"With respect to professional medical treatment of wounded Greeks, we doctors were completely unhampered. Likewise, on the retreat when wounded native inhabitants, Russian fliers who had crashed, and genuine Partisans, were brought for treatment to the hospitals and/or to the dressing station. Even at the taking over of the hospital in Zagreb (December 1944) wounded Partisans were taken over from the German hospital trains and attended, i.e. at a time when, as is known, German prisoners of war had their eyes gouged out and their genitals cut off by the Partisans. On the other hand, I have operated on a German Luftwaffe soldier from the air base Tatoi, near Athens, who had drunk with Greeks in a Greek tavern, and was attacked by his Greek 'friends' when he went to the toilet. They slashed his throat in such a manner that his larynx gaped apart between the true and the false vocal cords like a frog's mouth. Since I was still able to save the man, I later learned this incident from him.
"A soldier of the Navy, who was standing guard before the Navy laundry in Athens, was attacked there, apart from any fighting engagement, and had his frontal skull and lower jaw completely shredded by a pointblank shot. He died during the operation.
"On the retreat, during a rest of several hours, my unit was subjected to machine-gun fire on the part of Partisans in the Balkan passes, in spite of Red Cross insignia recognizable from afar and the abandonment of every camouflage. This took place after the Partisans had recognized our Red Cross insignia and had taken note of the fact that we had lost contact with the anti-aircraft unit which was covering us and that no other armed units would follow us at our rest-station.
"On the retreat we passed by a large column of destroyed Red Cross vehicles and we heard that this large medical unit had been attacked by the Partisans following a 12 hours rest and had been annihilated down to the last man, without any chance for defense.
"In consequence of this mode of warfare of the Balkan guerilla bands, which mocked all International Law, a medical unit could reckon with its liquidation at any hour during the retreat.
Already in 1943, near Delphi, individually traveling medical trucks were raided and the wounded and medical soldiers massacred and hanged."
As the final contribution to this, I should like to read once again from Document No. 73, on page 24 of the original which I have offered before. It says there on page 25, in the third paragraph:
"Things looked bad for the Italians. They were continuously fighting the bands, while we had comparative peace. Frequently I alone with the driver drove through half the Peloponnes, unharned. Our situation grow more severe only after the collapse of the Italian front in Greece. The bands often attacked us in German or Italian uniforms and with Italian arms. Bestially and cruelly they mowed down anything that crossed their path. We could hardly dare to go into the villages any more and we only drove with an escort. I frequently had the impression that whole village communities were kidnapped by the bands and forced to attack us, for, on the whole, the civilian population did not sympathize with these mostly communist bands of the ELAS or EAM. The main purpose of the continuous raids probably was the looting. Even women and children participated in these. Such a battlefield looked terrible. The soldiers usually were mutilated and clubbed beyond recognition. It is a fact, for instance, that a finger would be cut off for the sake of a ring. Smaller vehicle crews disappeared in villages, where before they had enjoyed hospitality and which they therefore entered trustingly. Frequently they were later found, looted and naked and beaten to a pulp. Many of them, however, were never seen or heard of again.
"From the 10 October to 14 December 1944, we fought our way through from Athens to the Balaton Lake, Lake Flatten. In the course of this retreat we suffered considerable losses due to attacks by bands. The attackers, among them women and half-grown boys, could only be called bands of robbers. Frequently we saw, in the retreat area, dead comrades, who had been cruelly mutilated. The arms, legs, and feet of many had been broken so that the the clothing could be removed more quickly and easier.
The throats of some of then had been cut through to the vertebra, although these dead also had clearly visible bullet wounds. I saw dead people whose heads were torn off almost completely, or who had large holes in their stomachs or chests. Since one of the dead once had an unexploded Italian egg-shaped hand grenade tied around his neck with a wire, the cause could easily be explained.
