprisal measures during that time which concerned a territory that was not normally located within his district. He does not even remember the possible incidents which caused the reprisal measures.
After Field Marshal List returned from his leave he only informed him of the situation in Southern Greece, i.e. about his own district. If General Felmy would have ordered reprisal measures during this month, the attacks and acts of sabotage of the partisans in Serbia would not have increased to such an extent during this time and the situation would not have become so much worse, as it actually did.
Because of the reprisal measures which were carried out in later months, the attacks and acts of sabotage in Serbia decreased again.
In conclusion I would like to mention an individual case: It concerns the OKW-order of 23 July 1941 signed by Keitel. I mention this ease because it was also specifically mentioned in the indictment with regard to General Felmy. This document, according to the distribution list, is the second copy destined for the High Commander of the Navy. This order which clearly refers only to the Russian theater of war, as is shown through its contents and through its reference to the "spread of terror" and the use of "draconical measures" against the civilian population, was never delivered to the Armed Forces Commander South-East.
He can, therefore, not have worked on it nor, in particular, have distributed it, as the indictment charges.
During the time Field Marshal List was ill in October 1941 until General Kuntze entered upon his duties. General Felmy did not deputize for Field Marshal List. I refer in this connection to the interrogations of Felmy and Foertsch. General Kuntze was evidently mistaken when he voiced the opinion that General Felmy deputized for Field Marshal List as justiciary. If General Felmy had been appointed deputy, it would have had to be ordered, as in the case discussed before, by the OKW. This was not done, however, as Field Marshal List expressly confirmed in cross examination in the rebuttal and as is shown on page 1 of the document which was Exhibit 664.
I shall insert now.
In contrast to the presentation delivered by the Prosecution in the closing statement, this document, as well as Exhibit 18 of the Prosecution, shows that General Felmy deputized for Field Marshal List during his leave in July-August 1941 but only in his capacity as Armed Forces Commander Southeast. A corresponding entry for the period of Field Marshal List's illness in October 1941 cannot be found in a single document.
In order not to destroy the chronological sequence, I should like to discuss shortly here two orders of which the indictment alleges that all of the defendants, including General Felmy, have issued, carried out and passed them on. They are the Commissar Order and the Commando Order.
The Commissar Order has never been delivered to General Felmy, as the office of the Commander South-East did not exist yet at the time it was issued. General Felmy, therefore, cannot have "issued" nor "passed it on". Nor has he carried it out. The Prosecution has not submitted any evidence for this in spite of its claims.
The so-called "Commando Order" and the supplementary order, were issued between General Felmy's two assignments in Greece. At that time - the orders are dated 18 October 1941 - he was in the Kalmucksteppes where it was not delivered to him either; this order was not known to have been distributed there. The defendant, therefore, cannot have "issued" nor have "passed it on". He, later on, received knowledge of it through a conversation but never carried it out, dealing with this question here at once. The report of the Army Group E of 18 July 1944 on the English Commando Action against the Isle of Calino submitted in rebuttal is no proof to the contrary. This island is not situated in the area of the LXVIIIth Corps. The words in the report that sergeant Dryden was flown over to Athens and is being transferred to the SD do not prove that this was actually done and above all do not prove that General Felmy had anything to do with this affair. The fact that his Corps Staff was located near Athens will not be seriously considered by the Prosecution to constitute a sufficient indication for it.
An interpolation here:
The Prosecution in its statement has for the first time, and without any substantiation, asserted that after General Speidel was transferred General Felmy had taken over all agencies stationed in Athens.
Examinations of the defendants Felmy and Speidel, as well as Speidel Document Book III, page 24, Exhibit 23 and his signature under the Situation Report under the Military Commander for Greece, 13 July 1944, Prosecution Exhibit 468, show that General Speidel was relieved by General Scheuerlein.
I continue:
Franz Borstorff, who was English Interpreter in General Felmy's staff at the time, has confirmed the statement of the defendant in his affidavit to the effect that the Commando Order was in no case carried out by the 68th Corps."
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. We will take our afternoon recess. (A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I shall continue on page 25, last paragraph:
The actual treatment of Commando members is clearly shown in the affidavits of the former English commando officers McGregor and John Lodwick who were at that time brought before the office of the General Felmy. They were not, as the order ran, handed over to the SD, but the superior officers were deceived and they were taken to prisoner-of-war camps. Although these officers had inflicted great losses in material to the German Wehrmacht, General Felmy considered them merely as his adversaries, like any other members of an enemy power, as they had been wearing uniforms and had done nothing criminal in the execution of their sabotage orders.
I would like to deal in the following with General Felmy's second assignment in Greece.
I shall interpolate. First of all, I should like to determine that General Felmy never commanded the 15th Mountain Corps, as the prosecution claimed in its final plea. It is incomprehensible.
The Special Staff F (Sonderstab F) had been transformed into General Command LXVIIIth A.C. before he left Greece for his first time. General Felmy returned to Greece with it in June 1943 from his Eastern assignment in the Kalmucksteppes. The task of the Corps, to which some German and at first also Italian divisions were attached, was to protect the Peloponnesus against a landing of the Allies from the air and from the sea. All other additional tasks ranked far below this task in importance. No thought at all had been given at the beginning to the appearance of bands because there had hardly been any partisan raids on Germans during the first Greek assignment. The troops who had been used to have in front of them an openly fighting adversary, were at first in no way prepared for band warfare.