"As rear-guard leader and at times as base commander, I had constant dealings with the bands. For instance, in an attack between PryjepoljePryboj, near the monastery of Banja, I was once forced to retreat during the night and could only regain my position after being reinforced by a field railway detachment. All my dead were plundered and horribly mutilated. The genitals of one had been cut off and pinned to a branch. The bands had also destroyed a farm about 100 meters distant, which had no part in the fighting, and shot the only son. I noticed an extraordinary great number of women in the hand-to-hand battle. I tore the cap of one of them. She was wearing a red five-pointed star with hammer and sickle. Many peasant families had lost everything in this manner and tried to go with us to Belgrade or Zagreb. On the top of a pass in the vicinity of Visegrad, we wanted to come to the aid of a medical company which had been attacked. This motorized unit, clearly narked with the Geneva Cross, had a load of wounded. The vehicles were a blaze and only few of them could still be saved. Most of the wounded in the cars burned. Here also horribly mutilated, plundered and clubbed dead. Hardly a day passed without attacks, and only once during the whole time, in Zagreb, did we sleep all night in a house."
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, did the German soldiers give any cause to the bands to violate International Law as they did and fight as they did?
A. No. The initiative in all these cases lay with the bands. They had been incited. They were also better supplied, as time went on, and they conducted war according to their Bolshevik manners.
Truth of this statement lies in the period of time when everything was calm, when I was down there in 1941 and 1942, and in the appearance of the hands after the autumn of 1943.
Q How were relations between the bands and the Greek civilian population, according to your experiences?
AAs time went on, the bands had become a veritable scourge of the country. They terrorized everybody and above all they did that in those parts of the country which were populated by people who did not sympathize with them. They recruited by force. They requisitioned food supplies. In order to safeguard their own supply of men and material, they kidnapped their political opponents, if they did not murder them, of course. They kidnapped them and put them into special camps. We had a number of instances when we were out on operations against the bands that we liberated national Greeks from such camps. Their number amounted to almost 500 in the various camps.
Q Were there any Greek authorities who turned to German authorities in order to obtain help against the bands?
A Yes, we had many cries for help from agencies who asked to be protected by German garrisons which for military reasons we could not do to the extent that the population wished us to. As we were menaced with an Allied landing; we had to keep our troops on the alert and I could not scatter them at large over a number of garrisons.
Q In this connection, there is a document in Felmy Document Book No. III which is document No. 67 on page 1. It is offered as Exhibit No. 30. This is an affidavit by Franz Fritsch. In the second paragraph he says:
"The last rank I held during the war was that of a Lieutenant Colonel in the signal corps of the regular army, Commander of the Corps Signal Unit 468 and, between 15 May 1943 and 31 January 45, Commander of the signal units of the 68th Army Corps."
I shall then read from page 4:
"The attitude of the Greek population towards the bandits was generally one of rejection with only a few exceptions caused by local conditions, their inner feelings being against them, but always full of fear. Many Greeks literally told me: "We only hope that the German occupation force will remain here until the end of the war, or else we will have a dreadful civil war."
When the imminent evacuation of Greece by the German troops became known, the Greeks had only the one desire that "handing over" to the British would be done without any time interval if possible. Repeatedly I was asked by Greek mayors for military protection against bandits and Communists (for instance in the villages of Levidi, Merkovuni, Paiania, Koropi, Markopoulon) and repeatedly I received reports about the appearance of bands from the Greek population, which probably were exaggerated in most cases, but nevertheless were evidence of fright and anxiety. It never was a question of international deception. With two combat units formed from my own force, I myself had to carry out an action against the bandits in the summer of 1944 in the area between Athens and Levadia. The bandits could not be apprehended any more in the mountainous districts, and the villages, which I had been ordered to clean up, had already been "cleaned out" completely by the guerrillas, and only old men, women and children were to be found, the whole male population having been dragged away into the mountains in the very sense of the word."
General, whose idea was it that these volunteer units which were mentioned in the affidavit just now were formed?
A The idea came from conservation Greek circles whose positive attitude to Britain was obvious. These volunteer units were formed in the Peloponnes under the leadership of the Greek Colonel Papadongolas. The Greek government issued a law and dressed them in Greek uniforms.
Q How strong were these volunteer units and how were they recruited?
A The strength of these volunteer units amounted soon to 5,000 men. They were divided up into so-called security battalions. The influx into them mounted and mounted. I could have formed units up to 10,000 men if I had the necessary weapons; but unfortunately I could arm only 5,000 men with rifles, machine guns, and trench mortars.
The volunteers from the various districts of the Peloponnes--it was their endeavor to protect their home districts from the bands and German and Greek interests there completely coincided.
Q Were these volunteer units subordinated to the army throughout that period of time?
A No, at the beginning of April they were put under the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q Did the leader of these units, Col. Papadongolas, guarantee to you that his soldiers would not stab you and the Germans in the back?
A Col. Papadongolas, it was my impression, was an officer of a conservative mentality and of the old school and, as such, he regarded the band terror as a national disaster just as much as we did; until the end he would wear the Royal Crown on his shoulder. The Greek government did not like the idea that Col. Papadongolas was to take over these units in the Peloponnes because he was so conservative,- they would have preferred a liberal or democratic leader, I suppose,-but I always felt that Col. Papadongolas was sincere and honest. He assured me that should the Allies land, he and his men would go up into the mountains in order to avoid this dilemma which would not have been too simple for him. He also assured me that then his men would not stab us in the back. He offered me his wife and daughter as hostages. Of course, I did not avail myself of this offer because I trusted him and his word.
Q What was the attitude Col. Papadongolas took towards reprisal measures, especially as these measures were directed against members of his own country?
A We discussed that problem in great detail as a matter of fact. We were quite clear about the fact that reprisal measures were inevitable. The way the bands fought forced us to take these measures because they did not observe international law.
Q Did Col. Papadongolas take any active part himself in the carrying out of reprisal measures?
A Yes, in various ways. When he went out on raids, he arrested band suspects as reprisal hostages and on some occasions he would have them shot. He also used his staff, as it were, as a screening agency at my request. He was to screen our reprisal hostages whether and how far they were connected with the bands.
Q Why did you have this screening agency, as you call it?
A Well, I thought that was the best and safest means to find the guilty as Col. Papadongolas was a Greek and knew the confused and chaotic conditions as they prevailed there better than anybody else and he knew them in great detail. After all, he himself came from the Peloponnes, he was born there.
Q Did you have permanent contact with Papadongolas?
A Yes. There was a liaison detachment of The Corps permanently with him led by an officer. Later on, I attached a signal unit to this liaison detachment, and the detachment with the signal unit remained with Col. Papadongolas when the German troops evacuated the Peloponnes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will stand in recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 3 December 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 3 December 1947, 0930, Judge Wennerstrum, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom with the exception of defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Doctor.
HELMUTH FELMY DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued).BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, last night we discussed the volunteer units and Colonel Papadongelas and we had finished that chapter; how did the situation develop, particularly in Athens?
A. In Athens itself the situation became more and more acute. Athens could be compared to a powder barrel and I was always of afraid that incident might occur, such as occured in Warsaw such a situation did develop in Athens, but only after we left. The British at that time broke the power of the Elas in Athens and of the whole Pyracus. No less a person than Mr. Winston Churchill wrote an article in Life, an American magazine.....
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I object to mention here as to what Mr. Winston Churchill is supposed to have written in an American magazine.
THE PRESIDENT: What is your objection, what basis?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, complete hear-say.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the objection is good, but I think we should have some basis on which we can rule, though the objection will be sustained BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. Where was it that the situation in Athens became particularly acute, was it particular quarters in the city or was it quite generally in Athens itself?
A. In certain parts of the city and suburbs where the Communists held the power you could only enter with a special pass. There above all the Evzones, who had been established by the Higher SS and Police leader, were fighting all Greek police and gendarmes, who had been reinforced. Moreover Elas interrupted the flow of food supplies to Athens, thereby they wanted to increase daily worries and unrest in wide circles of the population. Nightly shootings occured almost constantly. In those instances members of the national circles, of the right, fought their opponents of the EAM. There was an attack made one night on the corps headquarters, and so therefore it was quite possible to say we were sitting on a powder barrel and only one small incident might be sufficient to bring it to an explosion.
Q. General, you said yesterday that an important turning point was brought about the by capitulation of the Italians on 8 September, 1943; were you prepared for this capitulation to happen?