I have already tried in my opening statement to clarify somewhat the position of the Commanding General (Kommandierendor General) in the German army. The division was an integrated and independent military organism for tactical as well as for supply purposes. This is clearly shown from the wartime structure of the 117th chasseur-division. This independence also extended to the judicial system. In legal matters it was not the Commanding General but only the Supreme Commander of the Army who could, as the higher instance, take necessary decisions.
Likewise, the divisions were completely independent as regards the ever-increasing band activities: in fighting the bands, which constituted a purely tactical matter, as well as in the execution of reprisals. At the beginning a regimental or independent battallion commander was entitled to order such reprisals, later only a division commander himself. Quite apart from the fact that General Felmy was up to his neck in the preparations for the defense against an Allied landing, he was not, in view of the size of his Corps area which after the capitulation of the Italians in the autumn of 1943 had practically increased to the size of an army zone and in which official travels on account of the inaccessible terrain often took up a number of days, in a position at all himself to examine on the spot the situation that had arisen through raids of bands and acts of sabotage.
In order to serve as a basis for a decision in accordance with the actual facts, this examination had to be done, as far as the time factor was concerned, at once, as far as the locality was concerned, on the spot, as far as the matter itself was concerned, through the senior officer who had witnessed the incident directly. The type and size of any reprisals could only be decided upon by the competent commander on the strength of these reports. General Felmy, however, got to know what happened in this respect at best through the Ia or Icreports of the divisions. The greatest part of all these reports, he has, as he has stated himself never set eyes on, of course, for that not technically possible.
His instructions to the divisions, in his supervisory capacity, could only be on a general plane. On this plane were his conferences. To give written instructions which were not in full accordance with the orders from above was too dangerous. He was -and that was the other aspect of his peculiar position as Commanding General -- formally bound to the very strict orders on reprisals given by the supreme Wehrmacht authorities. Thus, he did not even in matters of principle, in which, as I have tried to show, he alone could make his authority felt, have the independence which one might have ascribed to him at first flush. The fact that he was bound to the orders given him is not nullified by the provision in article 47 of the German military penal code: for it is, of course, the tacit assumption of every order given by the leaders of a totalitarian state that the prerequisite of article 47 which was written for the safeguarding of the internal order do not exist. The answer to the question, however, whether an order violated the law of nations had to be left to the authorities which had issued the order. It was a prime necessity that all requirements of a formal and material nature had been reliably examined from a legal point of view. Where would there be any legal security in the military sphere -- and on top of it in war -- if every soldier had the right to investigate whether an order was in accordance with international law and if he were entitled to refuse to carry it out if he considered it to constitute a breach of the law of nations! In the military sector orders are given in order to be carried out. That goes for all armies of the world in totalitarian states exactly in the same way as in the armies of democracies. If, therefore, article II-4 b of the Control Council Law No. 10 considers the carryingout of orders which allegedly violate international law only as a mitigating circumstance but not as freeing from responsibility, it is in contradiction to the commonly accepted axiom "Nulla poena sine lege", as before the issuance of the Control Council Law such a legal axiom had never been in force.
Nor is this a case in which a generally accepted customary international law had been hardened into codified law. On the contrary, completely new law has been created. Even if one were of divergent opinion the legal defense of the duress, which also has its place in international law is not ruled out by this. This has also been clearly expressed in the Judgment of the Military Tribunal No. VI in the case against Flick at all. It should not be doubted that -quite particularly in war -- in the execution of military orders, every soldier up to the highest officers of the German Wehrmacht acted under duress. Every soldier, in case he clearly refused to obey orders, had to reckon not only with being released but also with being most severely punished. If, therefore, an order was given which appeared to him who had received the order as being in contradiction to international law or as being incapable of being executed, what he could do was to try and mitigate it as far as possible without higher authority ever getting to know anything of it. This applies to all orders emanating from Hitler and the OKW, especially, of course, also for all measures taken in the reprisal sector, thus also to the so-called "reprisal-quota-order", which was abolished only after it had been in force for a considerable time, through the so-called "Loehr-order" of 23 December 1943. Thus, General Felmy was placed between the devil of orders from above and the deep blue sea of the events which happened far below his own level and could, for the measures to be taken, only be examined on the spot.
The connection with all the incidents which happened in the area of the defendant was extremely loose. No clearer evidence of it can be found than in the indictment in which for instance the formula "Troops under the command and the jurisdiction of the LXVIIIth A.C." are alleged to have committed any act in violation of international law, is repeated again and again. The fact that this act was committed by were supplemented by numerous other statements introduced by the defense.