A. Yes, we were not surprised. Ever since the loss of Sicily and Mussolini's resignation, Italy's situation both in internal and foreign politics had become so dramatic it had to be expected that our former ally would desert us and get out of the war. Anyway, I expected it and I told the local commanders in the villages and towns of the Pelepennes to issue a proclamation in that event, which was to be handed to the Italians as soon as the cede-word "Axis" was spread. I had to prepare this because if the cede word "Axis" was mentioned, I was to go to Athens in order to negotiate with General Vocchiarelli and in that moment I was in no position to draw up a proclamation and especially I could not deliver at to the various garrisons in good time.
Q. May I submit this proclamation as document Felmy No. 102, Volume V, it is offered as exhibit 31. This is how the proclamation reads - it is on page 52 in volume V:
The German Military Commander on the Peloponnessus.
His Majesty the Emperor and King and Marshal Badoglio have solemnly declared on 25 July 1943 that the war on Germany's side will be continued, and that Italy will abide by its given word. Because of political pressure they could not realize this intention. At present you have only the following alternatives: You and your troops remain our old allies and continue to fight with us against the common foe. In that case, you will be subject to German leadership, which will take care of you and your troops as much as possible. You are to issue immediately the orders required for that purpose. Unreliable leaders or troops have to be reported to me without delay.
Or You have the desire to cease the fight and to return peacefully to your homeland.
In that case you are ordered to surrender and secure all your military equipment in perfect condition to the German Wehrmacht, so that nothing will fall into enemy hands.
You and your troops, who up to now have courageously fought on our side as our close comrades in arms, remain our good friends. You and your troops will be granted an honourable evacuation back to your homeland. The officers will, of course, retain their weapons, All non-commissioned officers and enlisted men their side arms. On the other hand, it will not be permitted that any additional war equipment or army stocks are taken along. The Army Group will at an early date arrange for the orderly evacuation of your troops by rail.
Should any of your troops have the objectionable intention of joining the enemy, this plan will be prevented by armed force. Telephone conversations and teletype messages are prohibited. The troops will be guarded in their billets by German troops. Until further notice, supplies will be provided by German Wehrmacht authorities.
(Signed) FELMY
Q General, following up this proclamation, were measures taken in accordance with the proclamation?
A Yes, I know of no case where measures were not taken according to the directives in the proclamation. The opinion, as I judged, it at that time, and my own attitude toward the Italians, becomes quite clear from the wording of the proclamation.
Q I now offer from document book 5, document No. 98 on page 34, it is offered as exhibit 32 and I beg to read this document:
"1st Armored Division Commander - 15 September 1943:
A The Commanding General of the Corps General Staff LXVII. Army Corps directed the letter enclosed in enclosure 1 to the Monarchs of Nauplia, Patras, Pirgos, Tri polia, Kalamata, and Sparta.
B In the area of the division the announcement, attached as enclosure 2, is to be forwarded to the prefects of Nauplia, Patras and Pirgos through the territorial commanders. They are to be posted up in all municipalities.
C The feeling of relief and the joy of the population because of the departure of the Italians are to be followed up as far as possible, the now re-established order is to be emphasized on all occasions. In this connection the following orders are, in particular, issued herewith:
1.) Peace and order in the country must be maintained by all possible means. Our own forces are to be kept to the strictest discipline. From now on I will have prosecuted any violation of discipline, as well as looting, unlawful requisitioning of food, too low payments etc. without mercy by Court Martial. I warn all commanders and loaders of units of the grave consequences of any failure in proper official supervision.
2.) Any interference in internal Greek affairs is prohibited. Maintenance of internal order is left to the Greek authorities of police, civil administration and judiciary.
They are, in their work, to be assisted in every respect.
3.) In each nomarch 100 trustworthy policemen are to be nominated by the nomarch who are available for carrying out police measures. After having been screened they are to be equipped with one carbine each, if possible with an additional pistol (revolver). The territorial commanders will issue the police with weapons stored by the Italians, where they cannot be found, or prove insufficient. Italian weapons should be used. The nomarchs are to be warned that they are personally responsible for the safeguarding of the weapons. In doubtful cases the Chief of military police 81 is prepared to answer all questions.
4.) 20 additional Greek policemen are to be armed by Station Headquarters Corinth, who will be subordinated to the Military Police Force 81 for the purpose of the bridge control Corinth.
5.) All prisons are to be checked up with the assistance of the Secret Military Police (G.F.P.) Pro-German Prisoners, incarcerated by the Italians, are to be set free. Members of enemy states interned are to be brought to the Secret Military Police group 640, Pricus. The guarding of the prisons is left to the Greek police, as well as the food supply. In case prisoners have been caught of importance for our own forces (agents, spies, saboteurs), a special non-commissioner is to be assigned for supervision during the time of their detention.
In order to satisfy the ardent craving for news of the Greek population the printing-works will be opened without delay. The newspapers issued will be scrutinized. One copy each is to be sent to the division section Ic, another copy by courier direct to the Corps General Staff for special assignment LXVIII Army Corps Ic.
For announcements from the territorial commanders a special column on the first page will be reserved. Besides announcements of orders, the territorial commanders will have to lay stress on influencing the population, particularly in the fight against communist organizations.
In the first place original ideas, adapted to local conditions, should be published. Excerpts from German radio news are to be forwarded to the papers. Supply of leading articles will be done by the propaganda platoon.
7.) Censorship of mail and telegrams will be abolished, and replaced by spot-check censorship through the territorial commanders. Suitable officials of the Greek administration will participate in this censorship.
8.) Contact is to be made with all organizations offering their co-operation, reports will be, at the same time, made to the division.
9.) Restrictions of the personal liberty of the population, ordered as a first measure of the state of siege, may be relaxed by the territorial commanders at their own discretion. In places where there is still a greater number of interned Italians, the population should be barred from the streets after dusk, until they have been transported away. The Greek population is to be kept away from the Italian internees.
By order (signed) Soeth, Colonel."
Colonel Sooth at that time deputized for the commander of the 1st Armored division because the latter deputized for General Felmy, commanding general of the LXVIII Corps. General Felmy was at that time in charge of Army Group Southern Greece.
The proclamation mentioned in the present document to the Nomarchs is the next document, which I would like to offer now. It is part of the same document and it is on page 36a;
"The German Commander on the Peloponnesus - 15 September 1943. To the Nomarchs in.........(blank). I believe there were six or seven of these, a nomarchy corresponds, as far as I can ascertain, roughly to a Landkreisin Germany and is the same size:
It is my firm will that, after the elimination of the Italian occupation forces, are now, after I have taken over the supreme command over all the German forces on the Peloponnesus, the country now entrusted to my protection shall regain absolute police order and security of law. Wherever any subordinate command or unit should in future become guilty of unlawful and arbitrary actions against the population, I will act with ruthlessness and severity. Every Greek citizen will be granted the right to complain against encroachments to the nearest German command.
Likewise, I assure the peaceful Greek population that I will give them my full military protection against the criminal activities of the predatory rabble of bands.
I hold you, in the area of your nomarchy, responsible for assisting me in my endeavours to preserve the police order and the reign of the law with the help of your official agencies to the fullest extent.
As a first measure, I have ordered that for the area of your nomarchy 100 trustworthy members of the rural police shall be re-armed and placed at your disposal for the execution of police measures. My intention is, in case this rural police proves to be worthy, to rearm gradually the entire rural police, disarmed formerly by the Italians.
I request you to see that the handbills you are receiving at the same time, containing my proclamation to the Greek population, are posted up in all the municipalities of your nomarchy in a place where it can be easily read. Beyond that, I expect that you impressively draw the attention of all the mayors of the municipalities of your nomarchy to the need for a good co-operation with the German occupation forces, and, that you see to it that future complaints against excesses of subordinate units-- if such should be raised -- will reach the competent military commands, so that just remedy may be done.
The German occupation force will confine themselves exclusively to their military task of warding off an attempt of invasion by the enemy, if any should be tried, in order to spare this country the horrors of a new war. We shall not interfere in the internal affairs of Greece.... It will be left exclusively to the Greek authorities of the police, the administration and the judiciary to maintain the internal order. They will be assisted in their task by the German Army in any possible way.
In this I have confidence in your being conscious of the supreme responsibility, resting upon you as the Nomarch, for the well being of tho province entrusted to you. (Signed): Krueger."