As for the rest, Doc. Book Felmy IV containing the war diary of the LXVIIIth A.C. covering the first half of 1944 is the best object lesson on the situation then prevailing. I refer in this connection to the short characterization of the diary given by me when I introduced it. Only he who has ever been in band infested areas knows how to judge the danger and also understands the psychological reaction caused by the band plague in the minds of the soldiers of the German occupation forces. This applies, of course, to an increased extent to our case, it being generally known how perfidiously the raids of the bands were executed and how cruelly and inhumanely the partisans treated the prisoners and wounded of their enemies. General Felmy, and for sure all of the other members of his Army Corps, would have liked much better to meet the bands in open combat. Then reprisal measures would at least not have been necessary to the extent they were resorted to.
And the result of the combat would, undoubtedly, have had a lasting effect on the partisans. But these were very elusive. The most rugged terrain in Southern Greece -- above all in the Peloponnesus where the danger from the bands was greatest -- greatly benefitted the partisans. They knew how to take advantage of the favorable situation by using unscrupulous methods. Thus the German soldiers, as well as the decent elements of the Greek population who did not make common cause with the bands, were in constant danger. The Greek Ministry of the Interior at that time published lists containing the names of members of security troops assigned to enforce law and order besides the German soldiers, who had been murdered by EAM. The size of these lists speaks for itself. The official Greek Government Authorities -- starting from the Prime Minister -- as well as the high church dignitaries tried again and again to make the recalcitrant parts of the population see reason. But I am sorry to say it was all in vain.
Confronted with this situation, General Felmy's possibilities were doubly limited as I have shown in a former context. How was this development to be met? General Felmy had often and with a thoroughness characterizing him pondered this question. He was not in sympathy with the reprisal measures, he, the soldier grown up in the good old tradition who had never had to do any such things in former times, though, on the other hand, he was well aware, and could be well aware, of the fact that reprisal measures were permitted under international law. There is no provision in the positive law forbidding them, nor has an international customary law banning them developed at any time. The sole basis of a general nature is to be found in the legal institution of the so-called "military necessities" contained in the Hague Conventions; they set the limits for what is permissible even if the wish to mitigate the sufferings caused by the war cannot be fulfilled. In the last analysis, General Felmy plainly aimed, when he took the measures which military necessity seemed to require, at mitigating as much as he could the sufferings caused by the war, for his soldiers as well as for the Greek population.
He first tried all manner of peaceful means. He had thought he might influence the recalcitrant elements of the population by propaganda of various types. Reprisals were, at the beginning, totally refrained from. The turning-point was reached when the Luftwaffe Field Company was attacked near Inoi on the Eleusis-Thebes road. Two thirds of this company were ambushed and killed; the last third, which was captured, was brutally slaughtered. I would have liked to have presented, for interrogation, to the Tribunal the sole survivor by the name of Doerner, who managed to escape, though wounded. But apparently he is in Jugoslav captivity, like a great part of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division in General. General Felmy, in spite of this incident could not make up his mind yet to recommend to the divisional commander, General Drum, who describes in his affidavit the event in its details, the carrying out of reprisal measures.
And then there was a decisive turn in the mind of General Felmy. The clemency shown by him in the Case Inoi, which is, emphasized by Gemmrig's affidavit, narrating a similar incident, and which he tried to justify before himself by the propaganda measures mentioned earlier, did not have the slightest effect. The bands did not have any understanding neither for the clemency nor for the propaganda. The situation did not improve but became increasingly worse -- particularly on the roads where the raid at Inoi had occurred.
From this moment on General Felmy was genuinely convinced that reprisal measures were indispensable. He considered them as ultima ratio for the maintenance of order. If he had failed to have reprisal measures carried out in the future, the discipline of the troops would have been undermined as they would have lost their confidence in the leadership and would have taken independent measures according to their Court 5, Case 7 (Int.
Lea) emotions.
This had to be prevented at all cost in view of the steadily increasing danger of an Allied landing. Moreover in accordance with Article 43 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare the German occupation force had the obligation of maintaining public order in the country in the interest of the population. Also in the interest of the latter, being menaced by partisans as well to an ever-increasing decree, General Felmy felt obliged to take steps against these occurrences. He thus contributed his share towards the prevention of the Bolshevisation of the country which, according to the statement of the witness Prof. Dr. Stadtmueller, would have turned Greece into a Soviet country at this time already, if reprisal measures had not been used.
Here an interpolation. In contrast to the prosecution statement it can be established that the witness Dr. Altenburg did not mention one word that he had asked for his relief because he considered reprisal measures criminal, on the contrary, the question in cross examination as to whether he considered orders for the execution of hostages criminal was not admitted, because the tribunal objected. It is hardly to be assumed that the prosecution did not remember this. I continue.
General Felmy and the troops subordinate to him were supported by the nationalistic part of the Greek population. They were joined by the volunteer units of Colonel Papadongonas, who also carried out reprisal measures, being convinced of their necessity. By the way partisans were by far more afraid of their own compatriots than of the Germans, as the former had naturally been quicker in recognizing the requirements of the situation.
Thus there was only the question as to the choice of kind and extent of the reprisal measures, in order to make them as effective as required. General Felmy was convinced that the reprisal quota order of the OKW was too rigid, not pliable enough and generally too severe. In his opinion reprisals had to be fashioned according to the individual case.