General Krueger was the commanding general of the 1st Armored division, and as I said before, deputized for General Felmy in his capacity as commanding general of the LXVIII Army Corps.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Now, let me turn back again to the document books of the prosecution. The next which is of interest now is Document Book XIII. The first document there is NOKW-898 which is Exhibit 314 on page 27 of the English and page 18 of the German. In this document we are concerned with the basic order by the OKW concerning the further treatment of those Italian soldiers who were not inclined to fight on the German side. According to this order, they were to be treated as prisoners of war and handed over to the suitable agencies for labor allocation.
Q. General, do you know this order?
A. In those days, after the Italian capitulation, a number of orders came in, one on top of the other. I cannot recall the details. Vecchiarelli's army had capitulated, had given up its arms, and there was, therefore, no reason to take any measures in the army area.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The next document which I would like to discuss in this connection is on page 42 of the English and page 29 of the German book. It is NOKW-916, Exhibit 323. This document represents detailed directives issued by the OKW concerning the treatment of the Italian armed forces. The date is 15 September 1943.
Q. General, did you receive that order at the time and did you pass it on?
A. I am sure that we received it but there again I do not recall the details even if I look at it now. I said before the concentrating and transporting away of the Italians was in full swing at that time.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal please, because of the connection in facts there, I should like to discuss another document here which is not contained in the same volume. It's contained in Volume XIX. It is NOKW-1016 on page 13 of the English and page 8 of the German book. It's Exhibit 445.
This document is a teletype letter by the 68th Corps addressed to the 1st Panzer Division on 16 September 1943 concerning the treatment of Italian units who turn over their arms to insurgents and further made common cause with the insurgents.
This wording allows for two basic conditions before the Italians were being dealt with. It amounts to a definite modification of the order which had come down from higher head quarters. The teletype letter also contains an additional paragraph by the Army Group Southern Greece according to which the shooting by court martial of officers by the divisional commander -- that is to say, not be some subordinate units -- it to be ordered.
Q. General, do you recall that order?
A. No, I do not recall any of the details.
Q. These orders concerning the treatment of Italians -- did they become of any practical importance in your area at all?
A. No, our situation was more fortunate than those of other army sectors. The disarming of the Italians in my area had proceeded very smoothly. The concentrating of Italian units, their transporting to Athens and their transporting away from there was in full swing. These assignments clained the time of the army group completely.
I once before pointed out that the situation was extremely acute. At first we were in no position to know whether or not the Italians would surrender and whether the disarming would proceed without fighting. Parts of the units had to be alerted for that contingency all the time. Other forces were necessary to collect the arms, the ammunition, vehicles---in short, the whole of the equipment of the Italian units, and to guard them, of course, because these things were extremely valuable and ultimately not the least important was to take over by our own forces the strong points which the Italians had evacuated.
I said before, had the Allies attacked at that time they could have taken Greece in one go. A landing from the air, or from the sea, along the Southern Greece area was entirely possible. In Attica and Boetia where I was a greenhorn, so to speak -- the Peloponnes I knew like my waist-coat pocket - but in those areas -- Attica, Boetia and Euboea -- I had to improvise many things in order to establish safeguarding and, if possible, defensive measures and to get the situation under control.
Therefore, I left all office work to my chief of staff, General von Gyldenfeldt who had been German chief of general staff of the Italian army before that. He knew the various people much better than I did and for that reason he rather skillfully smoothed out all conflicts with the result that I in Athens was not faced with any surprises.
You had to bear in mind that, according to Italian statements, the number of the Italians leaving the Peloponnes and Crete amounted to about 160,000 men and around that period of time in Athens we as a unit had about 5,000 men, the one airforce Field Regiment. That was the situation and, therefore, it is hardly surprising that I no longer recall these individual teletype letters, telegrams and other things which came in the mail concerning the treatment of individual Italian units. These details I really can't recall any more.
Q. About this problem of the Italians, in order to bring it to a conclusion as regards the prosecution documents, I should like to draw attention to one document in this connection which is contained in Volume IX. It is on page 31, 32 of the English book and on page 27 of the German text. It's Exhibit 220.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me just a minute; will there be other references to documents prior to Document Book XII? We brought them in from XII on this morning. We are going to send out for this one. Will there be others?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal please, I just wanted to a very brief passage in this document for the record.
